DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate for Estimates ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATIONS 15 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070011-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 15, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate for Estimates
ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
WARS OF LIBERATION
15 SEPTEMBER 1975
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
CLASSIFIED BY DE
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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The table below explains the terms most frequently used to describe the range of
likelihood in the key judgments of this estimate.
Order of
Chances
P
Likelihood
Synonyms
in 10
C
virtually (almost) certain
Near
we are convinced, highly
9
Certainty
probable, highly likely
likely
we believe
8
Probable
we estimate
chances are good
7
it is probable that
6
chances are slightly better
than even
Even Chance
chances are about even
5
chances are slightly less
than even
4
probably not
3
Improbable
unlikely
we believe ... not
2
almost impossible
Near
only a slight chance
1
Impossibility
highly doubtful
er
ent
NOTE: Words such as "perhaps", "may", and "might"
will be used to describe situations
in the lower ranges of likelihood. The word "possible", when used without
further modification, will generally be used only when a judgment is important
but cannot be given an order of likelihood with any degree of precision.
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This memorandum has not been coordinated with the Service Intelligence
Chiefs.
JAMES M. THOMPSON
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Estimates
15 September 1975
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A Defense Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (DIANM) presents evidence gathered
during research for an estimate, and more detailed analysis than would be appropriate
in the estimate itself. A DIANM is intended for use primarily by members of the intelligence
community rather than policy makers for whom less detailed estimative products are more
useful.
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PAGE
Introduction
1
Managing Insurgency
4
Guerrilla Warfare Training in the USSR
5
The Pattern of Soviet Support and the Role of Intermediaries
7
The Role of Local Pro-Soviet Communist Parties
9
The CPSU 24th Party Congress -- A Turning Point
Deepening Involvement
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East
Indochina
Latin America
The Arabian Peninsula
Afghan istan/Pakistan
Ethiopia
Moscow's View of the Prospects
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(S) A judgment often encountered in the US intelligence community is that
the Soviets have become less involved over the past few years in support for what
they call "Wars of National Liberation." However, there is a considerable body
of evidence contrary to that judgment. The evidence is too fragmentary and
inconclusive to warrant a firm assessment of the exact degree of Soviet involvement
in most specific liberation movements when they are considered in isolation. Yet,
in vastly different movements and widely separated regions -- Sub-Saharan Africa,
the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin
America -- the pattern of Soviet involvement is so similar that we believe it to
be more than a coincidence. This Analytical Memorandum describes this pattern
and concludes that the Soviets have not only continued their support for liberation
movements, but have markedly increased their commitment in several areas.
Users of this Analytical Memorandum are encouraged to provide comments
concerning its scope and content to the DIA Directorate for Estimates, attention:
LtCol Robert Fuller, USAF, Soviet/East European Division, 0X4-8105. The
evidence referred to in this DIANM is available from the author.
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SOVIET SUPPORT FOR WARS OF LIBERATION
1. (S) Two recent dispatches from US Embassy Moscow set the tone of
current official Soviet views on the support of "Wars of Liberation."
- In a speech at Lenin's birthday ceremony on 22 April 1975, Mikhail
Suslov stated in forthright terms the two sides of the peaceful coexistence coin.
He asserted that detente is "deepening and becoming more stable" and, at the
same time, said that the provision of "political and material assistance" to peoples
fighting for "national and social liberation" remains "one of the most important
principles" of the Soviet foreign policy. He noted that while "broad new prospects"
are opening up for a further stabilization of peace, these same opportunities enhance
the "further development of the world revolutionary movement. "
- In describing the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence in the foreword
of a book, Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, published in January 1975, Foreign
Minister Gromyko said, "in peaceful conditions it is easier to develop the
revolutionary struggle of the working class in capitalistic countries as well as the
liberation movements of suppressed peoples, and to achieve solution of international
problems. " He also noted that "active assistance" to "progressive" and national
liberation movements is "one of the main tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union. "
2. (S) Despite Moscow's inevitable preoccupation with major power
relationships, Soviet leaders have consistently displayed a profound sensitivity to
the revolutionary potential of the Third World. In general, Soviet Third World
interests are:
- To supplant Western influence and presence;
- To secure access to support facilities; and
- To counter Chinese influence.
