History of NSCIC Working Group Activities
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00506R000100080016-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 13, 2004
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 20, 1973
Content Type:
MF
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CIA-RDP84B00506R000100080016-0.pdf | 502.58 KB |
Body:
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20 July.1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham
25X1
SUBJECT: History of.NSCIC Working Group,
Activities en:MV 29-et-'7f .- 7
1. At the first meeting of the NSCIC Working Group in
December 1971, members were asked to submit to the Chairman a list
of their intelligence needs and their ideas on how to tackle
the problem of product evaluation.
2. On the basis of member submissions - NSC did not reply -
PRG prepared for the Chairman a work program of 12 projects,
grouped under headings of consumer needs, product evaluation, and
production improvement. The Work Program proposal was sent to
members and at the second meeting in February 1972, the Group
elected to go ahead with five projects, four from the work.
Marshall,,i5c
program list, and one proposed by~~ Mr (0
3. Only one. project did not involve a study: the group
approved the idea of the DCI sending a letter to Dr. Kissinger
asked for his views on how well the DCID 1/2 reflected the
intelligence needs and priorities of the White House and the NCS.
A second phase of this was for Mr. Marshall to solicit comments
from the NSC staff. The letter was sent on 24 February but no
formal reply was ever received. Comments were provided by Mr.
as being of prime interest to Dr. Kissinger. It was a review of
the intelligence inputs to NSSM-69.
6. (Under the first chairman], the Working Group sponsored
n studies of an informa nal or background nature - intended
a study of intelli, Jence reaction to a political-military crisis
(the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971); a survey of intelligence
activities and
a study of resources devoted to production by the U.S. intelligence
cummuni ty .
5. The fifth project approved was one identified by Mr. Marshall
Abu
4. The thr
ee projects approved from the work program were:
for self-education zc=s basis for identifying possin future C
stttd-t s. The Justice member asked for a report on US intelligence
activities relating to international narcotics traffic; Dr. Proctor
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produced a report on the production of economic intelligence in
OER; PRG prepared a report, based on submissions from the community,
on current intelligence production during the month of April 1972;
PRG also produced reports on resources and manpower devoted to
intelligence production. The Group's concerns about who was doing
what in the economic intelligence production area were not satisfied
by the OER report and a follow-on project to report on coverage
in other departments and agencies ended up in the Economic Intelligence
Committee -- where it is still in work, over a year later.
7. Seven case studies were approved for work: five have been
completed, one is still in work, and one was cancelled due to
difficulties in getting analysts assigned to work on it. The
major effort was the three crisis studies, which resulted in a
summary report from the Working Group to the NSCIC, identifying
problem areas and recommending actions.
8. Mr. Marshall was the most active member in identifying
topics for Working Group cons' eration. Dr. Hall and Dr. Cline
also made several contributio they both identified the India-
Pakistan crisis as a prime to et for study, and Dr. Cline
originated the request for the survey of economic intelligence
production. Dr. Cline also proposed several area studies of
intelligence production, from which the Group selected Yugoslavia.
9. The CIA representatives were not active contributors
in identifying topics for study, but were vocal in discussions
and written comments on topics proposed by others. They were
certainly influential in some of the decisions not to pursue
a particular topic.
10. The Working Group met five times in 1972, first in February,
and last in October....The decision-to hold-a--meeting was__based
on whether th
e
-
er
was an on
going study ready for consideration.'
Except for the second meeting, held in February, to consider a
work program, no meetings were held unless there was action
needed on a completed study.
I/ ~, Kw ? r wl V s? V V _Pt r4 IA I1 01, 141 ts.,pprAti v- 'a
ll.; The DDS&T attended the first meeting only, and did not
make any contribution thereafter. The Justice De
artme
t
p
n
was
represented by Mr. Wells at th .rlast three meetings, and subsequently
advised in May of 1973 that tly-would no longer participate
except when subjects within t4efr area of responsibility were
on the agenda. 12. A variety of topics were surfaced, either at the meetings,
or in correspondence, which were not taken under active consideration
at the time, but which may-still warrant consideration. Attached
at Tab A is a list of these subjects Alen tt h
d
at Trb B
is a detailed breakout of Working Group a ac n
At Tab C is a list of the task groups, that performed the studies.
