HANDBOOK of BAYESIAN ANALYSIS for INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 30, 1975
• Content Type: RS

Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
For Official Use Only
Handbook of Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence
For Official Use Only
OPR-506
June 1975
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/9614 0PA-RPL8Q ~ 00100070010-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
HANDBOOK OF BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
FOR INTELLIGENCE
In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Re-
search consulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Their comments and suggestions were appreciated and used, but
no formal attempt at coordination was undertaken. Comments
would be welcomed by the author, (Code
143, x4091),
Approved For Release 2000/0c?4 : e1 6A496( 586060100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/j CJf pf ~B9RRi0 100070010-7
Summary....................................................
Page
v
Bayes
1. What are its Capabilities and Benefits? ............. . ....... 1
2. When is it Useful? ............. ........................ 2
How to Initiate a Bayesian Exercise
1. Flowchart of Setup Procedure ............................. 4
2. Defining the Scenarios .................................... 4
3. Participants ............................................. 5
4. Time Span and Frequency ................................ 6
5. Designing the Format .................................... 7
6. An Initial Meeting ....................................... 7
7. Practice Runs ........................................... 7
The OPR Bayesian Analyses
1. More than One Analyst ...................... . ........... 8
2. Printing the Evidence .................................... 9
3. Graphs and Visibility ..................................... 9
4. Identifying the Participants ............................... 10
How to Manage an On-Going Bayes
1. Flowchart of Periodic Procedure ........................... 13
2. Routine Procedure ....................................... 13
3. The Calculations
A. The Basic Method .................................. 14
B. The Simplified Method .............................. 16
4. Problems in Mid-course ................................... 17
5. Terminating and Evaluating a Bayes ....................... 18
Inherent Weaknesses and Problems of the Bayesian Technique
1. Limited Applicability ..................................... 19
2. Data Problems .......................................... 19
3. Problems over Time ...................................... 20
4. Problems with Numbers .................................. 20
5. Manipulation ............................................ 21
Approved For Release 2000/09/1b PAFI b b0~S66R66b100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Appendix 1. The Statistical/ Mathematical Basis for the Calculations
1. Rationale ............................................... 23
2. Derivation .............................................. 23
3. Example ................................................ 25
Appendix 2. Interactive Programs in APL and BASIC
1. Interactive APL Program ................................. 27
2. Interactive BASIC Program ............................... 28
Figures:
1. Bayesian Analysis on the Likelihood of a Major North Viet-
namese Military Offensive .............................. 11
2. Bayesian Analysis on the Likelihood of Major Hostilities in the
Middle East in the Next 30 Days ....................... 11
3a. A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of Sino-Soviet
Hostilities ............................................ 11
3b. Individual Assessments of Sino-Soviet Tensions ............. 11
iv
Approved For Release 26 OYA,4jCdF -RbO,@4M 68000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUMMARY
Within the Intelligence Community, the term "Bayes" has been
bandied about from time to time over the past decade, as one of a number
of techniques to supplement traditional analysis. There have been frequent
assessments of the Bayesian technique and infrequent applications of it to
the analysis of an intelligence question, usually on an experimental basis.
During 1974 and 1975, the Office of Political Research used Bayesian analy-
sis in three separate studies-dropping the qualifier "experimental" after
the first-and the office intends to continue its application in the future,
when such an approach is relevant. The technique produced a style of
report which conveyed much information in a very concise format. It is our
view and the frequently-voiced opinion of others that this represented an
advance in communications over traditional methods of reporting.
This handbook will attempt to explain the use of the Bayesian approach
as a forecasting tool for intelligence. It is written for potential users of the
technique, both to make OPR's experience available to others, and to en-
courage and facilitate its proper use. It is meant as a self-help guide on how
to conduct such an exercise. Our experiences are intended to be instructive
in a general way; the techniques described represent a particular solution to
problems of political intelligence, but could be adapted with minor or major
changes to other intelligence and bureaucratic situations. The presentation
explains the rationale and format of the three OPR analyses, the procedures
developed to administer them, and the benefits and problems of the Bayesian
method. Neither the analyses nor this handbook wallows in methodological
soul-searching; in both cases, the purpose is utility rather than perfection.
There will be, of necessity, some examination of the mathematical
formulae involved. The bulk of this handbook, however, is a catalog of the
practical administrative details of such a project. To avoid "perfection of
means and confusion of goals [which] seem to characterize our age" (Einstein)
the need for careful definition of the problem and careful project design is
repeatedly stressed.
V
Approved For Release 2000/09/100:ICWR WQO?,96ROU 100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BAYES
1. What are its Capabilities and Benefits?
The task of intelligence is to answer questions about the capabilities
and intentions of various international actors; information may be abundant
or meager, but it is usually incomplete or incoherent. The main feature of
Bayesian analysis is that it provides a rational, consistent, and objective
process whereby many apparently unrelated facts can be combined to
produce an overall assessment. If an intelligence problem can be formulated
into a set of questions which can be answered in probabilistic terms-how
likely one of a set of outcomes is-it may lend itself to Bayesian analysis.
There is no magic and no inherent wisdom in Bayes. In simplest terms,
the Bayesian technique consists of a statistical formula and a procedure for
its use. (Statistics is a discipline which allows one to deal with uncertainty
in an organized fashion without being vague or imprecise; Bayesian statistics
differ from classical statistics in that they allow an analyst to use his own
expert understanding of a situation along with probabilistic judgments
based on evidence.) The Bayesian technique is an organizing device which
allows an analyst to assign probabilities to the likelihood of various carefully
drawn scenarios about an intelligence problem, and thereafter to evaluate
fragments of evidence in terms of those hypothetical scenarios. The Bayesian
formula then aggregates these numbers mathematically, rather than by the
inductive logic of an analyst, into an overall set of probabilities. This has
several advantages:
-More information can be extracted from the available data because
the technique allows each piece of evidence, central or marginal, to add its
weight to the final assessment in a systematic way; thus, a number of small
items can outweigh a large one, and the probabilities are not at the mercy
of the most recent or most visible item.