3. (S) The USSR's two-tiered foreign policy first elaborated in the 1920's
and subsequently carried forth to the present day in the Third World, has
simultaneously pursued both the improvement of normal state-to-state relations
with legitimate leaders in power and the patient cultivation of revolutionary
successors to those leaders. These two aspects endow Soviet foreign policy with
a seemingly ambivalent mixture of cooperation and conflict. Thus, the Soviet
concept of "peaceful coexistence" means both good state-to-state ties and support
for subversion and armed struggle. The decision on which to emphasize at any
given time and in any place depends upon an analysis of the circumstances and
opportunities that exist to serve Soviet interests.
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4. (S) Soviet leaders have long asserted Moscow's commitment to support
"struggles" against Western or Western-oriented governments, and generally view
insurgencies) as legitimate wars of national liberation. Some examples of Soviet
statements in support of liberation struggles are:
- One of the basic aims of Soviet foreign policy "is to support the
national-liberation movement and to realize an all-embracing cooperation with the
young developing states." (Editorial in Pravda of 2 June 1971.)
- "The Soviet Union is promoting, firmly and steadfastly, a policy of
revolutionary solidarity with the forces of national liberation in the Middle East,
rendering them continuous political, moral, and material aid." V.V. Zagladin
CPSU/International Department. (Moscow, Kommunist #13, September 1972.)
- "The USSR, pursuing Lenin's will, has always supported and will
continue to support the peoples' liberation struggles." (Brezhnev, in a speech
referring to the Persian Gulf, April 1974.)
- "The CPSU, our government, and all the Soviet people openly and
unambiguously express solidarity with their class brothers struggling in foreign
countries and solidarity with the liberation, anti-imperialist movements. And this
position in no way contradicts the struggle for peace and for peaceful coexistence
between states." (Brezhnev, in a speech in Moscow, October 1974.)
- In March 1975, Soviet General of the Army Shavrov expressed the
Soviet view of increasing prospects for wars of national liberation in quantitative
terms. Shavrov, speaking of the period since World War II, asserted that "of 468
wars and conflicts, 258 ended in defeat or with the forces of reaction not attaining
their goals. This is the general correlation of results of the use of military force
for the last 30 years. However, . . . it has sharply changed in favor of the national
liberation forces in the last decade. While in 1956-1960, this correlation was 60:62
and in the following five-year period 66:61, by 1970 it has already come out
as 60:46, and in the first half of the 70's, as 30:12 in favor of the forces of
progress and national liberation."
5. (S) Soviet motives for supporting particular insurgencies have varied, but
their long-term goal is to bring governments to power which are amenable to Soviet
interests. Moscow's backing of insurgent groups offers the opportunity to cultivate
potential national leaders, to place them in Moscow's debt, and thus to facilitate
the accession of pro-Soviet regimes. The Soviets have also found support for
insurgencies useful in exerting pressure when formal bilateral relations have failed
1For the purposes of this Analytical Memorandum, an insurgency in a given country
or region is defined as the activity of an organized armed group, rural or urban,
dedicated to opposing, and destroying if possible, local or central government
authority, with the ultimate goal of seizing power. The terms "insurgent" and
"guerrilla" are used interchangeably in this paper.
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to achieve Soviet expectations, or when governments threaten to adopt anti-Soviet
positions. Soviet support for wars of liberation is also motivated by a desire to
compete with China,1 and to weaken Western governments by forcing them to
devote substantial national resources to combat armed opposition.2
6. (S) On the other hand, the Soviets have been circumspect in supporting
insurgencies or opposition elements against regimes with which Moscow maintains
cordial relations, and radical initiatives which might fundamentally impair these
relations are likely to be sacrificed or shelved. Moscow has frequently used its
official leverage to pressure friendly legal governments for the benefit of insurgents
in nearby countries. Indeed, one reason for Moscow's desire to maintain an official
presence in such states as Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, and Guinea,
regardless of the regime in power or its attitudes toward the USSR, is the access
that such an enduring presence affords for infiltrating, training, and, where possible,
controlling guerrilla groups' activities in neighboring countries.
Managing Insurgency
7. (S) The Soviets do not insist on total control of the guerrilla movements
they support. They consider it sufficient that the insurgents share a common interest
with them in weakening the position of the host governments and diluting Western
influence and presence. Broad Soviet objectives are thus often served with only
marginal control or intervention in the movement.
