LETTER TO DIANE LAVOY(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000200570027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 11, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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fI
z\, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,
Legislative Liaison Branch
\TE
Telephono:
11 Marc
TO? Ms. Diane LaVoy
permanent Sal ec : Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives
H-405 The Capitol.
I hope the enclosed published items
are useful. To my knowledge, there are
no additional documents pertinent to
your request.
FORA OBSOLETE
,fl 1533 PREVIOUS
EDITIONS.
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n
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USSR n EL SALVADOR: SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY
Encouraged by the success of the revolution in
Nicaragua, the USSR in 1979 began to advocate and in-
directly support armed revolution in El Salvador. 'The
Soviets have apparently encouraged their allies and
clients to provide weapons and other military support
to the insurgents and have mounted an international prop-
aganda campaign on their behalf. The USSR, however, has
refrained from any di::ect military involvement as it ap-
parently wants to avoid exacerbating US-Soviet tensions
and to reduce the risk of provoking direct US military
action against the revolution. Although Moscow will con-
tinue to indirectly back the revolution in El Salvador,
it probably is less optimistic now than it was a year or
so ago that such upheavals represent the wave of the
future in Central America.
Nicaragua--in which Moscow played virtually no role-.,;,
has l?d the USSR to encourage and support armed revo-
lution in Central America. Although the Soviets have
always recognized armed struggle as a legitimate option,
during the 1960s and 1970s they urged leftist forces in
Latin America to use the pol;tical process to achieve
power. Since 1979, however, :oscow has encouraged most
of the Central American Communist parties to align them-
selves with other forces of the left, create broad mili-
tary-political fronts that include the middle class, and
engage in or prepare for armed struggle.
In the case of El Salvador, Soviet officials, in
apparent coordination with the Cubans,'in 1979 began to
actively encourage the pro-Soviet Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES), headed by Jorge Shafick Handal, to join
forces with other leftist groups already resisting the
government and form the Unified Revolutionary Directorate
(DRU), the umbrella organization directing the insurgency.
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The Soviets urged forrt1ation of a broadly based insurgent
movement similar to that established by the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua. S^viet officials subsequently encouraged
this winter's united offensive by the insurgents against
the junta.
Although the evidence of Soviet encouragement and
endorsement of armed revolution in El Salvador is clear-
,cut, information on the nature of their role in providing
such support as arms is less precise. In the spring of
1980, clandestine reporting indicated that Mosc.w had
promised the insurgents that ould provide arms aid
through third countries.
Confiscated PCES documents indicate that last June
and July, Handal visited the USSR, Eastern Europe, Viet-
nam and Ethiopia seeking weapons and other military sup-
port. He was unable to extract a Soviet commitment to
provide arms, but Moscow directed him to Vietnam, indi-
cating that he was likely to get a positive response
there. The Vietnamese did, in fact, promise Handal a
large amount of captured US weapons. The Salvadorans
subsegtr:-. t.ly asked the USSR to transport these weapons;
the Sov:v-t contact agreed to do so in principle but
equivocai.ed, saying final determination would be made
at higher lavels. Although the weapons eventually did
arrive in El Salvador, we have no good evidence -,.oat the
Soviets had a role in transporting `.hers, During Handal's
visit to Moscow he was offered paramilitary training for
30 Salvadorans, but we do not know if their training is
in process. F_]
Handal also received promises of arms from Ethiopia,
Bulgaria, and.Czechoslovakia, and of military support
equipment from Hungary and East Germany. It is likely
Moscow encouraged these commitments. We have numerous
well-documented reports of efforts by the Soviets to en-
courage clients and allies, including the PLO and East
Germany, to support other Soviet initiatives in Latin
America. The PLO was reportedly specifically asked to
assist the revolutionary movements in El Salvador in
exchange for Soviet military and political assistance
to the Palestinian cause. We also know Moscow threatened
to curtail its financial subsidies to the Costa Rican
Communist Party if it did not support the Salvadoran in-
surgents.
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 in Nicaragua for onward shipment to El Salvador.