-The procedure provides a reproducible sequence of steps for arriving
at the final figures; a disagreement among analysts can thus often be seen
to be a disagreement over the meaning of certain items of evidence rather
than an unresolvable difference of opinion.
-The formulation of the questions forces the analyst to consider
alternative explanations of the facts he sees, thus loosening the bonds of
1
9-50?IjJP100070010-7
Approved For Release 2000/09/ log j 4B9
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
established opinions. In other words, he is asked to look at how well the
evidence explains possible scenarios other than the one he has already
decided is most likely.
-The use of quantified judgments allows the results of the analysis
to be displayed on a numerical scale, rather than through the use of terms
like "probable," "likely," "unlikely," or "possible." Also, the work of a
number of analysts can be arrayed in graphic form, with ranges and averages.
-The formal procedure has been shown to be less conservative than
analysts' informal opinions, and to drive probabilities away from 50-50
faster and farther than the analysts' overall subjective judgments do. This
is often initially unsettling for the analysts, but most have admitted that
they later agreed with the assessment.
--The mere fact that a team of experts is asked to assess periodically
the evidence on an important intelligence question provides managers of
intelligence production with a degree of assurance that the question is indeed
being monitored.
Before embarking on their initial Bayesian project, the OPR analysts
assigned to coordinate the exercise reviewed the Agency's previous experi-
ments with Bayesian analysis, read the available literature on the theory
and application of Bayes, and consulted with individuals familiar with the 25X1A9a
technique both in and outside of the Agene . The earlier work of -
and the advice of in various offices 25X1A9a
o e 1 gency, prove e e e especially useful guidelines for the design of these
projects.
The rule of Bayes is an established statistical technique with a variety
of applications in the social sciences and industry, but its application to
intelligence questions is both more complex and less precise. The political,
economic, strategic, and social events of the world are imperfectly under-
stood and difficult to measure. Hence, to use a technique like Bayes it is
necessary to turn to expert judgments expressed quantitatively. The values
assigned by expert analysts are, of course, approximate, but they provide a
rough basis for comparison and analysis. OPR's experience suggests that it
is relatively easy to induce analysts accustomed to qualitative expressions of
probability to shift to numerical assessments. An ever-present danger,
however, is the tendency to attribute more precision to the numbers than is
warranted, and it should be stressed that the numbers are always only
approximations.
2. When is it Useful?
The starting point for any investigation must always be the careful
formulation of a relevant question. Before discussing the rule of Bayes
further or the procedures developed to work with it, it is important to
remember several overriding substantive considerations.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA ?2DP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
What is the nature of the intelligence problem; what is the question and
what data are available? In the intelligence process the nature of the problem
must dictate which methods and approaches will be most successful. There
are many techniques for enhancing traditional analysis, and it is possible
that something other than Bayes would be more appropriate to the level
and complexity of the issue involved; trend analysis, an econometric model,
or a Delphi exercise might, for example, be more relevant. Many of the more
rigorous techniques require good data, and to the extent that a problem
becomes more data-rich, it may actually cease to be an intelligence problem.
There is also a certain delay involved in the genesis of a project, which
might preclude its use in fast-developing situations. To be the type of
question which is susceptible to Bayesian analysis:
-It must lend itself to formulation in categories which overlap very
little, such as war versus no war, or development of a complete nuclear
capability versus development of a peaceful nuclear capability versus no
nuclear development. Bayes is useful only when the question is expressed
as a specific set of outcomes; thus, the Bayesian approach would be useless
as a predictor of something as amorphous as future Middle East relations.
The question would have to be re-cast in terms of specific alternatives, that
is, a set of more or less mutually exclusive scenarios of Middle East develop-
ments. In this process, however, there is a danger that the question will be
so simplified that the answer would be neither relevant nor interesting.
-There must be a fairly rich flow of data at least peripherally related
to the question. For example, in the nuclear example above, data on all
related materials and processes would be relevant. If data are sparse, the
technique is very sensitive to each piece and is less reliable although it may
still be useful.
-It must be the type of activity which produces preliminary signs and
is not a chance or random event. For example, it would be fruitless to attempt
to predict whether Giscard would be killed in an automobile accident.
Bayesian analysis can measure only preparations for and indications of the
hypothesized outcomes.
For whom and at what level is the question important? This will have a
direct bearing on the level of resources which can be commanded for an
analytical effort. The consumer receives a product which displays results
concisely and graphically, and unless he or she reacts negatively to such
displays, this can be an important consideration.
Each production office would have to weigh the benefits and costs of
the method-on one side the rigor, reproducibility, and sex appeal of the
method, and on the other the need for education, monitoring, and coordina-
tion of a number of analysts who may not find the method immediately
congenial. Having considered the above questions, one should ask whether
Bayes is applicable.
3
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
HOW TO INITIATE A BAYESIAN EXERCISE
1. Flowchart of Setup Procedure
Ask a
Question
Coordinating Other
Office Offices
Define the
Question
Arrange for
Participants
Contribute
Analysts
Set Time Span
and Frequency
Design the
Format
Advise on Graphics
and Printing
Hold Initial
Meeting
Arrange
Practice Runs
2. Defining the Scenarios
Once a question has been selected or assigned as a candidate for a
Bayesian analysis, the first step is to formulate it into categories which are
more or less mutually exclusive, that is, which cover the relevant possibilities
and overlap as little as possible. It is imperative not to let the question run
away with the formulation; that is, it must not be chosen simply because it
can be answered using the Bayesian technique. If so, it may not necessarily
be the question that the customer really wants answered.
This formulation is easiest when there is a single event which one is
interested in predicting. For example, the actual formulation of the first
OPR study, in what are termed "scenarios" or "hypotheses," was:
A. The North Vietnamese will launch a major military offensive
(defined as a countrywide offensive on the scale of the Tet 1968 or March
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA4RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
1972 fighting, or attacks on a similar level generally confined to one or two
military regions) before the end of June, 1974.
