THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES A-B TEAM EPISODE CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITY AND OBJECTIVES
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95th Congress
2d Session
~ X01- 27f7
$ Ci
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES A-B
TEAM EPISODE CONCERNING SOVIET STRATE-
GIC CAPABILITY AND OBJECTIVES
REPORT
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COLLECTION, PRODUCTION, AND QUALITY
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-542 WASHINGTON : 1978
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d sess.)
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana, Chairman
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Vice Chairman
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
GARY HART, Colorado
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JAKE GARN, Utah
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
EARL D. EISENHOWER, Minority Staff Director
AUDREY H. HATRY, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND QUALITY
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois, Chairman
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey, Vice Chairman
GARY HART, Colorado RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
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The following report is the second of a series prepared by the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Pro-
duction and Quality, chaired by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.),
and Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), vice chairman. The report on
The National Intelligence Estimates-A-B Team Episode Concern-
ing Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives also carries the sep-
arate views of Senators Gary Hart (D-Colo.), Daniel P. Moynihan
(D-N.Y.), and Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.).
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CONTENTS
The National Intelligence Estimates-A-B Team episode concerning
Soviet strategic capability and objectives---------------------------
1
Scope of the committee inquiry--------------------------------------
1
The facts of the case-----------------------------------------------
1
Principal judgments and recommendations----------------------------
2
Critique----------------------------------------------------------
4
Committee findings------------------------------------------------
4
Separate views:
Senator Gary Hart--------------------------------------------
7
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan------------------------------------
9
Senator Malcolm Wallop---------------------------------------
12
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES-A-B TEAM
EPISODE CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPA-
BILITY AND OBJECTIVES
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as part of its over-
sight function, has conducted a study of the 197 6 "A Team-B Team"
experiment in comparative assessments of Soviet strategic strength
which was initiated by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board (PFIAB). The committee conducted this inquiry under its
mandate to evaluate the collection, production, and quality of U.S. in-
telligence, in this case assessing whether the A-B experiment had
proved to be a useful procedure in improving National Intelligence
Estimates (NIE's) on a centrally important question.
The pertinent facts of the A-B case are (a) that PFIAB connnis-
sioned three ad hoc outside groups (composing the "B Team") to
examine the data available to the U.S. intelligence community's ana-
lysts (the "A Team"), to determine whether such data would sup-
port conclusions on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives dif-
ferent from those presented in the community's NIE's, and (b) that
during the exercise details of these sensitive questions leaked on sev-
eral occasions to the press.
The committee has prepared a classified report on the. subject,
sent copies of that report to the executive branch, made copies avail-
able to certain members of the B Team for review and comment, and
subsequently rechecked the record thoroughly and accommodated
some of the B Team members' comments. A summary of the commit-
tee's report follows.
SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE INQUIRY
The committee sought to determine the facts and issues central to
the A Team-B Team case, and to give a critique of the procedures
which underlay the principal judgments and conduct of both the A
and B Teams. The committee's report makes no attempt to judge
which group's estimates concerning the U:S.S.R, are correct. The
report focuses on the processes followed; its findings and recom-
mendations for improving the quality and utility of future NIE's on
Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives are primarily directed at
procedural issues.
In the broadest sense, the NIE-B Team episode derived from a
growing concern over the U.S.S.R.'s steady increase in strategic
weapons strength over the course of the past decade and disagree-
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2
ment within the U.S. intelligence community 1 on the meaning of
this growth.
The B Team experiment in competitive analysis stemmed from
the PFIAB's opinion that the NIE's had been underestimating the
progress of Soviet strategic weapons.2 In an August 1975 letter to
President Ford, PFIAB Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr.,
proposed that the President authorize the NSC to implement a "com-
petitive analysis." The then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
William E. Colby, speaking with the unanimous agreement of the
U.S. Intelligence Board (the chiefs of the intelligence community
components), responded with a proposal that the PFIAB first ex-
amine an applicable NIE then underway and thereafter determine
what specific course of action to take.
The PFIAB found weaknesses in that NIE and, after having made
further investigations of its own, again proposed 3 (in April 1976) an
experiment in "competitive analysis." The PFIAB recommended that
the exercise be placed under the DCI's jurisdiction and that it address
certain critical estimative issues.