1The China factor looms large in Soviet liberation policy and Moscow's support
for wars of liberation is undoubtedly inspired, in part, by a concern not to be
outdone by Peking. Nevertheless, the significance of Sino-Soviet competition should
not be overrated. Moscow and Peking both have interests in insurgency support
which are independent of their competition. Sino-Soviet differences over liberation
support are often ones of degree, rather than substance, and seem to relate to
strategy, tactics, and timing rather than differences in ideology. Despite their
polemics, Moscow and Peking apparently agree that developing countries represent
the "weakest link of the capitalist system." Both countries share broad common
revolutionary interests, and both would profit from weakening the position of the
West in the Third World. There has been simultaneous Soviet and Chinese support
for the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, the Fedayeen (the generally used term to describe
the various Palestinian terrorists and guerrilla groups), the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), the African Party for
the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands(PAIGC), and
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).
2Among other examples, the human and financial cost to Portugal of combating
its African insurgencies was considerable. From 1960 to 1971, Lisbon tripled the
size of its military and security forces to 245,000 men. These forces, 60 percent
of which were tied down in Africa, represented almost 8 percent of the Portuguese
labor force. The African insurgencies cost the Portuguese well over a billion dollars.
Military spending, 60 percent of which was absorbed in Africa, had risen by 1971
to about 6 1/2 percent of the GNP and more than 35 percent of the total budget.
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8. (S) The primary Soviet administrative organ for directing guerrilla activities
abroad is the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). The Organization for Africa, Asia, and the Americas, within the
International Department, probably handles overall relations with individual Third
World guerrilla movements. Its senior officials travel widely within their regions
of responsibility and serve as members of Soviet delegations to most international
conferences on Third World matters. They also provide policy guidance to insurgent
representatives. In addition, Soviet embassies and local Communist parties normally
have contacts with guerrilla organizations and serve as principal sources for funding
and communications.
9. (S) Also, high-level insurgent delegations travel frequently to Moscow and
Warsaw Pact countries to attend Soviet-sponsored international conferences.
Presumably, one purpose of these trips is to discuss insurgency strategy and tactics.
In addition, most insurgent groups maintain contact with a host of unofficial
Socialist and international front organizations which offer opportunities for liaison.
Guerrilla Warfare Training in the USSR
10. (S) Because of its enduring effect on potential leaders, guerrilla warfare
training in the USSR offers Moscow its best opportunity for influencing and gaining
control of insurgent movements. Most major movements have had members trained
in guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union, and many thousands of insurgents have
received such training in the USSR. Most of the graduates return to their own
locales to teach the newly-learned skills to others, thereby multiplying the effects
of Soviet efforts.
11. (S) Recruits for guerrilla warfare training are ordinarily selected by the
appropriate local Communist Party or Soviet representative, with primary focus
on aptitude and loyalty. Usually, these recruits are expected to complete their
initial training in their home countries or in nearby third countries. More intensive
and sophisticated training required for selected guerrilla leaders is generally offered
later in the USSR.
12. (S/NFD) Guerrilla warfare training is given at various locations throughout
the Soviet Union. The basic course is laced with political indoctrination and averages
6 months in length. It consists of instruction in guerrilla tactics and organization,
explosives, weapons training, cartography, sabotage, and communications.
Subsequent refresher or advanced courses and leadership training may last a year
or more. Details reported on representative programs follow:
- Insurgent Training Center at Simferopol.--During the mid-1960s recruits from
Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia received guerrilla training in the USSR in the
Crimean City of Simferopol. From the mid-1970s through 1973, such training was
offered at Simferopol (and perhaps other sites) for some 500 insurgents from
Rhodesia, 1,200 from Mozambique, 700 from Angola, and 500 from
Portuguese-Guinea (Guinea-Bissau).
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- Guerrilla Training Base in Armenian SSR.--In 1972, a training base for
insurgents was located about 2 kilometers south of Leninakan. The trainees were
Palestinians who arrived at the base from Moscow where they had studied at the
Druzhba University. The courses lasted 6 months with 34 trainees attending each
course. Instruction covered night combat, guerrilla warfare, and the use of sabotage
materials. The trainees also received a course in arms familiarization.
- Guerrilla Training Camp East of Moscow.--From 1972-1974, courses lasting
about 9 months were offered once a year for various groups of Fedayeen. The
courses were taught by Soviet instructors at a special training camp 250 kilometers
east of Moscow. The instruction was designed for squad commanders of special
forces units and was principally devoted to conventional warfare training. Special
emphasis, however, was placed on sabotage techniques and guerrilla tactics. Included
were familiarization with the operation of sabotage equipment, demolitions, booby
traps, the manufacture of improvised charges, and the operation of rocket launchers.