B. The North Vietnamese will not launch such an offensive.
When this formulation as a dichotomy can be done, it allows a simplified
assignment and computation technique, as explained later.
Often, however, the problem is not so simple, and to formulate an intelli-
gence problem as an either-or question would be to strip it of its complexity
and interest. For example, the second project was designed to monitor the
Sino-Soviet conflict, and the following possible scenarios were identified:
A. The Soviets will undertake a nuclear strike against Chinese
strategic or nuclear targets within six months.
B. The Soviets will launch a large-scale conventional attack against
China within six months.
C. The Soviets will launch a localized cross-border attack, with
limited objectives, on a scale larger than the 1969 incidents within six
months.
D. The Chinese will launch a localized cross-border attack, with
limited objectives, on a scale larger than the 1969 incidents within six
months.
E. One or more minority groups on either side of the border will
revolt, following instigation by the opposite side within six months.
F. Neither side will undertake any of the above types of hostilities
within six months.
3. Participants
The second step is to decide the number and variety of participants
that are needed to carry out the Bayesian analysis. OPR has been able to
enlist participants in its various Bayesian projects from a wide variety of
offices within CIA, analysts who concentrate on economic, strategic, politi-
cal, and geographic affairs, or who analyze propaganda or imagery, or who
follow the broad spectrum of current events. For Intelligence Community
projects, participants have been enlisted from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
DIA, NSA, INR, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the National
Intelligence Offices. As stated before, the importance of the question will
affect the number of persons willing or even available to give time to this
type of effort. The number of participants in our reports has varied from
six to thirteen, and although a larger number would clog the logistical
mechanisms and clutter certain types of graphs, there is no theoretical
limit. Nor is there any reason the analysis could not be done by one person.
Depending on the purpose of the exercise, it is possible for an individual,
an office, an agency, or an interagency group to carry out a Bayesian analy-
5
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
sis. OPR, in its projects thus far, has had the benefit of working on topics
of high-level interest, with a specific consumer demand that this technique
be applied. On a topic of lesser moment, or where there is little visible en-
couragement from above, it would still be practical and quite useful for a
small group or even an individual to undertake a Bayesian analysis. The
scale on which OPR has been able to carry out its projects is not essential
to a useful application of the technique.
Monitoring an intelligence situation is most frequently done by an
office or an individual within an office, and the Bayesian technique can be
applied just as profitably on that level, without the overlay of logistics and
cartography. In a scaled-down procedure, the logistics of the exercise would
diminish to the point where everything but the selection and evaluation of
evidence could be recorded, stored, processed, and printed via a computer
terminal. A member of OPR's Analytical Techniques Group could provide
assistance in setting up the exercise and training the participants, after which
another individual could administer the project. A small in-office Bayes
could serve well to support or supplement conventional analysis, and would
be better suited to following a fast-moving situation than the elaborate
productions OPR has designed. It might even serve as the basis for a later
full-scale project.
After the exercise has been initiated, a single analyst or a small number
of analysts in a single office could draw up a list of individual items of
evidence; probabilities could then be assigned to each item and consolidated
by computer or by hand. This could be done on any schedule: weekly, daily,
or whenever new evidence appears. Readouts of revised probabilities would
be immediately available at any time, and the results could be circulated via
narratives, hand-drawn graphs, or computer-drawn graphs.
4. Time Span and Frequency
The third step is to determine how long the exercise should run and how
often reports should be issued. This depends on the volume of data and the
expected speed of development. For a data-rich question of great urgency
and some probability, it may be necessary to run the exercise once or twice
a week over a period of many months. Lacking any of these attributes,
however, the problem may lend itself to a more leisurely schedule. OPR's
reports have been issued at intervals of one week, two weeks, four weeks,
and six weeks, and have lasted for periods of six months to one year. The
reporting period can be changed in the course of an exercise, as the question
becomes more or less urgent, without upsetting continuity.
Another consideration which has great practical impact upon frequency
is the cost, in man-hours of analysis and coordination, of running a large
project. As developed by OPR, these studies have kept to a minimum the
time required of analysts, though this was achieved by a large expenditure
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-FtDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
of time on the part of the coordinators. Whereas each coordinator spent
approximately two full days for each periodic assessment, each analyst
spent only one-quarter to one hour. Even this large investment of coordina-
tion time might be decreased by a greater use of computer terminals and an
interactive data-gathering program, already developed but untested.
5. Designing the Format
Finally, the format for presenting the results should be designed. If the
exercise is of sufficient import to be published, that is, if there is a known or
perceived consumer demand for it, then the design of the graphic presenta-
tion is a very important step in communicating the analysis. Any carto-
graphic aid, either for initial design or for continuing support, should be
enlisted early in this process. If there is no perceived high-level demand
for such an analysis, meaning that it would be done for the benefit of
working-level analysts, a less formal and expensive presentation would
probably be more appropriate and just as effective.
6. An Initial Meeting
It will be necessary to have an initial meeting of participants at which
the rationale, format, and procedures are explained. It is also convenient
at this time to collect the following information, some of which will be used
for the list of participants in the publication:
-Name as it is to appear in print;
-Title and office name;
-Number of years in office;
-Number of years on subject;
-Office telephone number(s);
-Tube station or LDX address;
-An alternate analyst to stand in during vacations;
-Starting probabilities for each hypothesis.
The latter numbers should represent the participants' current overall
feeling for the probability that each event will occur as stated. (See the
section on calculations for a further description of the starting probabilities.)
7. Practice Runs
It will be useful to arrange one and perhaps two practice runs, to
familiarize the analysts with the routine, and also to work out the logistics,
the cartography, and the printing of the report. The wording of the hypoth-
eses should be reviewed at this point, to assure that the proper question is
being addressed. Although the basic design of the exercise and the formula-
tion of the questions will remain fairly constant once the formal publication
begins, the work of familiarizing analysts with the routine will never
7
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
completely end, as occasionally someone will forget to cite sources or to
return contributions on time.
All of the foregoing constitutes the design and definition of the project.