The committee's report includes these central judgments :
That the concept of a review of the NIE's by outside experts
was a legitimate one.
That the B Team made some valid criticisms of the NIE's,
especially concerning certain technical intelligence questions, and
some useful recommendations concerning the estimative process,
but those contributions were less valuable than they might have
been because (1) the exercise had been so structured by the
PFIAB and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that
the B Team on Soviet objectives reflected the views of only one
segment of the spectrum of opinion; and (2) that Team spent
much of its effort on criticizing much earlier NIE's rather than,
as had been earlier agreed upon by the PFIAB and the DCI,
producing alternative estimates from certain of those of the 1976
NIE.
That the value of the A-B experiment was further lessened by
the fact that details concerning these highly classified questions
leaked to the press, where these appeared in garbled and one-
sided form. It has not been determined who was responsible for
the leaks.
That, most importantly, NIE's on Soviet strategic capabilities
and objectives still need improvement in a number of important
respects.
I In the past. the U.S. Intelligence community included the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence com-
ponents of the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, FBI, Energy Resources Develop-
ment Administration, and Treasury.
2 As of August 1975, the PFIAB's members, in addition to Chairman George W. Ander-
son, Jr. (Adm. USN, Ret.), were William 0. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr..
Robert W. Calvin, Gordon Cray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. and
Edward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and these additional
members had joined the PFIAB : John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer. Robert D.
Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB function has since been abolished by
President Carter.
6 Through Its Committee on NIB Evaluation (Messrs. Robert Galvin, Edward Teller, and
Tohn Foster).
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The report's principal recommendations include :
That a collegial estimative group be formed in place of individ-
ual National Intelligence Officers.
That outside critiques of NIE's should continue to be con-
ducted, but should, in each instance, be made by expert groups
which are broadly representative in character, and whose pro-
cedures are thereafter more strictly monitored by the commis-
sioning authorities than obtained in the A-B case.
The committee's investigation was based upon study of primary
documents; examination of the NIE record since 1959 on Soviet
strategic weapons developments; and interviews with principals from
the A and B Teams, the intelligence community, and the PFIAB.
The committee has enjoyed the full cooperation of all the above
parties. The comments of DCI Stansfield Turner on the report and the
present statement and the views of certain members of the B Team
on Soviet Objectives have been given consideration by the committee.
Responding to the PFIAB initiatives, the new DCI, Mr. George
Bush, consented to the experiment, and by June 1976, the PFIAB
and the DCI had worked out ground rules for a competitive assess-
ment experiment. The DCI, through his representatives, made ar-
rangements for, and monitored the experiment in accordance with,
those ground rules. Members of the PFIAB were called upon to assist
in the. formation of the three B Teams and took an active role in the
selection of team members.
The exercise did not simply pit an A (or NIE) team against a B
Team. There were three B Teams : two on technical questions and one
on Soviet objectives. As for the A side, an NIE, on Soviet strategic
weapons had already been regularly scheduled earlier in the year, and
work on it by the intelligence community had already begun before
the B Teams came into being. This NIE was much broader in scope
than the particular estimative questions the B Teams had been com-
missioned to address, and the individual civilian and military analysts
involved in producing that NIE represented a wide range of views
held within the departments and agencies of the intelligence com-
munity on the NIE's many questions.
The NIE participants and the B Teams proceeded to produce their
two sets of studies independently, with only occasional direct contact
during the drafting phase. After the initial drafts of the three B teams
were completed, the two sides confronted one another formally on three
occasions. Once the decision to proceed with the exercise 'had been
made, procedural cooperation was good between the intelligence com-
munity and the three respective B teams. The specific results differed,
however, in the three cases. Those concerning technical questions were
the most rewarding : there was a mutual give-and-take, and these B
Teams clearly made a constructive contribution. By contrast, the dis-
cussions concerning Soviet objectives were more controversial and less
conclusive. The B Team on Soviet Objectives contributed some useful
critiques concerning certain technical intelligence questions, but there
was not much give-and-take on broader issues. The view cited in a
December 1976 press article 4 that the B Team challenge turned the
NIE "around 180 degrees" is incorrect.