- GRU "Special Center" for the Training of Insurgents.-- From 1973-1974
the "Special Center" of the GRU was responsible for training insurgents from Latin
America, Africa, and Asia. Training sites of the Special Center were located in
the Moscow area, the Crimea, and Krasnodar Kray. The Center offered various
programs for leaders of insurgent movements. Subjects studied included ideology;
techniques and tactics of guerrilla combat; organization; clandestine methods of
operation; use of arms, explosives, and radios; and topography. The Center was
organized into three geographical sections: Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It was
staffed by 70 to 80 GRU officers and about 30 civilians, all of whom served as
instructors.
Each year the Special Center trained "several hundred" leaders of
insurgent groups from about 24 countries. Rank and file members of these groups
were not trained by the Center. All students attended the Center under aliases.
The greatest number of trainees were from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The majority of Latin American students were from Argentina, with the remainder
from Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. The
students from Africa who received training were leaders of the nationalist
movements in the three former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau,
and Angola. Also, some Palestinians attended. The Asian students were primarily
from Malaysia, Burma, and the Philippines.
Instruction at the Center was conducted in small groups of about three
or four students and tailored to the individual needs of each student. Although
training usually lasted from 6 to 8 months, in certain cases it was as short as
3 months or as long as 1 year. There was close coordination between the Special
Center and the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
In some instances, the International Department invited Party leaders to the USSR
for training. In other cases, these leaders went to the Soviet Union for a vacation
or medical treatment and then were given training.
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- The Institute of Social Sciences1.--From 1971 through early 1975, the
Soviets conducted guerrilla warfare training at the Institute of Social Sciences near
Moscow. I n 1971, trainees from Angola, Portugal, Mozambique, and Latin American
countries attended such courses. In most instances, this training lasted several
months and included instruction in the handling and maintenance of light arms,
the handling and use of explosives, hand-to-hand combat, and guerrilla insurgency
tactics.
In early 1975, a group of 10 Chilean students was given a 2-week course
in military and paramilitary tactics which included the fabrication and use of various
types of bombs. An undetermined number of Argentine students was also given
similar training in a course which lasted 1 week. The training was carried out at
a Soviet military garrison located about 1 hour from Moscow.
13. (S) In addition to guerrilla training offered in the USSR, local
Soviet-supported courses are offered by Tanzania, the PDRY, Iraq, Syria, and Cuba,
among others. Some reports suggest that such courses are also offered by
Afghanistan and in Fedayeen camps in the Middle East. Cuban training programs,
conducted in Guinea and the PDRY have provided direct support to Soviet-backed
insurgents in nearby countries.2 In addition, members of Soviet-backed liberation
groups and Communist parties have attended guerrilla warfare training schools in
North Korea and China.
The Pattern of Soviet Support and the Role of Intermediaries
14. (S) Soviet money, arms, and material assistance are usually limited to
those guerrilla groups who display an "acceptable" political orientation and who
hold out some prospect for Soviet influence over their activity. Soviet assistance.
to guerrillas is usually not "massive." The extent of the aid is undoubtedly affected
by Moscow's hard-nosed, pragmatic calculations of cost, risks, and prospects.
15. (S) Today's Soviet-supported guerrilla forces appear to be better trained
and equipped than in the past, although the amount of support furnished to
1The Institute of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee is the formal
name for an institution in Moscow known variously, and perhaps more commonly
among non-Soviets, as the "International Institute of Marxism.-Leninism" or the
"CPSU School for Non-Bloc Communists." Apparently, around 1970 or early 1971,
the school acquired an installation outside Moscow to provide training in guerrilla
warfare. Training has been conducted in great secrecy.
2There is strong evidence of extensive collaboration between the Cuban and Soviet
intelligence services. The Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was
originally organized along Soviet lines, with Soviet advisors, training, and funding.
The DGI once had the function of supporting liberation movements. Although
the DGI still exists, this function is currently the responsibility of the Cuban
Communist Party (PCC). However, Soviet advisors still assist the Departments of
the PCC Central Committee which perform this function.
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insurgents is small compared to Moscow's state-to-state military assistance programs.
Guerrilla movements usually require fairly modest levels of assistance to serve their
operational needs and the Soviets try to provide appropriate, sufficient, and timely
support in consonance with these needs.