Careful attention at this stage is extremely important to the subsequent
conduct of the exercise. It is also the point at which basic questions about
goals and intentions must be resolved. Much of it can be handled by one
person-preferably the one who will later coordinate the exercise--in
consultation with both consumers and participants.
THE OPR BAYESIAN ANALYSES
The three Bayesian analyses run by OPR in 1974-75 relied heavily for
their success on supplementary techniques relating to data-gathering,
presentational format, and administration. The Bayesian aspects of the
reports formed the core of the analysis, around which a number of other
carefully-tailored aspects were draped.
1. More than One Analyst
One of the central features of the studies was the use of a group of
analysts rather than a single expert. This more than anything else influenced
the 'data-gathering process, the format of the publication, and the actual
production procedure. The reasons for this decision were:
--To bring to the exercise a range of expertise beyond the skills and
experience of any single analyst;
---To supply a richer mix of evidence on the questions by asking each
analyst to contribute anything he or she considered important. Most
political, strategic, or military intelligence problems involve such varied
inputs as propaganda analysis, photographic interpretation, and logistic
matters. (The evidence was then shown to all participants without
identifying the contributors); and
-To provide a balance of expertise in which the effects of organizational
and individual biases are minimized.
It is well-known that different analysts will tend to place greater
reliance on different types and sources of intelligence. The consolidated list
provided an opportunity for each analyst to call an item of evidence to the
attention of his colleagues, and assured that the participants would consider
each item explicitly before judging its relevance.
To avoid the unpredictable and oft-decried effects of group dynamics,
however, each analyst worked on the probabilistic assessments individually,
and relayed them to the OPR coordinator. This also avoided the time
wasted in a group meeting and the problem of assembling the group on a
convenient schedule.
8
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
2. Printing the Evidence
Each periodic report contained the pieces of evidence identified and
used by the participants, along with only a paragraph or two on the principal
trends during the period. No attempt was made to formulate or coordinate a
lengthy textual analysis of the situation. This allowed the reader
. To see the basic evidence rather than just a summary and hence to
better understand the analysts' assessments;
- To make his own direct assessments if he so desires, or just to keep up
with the topic by viewing the evidence regularly; and
To keep a concise record of the situation.
3. Graphs and Visibility
The ability to portray the results of the analysis graphically. was one of
the strongest arguments for using a quantitative method like Bayes, and the
graphs in the publications have been well-received. In each study, the
probability of the hypothesized event, usually "how likely are major
hostilities within a certain time period?" was immediately visible on a
broken line or bar chart. This conveyed much information at a glance,
especially with the broken-line charts, which illustrate trends far more
concisely and vividly than do words. On both the broken-line and bar
charts the range of estimates around the central measure showed clearly
and concisely how much disagreement there was.
Different formats were tried in the various reports, each demonstrating
certain advantages and disadvantages. Arrayed on the foldout page are
examples of the graphs and combinations of graphs (with representative
values) used in the various reports. As a rule, the aim was to make the
graphs as prominent as possible, while trading off the amount of information
against the degree of clutter, the use of color against the cartographic and
printing constraints, and the size and placement of the graphs against the
requirements of the overall publication.
In figure 1, from the Vietnam study, each analyst was represented by a
separate line showing his or her position in successive weeks. This extensive
detail was possible because there was only one positive question to be an-
swered and there were only six analysts participating. (The negative scenario
could of course be omitted because it was the mathematical complement of
the positive one.) The assessments were represented by six lines on a single
graph, plus one for the average (arithmetic mean).
For the Middle East study with four scenarios and thirteen analysts,
this format was reduced to four charts-one for each scenario-each of
which displayed the median, the interquartile range, and the range, because
the full representation would have been confusing, time-consuming, and
9
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
expensive in printing. One of those four charts is represented in figure 2.
This format does have the disadvantage, however, that individuals are not
identified; consequently a full-page supplementary graph was supplied for
that purpose, similar to figure 3b, on which each analyst gave a hunch
judgment of hostilities in the next ninety days. This supplementary graphic
was totally non-Bayesian. The provision of individual lines allowed each
analyst to be visibly identified, as in the Vietnam reports, and thus to
advocate a certain position if desired. This visibility was pleasing to the
analysts and interesting for the readers, with the result that there was little
if any pressure on the analysts to try to manipulate their positions on the
other graphs (see the section on manipulation).
In figure 3a, the assessments of thirteen analysts for six scenarios of
Sino-Soviet hostilities were condensed into a bar graph which showed, for
each scenario, the average of the thirteen probabilities along with the lowest
and the highest values assigned. To provide continuity from period to
period and to illustrate trends, a single broken-line chart was added which
showed the progression of the average figures over time. In addition, in-
dividual lines were provided on a single supplementary chart, figure 3b,
which was an attempt to- quantify and measure a related problem, the
"level of tension" between the two countries; this was also a non-Bayesian
assessment. Each analyst was asked to gauge his overall feeling of the level
of tension between the two countries on a pre-arranged historical scale,
independently of the chances for hostilities. Gossamer though this concept
is, the graph performed well as an indicator of changes in the atmosphere
between the two countries; once each individual chose his or her position on
the chart-as a hawk, a dove, or a middle-of-the-roader-the ups and downs
of the graph showed clear trends from month to month, and there was no
need for the analysts to agree on a single number.
4. Identifying the Participants
The final presentational technique was the listing of all participants by
name, and their identification on at least one graph with a trend line of
assessment. This visibility, as mentioned, helped to motivate participants,
and in the latter two studies provided them a direct medium for expressing
themselves in accord with their opinions on the issue.
10
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
Figure 1
Figure 2 Bayesian Analysis on the Likelihood of Major Hostilities
in the Middle East in the Next 30 Days
Assessment as of 9 April
Likelihood of any Major Hostilities,
Regardless of the Initiator:
- - - Lowest estimate by any
of the analysts
20~ -... - ?
