Notes on Seventh Meeting, NSCIC Working Goup, 4 April 1973, 1430 hours, DCI Conference Room

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 5, 1973
• Content Type: MFR

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5 April 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Notes on Seventh Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 4 April 1973,
1430 hours, DCI Conference Room
1. Present were:
Members:
Chairman
25X1A9a
DCI/IC
NSC Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department Dr. Ray Cline
Mr. Seymour Weiss
Defense Department Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
Major General H. P. Smith, DIA
(Representing Vice Adm. de Poix)
Brig. General Richard Bresnahan, JCS
(Representing Lt. General Seith)
Justice Department Mr. Bernard A. Wells
(Representing Mr. Maroney)
CIA Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI
Mr. John Huizenga, ONE
X19ggld H. Steininger, DDS&T
Executive Secretary
Observers:
NSC Captain George Pickett
State Department Mr. Richard Curl
Defense Department Mr. Patrick J. Parker
2. Minutes of 3 October meeting.
No members had any comments or questions and the minutes were
approved without change.
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3. Questions to be Answered on Soviet ICBM's.
The Chairman proposed this item be discussed first to insure
its consideration in the event pressures of time prevented completion
of the entire agenda.
He explained the IC staff wanted to examine the user need/
production/resources linkage across a narrow field, and Soviet ICBM's
had been selected as a topic of general interest. Representatives
of all NSCIC principals had responded with a list of questions, from
which a summary listing had been prepared along with a proposed follow-
on questionnaire to be filled out by intelligence users.
(A handout on this had been distributed before start of
the meeting.)
The Chairman noted no mention of interest in reporting of
every missile firing had been indicated in the responses, although
this was being reported each time one occurred.
The Chairman said it was now intended to go back to users with
a matrix which would solicit information as to the extent to which
the questions listed are being satisfied or over-satisfied. The
matrix would be used to measure the adequacy of information now
being received, the desired frequency of reporting, what products
are being used, and what kinds of products were desired.
He asked the members to examine the paper and comment on the
matrix and the extent to which the questions listed included those
each member had submitted in his response to the chairman's 30 March
memorandum.
Dr. Proctor asked "what customers" were we concerned about,
and the, chairman cited such examples as DDR&E, ISA and SA in OSD,
J-3 andJ-5 in JCS, O'Deen and similar staff officers at the NSC.
Mr. Weiss asked what was wanted in response to the matrix
heading on the kind of product desired. The Chairman said the
respondent could indicate whether, with respect to any of the
questions, a weekly wrap-up, daily reporting, or a yearly summary
was desired, and whether current reporting was too detailed or did
not have enough detail. Mr. Weiss said: "The object, then, is to
find out where improvement is needed."
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Dr. Hall said his answers had put emphasis on the matter
of priorities, and the Chairman noted this was the first step, and
the second step would be to -Find out if DOD was satisfied with
what it is getting. Dr. Hall noted the answer to that was "No,"
since his answer focused on what was needed. The Chairman said
the difference is in knowing whether you are getting answers or
merely documents which purport to provide answers.
Dr. Hall then questioned the need for another survey. He
asked why action could not be taken on the basis of the priorities
already listed in the submissions, noting that the questions listed
all pertained to problems on which answers were needed but were not
at hand. He couldn't see the purpose of the proposed exercise.
The Chairman said he thought Dr. Hall was hurdling two steps ahead.
Dr. Cline commented that "you are getting at form and
frequency -- not the form of reporting," and he noted that in the
State Department consumers don't normally look at reporting on
ICBM's. Such reports are kept in INR and used as appropriate in
oral briefings. "Our customers are not generally aware of the
problems raised in this questionnaire," he said. "They couldn't
answer the questionnaire, and I would have difficulty filling it
out myself."
Mr. Weiss agreed. He said that in the State Department
response he had focused on the inadequacy of knowledge on Soviet
purpose and intent. He had thought the purpose was to get at areas
of weakness. He thought the Working Group could look at the
questions and reach a consensus as to where current information
is adequate.
The Chairman said he would like answers to two questions:
What are we reporting we don't need to because the user is not
interested? And, what do the users really use?
Dr. Cline said the Working Group could tackle this
"in this room" by being candid and analyzing the reporting.
"I am suspicious of questionnaires," he added.
