SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO CUBA AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000500980033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 14, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO CUBA AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES
Summary
Some 56,100 metric tons of military gquipment were delivered by the
USSR to Cuba during the reporting period. , Of that total, 50,260 metric
tons arrived in 1982. The pace of total military-related deliveries this
reporting year is nearly the same as last year. Deliveries of arms have
returned to lower levels common until 1981, but these were offset by a
significant increase in the delivery of military-associated support
equipment. The most important military items delivered were fighter
aircraft, helicopter gunqhinc surface-to-air missile launchers and an
amphibious landing ship.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis and Office-of Global Issues, CIA, and coordinated within the
Intelligence community. Comments and questions may be directed to
ffice of African and Latin American Anal
ALA M 82 10162
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The major impact of these deliveries on the Cuban armed forces will
be a potentially significant improvement in air force capabilities, a
strengthening of the navy, and a somewhat greater capability to provide
military support to allies in the Caribbean region. It will take Cuba
some time--perhaps another year or two--to integrate all of these new
weapons into its armed forces. The technical sophistication of these
weapons--many of which are new to Cuba--has required a greater Soviet
advisory presence. A new training school for fighter pilots was also
established in Cuba this year, with assistance from the Soviets.
We believe that most of the arms and equipment delivered by_the
Soviets have remained in Cuba, but Cuba also continues to serve as a
conduit for Soviet military equipment destined for Nicaragua and
Grenada. Although we can identify some shipments of small arms,
ammunition, jeeps, and trucks from Cuba to those two countries, we cannot
determine whether these items came from this year's Soviet deliveries or
from older Cuban stocks.
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The Deliveries
The overall volume of Soviet arms and military-associated
deliveries continued at a high pace during the last two months of
1981 and the first nine months of 1982, even when adjustments for
changes in our estimative methods are taken into account (see
page 4). Shipment tonnage per month ranged from 2,370 tons in
December 1981 to 9,140 tons in February 1982. There were no
deliveries in October this year, but several arms carriers
subsequently have arrived in Cuba, and it appears that the totals
for calender year 1982 will be only slightly below the 63,700
metric tons overall carried in 1981.
Leading the list of items delivered were large numbers of
fighter aircraft. ThIIse included 24 MIG-23s, the first since
1978, and 36 MIG-21s. The 15 Czechoslovak-built L-39 jet
trainers that were delieved on a Czechoslovak ship late this
summer have formed the nucleus of a new fighter training
school. Finally, Cuba received its first 12 MI-24 Hind
helicopter gunships in January.
Ground-based air defense equipment delivered this year
included at least three SA-9 surface-to-air missile hSAM)
launchers, the first seen with a Cuban unit in Cuba, and
possibly some additional SA-6 SAM equipment to support two new
SAM facilities. The SA-6 system was first identified in Cuba
last December, but apparently was delivered earlier in 1981. It
was not included in last year's report of Soviet arms
shipments.
Deliveries to the Cuban Navy included six OSA-II missile
patrol boats, a Pelym-class degaussing ship, two small
minesweepers, and a Polnocny-class medium amphibious landing
3AA-7 air-to-air missiles, and AS-7 and possibly AS-l0 air-to-surface
missiles--all carried by the MIG-23--were also noted in Cuba for the first
time this year.
4SA-9 equipment has not yet been identified at a Cuban garrison. The
three launchers were seen at a training facility with a Cuban armored unit.
The Soviet brigade in Cuba also has SA-9s.
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ship.5 A second Polnocny was en route to Cuba a
reporting period and was delivered in December.
With the exception of 48 anti-tank guns that arrived late
last year, we have not identified any specific pieces d
force equipment delivered during the reporting period. 7
consequently, we saw no military equipment on the quays at Cuban
ports this year, even while the ships that carried arms from the
USSR were in port.
may have been a result o.t explicit stories about Soviet arms
deliveries to Cuba which began appearing in the press as early as
July 1981. Unlike aircraft and naval vessels, which are
primarily kept in the open, new ground force equipment is
difficult to identify after it reaches a military garrison.
The number of Soviet ships carrying arms from the Black Sea
Port of Nikolayev to Cuba declined this year to a level roughly
equal to that seen in the 1970s. At the same time, however,
shipments of military-related goods from other ports, only
included in our estimates in the last two years, are up
substantially. (see Chart 1). In 1981, 18,200 metric tons of
military-associated goods were delivered in 24 ship voyages from
ports other than Nikolayev. In 1982, military-associated goods
were delivered by 43 ship voyages from other ports and accounted
for 29,760 metric tons of the total deliveries in January through
Data on tonnage and ships in chart 1 for 1962 through 1980
reflect only major military shipments. These shipments are
comprised of ships loading goods at Nikolayev and some few
shipments from other ports where military cargo--usually naval
Tonnages of identified military
craft-
deliveries for 1981 and 1982 should be used to compare with
51n previous years we have not included tonnages of naval ships delivered
under tow or under their own power because of the typically large tonnages
involved and the inherent risks that inclusion of these figures might lead to
misinterpretation of real trends in deliveries. Henceforth such tonnage will
be included but noted separately in order to facilitate monitoring of all
component trends.
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prior-year figures. Starting in 1981 we included shipments of
military-associated goods from ports other than Nikolayev when it
could be determined that they were assigned to the Cuban
military. This change was made to make our estimate directly
comparable to those of other government agencies.