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The Soviets also have appaL?ently indirectly sup-
plied weapon: to the Salvadoran guerrillas via Cuba and
Nicaragua. A Soviet-piloted TS-154 transport has been
loaned to Cubana. Airlines for transporting such arms,
supplies, and Cuban personnel from Cuba to Nicaragua.
Some of these weapons ha'-e probably found their way
into El Salvador, or served to release US-made weapons
The overall pattern of Soviet activity indicates
that Moscow and its East European allies have aLtively
supported the revolution in El Salvador but have sought
to conceal their actit-ity and to avoid direct linkage to
the insurgency. The afor_eme.eti oned confiscated PCES
documents indicate, for ezamp?e, that the Czechs were
deliberately seeking to conceal. their arms aid. Further-
more, the most significant commitments of arms of which
we are aware--from Ethiopia and Vietnam--were of Ameri-
can-made arms, again reflecting an apparent effort to
conceal their source of origin. The Soviets obviously
hope that this factor will make -It difficult for the
United States to refute Soviet public denials that they
have supplied weapons to the insurgents.
MOSCOw'spolicy of providing only indirect support,
however, did lead to criticism by Central American Corr.-
munists that Voscow had failed to give sufficient support
,o the Salvadoran guerrillas. The confiscated documents
also indicate that Soviet reluctance to provide di.?ecfi
sunriort n Poet frustrated ? t.e Salvadoran Communists.
Media Sup~p.ort for the Insurgents
The most obvious form of Soviet support for the
S?lvaadoran guerrillas is the propaganda compaign which
began in late 1980. Moscow's media campaign--abetted by
the press in Easterr: Europe--has been aimed at winning
international support for the insurgents and at insti-,
gating criticism of the US role in E. Salvador. The
Soviet media has blasted the "US-backed repressive junta,"
which "terrorizes the population." Imminent intervention
by the United States and its !!nn pets"--Honduras and
Guatemala--is a key theme.
3 April 1981
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The Soviet press initially overplayed the recent
"final offensive" and its potential for success--perhaps
because it was relying on optimistic assessments provided
by the insurgents. Moscow has attributed the junta's suc-
cess in countering the offensive to growing intervention
of the United States in the form of military aid, advis-
ers, and funds. Soviet officials have privately been
saying that Moscow, does not think the insurgents' pros-
pects are bright.
Moscow's Assessment of Impact on US
Recent private Soviet comments indicate growing
Salvador is having on US policy and on Soviet relations
with Latin American countries. Moscow's concern that
its policy toward Central America may be damaging to its
own interests is also reflected in the reported comments
of Soviet officials in the region, who claim that they
Central American attitudes toward the USSR. They said
that Moscow's foreign policy--and international image--is
Lions" "irresponsible hotheads" linked with terrorism. and
Such comments suggest Moscow will be increasingly
cautious on its involvement in El Salvador but they prob-
ably do not presage any significant change in Soviet sup-
port, which has been limited and indirect all along.'
Nevertheless, Moscow is probably far less optimistic now
that revolutionary upheavals represent the wave of the
future in Central America. Brezhnev's failure to mention
El Salvador or Central America in his Congress address on
23 February seems to represent not only a deliberate
effort to avoid introducing a subject unpalatable to the
United States but a disassociation of Soviet prestige
from a potentially losing cause.
Moscow's reluctance to provide direct support to the
Salvadoran guerrillas probably stems from Soviet concern
over the consequences that such activity could have on US-
Soviet relations. In addition, it may reflect Soviet
fears of provoking a US military intervention that would
J
;
t:.A _ ::. ~. . -. r.-t .. n
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~; ~?
--~
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put-an end to Soviet hopes for revolution in El Salvador.
The advent of the Reagan administration has probabl I
added to Soviet apprehension on this question. 25X1:
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SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE EL SALVADOR INSURGENTS
(DRU), the umbrella organization directing the insurgency..