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS ON THE LIKELIHOOD
OF A MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY OFFENSIVE
10 December 1973-30 June 1974
Current status of the Assessment
10 18 27 10 17 24
Dec '73 Jan '74
Participants:
Average of all analysts
(median)
-?-??~ Highest estimate by any
of the analysts
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
Figure 3a
A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of Sino-Soviet Hostilities
Before 1September 1974
Current Status of the Assessment -- as of 1 March
A The Soviets will undertake a
nuclear strike against Chinese
strategic or nuclear targets.
Probability %
0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
B The Soviets will launch a large-
scale conventional attack against
China.
C The Soviets will launch a localized
cross-border attack, with limited
objectives, on a scale larger than
the 1969 incidents.
D The Chinese will launch a localized
cross-border attack, with limited
objectives, on a scale larger than
the 1969 incidents.
E One or more minority groups on
either side of the border will revolt,
following instigation by the opposite
side.
F Neither side will undertake any of
the above types of major hostilities.
Lowest estimate by ? Average of ? Highest estimate by any of
any of the participants all estimates the participants
A Time Chart Showing the Movement of the Group's Averages for
Probability % Hypotheses A Through E (as described above)
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For ReIe;se 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000'100070010-7
A, Figure 3b
Individual Assessments Of. Sino-Soviet Tensions
Level of Tension
100
70 is defined as
the level of tension 70
in August 1969
10 is defined as
the level of tension 10
through 1958
0
DEC
000,
............
ftm
?-
.
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
The points on this chart were chosen by each participant on an intuitive basis,
using the rough guidelines shown on the chart.
25X1A9a 25X1A9a
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For ReIeHOW OTO /MANAGE ANB3N-G89NU Q0CffXY'ft-7
1. Flowchart of Periodic Procedure:
Analysts Coordinator Services
Collect and Submit
Evidence
Consolidate
Evidence
Evaluate
Items
Compute Revised
Probabilities
Revise
Graphics
Compose
Report
Cartography
Printing
2. Routine Procedure
Once an exercise is started, the procedure is periodic and recurring. On
the first day of each period, each analyst submits the items of evidence he
has seen since last round relating to the question. The submission is in the
form of one or two sentences summarizing the item, along with the date,
source, and classification, e.g.,
Statement in the Soviet journal, Problems of the Far East by
Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, alleging that
groups of Chinese soldiers violate the Mongolian border, fell
trees, start forest fires, and herd diseased cattle into his country.
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, 10 January,
UNCLASSIFIED)
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 App roved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
1' his can best be done on preprinted forms. The choice of data is left entirely
to the analyst, who should include anything relevant, and exclude what can
be judged to be irrelevant. There will be some overlap and considerable
diversity in what is submitted.
Later the same day, the coordinator to whom the data is sent consoli-
dates the items, resolving differences of wording, emphasis, and meaning,
and distributes the complete list of items to all participants. At the coordina-
tor's discretion, one standard item may be added which asks the participants
to evaluate the volume of data itself. This is explained later in the section
on weaknesses of the method.
By the following day, the analysts working individually should evaluate
the items, as explained below, and return their numerical assessments to
the coordinator.
3. The Calculations
There are two ways in which the Bayesian assignments and subsequent
calculations can be made, a basic and a simplified way. They are both based
on the same mathematical relationships, but one works with ratios of prob-
abilities and the other with probabilities directly. The simplified is restricted
to use with questions formulated in an either-or fashion, such as war or no
war. The basic method, however, can be used in all cases, for either-or
questions and for multiple scenario questions. Both methods require a set of
starting probabilities which represent each analyst's best judgment of the
situation at the start of the exercise, and the subsequent evaluations build
on these.
A. The Basic Method
For example, using the basic method and the following scenarios,
A: Large-scale aggression by country X within six months
B: Small-scale provocations by country X within six months
C: No planned hostilities within six months
an analyst might assign a set of starting probabilities to A, B, and C of
25%, 25%, and 50% likely at the start of the exercise. (The assignment of
these probabilities is done entirely subjectively, although techniques exist
to refine what a person really means by these numbers.) Note that the sum
of these probabilities equals 100, because the scenarios supposedly cover all
possible events. This is the only time the analyst will have to assign numbers
which total 100.
In the course of the exercise, the analysts will evaluate each item of
evidence as it relates to the scenarios, formulating the question as "how
likely (0-100%) is it that this item would occur if A is planned?", "how
likely is it that this item would occur if B is planned?", and "how likely is it
that this item would occur if C is planned?" The peculiar formulation of the
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
questions is dictated by the nature of Bayes' theorem, which depends upon
conditional probabilities as explained in the first appendix. The set of
probabilities assigned for each item need not add to 100. In this case, the
wording of a very bellicose speech by the leader of country X might be 90%
likely if that country were contemplating outright aggression against its
neighbor, 90% likely if small-scale border provocations were planned, and
80% likely even if nothing were planned.
This procedure is followed for each item independently, without refer-
ence to the other items. The only exception is the discretionary final item,
which refers explicitly to the other items: "How likely is it during this period
that this volume of information (no more and no less) would occur if A is
planned?", et cetera.
The mathematics of revising the estimates, once the coordinator receives
them, is straightforward though tedious. It is recommended that an inter-
active computer program be used to save time and reduce arithmetic errors.
The calculations are performed for each analyst separately; in other words,
analyst A's set of probabilities from the previous round are updated by the
conditional probabilities for each item in turn, resulting in a final set of
revised probabilities for this round, which are used for the publication and as
starting probabilities for the next round. The same procedure is then followed
for each other analyst.