16. (S) Moscow would probably prefer to support guerrilla movements
directly from the beginning so that it could exert a greater degree of influence
and ensure that supplies are delivered to their intended destinations. However, the
characteristic Soviet pattern of support for guerrilla movements is first indirect,
and then direct. The Soviets have usually chosen to conceal their involvement and
reduce the risk of exposure during the early stages of an insurgency by supplying
guerrillas through third countries. Moscow occasionally finds it expedient to remain
uninvolved while third countries unilaterially support a movement, or while a
movement progresses on its own. If a movement subsequently demonstrates
cohesiveness and shows promise, Moscow may become more directly involved and
increase its visibility.
17. (S) Where the likelihood of insurgent success is low, the Soviets limit
the quantity and quality of aid. Moscow has withheld aid or limited it to guerrilla
training in cases where insurgents are weak, divided, or lack popular support. Even
during the later stages of an insurgency, the Soviets constantly assess costs, risks,
and prospects in the light of the viability of the movement, the tactical support
the insurgents require, and evolving Soviet interests.
18. (S) In the early stages of an insurgency, one procedure typically followed
by the Soviets is to have third countries, such as Guinea and Tanzania, transfer
military equipment from their own inventories to insurgent groups. The Soviets
subsequently rebuild the inventories. Soviet willingness to replace the equipment
amounts to support of these transfers by the USSR. Another procedure used early
in support of guerrilla movements is for Moscow to route Soviet arms shipments
to insurgents through military channels of third countries. Such shipments have
frequently been earmarked in advance for intended guerrilla recipients.
19. (S) During the advanced stages of an insurgency, Soviet shipments of
military equipment are routed directly to guerrillas with little handling by the third
countries involved. These shipments, clearly marked, are typically delivered to third
country ports and picked up at dockside by guerrilla representatives. The third
country governments exercise little authority in the process and essentially lose
administrative and distribution control. This procedure, in effect, constitutes
"direct" shipping. Some specific examples are:
- Soviet shipments of arms to the Fedayeen, prior to 1972, were funneled
primarily through Syria and to a lesser extent through Iraq and Egypt. Since 1972,
an increasingly large proportion of Soviet shipments was apparently consigned
to the Fedayeen and probably picked up directly by guerrilla representatives at
Syrian ports.
-Initial Soviet arms shipments to guerrillas in Sub-Saharan Africa apparently
followed the same pattern, with aid routed through the governments of Guinea
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and Tanzania for the insurgent movements in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique,
and Angola.1 By 1973, shipments to the PAIGC and FRELIMO, clearly marked
for the intended recipients, were routinely delivered to ports in Guinea and
Tanzania by Soviet ships, and picked up there by guerrilla representatives.
20. (S) Most third countries used for shipments of insurgent supplies are
dependent on the USSR militarily and, to a lesser degree, economically. For
example, Syria, Iraq, PDRY, Cuba, North Vietnam, Egypt, India, and Guinea have
all received substantial economic aid and military assistance from the Soviets.
21. (S) Although other Communist countries participate in the support of
liberation movements, their contributions are relatively small compared to those
of the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact countries do cooperate in foreign policy matters
relative to the Third World. It is probable that Pact assistance is closely orchestrated,
and that Soviet assistance is routed through other Pact countries.
22. (S) In addition to Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba, which apparently
assist in arms shipments and training, a host of Soviet- controlled international
peace, labor, and youth organizations serve as additional channels for supporting
guerrilla activities. One example is a Paris-based organization, the Curiel Apparatus,
which is involved in collecting funds, organizing support committees, recruiting
agents, and training guerrillas.
23. (S) In addition to its emphasis on using intermediary countries, Moscow
has recently shown an interest in increasing the cooperation among liberation
movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and
Latin America. At present, most insurgent activities are national in scope, but
cooperation between major guerrilla groups appears to be growing.2 They often
provide each other safe houses, assistance in transit, and financial and
communication support.
24. (S) Although the Soviets support various radical leftists without the
involvement of local Communist parties, they believe that guerrillas are best led
'These movements were: PAIGC (The African Party for the Independence of
Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands); FRELIMO (The Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique); and MPLA (The Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola). The Soviets also provided arms and training to insurgents in Rhodesia
and South-West Africa.