In the case of El Salvador, Soviet officials, in
apparent coordination with the Cubans, in 1979 began ac-
tively to encourage the pro-Soviet Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES), headed by Jorge Shafick Handal, to join
forces with other 1rftist groups already resisting the
government and form the Unified Revolutionary Directorate
engage in or prepare for armed struggle-
Encouraged by the success of the revolution in
Nicaragua, the USSR in 1979 began to advocate and in-
.directly support armed revolution in El Salvador. The
.Soviets have apparently encouraged their allies and
clients to provide weapons and other military support
to the insurgents and have mounted an international
propaganda campaign on their behalf. The USSR, however,
has refrained from any direct military involvement as
it apparently wants to avoid exacerbating US-Soviet
tensions,and to reduce the risk of provoking direct.US
military action against the revolution.. Although Mos-
cow will continue to back the. revolution in El Salvador
indirectly, it probably is less optimistic now than. it
was a year or so ago that such.upheavals represent the
Background .
The success of the 1979 Sandinista revolution in*
Nicaragua--in which Moscow played virtually no role--has
led the USSR to encourage and support armed revolution
in Central Az:;arica. Although the Soviets have always
recognized :armed struggle as a legitimate option, during
the 1960s and 1970s they urged leftist forces in Latin
America to usa the political process to achieve power.
Since 1979,.however, Moscow has encouraged most of the
Central American Communist parties to align themselves
with other forces of thA.left, create broad military-
political fronts which include the middle class, and
1
SECRET
26 February 1981
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 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84B00148R000200570027-4
The Soviets urged formation of a broadly based insurgent
movement similar to that established by the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua. Soviet officials subsequently encouraged
this winter's united offensive by the insurgents against
the junta.
.Obscuring Moscow's Role
Although the evidence of-Soviet encouragement and
endorsement of armed revolution in El Salvador is clear-
cut, information on the nature of their role in provid-
ing such support as arms is less precise. In the spring
.of 1980, clandestine reporting indicated that Moscow had
promised the insurgents that it would provide arms aid
through third countries.
Confiscated PCES documentsindicate that last June
and July Handal visited.the USSR, Pastern Europe, Viet-
nam, and Ethiopia seeking weapons and other military
support. He was unable to extract a Soviet commitment
to provide arms, but Moscow directed him to Vietnam,
indicating that he was likely to get a positive response
there. The Vietnamese.did, in fact-, promise Handal a
large amount of captured US weapons. The Salvadorans
subsequently asked the.USSR to transport these weapons,
but the Soviets equivocated. Although the weapons even-
tually did arrive in El Salvador, we have no good evi-
dence that the Soviets had a role in transporting them.
During Handal's visit to Moscow he was offered paramili-
tary training for 30 Salvadorans, but we do not know if
their training is in process.
Handal also received promises of arms from Ethiopia,
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, and of military support
equipment.from Hungary and East Germany. It is likely
Moscow encouraged these commitments. We have numerous
well-documented reports of efforts by the Soviets to
encourage clients and allies, including the PLO and East.
Germany, to support other Soviet initiatives in Latin
America. The PLO was reportedly specifically asked to
assist the revolutionary movements in El Salvador in ex-
change for Soviet military and political assistance to
the Palestinian cause. We also know Moscow threatened
to curtail its financial subsidies to the Costa Rican
Communist Party if it did not support the Salvadoran
insurgents.
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SECRET
26 February 1981
ia`L? - Y;
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The Soviets also have apparently indirectly sup-
plied weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas via Cuba and.
Nicaragua. A Soviet-piloted TU-15.4 transport has been
loaned to Cubana Airlines for transporting such arms,
supplies, and Cuban personnel from Cuba to Nicaragua..
Some of -these weapons have probably found their way into
:El Salvador, or served to release US-made weapons in
The Soviet media has blasted the "US-backed repressive
junta" which "terrorizes-the population." Imminent in-.
tervention by the United States and its "puppets"--
Honduras and Guatemala--is a key theme.
26 February 1981
3
SECRET
Nicaragua for onward shipment.to El Salvador.