Impact on Cuba's Armed Forces
Air and Air Defense
The large number of new fighter aircraft delivered over the
past year has allowed Cuba to modernize and expand its air
force. We believe that most of the new aircraft are replacing
older MIG-15, MIG-17 and early-model MIG-21 fighers. Many of the
older aircraft are too old to be of further use and are simply
stripped of useful parts and abandoned., Others have been:
refurbished, probably with parts cannibalized from other older
aircraft, and are still available either for use by the Cubans or
perhaps to pass on to Nicaragua when the time is judged right.
The 36 MIG-21s delivered were divided between the airbases
at Holguin in eastern Cuba, and San Julian--where the new fighter
school was established. Counting an addtional 22 MIG-21s
delivered in September and October last year, Cuba has doubled
the number of late-model MIG-21s in its air force in the last 15
months. Late model MIG-21s are roughly comparable to the US
F-5E.
The 24 new MIG-23s joined a squadron of MIG-23 fighter-
bombers Cuba has had since 1978 to form a Flogger regiment at San
Antonio de los Banos Airfield just southwest of Havana. Four of
the new aircraft have been identified as trainers, while most of
the rest appear to be air defense variants. At least some of
these are known to be Flogger B interceptors, the first of this
model to be sent to Cuba. The Flogger B interceptor has a more
advanced radar and weapons system than the MIG-21 and other MIG-
23 models exported to Cuba. They are more effective against
medium and low altitude attackers than Cuba's MIG-21s and were
the most advanced fighter in the Soviet Air Force from 1972-
1978. As a fighter, the MIG-23 is roughly comparable to the US
F-4.
The new MI-24 helicopter squadron has been established at
Cienfuegos. Helicopter gunships are primarily designed for
supporting ground forces, but we do not yet know what mission the
Cubans intend for them. They would be particularly valuable both
for internal defense and for counterinsurgency operations in
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Cubans plan to send them to Nicaraaua or that their pilots are
being trained for such a mission.
The new SA-6 and SA-9 SAMS Cuba has received are mounted on
mobile launchers and are more effective against low-altitude
targets than the SAMs Cuba has received in the past. The radar-
guided SA-6 is used to defend mobile ground force formations in
the USSR and Eastern Europe, but the Cubans appear to be setting
up semi-permanent launch positions for them. The SA-6 is
especially effective against high-performance aircraft attacking
at medium to low altitudes. The SA-9 is an infrared-guided
system with a much shorter range. It is usually employ
conjunction with radar-directed antiaircraft artillery.
It will take the armed forces sometime--perhaps another
year or two--to train enough pilots, operators, and maintenance
technicians to assimilate all of these new weapons into their
units. The technical sophistication of these weapons,
particularly the radars and missiles, will require a greater
Soviet advisory presence over the new few years. Establishment
of the fighter training school in Cuba will allow Cuban pilots,
and perhaps Nicaraguans, to receive their training close to home
and in their native Spanish. Until now, Cuban and Nicaraguan
fighter pilots have been sent to schools in the USSR and Eastern
Europe for up to four years.
The Navy
The six new OSA-II missile patrol boats constitute a nearly
50 percent increase in the inventory of these vessels. They are
primarily used for coastal defense missions, but the long range
(20-39 km) radar-homing missiles they carry give them an
offensive capability as well.
The delivery of two minesweepers and a degaussing ship (used
to measure the magnetic signature of surface combatants to
provide data that can protect them from certain torpedoes and
mines) suggests a continuing Cuban concern about the threat of a
US blockade possibly involving the use of mines and attack
submarines.
The most significant new delivery to the Cuban navy this
year was the Polnocny-class amphibious landing ship. The Cubans
previously have had to move all troops and equipment abroad by
air or on merchant ships that require access to a friendly
port. Amphibious landing ships give the Cubans some capability
to deliver troops and equipment over beaches or even, in some
limited cases, to conduct opposed landings. While the capacity
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limited cases, to conduct opposed landings. While the capacity
of these landing ships is relatively small (180 troops or six
armored vehicles each), they can be used both for delivering
equipment outside of port areas and for limited offensive
operations. Their radius of action limits them to the Caribbean
region.
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Chart No. 1
SOVIET DELIVERIES OF MILITARY GOODS TO CUBA
Selected Years
Identified Military- Naval
Military Associated Ship
Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries*
YEAR
SHIPS
TONNAGE
SHIPS
TONNAGE
TONNAGE
TOTAL
1962
125
250,000
--
--
--
--
1965
5
10,800
--
--
--
--
1970
8
11,300
--
--
--
--
1975
8
13,900
--
--
--
--
1976
13
19,500
--
--
--
--
1977
10
21,600
--
--
--
--
1978
12
22,200
--
--
--
--
1979
12
17,300
--
--
--
--
1980
14
20,900
--
--
--
--
1981
24
45,500
21
18,200
--
63,700
1982`
11
18,100
43
29,760
2,400
50,260
Incorporated in the 1981 and 1982 estimates for the first time as a separate
category; which were included in prior- 25X1
year tonnages; also includes Naval ships delivered under tow or their own power.
January through October only.
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Chart 2
Tonnage of Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba,
1981 and 1982
TOTAL 198t 63.680 Metric Tons (Jan-Oct: 57.800 Metric Tons)
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1981
TOTAL 1982: (Jan-Oat) 50,260 Metric Tons
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1982
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