2For example, the Fedayeen operates an extensive international support network
which probably maintains some form of contact with most of the principal
revolutionary groups throughout the world. PFLO/PFLOAG has close ties with
active covert cells in each of the smaller Persian Gulf states and with the Fedayeen.
Close operational ties also exist among Argentinian, Chilean, and Uruguayan
guerrilla groups.
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by local Communists. Virtually all Third World pro-Soviet Communist parties are
to some extent funded by Moscow and most are consistently responsive to Soviet
guidance. In any case, the local Communist parties perform three functions:
- Educate, unite, and organize mass support for the revolutionary program.
- Covertly create revolutionary situations (i.e., disrupt existing state functions
and foment dissatisfaction among the populace), provide direction and support for
Soviet-backed guerrilla groups, bring unattached dissident groups under Party
control, and maintain an armed paramilitary component which could serve as a
nucleus for insurgency.
- Support USSR-backed international socialism. This involves overt
representational activities, such as meeting visiting dignitaries and attending
international Party or front conferences, as well as covert activities, such as sending
selected recruits to the USSR, or funneling money, material, and advisers into the
country.
25. (S) Whether Soviet policy emphasizes friendly diplomacy or support for
subversion and armed struggle, or a combination of both, is determined by the
USSR in conjunction with the local parties or revolutionary groups. The degree
of authority the USSR permits local Communists to exercise varies widely from
case to case. Current emphasis is on the peaceful, legal route to power, but the
Soviets have not rejected the option of violence in any Third World country where
it appears vital to the likely success of a coordinated, approved national liberation
movement.
26. (S) In the Soviet view, most Third World Communist parties are still
insufficiently strong to guarantee "irreversible" gains, and Moscow has strongly
criticized what it perceives to be premature armed attempts to seize power. In
particular, Moscow apparently believes that armed struggle in Latin America is
generally inappropriate at this time, because guerrilla movements lack popular
support. Since 1971, the Soviets seem to have encouraged Cuba to unite
Cuban-backed guerrilla groups with local pro-Soviet Communist parties and other
movements into "revolutionary fronts." Some evidence suggests a Soviet willingness
to finance such Cuban efforts. "Revolutionary fronts" are probably viewed by
Soviet strategists as having more potential for future Soviet influence, and as more
likely to succeed. At the 24th CPSU Congress, about the time the Soviets began
encouraging Castro to develop "revolutionary fronts," there was increased optimism
for the success of Latin American revolutionary movements.
The CPSU 24th Party Congress -- A Turning Point
27. (S) The 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, held at Moscow in March
and April of 1971, gave an accounting of the regime's foreign policy achievements
and expectations. Three broad areas of Soviet foreign policy were identified and
ranked in order of priority. The ranking was the same as it had been at the 23rd
Party Congress 5 years earlier. These areas were:
- To strengthen the world Communist system;
?fCR
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- To support national-liberation movements and promote the world
anti-imperialist struggle;
- To maintain the principle of peaceful coexistence in relations with states
having different social systems.
28. (S) At the Congress, Soviet leaders displayed optimism about the
heightened revolutionary prospects throughout the Third World and pledged new
support for national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
Their statements suggested that increased support was in order because of a
continuing favorable shift in the world balance of power which offered new
opportunities for revolutionary advancements. Since the Congress, official Soviet
statements have increasingly emphasized the Soviet role as the principal guarantor
of success for liberation struggles and have suggested that the growth of Soviet
military power underwrites this role.
29. (S) Despite the appearance of moderation and restraint, and the adoption
of a "peace program," there was a pervasive undertone in the Congress that
suggested a harder line on "imperialism" and the necessity for accentuating the
liberation struggle in a time of growing detente. Several events have indicated that
this harder line was embodied in a positive program which was initiated to
strengthen and improve liberation forces' prospects for success, particularly in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these events were:
- March 1971 The 24th CPSU Congress. Official representatives
of guerrilla movements attended a Party Congress
for the first time.
- April 1971 The CPSU Coordinating Committee convened at
Moscow immediately following the Congress, to
discuss the "liberation" of southern Africa.
Representatives from the Communist parties of
Western Europe, New Zealand, the USA, and
South Africa attended.
- April 1971 A conference of Western European support groups
for "freedom fighters" of the Portuguese colonies
was held in Holland to discuss the possibility of
convening a conference to coordinate Warsaw Pact
aid.
