U.S. APPROVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00274R000100190004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 10, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/03/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000100190004-2
It
SUBJECT: (Optional)
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
Director, Office of External Affairs
7D43 Hqs
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
3.
DDC I
13? ALL PORTIONS OF THIS
NOTE ARE SECRET
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
1_79 EDITIONS
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
10 M/ R 1982
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
.We received a call today
from Jim Van Wagenen, House
Appropriations Defense Subcommit-
tee. He said that Chairman
Joseph Addabbo (D., NY) and
Representative Jack Edwards
(R., AL) have asked that the
Agency be prepared to comment
at tomorrow'.s briefing on the
article in the Washington Post
today by Bob Woodward reporting
on the Central American Covert
Action program.
You may wish to address this
in your opening remarks or
respond to a question from the
Chairman on the article
Attachment
 Approved For Release 2007/03/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000100190004-2
WASWIPGT0N 140 ST 10 March 1982
11
U.S. A"proves,
Covert Plan- .
a1 Nicaragua ?
By Patrick E. Tyler
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers
COVERT, From Al . .
necessary; officials said. The-- CIA
force would lre supplemented by an-
other Latin Amer it;::i commando.
force of up to 1,000 uir..-some of
whom currently arc t;;ulergoing
training 1{y Argentine indit;try offi-
cials.
This is the' plan for CIA covert
operations first reported in The
Washington Post.on Feb. 14 as part
of the Reagan administration's strat-
egy in the region. At the time, it a
could not been determined whether
the president had authorized the
CIA's plan to build a
paramilitary
force against Nicaragua.
Several informed sources now say
that the president did formally au-
thorize the proposal, but the precise
timing of his authorization could not
be determined. It may have occurred
late last year. I
The covert action proposal was
developed by the. CIA and first
presented in detail to President Rea-
President Reagan has authorized
covert operations against the Central
American nation of Nicaragua,
which, administration officials have
charged, is serving as the military
command center and supply line to
guerrillas in El Salvador.. -
According to informed adminis-
tration officials, the president has
ruled out the use of U.S. military
forces in direct anti-Nicaraguan " op.
erations. But the authorized covert
plan directs the CIA to begin to
build and fund a paramilitary force-
of up to 500 Latin Americans, Who
are to operate out of commando
camps spread along the Nicaraguan
Honduran border. - - : ' ; ,.= ~ -
The officials stressed that it will
take months for the paramilitary
force to be recruited, trained, and
positioned to begin operations. They.;;
did not say precisely when the'cross
border operations are` scheduled to.
begin.
. As part of this plan, the comman7
dos eventually would attempt to de-
stroy vital Nicaraguan targets, such
as power plants and.bridges, 'in - an
effort to disrupt the economy and
divert the attention and the ? re'-
sources of the government. CIA.
strategists believe these covert op
erations inside Nicaragua will slow
.the flow of arms to El Salvador and*
disrupt what they claim is a Soviet;
and Cuban-controlled government in'
Nicaragua. .
Operating under a $19 million
CIA budget, the planned 500-man
force could be increased in -size if
See COVERT, A16, Col. 4
gan. by CIA . Director William J.
Casey at ' the Nov. 16 meeting of the, National Security Council. It was
supported by Secretary, of State Al-
exander M. Haig Jr: and Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, ac-
cording to knowledgeable *officials.
Administration officials familiar
with the CIA -covert program.
stressed that the decision' to focus on
economic targets was based on a de-
sire to disrupt the Nicaraguan arms
supply line to El Salvador in a man-
ner that is relatively inexpensive and
least threatening to the civilian pop-
ulation. .
"If you blow up a dam, you cause
a lot 'of trouble, but you're not kil-
ling people;' one high-level official
said., .
in his-Feb' 18 press conference,
\Reagan was asked if the United
States was planning covert opera- .
tions in Nicaragua; but he declined
to comment.
Nicaragua currently is ruled by
I the Sandinista National Liberation
Front; whose guerrilla forces- over-,
tbrew the government of dictator.
,.Anastasio Somoza in July 1979. .
Honduras has a'close military re-
lationship with the United States,
and Honduran officials-fear that the
political upheaval in El Salvador and
Nicaragua will spill into their coun-_
try. As' a separate part of the U.S.
-strategy in the region,'the U.S. mil-
itary eurrently--is engaged in two op-
eration's in neighboring Honduras to
indirectly support anti-Nicaraguan
efforts-, ,informed administration of-
ficials said.
According .#o' highly classified
NSC -records, the initial CIA propos-
al-in November called ' for "support
and conduct of political and para-
military. ;- operations against the
Cuban. presence and Cuban-Sandi-
nista support strucl.ufe. in. Nicaragua
and elsewhere in Central America."