Dr. Proctor said his experience with questionnaires is
that the answers are perfunctory. If questionnaires were used he
felt they should be followed by an interview. "Staff people don't
want to be cut off from anything," he added. He considered that a
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problem had arisen since some Working Group members had submitted
questions based on what we don't now get but really need and others
had indicated merely what we need.
The Chairman said there were few questions in the submissions
not covered by production of some type. Dr. Proctor said some questions
are being addressed satisfactorily, but some are not.
Dr. Hall said the question of whether we are producing on things
we don't need should be addressed in a different context than this.
Much of what is produced now is valuable, he said, and the data on
individual test shots is fundamental to the program.
Mr. Weiss considered the questions as listed were good,
but that someone could answer them in a narrative way, indicating
which we do well on, which need more collection, etc.
Mr. Marshall questioned whether the manner in which the
questions were structured would really evoke what is wanted since
the questions and the matrix format doesn't address the overall
meaning of'the Soviet program.
Dr. Proctor said this was far broader than the ICBM problem,
but Mr. Marshall responded there are comprehensive aspects of the
ICBM problem alone which would be important to know.
The Chairman said his staff would develop a paper which
he would submit to the Working Group proposing "how we get to
the problem." He indicated the paper would focus on finding out
what we are doing well-enough and what we are over-doing.
Dr. Cline asked if that meant the group was approving the
list of questions which had been distributed. Mr. Huizenga said he
was surprised at the specificity of the questions, since they were
not pitched at "general questions." He suggested all members of
the group should see all of the original submissions.
The Chairman agreed to distribute all of the inputs.
Dr. Cline then asked if the group could "discuss the
whole thing" at the next meeting, and the Chairman agreed.
Mr. Steininger said that if the idea was to have a cross-
section of questions which were related to resource problems then
the questions as listed were not comprehensive enough. Mr. Weiss
replied that "State's was." The Chairman then referred again to
the reporting of individual Soviet test shots, saying he didn't
think such needed to be reported, but Dr. Hall disagreed, saying
"I think the Secretary of Defense wants to know."
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Dr. Proctor said one could take the categories as used in
the list of questions and from them write generalizations, but
that considerable detail would be needed -- with all kinds of
breakdowns and consolidations -- in order to work back to the actual
use of resources.
The Chairman said that if intelligence officers were
asked to tell the users what they need to know the end result would
be a catalog. "If you go to the users, the answers will be too
broad to relate to resources," he said. "What I want to do is
strike a balance."
Dr. Hall referred to the Soviet command and control problem.
He said this had been studied in DOD for a long time. He said the
set of questions CIA had prepared for the Clandestine Service on
this problem was very detailed, when what was really needed were
answers to a very few significant questions. He considered the
command and control questions in the ICBM list were much too broad.
Dr. Proctor conceded that the end product sought was the
answer to some basic questions as to strength and weaknesses of
Soviet command and control, but to get these answers you have to
go to collectors with very detailed specifics, from which you can
draw your own general judgments.
Dr. Cline said that utility of reporting was what the Chairman
The Chairman said there is probably a stack of Soviet
command and control reports a foot high, but the question is whether
these are used.
Dr. Cline said the Working Group members would "think of how
to tackle the problem."
4. Review of Intelligence Support to NSSM-69 Follow-on.
The Chairman said that since completion of the study
some problems had been sorted out -- such as the location of missiles,
how to describe threats and scenario-driven intelligence.
Mr. Weiss asked if specific comments could be entertained,
noting that the "location of missiles is not yet sorted out since
the discussion was mis-focused." He noted that problems such as
site signatures was at the technical level and what policy had really
wanted to know was whether intelligence could provide assurance that
would warrant consideration of pre-emptive strike as a feasible
policy alternative. His recollection was that this had not been
sorted out, yet this was the issue with which policy makers had been
concerned, "as Andy Marshall suggested."
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Dr. Proctor replied that there were "various degrees of
answers. "When China gets ICBM's the U.S. will have as good a
count as we have on the USSR, but if the question is protection of
China's neighbors we won't have answers that good on mobile missiles
or short-range missiles.
Mr. Weiss reiterated that the problem of options was the
key, and Dr. Proctor said that intelligence relating to this "should
have come through loud and clear on the second go-around."
The Chairman said that, with respect to policy options, if
intelligence can assure location of 50% of the missiles, and there are
10, then the policy risk is the risk which attaches to use of the other 5.