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4
CRITIQUE
It is the view of the committee that past NIE's could have profited
from drawing on experts on Soviet strategic questions from outside
the intelligence community, both in and out of Government, and from
subjecting NIE analyses and judgments on this and other areas to
competing assessments from such sources. The PFIAB's 1975-76
proposition that outside expertise should be used to criticize and evalu-
ate the NIE's was a legitimate one. The exercise in practice, however,
fell short of the initial conception.
The composition of the B Team dealing with Soviet objectives was
so structured that the outcome of the exercise was predetermined and
the experiment's contribution lessened. The procedures followed by the
intelligence community in the A-B episode also weakened the overall
effort to some degree. The intelligence agencies were cast inaccurately
in the role of "doves," when they in fact represented a broad spectrum
of views. They needlessly allowed analytic mismatches, by sending
relatively junior specialists into the debating arena against prestigious
and articulate B Team authorities. And the monitoring of the pro-
cedures of the B Team on Soviet Objectives was subsequently fairly
loose.
The B Team contributions and the 1976 NIE can also be faulted on
various substantive grounds. Because of its narrowly specified purpose
and scope, influenced strongly in recent years by the preferences of
senior policymaking readers regarding format, the NIE did not ad-
dress the question of how Soviet strategic weapons development fits
into important larger concerns [the entire panoply] of Soviet domestic,
military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural efforts. As a consequence,
the NIE's discussion of Soviet objectives was too brief to be useful. In
the view of some readers, its discussion of 'Soviet military hardware in
certain respects was inadequate to be helpful to high-level officials.
A weakness in both the NIE and the B Team report is their lack of
expressed sensitivity to the fact and the significance of world develop-
ments other than those directly related to the U.S.-Soviet arms race.
The strategic weapons balance is the chief subject of both documents,
but both documents nonetheless are dominated by military hardware
questions and define "strategic power" quite narrowly. By design, in
neither the NIE nor the B report are U.S.-Soviet strategic matters
set within the wider framework of other dynamic world forces, many
of which are essentially the creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet
initiative or control.
Estimates should, of course, be written in an accurate and dispas-
sionate manner. They should reflect the best and most broadly rep-
resentative expert knowledge possible, from both inside and outside
the Government. The sensitive estimative questions at hand should not
be argued in the press. These requirements did not obtain in the case
of the NIE-B Team exercise.
The field of strategic weaponry is complex, and there is much valu-
able expertise on the subject outside of the intelligence community.
The quality of NIE's on these subjects would benefit from more exten-
sive use of this outside knowledge than is now the case. In this respect,
the PFIAB initiative was justifiable and desirable.
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To be of maximum value, however, such efforts must employ the best
and most competent expertise available. Panels representing only one
perspective, whether "hard" or "soft," are not desirable. In this
respect, the B Team "experiment" was not as constructive as it could
have been concerning Soviet objectives.
The exercise in competitive analysis was devalued by the fact that,
contrary to the expressed directions of both DCI George Bush and
PFIAB Chairman Leo Cherne, word of these sensitive matters leaked
to the press, where it appeared in garbled form.
The A-B Team experience sharply demonstrated the intense pre-
occupation of the CIA, the rest of the intelligence community, the
PFIAB, and policymakers with Soviet strategic weapons and their
consequences. This subject is of enormous significance to U.S. policy-
making, but there are also other significant questions. The greatest
intelligence attention often is given to the least likely Soviet actions,
nuclear attack, rather than to Soviet intentions and assertive world
activity short of those extremes.
Of most significance, the A-B Team case has demonstrated : (a) that
the key question of Soviet strategic intentions and conduct is one
which demands the best possible marshalling of U.S. intelligence re-
sources and American brainpower; and (b) that the estimative process
needs improvement in this area of concern.
The committee's recommendations for improving National Intelli-
gence Estimates concerning Soviet strategic weapons capabilities and
objectives included these judgments :
The intelligence community must more effectively meet the
particular needs of particular policymakers. Creative use should
be made of other estimative formats, in addition to the current
categories of NIE's, tailored to the particular needs, but not the
views, of different policymaking entities and levels.
There is need for competitive,and alternative analyses. Both
within the estimative body and with respect to outside expertise,
competing and on occasion alternative estimates should be en-
couraged. To be fully useful, such initiatives must avoid panels
with narrow preconceptions, of whatever kind, to assure the bal-
ance necessary for the competitors to evaluate evidence which is
often both conflicting and ambiguous.