The CIA,.in seeking presidential au-
thorizatidn'for the $19 million para;,
military force, emphasized. that "the
program should not be confined, to
that-funding level or torthe 500-ma'n'
force described," the records show.
Covert operations .under-the CIA-
_proposal, according:'. t0 the,. NSC
records, are intended 'to:
? "Build popular support in Cen-
tral America and Nicaragua ? for an
opposition front that would be na-
tionalistic, anti-Cuban and anti-
Somo4a. . .
P "Support the opposition / front
through formation 'and' training of
ction teams to collect intelligence
action'
and engage in paramilitary and po-
litical operations in Nicaragua and
elsewhere.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000100190004-2
"Work primarily through' non-
Americans" to achieve these covert
objectives, but in some cases the CIA,
might "take unilateral paramilitary
action-possibly using U.S. person-_
nel-against special Cuban targets."-
After the initial presentation, the-
CIA proposal was turned over to the
national security planning group, A.
subcommittee of the NSC, as a draft
"presidential finding," which states
the need for specific covert opera-
tions. Under national security -stat-
utes, no funds can be expeided for
covert actions "until the president
finds that each such operation is im-
portant to the national security of
the United States."
Senior U.S. defense and intelli-
gence officials have said in recent
weeks that without a slowdown in
the arms supply' to El Salvador by
air, land and sea routes from Nica-
ragua, the position of government
forces in the war-torn equntry could
deteriorate rapidly, potentially
prompting-an escalation of Salvador-
an requests for U.S. military assist-
ance. Such requests are likely to run
into strong congressional and public
resistance. -
According to administration offi-
cials, the covert plan is part of a
broader program through which the
administration hopes to achieve
long-term stability in Central Amer-
ica by creating, nurturing and sup-
porting new' political coalitions of
centrist forces ? in . Nicaragua and
other key countries..
Central America currently is ex-
periencing a,series of armed rebel-
lions, and officials here say U.S. in-
telligence has obtained detailed out-
lines of Soviet and Cuban long-term
financial, military and political plans
to Support armed insurgencies in the
region. This outline of Soviet inten-
tions-along with intell igen'ce.ol: cur-
rent Soviet and Cuban activity in.
the area-has alarmed the presi-
dent's national security advisers and,
according to .officials,_ is a central
reason for the administration's co-
vert program.
Several senior officials that
intelligence gathering efforts in Cen.
tral America : lapsed significantly
under presidents Nixon, Ford and
Carter and that each of those admin-
istrations -underestimated. the prob-
lems' of Central * American govern-
ments and the strength of opposition
movements. ' .
The CIA station in El Salvador,
for example, was closed for about
five years roughly, from 1973 to
1978-to save money, and the Unit-
ed States had virtually no intelli-
gencet sources there during that pe-
riod.' '
"It takes a long time to deveop
this intelligence,, spread mein ey
around and put people in crucidl
places and make the kind of friends
we need," one official said last week.
Only in the past year, officials
said, has the United States learned
details of what the Soviets and-.Cu-
bans hope .to gain in the region. U;S.
intelligence reports now show that-in
1978 the Soviets and Cubans com-
mitted the money and resources ,?or-
a major effort to support Cuban,
style rebellions in Central America. -
One senior official - said, "If you
look what the goals- were in 1978 And
realize how far they have come-,by
1982, then where they want to be,in
1987 has to be taken seriously and
that would concern anyone" in the
United States.
Other officials said they ' are
alarmed by convincing intelligence
reports that one Soviet-Cuban goal
in the region is the development,of
an active insurgency to destabilize
Mexico during this decade. i T
Some intelligence reports reaching
the president support the adminis-
tration charge,of an increased Soviet
and Cuban threat in Central Amer;
ica. One recent report indicates `that
the Soviet Union is training Latin
American pilots to fly the most-ad=
vanced Soviet fighter, the Mig'`?25
Foxbat, which has a radar systeni,cas'
pable of directing other planes'ih -a
large battle area.
The 'nationalitie's of the Latin
American pilots being trained onthe
Foxbat are not clear. Cuba'alreAdy
has acquired a squadron of Mig' 23
supersonic fighters, and previous' in-
telligence reports have confiriped-
that. Nicaraguans have trained-'oii
less sophisticated Mig fighters.
Further,- Guatemala, ,potentially
the most prosperous Central Airief_'
ican country, is also being tl' ~i?at=
erred by a' leftist insurgency and the
most current CIA estimate is that
the government will undergo a major
change of status within 18 months.:; -
While some members of the` ad-
ministratiori remain skeptical Abut
broad claims of spreading Soviet 'and
Cuban influence in the region,
knowledgeable officials say' this' is
the interpretation that has -l,een
largely. adopted by President Rear
gan. ' .