The overall pattern of Soviet activity indicates
that Moscow and its East European allies have actively
supported the El Salvador revolution but have soug`ut to
conceal their activity. and to avoid direct linkage to
the insurgency. The aforementioned confiscated PCES doc-
uments indicate-, for example, that the Czechoslovaks were
deliberately seeking to conceal their arms aid. Further-
more, the most significant commitments of arms of which
we are aware--from Ethiopia and Vietnam--were American-
made, again reflecting an apparent effort to conceal
their source of origin. The Soviets obviously hope that
.this factor Will make it difficult for the US to refute
their public denials that they have supplied weapons to
the insurgents.
Moscow's policy of providing only indirect support,
however, did lead-to criticism of the USSP by Central.
American Communists that Moscow had-failed vo give suf-
ficient support to the Salvadoran guerrillas.. The con-
fiscated documents also indicate that Soviet reluctance.
to provide direct support had in fact frustrated the
Media Support for the Insurgents
The most obvious form of Soviet support for the
.Salvadoran guerrillas is the propaganda campaign which
:began in late 1980. Moscow's media campaign--abetted
by the press of the East Europeans--has been aimed at
winning international support for.the insurgents and at
instigating criticism of the US role in El Salvador.
25X1
2~DAI
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vided by the insurgents. Moscow'has attributed the
junta's success in countering the offensive to growing
intervention of the United States in the form of mili-
tary aid, advisers, and funds. Soviet officials have
privately been saying that Moscow does not think the
.insurgents'. prospects are bright.
Moscow's Assessment of Impact on US
The Soviet press initially overplayed the recent
"final offensive" and its potential for success--perhaps
because they were relying on optimistic assessments pro-
international image--is being crippled by association
with ".so-called revolutions" and "irresponsible hotheads"
I I. Recent private Soviet comments indicate a growing
Soviet sensitivity to the impact its position on El.
Salvador is having on US policy and on Soviet relations
with Latin American countries. This concern is reflected
in the reported comments of Soviet officials in the re
gion, who claim that they have been tasked to prepare a
complete assessment of Central American. attitudes. toward
the USSR. They said that Moscow's foreign policy--and
support, which has been limited and indirect. all along.
Nevertheless, Moscow is probably far less optimistic
now that revolutionary upheaval: represent the wave of
the future in Central America. Brezhnev's failure to...
mention El Salvador or. Central America in his Congress.
address on 23 February seems to represent not only a
deliberate effort to avoid introducing a subject un-
palatable to the United States, but a disassociation of
Such comments suggest Moscow will be increasingly
cautious on its involvement in El Salvador but they
probably do not presage any significant change in Soviet
tration has probably added to Soviet apprehension on
Moscow's reluctance to provide direct support for
the Salvadoran guerrillas probably stems from Soviet
concern over the consequences that such act!vity could
have on US-Soviet relations. In addition, it may re-
flect Soviet fears of provoking a US military interven-
tica that would put an end to Soviet hopes for revolu-
tion in El Salvador.. The advent of the Reagan adminis-
Soviet prestige from a potentially losing cause.
this question.
26 February 1981
4
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 8 MAR 1982
CENTRAL M1EIUCAN AM S TRAFFICKING; T.W. COMAY'AGU.A CACHE
A) ms Traf ficki
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The Honduran far left--working closely with the Cuban-
Nicaraguan support apparat--is an integral part of the
infiltration of arms and personnel to the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Honduran.authorities have recently stepped
up interdiction efforts but their country will probably
continue to offer regional leftists the potential for
clandestine operations.
Of the three northern-tier countries of Centr%l. Amer-
ica, Honduras faces the least serious threat to stability
from leftist insurgents. Over the past several years,
however, the Honduran far left has been integrated into
a regional support network. Before 1978, the Honduran
Conoininist Party (PC;H) followed a cautious line, but in
that year--in large part at Cuban urging--it began to
support the Sandinista guerrillas against Somoxa. The
PCII helped infiltrate Nicaraguan revolutionaries through
Honduras, as well as providing training camps and supply
depots. Other Honduran leftist groups also aided the
andinistas with funding and weapons.