Estimates must openly express differences of judgment, and
clearly indicate the assumptions, the evidence, and the reasoning
which produce alternative readings.
Estimates should highlight significant changes from related
past estimates, including changing probabilities, the emergence
of new important alternatives, and findings that make past esti-
mates false or less relevant.
NIE's should define "strategic matters" more comprehensively
than has obtained in recent years, so that Soviet military develop-
ments can be better seen within the context of Soviet interests
and policies, and in interaction with U.S. and world developments.
Enchantment with the details of military hardware must not
permit either the producers or the policymaking consumers of
intelligence to become deflected from pursuit of the most impor-
tant estimative questions at hand, those of intentions.
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Reliable net assessments are needed to complete an effective
estimative process, so that policymakers can better appreciate
Soviet strengths and weaknesses by having systematically com-
pared them with those of the United State-%- & function which
the NIE's are not designed to perform. The NSC should commis-
sion such net assessments, to be prepared by experts at the national
level, including some from the intelligence community.
Policymakers must define the questions, not the answers. The
DCI and the intelligence community's estimative body must re-
main independent in judgment. Judgments must not be bent or
suppressed by outside pressures or fear of an uncongenial reaction.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR GARY HART
The most unfortunate result of the experiment in competitive
analysis was that the objectivity of one of the Nation's most impor-
tant intelligence judgments was compromised. And through leaks to
the press, the credibility and quality of earlier estimates was unfairly
and inaccurately brought into question.
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet Forces for
Intercontinental Conflict is one of the most important intelligence
documents produced each year.
As the Director of Central Intelligence's official report to the Presi-
dent on the Soviet strategic threat, it is a document that can affect
tens of billions of dollars in defense spending; the potential for arms
control agreements, and the confidence with which we guarantee our
own security and fulfill our commitments abroad.
Thus, it is essential to protect the objectivity of this judgment of the
strength and intentions of our most formidable adversary.
The committee report and information from other sources has con-
vinced me that "competitive analysis" and use of selected outside ex-
perts was little more than a camouflage fora political effort to force
the National Intelligence Estimate to take a more bleak view of the
Soviet strategic threat.
The correspondence about the exercise shows that the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) included members
more interested in altering the conclusions of the national estimate
than in improving its quality. From the outset of the PFIAB's initia-
tive in this case, it believed existing NIE's were "deficient" because the
PFIAB's members disagreed with the NIE conclusions.
William Colby, who was then the Director of Central Intelligence,
was successful in halting PFIAB's first effort to have "competition" in
analysis. Later, DCI George Bush consented to such an experiment.
The A-Team/B-Team experiment has also been explained as an ef-
fort to allow greater dissent and conflicting views. This overlooks the
procedures to accommodate differing viewpoints that are already a
part of the national estimates process. Representatives of the Defense
Department, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and State Department work
with the CIA in producing the estimates. The participating depart-
ments also have, and frequently exercise, the right to dissent from an
estimate as a whole or in part. In producing the 1976 estimates, for
example, the Department of Defense had more members of the
A-Team than either CIA or the State Department. Because of the
selection of outside experts with known views and a mandate to ad-
vocate a specific position, the A-Team/B-Team experiment did not
promote dissent. To the contrary, it intimidated and stifled the ex-
pression of more balanced estimates of the Soviet threat.
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I also disagree strongly with one of the apparent goals of the B-
Team exercise : That is, to make a "worst case" analysis of the Soviet
threat. There is real value in such analysis but it should not be the
mainstay of the National Intelligence Estimate.
In his NIE's, the Director of Central Intelligence should provide
not only a catalogue of what an adversary country might do, but
also his own best judgment of what is actually likely to happen-
a judgment that should not be tainted either by a desire to justify
greater defense spending and new weapons systems, or by any motive
to limit these expenditures.
The Pro-B Team leak and public attack on the conclusions of the
NIE represent but one element in a series of leaks and other state-
ments which have been aimed at fostering a "worst case" view for
the public of the Soviet threat. In turn, this view of the Soviet threat
is used to justify new weapons systems.
It is neither possible nor necessarily desirable to remove such politics
and debate from the defense budget. But it is essential to protect our
key intelligence judgments from these pressures.