Mr. Marshall commented that "people are saying a year later
that things have worked out, but this is beside the point. The problem
is how well did intelligence support the problem while it was still
underway. The tone of the documents2 a&lA9-4a optimistic."
The Chairman noted that in memorandum of 12 January
he had recommended the NSSM-69 evaluation be re erred to production
managers for their in-house use. He asked if there was any objection
to this action or should the Working Group send a paper to the NSCIC
for guidance.
Dr. Cline said he strongly favored the 12 January recommendations
and considered it would be a mistake to seek NSCIC guidance on this
study.
General Bresnahan asked whether the Working Group had
authority to do this under its charter.
Dr. Proctor said the action did not involve issuance of
instructions since the paper would be for information.
Mr. Marshall agreed the paper need not be sent to the NSCIC
principals, but he wondered how the group could find out what production
managers did with it, adding: "Past performance is not encouraging."
The Chairman said that the DCI is now Deputy Chairman of
NSCIC and his name on the covering memorandum would help to get a
producer reaction.
Dr. Cline said that "tons of paper" should not be "dropped
on the NSCIC."
Dr. Proctor noted that "we in production are responsible for
reacting in our own interests. We will do something." He considered
the counter-insurgency aspect of the study was "very woolly" and that
no paper should be generated on it.
Dr. Cline summed up by saying: "So we resolve that production
members after a period of time will undertake to report informally to
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the Working Group as to what has happened."
The Chairman said a memorandum would be prepared, along
with a package of comments on the study, would be sent to the
production managers "for action as appropriate" and that a report
on actions taken would be scheduled as an agenda item on a future
Working Group meeting.
General Bresnahan asked who were meant by the term "production
managers" and the Chairman assured him the JCS was "scot free."
5. Cruise Missile Study.
Before start of the discussion the Chairman requested that
the proposed revision of the Working Group Terms of Reference be
distributed, and he requested the executive secretary to explain
the changes which were proposed. This was done.
Both Dr. Hall and Dr. Cline requested time to review the
proposed changes and comment by telephone, and this was agreed. No
changes to the redrafted Terms of Reference were proposed by any
member. (The change in the functions paragraph has been drafted
to meet objection raised by General Seith in a memorandum which
noted that the Chairman's proposal to send the study to the DCI
for appropriate action was not within the terms of the Working
Group's Terms of Reference.)
The Chairman then proposed that the Cruise Missile Study
be sent by the Working Group to the DCI for his dissemination to
intelligence production managers.
General Bresnahan agreed on behalf of General Seith.
Dr. Cline said he did not consider the study addressed "our
problem of concern." He requested that the Working Group merely "note"
the study because he would not like the study to go out as guidance
from the group since he had problems with it.
Dr. Hall said he would like to hear Dr. Cline's view (which
Dr. Cline agreed to discuss outside the meeting) but he also would
like to have the study distributed.
The Chairman proposed and the group agreed that the study
be "noted" and distributed.
6. "The Arab-Israeli Ceasefire of 1970" and "Jordan-1970: A Case Study.
Mr. Marshall said he did not like the proposed summary which
had been disseminated as basis for the group discussion, and he
thought that more effort should be taken to devote time to discussing
the studies themselves and possible actions. He felt "some mechanism"
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should be adopted to do this, and he. proposed that either he
prepare an alternative summary or a small sub-group be set up.
Dr. Cline asked whether a NSCIC meeting was scheduled
soon and, if so, this paper could energize the parent committee.
Mr. Marshall said the reexamination he was proposing
shouldn't take more than two weeks, and that he would propose an
early NSCIC meeting. He again said that he Would prepare a
different summary and list of things which might be done, or
the group could agree to form a small sub-group.
Dr. Cline asked if Mr. Marshall had in mind more specific
proposals than were in the draft memorandum, and Mr. Marshall replied
that the present draft "doesn't tell people what to do."
Dr. Hall said he would like to see Mr. Marshall try it, and
.We offered to provide someone to help. He thought it would "be
helpful if something more specific could be laid out."
The Chairman said that something specific would give
the NSCIC "something to bite on."
Mr. Marshall also proposed that all members of the group
submit "more detailed comments to follow up with."
The Chairman asked if Mr. Marshall could meet a two-week
deadline, working with a group of State, OSD and CIA representatives.