The general formula for determining the revised probability for each
new item is
P(Si/I) = P(Si) X P(I/Si)
Y(P(S,) X P(I/Si))
where i I
P(Si)-is the starting probability for scenario i
P(I/Si)-is the conditional probability of an item
P(Si/I)-is the revised probability of scenario i
m-is the number of scenarios
For a full elaboration of the mathematics, see Appendix 1; Appendix 2
contains the code for interactive programs in APL and BASIC which will
perform these calculations. The following is an example of the interaction
using the starting probabilities assigned above, the probabilities assigned to
the hypothetical speech, and two other sets of probabilities chosen for
illustrative purposes. (The user's entries start in column 5, the computer's
responses in column 1) :
THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES EVENT PROBABILITIES BY THE
BAYESIAN FORMULA. YOU WILL BE ASKED TO ENTER A SET
OF PRIOR PROBABILITIES, THE NUMBER OF ITEMS OF EVI-
DENCE, AND THE ITEM PROBABILITIES.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
PRIOR PROBABILITIES FOR THIS ANALYST, IN ORDER.
HOW MANY PIECES OF EVIDENCE?
3
PROBABILITIES FOR ITEM 1, IN ORDER.
90 90 80
INTERMEDIATE RESULTS:
26.47 26.47 47.06
PROBABILITIES FOR ITEM 2, IN ORDER.
90 90 90
INTERMEDIATE RESULTS:
26.47 26.47 47.06
PROBABILITIES FOR ITEM 3, IN ORDER.
60 20 10
INTERMEDIATE RESULTS:
61.36 20.45 18.18
P(Si/I) =61.36 20.45 18.18
(a very small change)
(no change)
(a significant change)
It should he noted from perusing the above, as one of the lessons to be
learned early about the diagnosticity of evidence, that the items which have
the greatest impact upon the final values are the items with the greatest
spread of numbers. Item 2 had no effect on the probability of the scenario
,because, although it had large probabilities associated with it, the item gave
no indication of what scenario was more likely; it was not diagnostic. The
assignment of three nineties implied that the item was very likely to occur
no matter what scenario was true. Item 3, however, was a sensitive indicator,
because it was very unlikely if the second and third scenarios were true; the
effect of item 3 was to depress significantly the revised probability for those
two scenarios. This concept of diagnosticity can usually be conveyed to
the participants by showing them the results of the calculations for a
round or two.
B. The Simplified Method
Using the simplified method when the question is a yes-no either-or
formulation reduces the effort for both the analyst and the coordinator. It
is even feasible to perform all the calculations by hand. In this procedure,
each item is evaluated as before and assigned two numbers-one for each
16
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
hypothesis-but they are reported as a ratio, of one over the other. Identical
results are obtained whichever hypothesis is in the numerator, but the
practice must of course be consistent. For example, if an item is only 10%
likely if A is true, and 90% likely if B is true, and the ratio is to be reported
as A over B, the evaluation for the item would be 10/90.
The assignment procedure is followed for each item independently,
and the mathematics of revision is then considerably simplified. For each
analyst the starting probabilities are formed into a ratio (A-25% and
B-75% would become 25/75) and simply multiplied against all the item
ratios consecutively. Since multiplication is commutative, this can be done
in any order, and much cancellation can usually be done if the whole set of
ratios is considered. For example,
75 $1 0 X X 50 3750 15
- x - x - x - x - x-- = _ -
25 86" 0 ,9 10 t 250 1
The resulting figure is the revised ratio, and should be kept as the starting
ratio for the next round.
The ratio must be converted to probabilities (percentages) by the follow-
ing simple method for reporting purposes: add the numerator and denomina-
tor together and divide the total into 100. In the case above this produces
100/16, or 6.25. The result of this division can be used to multiply both the
numerator and the denominator, producing the percentages for A and B,
respectively. Again in this case, A = 15 x 6.25 = 93,75, and B =1 x 6.25 = 6.25.
Remember that for the next round the starting number is the ratio, not the
percentages.
This procedure can be further simplified by reducing the numerical
scale. If probabilities are only allowed to be multiples of 10, such as 10,
20, 50, and 90, the calculations become much easier. This level of precision
is thought by some to be as much as an untrained mind can estimate, al-
though many analysts have demonstrated their ability to use the full
100-point scale. Also, because 10/90 is the same as 1/9, the ratios can be
assigned using just the numbers from 1 through 9.
Whichever method is used, the basic or the simplified, each analyst
will end up with a set of probabilities, which can be reported in a number of
ways, as described in the section on graphics.
4. Problems in Mid-course
The most frequent problem in conducting a Bayesian exercise is one
common to any group project: the management of a group of individuals,
some of whom will make unusual demands and require special attention.
There will also be occasional logistics problems, and delays in cartography
and printing, for which there is no ready solution.
17
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
Holidays, vacations, and dropouts are another problem which should
be anticipated. Ideally each participant should designate an alternate who
would be familiar with the exercise and could take over when necessary.
When that is impractical, the exercise can be run with a diminished number
of participants; in that case, the individual's line can either be left out or
extended without change, and any averages can of course be calculated on
the basis of a smaller number of analysts.
Finally, there is always the possibility that the basic design of the
exercise-or the formulation of the question will be found lacking, but that is
the reason a practice run or two is recommended.
5. Terminating and Evaluating a Bayes
In some exercises the scenarios specify a fixed deadline at which time
the event either has or has not taken place, such as the OPR report on the
likelihood of a North Vietnamese offensive before July, 1974 (the end of the
dry season). It is clear that such a project would be terminated at that time,
if not before. Certain other questions will be formulated to look at the
probabilities of various scenarios within a continuously-moving time frame,
such as the report on the likelihood of Sino-Soviet hostilities within six
months. A project such as this may be terminated at any time, or extended
indefinitely.
The Bayesian method upon completion results in an archive of evidence,
evaluations, and predictions which lend themselves to various forms of
evaluation; OPR has undertaken only the grossest measures of performance,
however. A wealth of material lies untouched for rating collection systems,
analyst bias, the use of intelligence in the community, or-that most dubious
measurement of all-analyst performance.
The main criterion for evaluation is the accuracy of prediction, by
individuals and by group, although this may not be as straightforward as it
seems. Because of the myriad variables in the prediction equation, an event
may occur which was only 10% probable the day before, or an event which
was scheduled to take place may fail to materialize. Thus there have been
times of great uncertainty during our reporting periods when the probability
of a scenario rose, only to fall back again. Did this mean that the high prob-
ability of the event occurring was somehow in error? In retrospect, it seems
to mean that the event could very well have occurred at that time if other
factors had coincided; the evaluation really cannot be considered "wrong."
