WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000300590023-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 8, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP84BOO148R000300590023-5
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THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1982
Albert Gore Jr.
Window of p Opportunity
Millions of Americans have joined .the rap-
idly growing "nuclear freeze" movement to de-
mand that their government get moving with
meaningful arms control efforts and halt the
slide toward catastrophe. At the same time, the
Senate Armed Services Committee has voted
unanimously to defer production and deploy-
ment of the MX missile, because of lingering
confusion over its role $nd survivability.
These two events are in fact closely related.
The dangers of nuclear war and the complexity
of our next strategic move have both increased
dramatically because of the introduction of
``counter-force" - weapons-highly . accurate
ICBMs with multiple warheads, theoretically
capable of a "first strike" against the nuclear
forces of an adversary.
The ill-fated "racetrack" plan to hide the MX
missile, on moving railroad cars was, the first con-
crete indication that average citizens were correct
in perceiving that the. arms race had indeed
reached a new plateau of insanity. Having re-
jected that bizarre scheme, however, the adminis-
tration is evidently ate loss on how to proceed. `
I have proposed a solution that attempts to ad-
dress both the counter-force dilemma and the
goals of the nuclear freeze movement: a modified
freeze followed by selective and synchronized re-
ductions designed to.close the "window of vulner-
ability" through arms control.
Specifically, we should first propose a modified
moratorium on anything that can increase the
threat to the land-based ICBMs of either country.
Primarily,'this would. mean no more land-based
MIRVs, and no special efforts to increase the ac-
curacy of those already in existence.
Today, the Soviet Union already has so many,
warheads on its MIRVed ICBM force, and these
systems are so accurate, that they are theoreti-
cally in a position to destroy a large proportion of
the U.S. ICBM force and bomber bases,' using
only a fraction of the Soviet ICBM inventory to
do so. (Our submarine force, invulnerable for the
time being, may not always be so.)
.As of now, the United States is not in an
equivalent position, but the Soviets know that
we soon will be. The MX, when and if deployed,.
would be a "silo-buster.".But even if it were
never deployed, the Trident D5 missile, to be
placed aboard the new Ohio-class submarines,
would pose an identical problem. The Soviets,
who, unlike us, have 80 percent of their war-
heads on ICBMs, will then be faced with a
threat to almost all of their strategic forces.
Unless we act, the situation we are heading
toward is one in which each side will have so
much to lose if it hesitates that both will be
forced to keep their nuclear forces on a hair-
trigger alert. And of course, one false i ove in a
crisis'could be our last.
During the proposed moratorium, we would
need to have a hedge against the failure offthe
subsequent negotiations. Development and
;,.testing of the MX and D5 missiles should con-
tinue, although with 'the intent that their de-
ployment should be rendered unnecessary by
means of U:S.' and Soviet reductions. In other
words, the MX would remain "on the shelf,"
where the Senate committee has just put it.
Reductions should 'then aim straight at the
vulnerability problem. We should seek the step-
by-step dismantling of the MIRVed ICBMs of
both sides. Assuming, however, that ICBMs in
some form'will probably remain a necessary .
.evil, we should arrange to convert to a new, less
destabilizing type: specifically, .an ICBM carry-
ing just one warhead. At the same time, overall
totals of strategic launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs
and heavy bombers) must beheld down. A rea-
sonable number ' would be the lowest :level
agreed to in SALT II: 2,250 systems. Reduc-
tions would have to be carefully synchronized,
and take place in in -agreerpent of extended
duration so. as to remove the' arms control
process as much as possible from the turbulence
caused by our presidental politics.
There are many different ways to accomplish
such reductions and to adjust strategic systems
on both. sides. 'Calculations that have been done
-in.this regard prove -to me that: 1) the United
States and the Soviets can make this transition
without increasing the risk of surprise attack;
"2) once, it is completed, the deadly. arithmetic of
a "first strike" no longer would work out for ei-
ther side; and 3) although the number of nu-,
.clear warheads remaining on each side would be
substantial, they would be less than half the
.number that were anticipated under.SALT II.
This approach deliberately leaves great flexibil-
ity for each side to redesign its, overall nuclear
force if it=wishes'to do so. The familiar "Triad"
of land- , sea- .and air-based,systems could be
maintained, or there could be a shift to new
forms of launchers with characteristics that pro-
tect us against the reappearance of the vulner-
ability problem. And of course both sides would
be in a better position to continue the arms con-
trol process.
For many years, arms control was the domain
of specialists. Its transformation into a popular
issue is creating a new challenge for political lead-
ership: but the old responsibility. for careful delib-
eration remains: We should focus the growing
public mandate for arms control on an achievable
result that :-would do the most to diminish the
chances of 'nuclear war and create the stability
and momentum' necessary for greater progress
,later on. We have entered a "window of oppor-
'tunity" that will close if'we do not act.
The writer is a Democratic represent-
ative from Tennessee.
Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP84BOO148R000300590023-5