I Mr. Marshall said he thought he could, so the Chairman
accepted Mr. Marshall's proposal and said the new paper would be an agenda
item at a Working Group meeting in three weeks (April 25).
Dr. Cline said it would be helpful if Mr. Marshall could
outline his framework so it could be addressed.
The.'Chairman commented that "many of the things intelligence
would agree have been wrong could be agreed to without documentary
proof."
Dr. Proctor said that he considered the summary is OK, but
"actions are the key, and I will have suggestidns for more specific
things there."
Dr. Hall thought the summary could be pointed up so the
reader "wouldn't have to know what the message was."
Mr. Marshall asked that he be advised who would be working with
him. Dr. Proctor indicated he would participate personally if
possible.
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7. Progress Report on the Yugoslavia Study.
Dr. Cline and Mr. Marshall both said the study is "coming
along well" and that completion was expected by June.
8. Discussion of the Future Work Program.
The Chairman opened the discussion by reporting the new
DCI will shortly be putting out his own Planning Guidance paper,
it a fairly sharp document," and that it might be useful to have
the comments of the Working Group on it, and have it also goto the
the NSCIC for comment. The Chairman thought the new Planning
Guidance might "sweep away" some of the problems with which the
Working Group had been concerned.
Dr. Cline asked what the nature of the new document would
be, and the Chairman indicated the format would be about the same
as in the 10 January Planning Guidance, but the contents would be
more specific.
Dr. Cline asked "when?" and the Chairman replied "probably
before we meet again."
Mr. Marshall said he would be interested in any ideas the
members had as to future activities. The Chairman said that as he
saw it "we will have an accelerated program," and asked for recom-
mendations.
Dr. Proctor said that the crisis study should be completed
Mr. Marshall noted that issues were raised by the studies
already accomplished but that the paper which had been proposed for
the NSCIC did not "provide enough for recommendations."
Dr. Cline said that the crisis study summary offers an
agenda, to which he would make additions.
He thought that the group might suggest to the NSCIC that
when quick resolution of a problem involving operational policy/intel-
ligence interface,the Working Group could offer itself as an active
participant.
The Chairman considered this would be difficult in fields of
operational policy.
Dr. Cline asked: "Are we willing to take on an added role?"
and Dr. Proctor responded that he thought "our group would be the
wrong group."
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Dr. Cline said that "perhaps our responsibility is to
decide when to set up a task force." He recalled that when USIB
discussed the mining of Haiphong Harbor the USIB members decided
they did not know enough about policy aspects of the problem, and
set up a working group to work on it. Mr. Huizenga could not recall
that such a group actually was formed.
Dr. Proctor said the problem was "to have machinery designated
before a crisis."
"To do what?" Mr. Weiss asked.
"To cope," Dr. Cline responded.
Dr. Proctor said it: was clear from the crisis studies that
there is a flood of crisis reporting. He suggested there should be
one "authoritative report.,, If special departmental needs had to be
made, this could be done "at: home." But there should not be several
flows of reports from different places to top levels. Also, he felt
there is a need for a mechanism to produce "coordinated pieces" --
perhaps SNIEs or perhaps something less formal -- and if views differed,
an explanation why should be! included.
The Chairman said his staff was looking at a technical hookup
between current intelligence, shops and policy level offices by audio-
visual methods.
Dr. Proctor thought "this may be bkeh way off" but the
Chairman said "the technology is not way off."
Dr. Proctor noted, however, that there are problems of
acquisition of equipment, etc. He considered the existing system is
"pretty good," with secure telephones and the like. "Not as rapid as
an audio-visual system," he said, but we could build on what we have."
The Chairman said he planned to propose to the NSCIC "here is
what can be done on a real time basis for coordinating replies without
having personnel get together physically." He agreed that procedures,
LDX equipment, etc., "can be set up now."
Dr. Proctor said that his suggestion was that there would be
one place where representatives of all the agencies would sit, and
there would be "just one flow -- one piece of paper for the community --
and the user wouldn't have to pull things together."
Dr. Cline said the White House had recently sent State a paper
indicating that the handling of non-military crises would be done in
the State Department.
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The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours. Immediately following
the meeting, Mr. Wells advised that Justice concurred in the redrafted
Terms of Reference.
25X1A9a
executive Secretary
JET;sbc
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