The business of intelligence must be restricted to reporting the un-
varnished facts. Any attempt to bend intelligence to serve political
needs other than the truth is a danger as great as the Soviet threat
itself.
In conclusion, let me add two recommendations to supplement those
contained in the committee report. We need better mechanisms-some
outside the national estimates procedure-to create a more orderly
and balanced debate about Soviet strength, objectives, and intentions.
The estimates themselves should be better protected from political
influence and remain the Director of Central Intelligence's best judg-
ment about key intelligence questions. These estimates should remain
highly classified to help guarantee the President the best possible
advice, unaffected by fears of political consequences of reporting facts
that do not support established policy or preconceptions.
At the same time, the DCI should take steps to allow a more orderly
and informed public debate about Soviet strength, objectives, and
intentions. A great deal of this information already becomes available
through selective leaks and occasional public disclosure. To replace
this haphazard and occasionally illegal process, the DCI should regu-
larly review our strategic intelligence product to determine what in-
formation may be safely released to promote an informed public
debate.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIH AN
The subject of the "B Team" report has been before our commit-
tee for a year now, during which, if I am not mistaken, rather a strik-
ing shift has taken place in the attitude of what might be called
official Washington to the then unwelcome views of this group of
scholars and officials. Their notion, that the Soviets intend to surpass
the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so,
has gone from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy.
In his annual report, Defense Secretary Brown referred to "a sub-
stantial and continuing Soviet [strategic] effort, [which] is highly
dynamic." Although puzzled as to "why the Soviets are pushing so
hard to improve their strategic nuclear capabilities," Brown noted
that "we cannot ignore their efforts or assume that they are mo-
tivated by considerations either of altruism or of pure deterrence."
Last month, a member of the House of Representatives, Mr. Les
Aspin, in a paper the State Department promptly endorsed, warned
that if the Senate did not ratify a proposed SALT agreement, we
would be "entering 'a race in which we are already behind." Even after
spending $20 billion on strategic arms, in his judgment, we would still
be comparatively worse off.
This, by the way, is not a completely new argument in favor of
SALT. In 1972, then-Presidential Assistant Henry Kissinger had
reference to the "not the most brilliant" bargaining position in which
he found himself due to the imbalance between the Soviet and Ameri-
can paces of strategic arms development.
It is worth reflecting on how we got into this unfavorable bargain-
ing position, if we are indeed in it. While many different political' and
economic factors could be adduced, it is impossible to ignore the qual-
Z of the intelligence that our top leaders were receiving throughout
long period during which American nuclear superiority was
eroded, and during which we placed ourselves in the situation so alarm-
ingly described by Representative Aspin.
It was a sense that the National Intelligence Estimates had not
adequately performed their function of informing our top leaders as
to the dynamism of the Soviet strategic buildup that led to the `B
Team" episode. Prior to its abolition in early 1977, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had the mandate (in the words
of Executive Order 11460) to "conduct a continuing review of foreign
intelligence ..." and to "report to the President concerning [its]
findings and appraisals and make appropriate recommendations for
actions to achieve increased effectiveness ... in meeting national in-
telligence needs." This group persuaded the then Director of Central
Intelligence, the distinguished George Bush, to take the courageous
step of allowing an outside group of experts full access to the resources
of the Intelligence Community. This group (the "B Team") was to
examine all the data available to the analysts of the intelligence com-
munity to, in the words of the committee statement, "determine
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whether such data would support conclusions on Soviet strategic
capabilities and objectives different from those presented in the in-
telligence community's National Intelligence Estimates." The B Team
reached "somber assessments" of the Soviet strategic challenge, which
subsequently leaked to the press, most notably in a New York Times
article of December 26, 1976.
Given the B Team's purpose, it is hardly surprising that its mem-
bers' views reflected "only one segment of the spectrum of opinion."
Inasmuch as the main purpose of the experiment was to determine
why previous estimates had produced such misleading pictures of
Soviet strategic developments, it was reasonable to pick Team mem-
bers whose views of Soviet strategy differed from those of the official
estimators, just as a similar experiment, had one been conducted in
1962, might have called for a "B Team" composed of strategic analysts
who had been skeptical of the "missile gap."