- June 1972 An Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council
of Ministers Meeting at Rabat addressed support
of African guerrilla movements. Soviet Premier
Kosygin and the CPSU sent a message of greeting
to the OAU Chairman, reminding him of the
Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress to support
the freedom fighters of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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30. (S) Official pronouncements have continued to confirm a shift to more
assertive and bolder support for liberation groups in general, and Soviet assistance
to some liberation movements has increased markedly.
Deepening Involvement
31. (S) Between 1971 and 1974 there were sharp increases in Soviet aid to
liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East; that to Indochina
also increased during the period, although not to the highest levels of the 1960's.
The aid to insurgents in Africa and the Middle East has continued; that to Indochina
tapered off again in 1974. Moscow's growing influence over Havana's policies since
1971 suggests that Cuban support for Latin American guerrillas since then has
been undertaken with tacit Soviet approval. Since 1973, Soviet indirect support
for guerrilla activities in Dhofar has apparently increased, and there has been
sporadic reporting which suggests Soviet involvement in Afghan-supported tribal
efforts to destroy central authority in western Pakistan.
32. (S) Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. --Early Soviet support to
the Portuguese African and Middle East guerrilla movements generally followed
the indirect shipment method. In 1972, the Soviets substantially upgraded the
quality and quantity of their aid to the Fedayeen, the PAIGC, FRELIMO, and
the MPLA; training programs in the USSR were also expanded. In 1973, Moscow
again increased the quantity and sophistication of its arms support for all these
groups, except the MPLA which was temporarily ineffective. By this time, the
Soviets had upgraded supply procedures and apparently most Soviet arms shipments
were carried aboard Soviet ships for direct delivery to guerrilla representatives in
third countries.
33. (S) The PAIGC declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau in September
1973, and the Portuguese formally relinquished power to it in September 1974.
The PAIGC leaders signed economic and probably military aid agreements with
the USSR in February 1975. In Mozambique, promises of substantial assistance
from various communist countries, including the USSR, were made to the new
transitional government which was formed in September 1974. Throughout 1974
and into 1975, Moscow increased its direct aid to Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO, and
the Palestinians and, since late 1974, has sought to strengthen the military capability
of the MPLA in Angola. Soviet support to the Angolan insurgents reached
unprecedented levels in recent months and has included deliveries of Soviet armored
vehicles and heavy weapons.
34. (S) Soviet backing for insurgents in the Portuguese territories contributed
greatly to a train of events that produced the April 1974 coup in Lisbon. The
new government shifted to the far left and the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist
Party assumed a greatly enlarged role. The government collapse in Lisbon resulted
in early independence for the Portuguese African territories. Mozambique is
governed by former guerrilla leaders whose movement received substantial assistance
from the Soviets throughout its long struggle. In Angola, Moscow is well positioned
to gain considerable influence if the MPLA succeeds in gaining control of an
independent Angola.
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35. (S) In the Middle East, the USSR is the principal source of arms for
the Fedayeen and the dominant non-Arab external influence over its governing
body, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The increasing international
acceptability of the PLO and the possibility of the eventual formation of a
Palestinian entity, have resulted in additional leverage for Moscow in any Middle
East peace settlement.
36. (S) Indochina.--The Soviets furnished large-scale military assistance,
including sophisticated weapons, to the Viet Cong through Hanoi for a number
of years. There is evidence that aid to the Viet Cong was treated by Moscow
as distinct from official aid to Hanoi and that the Soviets administered the two
programs separately. Although the Soviets may have had little control over the
mechanics of distribution, there is evidence that Soviet shipments were earmarked
with special Soviet designators for transshipment to the Viet Cong. There is also
evidence that the Soviets designated shipments for the Pathet Lao and routed them
through Hanoi for distribution. Soviet-supported wars of liberation victories in
Indochina undermined US credibility in the region and have undoubtedly fueled
Moscow's optimism about revolutionary prospects elsewhere.
37. (S) Latin America. --Despite their belief that armed struggle is premature
in most Latin American countries, the Soviets have maintained contact with guerrilla
groups in many of these countries through Soviet embassies in the area and local
Communist parties. We believe that Moscow has provided financial support to
guerrilla movements through these conduits as well as arranged guerrilla warfare
training in the USSR.
38. (S) Foreign support for Latin American insurgencies has come primarily
from Cuba. Cuban support was far greater in the 1960's than in the 1970's, but
Cuba remains a direct source of modest support for various Latin American guerrilla
movements and continues to provide funds, training, and guidance. Prior to 1971,
Cuban support was apparently not approved by the Soviets, because of their belief
that conditions were not then ripe for the scale of activity advocated by Havana.