The Sandinista support effort provided previously
lacking practical experience for the PCH and other left-
ists. The Cubans. moreover, not only brokered contacts
between the PCH and other leftist groups, but accelerated
'their training efforts to prepare the Honduran left for
eventual insurgency. Castro, however, sees Honduras'
logistical role as being the major benefit to Cuba's
regional policy. `,:hus, when Havana began establishing
support networks for the Salvadoran insurgency shortly
after the triumph of the Sandinistas iiA mid-1979, it was
logical to include Honduras.
Meanwhile, however, Cuban support efforts were reac-
tivated in Costa Rica and brought along at a measured
pace--.at least initially--a-in Nicaragua. This availability
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is now the main pipeline.
mid-1979, Costa Rica was a principal conduit; Nicaragua
it has been difficult to interdict the arms flow to El
Salvador: Honduras was important in late 1978; through
of alternative routes points up one of the reasons that
The Comayagua Operation
Guerrilla documents captured by Salvadoran security
forces last November indicated that one of the Salvadoran
insurgent groups expected delivery of about 20 tons of
materiel through Honduras in December. We believe the
arms seized at Comayagua in mid-January were the final
shipment of this expected materiel.
By mid-December, significant amounts or sophisticated,
new weaponry were being employed by Salvadoran guerrillas.
Especially noteworthy was a sudden influx of M-16 auto-
matic rifles, which provide firepower superior to the
semiautomatic G-3 rifle used by the Salvadoran armed
forces and had been mentioned in-the captured documents.
Last month, Honduran authorities learned of an impend-
ing shipment of weapons overland from Nicaragua to the Sal-
vadoran insurgents, and on the 17th, a suspect tractor-
trailer was noted at the Guasaule border crossing. The
truck was followed to a warehouse outside Comayagua, where
Honduran security officials arrested six Salvadoran guer-
rillas unloading 100 M-16s, 100,000 rounds of M-16 ammuni-
'Lion, and numerous mortar rounds from a secret compartment
built into the roof of the trailer.
smaller parcels to guerrillas in the border areas of
that were probably used to transport the weapons in
trucks--carrying M-16 ammunition and rocket launchers--
addition, security officials confiscated several light
who reportedly arranged the truck loading in San Jose. In
the arrest of several accomplices, including a Costa Rican
aragua and Costa Rica. Subsequent investigation led to
ports containing numerous entry and exit stamps from Nic-
in wall cavities of the warehouse, along with false pass-
found in the truck. Additional weapons were discovered
A search of the warehouse uncovered 200 more M-16s
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False top of trailer truck exposed after unloading of weapons of warehouse near Comoyagua
A portion of the Salvadoran guerrilla arsenal recoiered from the trailer truck, including M?16 auto-
matic rifles and ammunition,.81?mm mortar rounds, and Chinese-made rocket launchers and rocket
grenadesF__1
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Many of the M-16s found during the raid have been
traced to former US Army stockpiles in Vietnam during the
early 1970s, corroborating the guerrilla documents that
cite Vietnamese arms contributions to the Salvadoran in-
surgents. The total weight of the Comayagua arms capture
was approximately.3-1/2.tons; the rest of the 20-ton ship-
ment presumably already had reached El Salvador.
Outlook
Honduran authorities clearly have discovered a major
arms-support apparat through their Comayagua investigation.
.Early this month, for instance, security forces were able
to raid four Salvadoran guerrilla safehouses in Comayagua,
La Paz, Siguatepeque, and Tegucigalpa.
The disruption of this operation is a significant
setback both to the Honduran Communists and to the Salva-
doran guerrillas, but-it may not prove lasting. After
similar reverses in the past, apparats have been fairly
quickly reestablished. Moreover, the Comayagua operation
may be only one of several clandestine support networks.
Honduran authorities are investigating another operation,
for example, in which Honduran leftists are recruited and
paid $400 monthly to fight with Salvadoran insurgents;
guerrilla training camps for these recruits have repor
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