The goal of the B Team was to place Soviet weapons developments
of the past dozen or so years in the context of an overall Soviet "grand
strategy." In its view, the estimates had avoided a conscious discussion
of Soviet strategy and, as a result, had resorted willy-nilly to explain-
in- Soviet developments in terms of U.S. strategic concepts. Un-
fortunately, these concepts corresponded to the Soviet reality less and
less as the years went by.
This contribution should not be disparaged on the grounds that the
B Team did not reflect the whole spectrum of opinions on the ques-
tions it discussed; surely the point of "competitive analysis" is to
sharpen the issues and to force bureaucratic committees-so often char-
acterized by consensus-seeking, to say nothing of plain inertia-to face
the difficulties in the lines of argument with which they have become
comfortable.
The committee statement concludes that "judgments must not be
bent or suppressed by outside pressures or fear of an uncongenial re-
action." This is certainly an important objective, and one in terms of
which the current trend toward centralized management of the intel-
ligence community ought to be evaluated. While "national" control
might, help dampen the bureaucratic rivalry (interservice, and mili-
tary vs. civilian intelligence) which occasionally raises its head in the
estimates, it would tend to make it e-ven more difficult for intelligence
analysts to draw conclusions which would complicate the lives of the
senior policymakers. Calling in outside experts from time to time is a
healthy corrective against the tendency of any organization to be-
come set in its own way of thinking. The particular panel of experts
chosen, however, will always be subject to charges of being "unrep-
resentative" or "biased" by those who do not like its findings, including
those in the intelligence community who are, after all, the ones being
criticized.
Knowledge is power; and the ability to define what others will take
to be knowledge is the greatest power. It is not to be wondered then,
that the National Intelligence Estimates-the sources of "official
truth"-escape irrelevance only at the price of controversy. Any at-
tempt to improve the estimates will be denounced as an attempt to
manipulate them by those who disagree with the new directions they
take. The objective standard will be to look at how well one institu-
tional arrangement, or one line of argument, has predicted and ex-
plained recent events.
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In the current case, it would appear that the National Intelligence
Estimates of the past dozen years have, by and large, failed this test.
The B-Team Report, the heart of which did not find its way into the
press, was in my view a creditable attempt to place recent develop-
ments in a context which makes them more understandable, and which
offers the possibility of greater predictive success. No one should have
expected that the intelligence community would accept the entire B
Team position; but it should not miss the opportunity, provided by a
powerful critique of some of its past failures, to sharpen its own
thinking.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP
The drafters of the NIE's on Soviet strategic forces, and the mem-
bers of Dr. Richard Pipes' B Team came up with substantially dif-
ferent evaluations of the Soviet Union's intentions and future
capabilities. The committee-especially the Subcommittee on Quality
of Intelligence--*rightly found this difference of opinion interesting,
and after gaining the viewsof Dr. Pipes and certain other members of
his Team on the committee's report, asked the staff to recheck the
"facts and issues" of the controversy. This remained an inquiry, how-
ever, into the quality of competing products. But although the re-
checking has produced a report on the A-B Team episode which is
much improved from the original, it is still fundamentally flawed,
because, in the words of the report, it "makes no attempt to judge
which group's estimates concerning the U.S.S.R. are correct." There-
fore, the report's "findings and recommendations for improving the
quality of future NIE's on Soviet capabilities and objectives are pri-
marily directed at procedural issues." But it is logically impossible
to determine the quality of opposing arguments without reference to
the substance of those arguments. After all, the quality of an estimate
depends, above all, upon its accuracy. In order to make judgments con-
cerning quality, never mind suggesting improvements, one must judge
where the truth lies against which the estimate's accuracy is to be
measured.
Of course, because there is controversy over the significance of the
Soviets' buildup of strategic forces, any report that touches on the
facts is likely to be fought over. But we cannot and should not try
to avoid responsibility for substantive judgments in this area. The
flow of events won't let us. Moreover, as is the case here, judgments on
substance turned away at the front door often come in through the
windows.