Generally, OPR's studies in 1974 successfully predicted non-events,
that is, they showed that the evidence did not support any of the positive
scenarios, and none of them occurred. In this case, the only point to be
noted is how early in the exercise the evaluations moved away from an
indeterminate figure toward a strong probability of no change. It has been
our experience that the Bayesian calculations show this movement earlier
than the analyst's own judgment would.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA8RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
Until one of the positive scenarios actually occurs during the course of a
Bayesian exercise, there is no way of knowing the predictive value of the
technique. When the positive event does take place, it will be possible to
conduct a much more searching evaluation of the Bayes procedure. What
were the earliest indicators? What evidence was missing, overlooked, or
misperceived? When did the trend lines signal a significant alteration in the
situation? How did the Bayesian assessment compare with other intelligence
assessments?
INHERENT WEAKNESSES AND PROBLEMS OF THE
BAYESIAN TECHNIQUE
1. Limited Applicability
The first and foremost reservation in the use of the technique, as noted
earlier, is that it is applicable only to certain types of questions. They must
be capable of definition as a set of fairly distinct outcomes or hypotheses.
Also, the procedure as developed is cumbersome enough to discourage its
use for questions on a crisis schedule, although it is conceivable that the
technique could be so adapted, using computer terminals and greatly
simplified presentational techniques.
2. Data Problems
There is the problem of identifying which evidence is relevant-
whether certain peripheral items should be included. And if included,
whether they should carry less weight than other items. The OPR exercises
have delegated that decision to the analysts. After all, they are experts,
and their frequent disagreement over items shows that objective measures
of relevance would be virtually impossible to devise. Little editorial
judgment is imposed by the coordinator in the process of consolidating
evidence, and any item which appears to be even peripherally relevant is
included for evaluation. Nevertheless, each analyst is then allowed to ignore
any item he or she considers irrelevant. This gives the participants great
leeway over what they rate, but insures that they at least see the evidence
and make an explicit decision whether it is relevant. Furthermore, if two or
more items are seen as overlapping, the participant is asked to rate only
one of them.
Related to this is the problem of source reliability. Although some
methodologists have suggested that each analyst assign a numerical rating
of source reliability along with each item, to be incorporated into the
calculations as a weight, the OPR studies have avoided placing this extra
burden on the analyst by requesting that the probabilities reflect how much
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP1894B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
faith the analyst places in each item. As mentioned earlier, the effect of an
item will depend on the spread of probabilities assigned, and items of greater
salience and reliability will automatically be assigned a greater range of
probabilities, if the analyst understands the process and rates items thought-
fully. The problem of discerning items of disinformation or fabrication is
left to the judgment of the participants; indeed, one of the benefits of the
Bayesian process as a group exercise may be the opportunity to identify
and sift out such items.
The problem of negative evidence is another point which bothers strict
methodologists. This refers to the fact that the absence of any positive
evidence may in itself be highly indicative, and the journalistic bias toward
reporting events rather than non-events compounds the situation. That is,
we tend to get news only of events or changes, whereas the fact that the
status quo is being maintained can be quite significant. This problem has
been recognized-as discussed in previous sections-and is partially satisfied
by including an item such as "how likely is it that exactly this volume of
evidence would occur (and be seen) if hypothesis A is true?", et cetera.
3. Problems Over Time
There are indisputable difficulties in the use of the method in a project
continuing over many months. First of all, the questions probably require
some reference to a time period (explicit or implicit), that is, an event to
occur within the proximate month or year. And as the project continues,
the timeframe must either contract or move forward. Contraction is illu-
strated by OPR's first reports, which investigated the probability of an
event before a certain fixed date. In this case, the passage of time and the
reduction of the period remaining may itself be of significance. The
administrator may wish to include an item to that effect for evaluation.
Moving the timeframe forward is illustrated by the second and third
OPR studies, which looked at the probability of events "within the next X
months." This "sliding window" approach brings up the problem of retaining
or discarding data which was evaluated months earlier with regard to an
earlier frame of possibilities. One solution, adopted by the second study,
which covered a year, is to drop earlier evaluations, maintaining only the
most current three months of evidence multiplied against the original
probabilities. The starting probabilities were also updated at intervals.
4. Problems with Numbers
There are also two numerical problems. The first is that multiplication
by zero must not occur; once a probability becomes zero it can never recover.
Thus any evaluation of zero probability must be replaced by a very small
number. The second is more profound, and is the problem of how individual
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-WDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
participants handle numbers, especially probabilities. It has been OPR's
experience that some analysts think easily in probabilities, others have to
work at it each time, and a few need constant attention and retraining. It is
essential that the process of assigning probabilities or ratios be reviewed on
an individual basis when necessary. We have found that the administrator
can recognize when a participant is uncertain of the procedure, and one of
the most effective teaching devices for sharpening the ability to assign
probabilities is to show him or her the effects of each of the evaluations on
the revised probabilities.
5. Manipulation
Finally, there is the problem of conscious manipulation. An analyst
may assign his probabilities in a manner which reflects a pre-determined
goal rather than unbiased judgment. This is especially true where the
Bayesian probabilities affect the individual trend lines, as in the first study.
Solutions to the problem could include disciplinary action or expulsion from
the exercise, but the later OPR reports to some extent circumvented this
problem by providing another outlet-the supplementary graphs-for the
expression of individual opinions.
21
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
APPENDIX 1
THE STATISTICAL/MATHEMATICAL BASIS
FOR THE CALCULATIONS
The statistical formula which underlies this method first appeared in
an essay by the Reverend Thomas Bayes in 1763. It is a tool of statistical
inference, used to find the probability that an observed event was caused
by one source rather than another.