39. (S) There is reason to believe that in late 1971 Castro accepted the Soviet
position that state-to-state relations and wars of liberation should be pursued
simultaneously. He subsequently adopted the strategy advocated by the USSR
which cautions restraint and selectivity. There is abundant circumstantial evidence
which suggests that Castro's present liberation policy is coordinated with the USSR
and, at a minimum, receives its tacit approval. Indeed, Moscow has, in effect,
underwritten Castro's revolutionary activities by furnishing Havana substantial
military, economic, and political support.
40. (S) We cannot establish with certainty the nature and extent of Soviet
guerrilla involvement in Latin America. But, given the importance of the role of
intermediary nations in the pattern of Soviet liberation activity, the Soviet-Cuban
connection in Latin American insurgencies is highly probable. We believe that most
current Soviet involvement in such insurgencies takes the form of indirect support
through Cuba.
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41. (S) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Uruguay have all, at some
time since 1971, experienced increased levels of guerrilla activity. Although most
government counterinsurgency campaigns have contained this activity effectively,
some of the infrastructure and the potential for guerrilla operations remain.
42. (S) The Arabian Peninsula.--The USSR is the principal source of arms
for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Arab Gulf
(PFLOAG), the most important insurgent movement in the Arabian Peninsula. The
PDRY serves as the conduit for Soviet assistance to the movement. Moscow has
steadily upgraded the quantity of weapons furnished to the Dhofar insurgents in
Oman since 1970. A shift in the Soviet line toward greater Soviet commitment,
and probably substantially increased Soviet aid, coincided with the tactical setbacks
suffered by the insurgents in 1973-1974. In 1974, Moscow probably offered specific
guidance to the PDRY and PFLO/PFLOAG on liberation strategy and tactics and,
apparently for the first time, a Soviet vessel delivered to Aden ammunition
specifically designated for the insurgents. Soviet advisers have appeared to be
increasingly involved in supervising the distribution of such arms shipments.
43. (S) Afghanistan/Pakistan.--Tribal dissidence has long been endemic to
Pakistan's western provinces (Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province). The
Soviets have achieved very strong influence in Afghanistan and, since mid-1973,
a number of reports have suggested Soviet involvement in the training and equipping
of Pakistani tribal guerrillas through Afghanistan.1 Because of the complexity of
the issue, and the ambiguities in the reporting, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint
the nature and extent of the Soviet involvement, but we strongly suspect that
the Soviets are aiding the Pakistani tribals through Afghanistan to some degree.
44. (S) Ethiopia. --There are indications that some Soviet military assistance
to Syria, Iraq, the PDRY, Libya, and Somalia has been funnelled through these
states to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Moscow extends military aid to
each of these countries, and is undoubtedly aware that some of this assistance
has been passed by these third countries to the insurgents. The USSR has apparently
not discouraged such procedures.
Moscow's View of the Prospects
45. (S) As Moscow sees it, the "correlation of forces" -- the Soviet description
of the interrelationship of all factors comprising the balance of international power
-- is shifting in its favor, and the "objective and subjective conditions" for socialist
revolution are improving. Detente has allowed the Soviets to improve Soviet Third
World diplomatic ties which, in turn, facilitates Moscow's contact with and access
to liberation movements through its embassies and other official missions. Moreover,
increased Soviet involvement with insurgents and radicals seems not to have
appreciably damaged Moscow's official respectability and influence in the Third
World.
1Tribal dissidents in Pakistan's frontier provinces have traditionally limited their
demands to local autonomy.
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46. (S) Moscow views wars of national liberation as an integral part of the
world revolutionary process and calculates that recent successes (e.g., in Portugal
and its colonies and Indochina) and long-run trends in the Third World are favorable
to the USSR. However, the Soviets are also aware of the obvious danger of moving
too fast, believing that a wholesale endorsement of armed struggle could cause
the West to close ranks, or perhaps to "over-react."
47. (S) Accordingly, the Soviets have been prudent in exploiting the West's
difficulties and, while they have substantially increased their involvement in some
insurgencies, their participation has generally remained discreet. Nevertheless,
support for insurgency offers Moscow a very significant but low risk means of
pursuing its ultimate goal of a worldwide Soviet imperium.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
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