Although the report finds some elements of value in the fact that
the NIE's drafters had some competition, it still tries to denigrate
the B Team by giving the impression that the NIE team contains a
wide variety of points of view, while its competitor was a narrow band
of zealots with preconceived notions. It even implies that Dr. Pipes,
head of Harvard's Russian Institute, wrote on Soviet intentions before
looking at the data. In fact, Dr. Pipes did no such thing. The report
focuses on the leakage of information about the B Team's report. Al-
though it states that the leakers were "persons unknown," it leads the
reader to ask cui bono Q and gives the impression the B Team benefited.
This is pure innuendo.
But above all, this sort of thing distracts from the main point:
The B Team was constituted because, for 10 years in a row, the NIE's
had been giving a picture of Soviet strategic programs which appeared
out of touch with reality. (I am not referring to relatively short-range
projections of numbers of launchers, which can hardly help but be
correct.)
'12)
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While the Soviets were beginning the biggest military buildup in
history, the NIE's judged that they would not try to build as many
missiles as we had. When the Soviets approached our number, the
NIE's said they were unlikely to exceed it substantially; when they
exceeded it substantially, the NIE's said they would not try for deci-
sive superiority-the capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Only
very recently have the NIE's admitted that possibility as an "elusive
question." Now the NIE's say the Soviets may be trying for such a
capability but they cannot be sure it will work. While there were
divisive views in the intelligence agencies responsible for the NIE's,
the views which dissented from the above-mentioned line were con-
fined to little footnotes. Only recently, under the pressure of events,
have dissenters gained the privilege of setting out contrasting views in
parallel text. Thus, while it would be inaccurate to cast the agencies
in the role of doves, it is quite accurate to characterize the NIE's
thrust and tone as very doveish indeed ! The President's Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board was therefore quite right to ask whether
the data on Soviet strategic programs would support more somber
views.
The report's main charge against the B Team on Soviet Objectives
is that it "reflected the views of only one segment of the spectrum"
and that consequently "the outcome of the exercise was predetermined
and the experiment's contribution lessened." One. might ask whether
the report is to be read to imply that what it calls the "prestigious and
articulate B Team authorities" wrote predetermined, that is to say
academically dishonest, analyses. The B Team's critique was indeed
pointed. It had a definite thrust. But, it seems to me, the direction of
that thrust was called for by the relationship between the NIE's past
analyses and the reality of the Soviet buildup.
The fundamental argument, of course, is over the Soviet Union's
intentions. Soviet professional literature has not deviated from the
pattern set in Sokolovskii's book, "Soviet Military Strategy," that
nuclear weapons do not change the fundamental nature of warfare.
Nuclear wars, like all others, have winners and losers. The Soviet
military's task is, above all, to win wars. The Soviets have considered
the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), on which our
military posture is based, but they have always rejected it. As the
report states, the NIE's in question do not deal adequately with how
the Soviet leadership views nuclear war. In my opinion, the problem
is not brevity, but rather that while consciously refusing to entertain
the Soviets' own conception of what they are about militarily, the
authors of the NIE's over the years have evaluated Soviet strategic
forces using indexes which tend to stress our own doctrine of MAD.
In 1976. the NIL mentioned that the Soviets think in terms of the
ability to win wars. Nevertheless, it continued to evaluate both U.S.
and Soviet forces using MAD criteria. The B Team's position is that
heranse the Soviet Union has built its forces all along with a view to
fighting, surviving, and winning a war, the use of MAD criteria in
evaluatinn Soviet forcers makes no sense. Instead of arguing the con-
trary explicitly, some of the B Team's detractors now try to minimize
the existence of a fundamental clash of approaches.
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We need more confrontation of opposing points of view on the basis
of evidence. It is well known that experts, especially in bureaucratic
settings, acquire interest in positions painstakingly built and long
defended. Too often they seek consensus in carefully hedged analyses,
so that whatever events ensue, they can point to this or that paragraph
to justify themselves. This sort of thing does not serve the country
well. The last thing we need are mechanisms for reaching more cen-
sensus on intelligence estimates, least of all should any such mecha-
nisms be placed under so politicized & ,body as the National Security
Council. Rather we need separate, competitive, teams of analysts,
each making the best possible case for what the evidence at hand seems
to indicate. Of course it is more comfortable for a policymaker to
receive a single estimate on any given subject, especially if that esti-
mate tells him what he wants to hear. But, while competitive analysis
is not likely to make either policymakers or the intelligence commu-
nity happy, it is likely to make all concerned more responsible.
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