Di s 4 urvy n For Release 2004/1 0/c 5X1A t
orig - General Graham
n Q
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Topics for Possible Consideration by the
NSCIC Working Group
1. Studies proposed to the Working Group, on which no action was
taken:
25X1X4
b. Review of NIE-il series
One of original work program proposals. Would be a review
of responsiveness of present NIE-11 series to needs of high-level
consumers. Intended to provide guidance to intelligence community
for upcoming NIE-il publications. Project was to be done under
chairmanship of Mr. Marshall. Mr. Huizenga objected and project
dropped.
c. Expected major requirements for new or different intelligence
in the near-to-mid term future
One of original work program proposals. Group considered
project too general in nature.
d. Survey of consumer reaction to intelligence products
A questionnaire type study to survey consumer reactions to
scope, quality, timeliness and usefulness of designated products,
and to identify specific areas of dissatisfaction. Group's general
reaction was that questionnaires had never been very satisfactory.
e. Survey of intelligence analyst situation
Intended to respond to President's charge to upgrade
intelligence analyst personnel and analyst methods. Some interest
expressed by group but no action taken.
f. R&D relating to intelligence production
No action taken.
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g. Follow-on studies to NSSM-69 study
Marshall suggested MBFR and then one on a political type
NSSM. He later defined this as NSSM-128, Nuclear Test Ban Policy.
Cline suggested a study of intelligence production on NSSM-108,
Review of US policy toward Latin America. No follow-on NSSM
studies were approved, but group did not close door on them.
h. Study of intelligence production - an audit of the product
of various elements of the intelligence community to assess
professionalism, originality, degree of duplication
Hall proposed this one and suggested that four topics
be explored: S&T, political intelligence and analysis, force
posture estimates and analysis, and economic intelligence and
analysis. Group considered project too vague and asked him to
work up a terms of reference for a study of this type, which
never was done.
i. Study of intelligence production on Chile
Proposed by Cline, to use analysts plus a panel of users.
He also suggested Libya, but later settled for Yugoslavia.
2. Topics or areas for study identified by Mr. Marshall in
various memos to this office, and in meetings.
a. In memo of 7/27/72 he listed the elements of a comprehensive
product improvement program:
programs to provide more training to analysts
- R&D programs on new methods of analysis
- quality control operations (by independent offices)
- product assessment within producing agencies
- active and aggressive effort to study consumer needs
b. A study of communication channels - why isn't the message
getting through, how to channel the many unstructured channels
into something definitive and collect it together.
c. Evaluation forms and polling techniques
[Note: Dr. Malkin used questionnaires and personal
interviews as part of his cruise missile study.
It might be useful to explore the details
more fully than were covered in the report.]
2
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d. A recurring theme in his conversations and memos is
his interest in R&D programs on new methods of analysis:
- use of outside consultants to train selected analysts
in advanced analytical methodologies
- his group on decision-making (foreign)
25X1A9A was a member of this group but says it
never progressed very far.
- psychologists study of the inference processes of analysts
- use of Bayesian techniques
e. His desire for different products
25X1
- development of wrap-up products for critical areas
- presentation of products containing conflicting viewpoints
- improved treatment and communication of uncertainty from
analysts to consumers
f. Consumer needs
He has been interested for some time In using
Delphi program with groups of high-level consumers and also
suggested trying this with the Working Group members
g. Development of a few highly classified case studies on
political/military crises which explore how the crisis management
problems look to key decision makers. To be developed for training
purposes.
h. An effort to examine how intelligence could more effectively
assist in the design and carrying out of military demonstrations;
increase its monitoring of the effects of US crisis moves.