1. Rationale
The purpose of Bayesian analysis is to determine the probability that
each scenario (hypothesis) is true, given that certain items of evidence have
been seen. The Bayesian formula allows this to be calculated in an indirect
fashion, from the probabilities that the items would be seen if each scenario
were true. In our application of the method, analysts assign subjective
values to the latter probabilities (that items would be seen), and the OPR
coordinators calculate the former (that the scenarios are true) by applying
the Bayesian formula. Only one other thing is necessary: a beginning set
of probabilities for the scenarios, which the analysts supply for the initial
round only, based solely on intuition. (This initial assignment, and the
subsequent assessments, could be refined by various academic techniques,
but we have not risen to that level of perfection or analyst rapport.)
2. Derivation
The formula itself is derived from the following basic statistical
identities and transformations:
S-represents a scenario, or hypothesis, such as "The USSR is
planning to launch a nuclear attack on China."
I-represents an item of evidence, such as "TASS reports that the
Chinese are deploying nuclear missiles, thereby threatening world
peace."
P(S)-is the probability of a scenario being true.
P(I)-is the probability of an item occurring and being seen.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP 4B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
S n I-is the intersection of S and I, that is, both S and I.
P(I/S)-is the conditional probability of I given S, that is, that an
item I would occur if a particular scenario S were true.
P(S/I)-is the conditional probability of S given I, that is, that a
scenario would be true if an item were seen.
1. P(S n I) =P(I n S) commutativity of intersection
P (I n S)
2. P(I/S) = P(S)
P(S n I) P(I n S)
3. P(I/S) = =
P(S) P(S)
4. P(I n S) = P(S) x P(I/S) transposition of 2
At this point, we define m mutually exclusive scenarios, Si, of which one
must occur. That is,
IP(SO =1
i-1
5. P(I) =P(I n S1) +P(I n S2) +. . . +P(I n Sm)
6. P(I) = (P(S 1) x P(I/S 1)) +. . . + (P(Sm) x P(I/Sm))
7. P(I) _ 2(P(Si) x P(I/Si))
i-i
by definitions
from 4 and 5
restatement of 6
The desired probability is the probability that each Si is true given that
a piece of evidence has been seen, or, using this notation, P(Si/I).
8. P(Si/I) =
9. P(Si/I) =
P(I n Si)
P(I)
P(Si) Y P(I/Si)
P(I)
P(Si) X P(I/Si)
10. P(Si/I) = in substitution of 7 in 9
I(P(Si) X P(I/Si))
definition of conditional probability
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-P84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
The last formula, which is the rule of Bayes, says that, given an
analyst's starting probabilities P(Si) for all scenarios, and his assessments
of how likely an item would be if S were true, P(I/Si), then the new
probability of Si, now that I has occurred, can be calculated using formula 10.
3. Example
Assume an analyst has assigned the following probabilities, intuitively,
to scenarios one and two, that the USSR is planning to launch a nuclear
attack on China within six months, and that she is not:
P(S1)=10% or .1
P(S2)=90% or .9
Also assume that the following item comes in and that the analyst
assigns probabilities that it would occur, first assuming that Russia is
planning a nuclear attack, and second, assuming that she is not planning one:
"TASS reports that the Chinese are deploying nuclear missiles, thereby
threatening world peace."
P(I/S1) =99% or .99
P(I/S2)=80% or .8
This information can be used to revise the probabilities that each
scenario is true by using the Bayesian formula:
P(S1) X P(I/S1) .1 x .99
P(S I /I) =- _
P(Si) x P(I/Si))
Similarly,
P(S2/I) =
P(S2) X P(I/S2) .9+.8
.099
_ =
.12
_
.88
099+.72 .819
Notice that the two new probabilities add to 1 (100%) even though the
item probabilities did not. As this is a recursive process, in which a succession
of items of evidence are assessed, the new probabilities are used as P(Si) in
calculating the effect of the next item.
25
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070010-7
APPENDIX 2
INTERACTIVE PROGRAMS IN APL AND BASIC
1. Interactive APL Program
V B;INSTR;INSTRI;INTERMF,DIATF,;COUNT;PRIOR.;RPVISFD;TIMPS;PROB;TOTAL
C1] r r
[2]
r r
[3]
'INSTRUCTIONS? TYPE YES OR NO.'
[41
INSTR1+-3 - (p (INSTR*91 ) )
[5]
+16xtINSTR1
16]
'THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES EVENT PROBABILITIES'
[7]
' BY THE BAYESIAN FORMULA'
[8]
[9]
]
[1
'YOU WILL BE ASKED TO ENTER A SET OF PRIOR PROBABILITIES,'
'
0
THE, NUMBER OF ITEMS OF EVIDENCE, AND THE ITEM PROBABILI
TIES
'
[11]
.
.
'
[12]
"TO CORRECT A MISTAKE: ON A DELTA, MOVE THE CURSOR BACK AND
HIT
[_13]
' ON A 2741, BACKSPACE AND HIT ATTN.'
[14]
'IF YOU WANT TO STOP, TYPE THE + KEY.'
[15]
'
[16]
'PRINT INTERMEDIATE RESULTS? TYPE YES OR NO.'
[171
INTERMEDIATE,{-3- (p (INTERMF,DIATE- ) )
[18]
'
[19]
COUNT--0
[20]
'PRIOR PROBABILITIES FOR THIS ANALYST, IN ORDER'
121]
PRIOR+0
[2:21
RF, VISE. D+PRIOR
[23]
'HOW MANY PIECES OF EVIDENCE'
[ 2141
TIMFS+f
[25]
COUNT-COUNT+1
[26]
'PROBABILITIES FOR ITEM ';COUNT;', IN ORDER'
[27]
PROB+O
[28]
+31xi((PPROB)=(pPRIOR))
[29]
'WRONG NUMBER OF ENTRIES'
[30]
+26
131]
TOTAL-+/(RF.VISEDxPROB)
[32]
REVISED+(REVISEDxPROB)fTOTAL
[33]
+35xi(INTERMF.DIATE)
[34]
'INTERMEDIATE RESULTS: ';RFVISEDx100
[35]
+25xi(COUNT