3. Consistent Marshall complaints
a. CIA does not devote energy to finding out what particular
customers really need and what they think of the product.
b. CIA doesn't tailor its products to special needs of particular
negotiations - NSC interested in negotiations with other governments.
25X1
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Status of Case Studies Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group
Initiation Action Study
Title Approved Officer Completed Disposition
1. India-Pakistan Crisis Study 2/4/72 Marshall 6/16/72 Sent to WG members 6/20/72. Considered
2.
Intelligence Support to NSSM-69
2/4/72
Marshall
1/12/73
3.
Arab-Israeli Crisis Study
6/6/72
Marshall
1/30/73
4.
Jordan- Fedayeen Crisis Study
6/6/72
Marshall
2/16/73
comments in item 3. above.
at 7/6/72 meeting. Draft memo to
forward study to NSCIC given to
Marshall to revise. On 10/5/72
study and cover memo sent to Chairrrn,
NSCIC. Comments of NSCIC members I
requested and meeting to consider
report scheduled, and rescheduled
and finally canceled. See item 3.
Original report sent to WG members 6/8/72
Study redrafted on basis of member
comments.. Delays.occured due to
departure of original drafter of study
and study not sent to members until
1/12/73. At 4/473 meeting it was
agreed that study raised no issues
requiring NSCIC guidance, and study
should be sent to DCI to forward to
production offices for in-house use.
On 4/6/73 memo to production heads
forwarding study sent to DCI for
signature. Not signed.
Sent to WG members 3/2/73. Summary
of results of three crisis studies
and action recommendations considered
by WG at 4/4/73 and 4/25/73 meetings.
Sent to NSCIC on 5/16/73.
Study to WG members 2/26/73. See
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Status of Case Studies Initiated by the NSCIC Working Group (cont'd)
Initiation Action Study
Approved Officer Completed Disposition
5. EAMSON-719 Crisis Study 7/6/72 Marshall cancelled Project died for lack of people to
do the study.
6. Review of Intelligence Products 6/6/72 Hall 2/1/73 Sent to members 2/26/73. Chairman
related to the Cruise Missile recommended that study not be sent
Threat to NSCIC, but to DCI with request that
he ask intelligence production managers
to take appropriate action. At
4/4/73 meeting group agreed not to
send report to NSCIC, but to ask DCI
to disseminate. This action has been
held pending consideration of amendments
to WG terms of reference.
7. Intelligence Production on 10/3/72 Marshall Project delays in getting started
Yugoslavia due to study group chairman's
occupation with other work. At
4/4/73 WG meeting, Marshall indicated
study coming along well and completion
expected in June. Later estimate
for completion was August or September.
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10 July 1973
Status of Background or Information Studies
L.
Initi t d
a
Title
C
the NSCIC Working Group
initiation Action Study
Annrnved
Office
1. US Intelligence Activities r
l
i
e
at
ng 2/4/72 PRG/IC 3/21/72 sent +n h-r_ ..,,.>,....__ __
to International Narcotics Traff;r
25X1
copy to DCI on 4/4/72. No-further
action taken by WG pending completipp
of CCPC study. [CCPC study datecQ 5X1
17 October 1972]
141
2a. same as above, other than CIA
4/12/72 Proctor
Cline Action for study given to EIC,
terms of reference disseminated
26 July 1972, due date estimated
25X1A9A for end of September. Action officer
25X1A9A I Ireports study due t
3. Resources devoted to Production
by the US Intelligence (already lady in 3/28/72
Community work)
work
4. Survey of Current Intelli e
soon. VU
Sent to WG members 3/30/72; copy-t(
DCI on 3/31/72. Provided as back-
ground for future studies. Additional
copies given to IC staff, CIA, and
INR/State.
Publications 9 nce 4/12/72 PRG/IC 9/21/72 Sent to WG members 9/22/72, considered
b
G
y
roup on 10/3/72. Study remanded
to task group for additional work.
Group chaired by rep. of chairman
with members from State, CIA, DIA
and NSA. Group completed its
reexamination of materials. No further
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