STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 9 FEBRUARY 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 416
• Publication Date: February 9, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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? SECRET 1P
9 February 1981
Staff Meeting Minutes of 9 February 1981
noted three articles which appeared in the press over the
weekend which pertain to the Agency or the Director. They were Seymour
Hersh's article on the overthrow of Allende, The London Sunday Times
interview with Secretary of State Haig, and a New York Times story on
terrorism (attached). In response to the Director's question about how the
information in these stories got out, said the officials providing
the information were not identified, but it was certain that no one from
the Agency was involved. The Director questioned the value and appropriate-
ness of Admiral Turner's appearance on "60 Minutes." The Director said his
policy on talking with the press was that the CIA was in business to
collect information not to give it out. Clarke discussed the NFAC/press
relationship and said he is attempting to cut back on the number of contacts
analysts have with reporters. The Director agreed this was a good idea but
said that there may be some times when contact with the press is beneficial
for the Agency.
Clarke reported that the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense is in
Cuba probably to discuss the situation in Latin America and Africa as well
as Soviet/Cuban and Soviet/U.S. relationships.
Clarke reported that the Soviets are building new facilities at
Cam Ranh Bay. These are the first major improvements since the Soviets
began using Cam Ranh Bay in 1979.
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Clarke mentioned to the Director that NFAC had prepared a paper on
Guatemala for his use at breakfast with Secretary Haig on 10 February.
In response to Clarke's question about additional material, the Director
said he could think of nothing further he would need, but if he did he
would contact NFAC.
last week was good.
In response to the Director's question about the 'paper on the freeze
exemption, Fitzwater said that the paper is in good shape and that he was
convening a meeting of senior officials after the staff meeting to discuss
the final paper.
The Director announced that for the immediate future staff meetings would
be held on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. He hoped that in the future they
could be held once a week.
Attachments:
As stated
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~ NEW YORK TIt-M S
0.1 FAO ?~ 9. FEBRUARY 1981
:
New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on His Role in Chile'
rr
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
For six years Edward M. Korry,
United States Ambassador to Chile from
1967 to 1971, has insisted that he. was not
involved in and indeed tried to stop White
House efforts to induce a military coup in
Chile in 1970-to prevent Dr. Salvador Al-
lende Gossens, a Marxist, from assuming
the presidency.
Evidence has come to light suggesting
that Mr. Kerry, despite his strong appeal-?
tion to the Allende candidacy, was frozen
out of the. planning for a proposed mili-.
terry coup and warned the White House
that it would be risking another "Bay of
Pigs" if it got involved in military, plots to
stop Dr. Allende's election.
Mr. Korry has not worked in his profes-
sions, journalism or public affairs, since
1974, two years after the columnist Jack
Anderson published International Tele
phone and Telegraph Cornoration docu
ments that seemingly linked Mr. Korry to
joint I.T.T: Central".Intelligence Agency
operations to block. Dr. Allende's elec
lion. _
Mr. Korry expressed particular bitter
ness toward The-,New York Times for-
what he said was unfair reporting about. {
his role in articles in 1974 that revealed
the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile and ..in
refusing in later years. despite his-en-'
treaties, to investigate rus actions accu-
rately.
Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in
Stonington, Conn., insists that his sullied
reputation and his early inability to get
appropriate work stem from publication
of the I.T.T. documents and from two
ple, an "eyes- only" internal C.I.A. re-
Port, filed in early 1971 and not provided National Security Interests
to the Intelligence Committee, shows that Yet, he said, his story is not just an-
senior agency officials were aware that other account of a frustrated "whistle!
"
Wash-j
an operative had entered Chile under a blower," nor is it simply another
false passport and posed as a member of ington morality story." The inability of
the Mafia in making contact with anti-Al- the press and the Senate investigators to
lende forces. reach the truth about his involvement, he
- In another internal 1971 report, William: insisted, "tells about our country and the
V. Broe, then chief of the agency's clan.way Washington really works when the
destine service in Latin America, was ambitions of. its most important people
formally advised that an operative had' and the interests of its most powerful
posed.as-a representative of the Ford; groups come into conflict with the na-
Foundation and the Rockefeller Founda-i tional security interests."*.
Lion while on special assignment to Chile; Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a
In October 1970 - a tactic in violation of a foreign correspondent for United Press
? Presidential prohibition against the use and went on to Look magazine, where he.
of American educational and plulan- served as European editor. In 1 he was
thropic foundations as covers. The opera- designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by
five, in later meetings with Chilean busi- President John F. Kennedy, serving
nessmen, made it clear, according to the, there with distinction, by all accounts,
C.I.A. documents, that "as a representa-. -until his assignment to Chile.
five of American business interests," he- His moment in the greatest glare of
was eager "to activate a military take-i publicity came in September 1974, soon
over of the Chilean Government." after The New York times disclosed that
None of this, it is now evident, was the C.I.A. had spent at least 38 million in
known to Ambassador Korry. Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's
.
that
sou
ht to
ili
i
d
f
,
g
a
ng
n
;
NotConsidered Trustworthy.i election an
make it impossible for him to govern. Mr.
- In interviews, a number of C.I.A. offi-
cials directly involved in the anti-Allende
operations emphasized that Mr. Korry.
was 'not: considered trustworthy by they
white House or by C.I.A. headquarters. 11
"Korry never did know anything," said
an intelligence operative who worked in
the embassy under Mr. Korry in 1970.
While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was l
known in the Nixon Administration for
his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and
his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr.
i{or y, who acknowledges the severity of
bis'views on Dr. Allende, was active in
lobbying for a $400,000 C.I.A. propaganda-
effort against him and his Marxist views
that was authorized by the Nixon Admin-
istration in the spring and summer of
1970.
Nonetheless, Mr. Korry insists that he
repeatedly advised Washington not to
take any steps toward a military solution
of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970,
for example, he told the White House in a
direct message made available to The
New York Times that he was appalled to
learn that unauthorized contact had been
made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago
with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing ex-
tremist group advocating the~tviolent
Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, and two
senior State Department officials, was
accused by members of the Senate staff.
of having provided misleading testimony
to the Senate multinational subcommit-
tee of the Foreign Relations Committee,
headed by Frank Church, Democrat of
Idaho, which held hearings in March and
April 1973 into I.T.T.'s involvement with
the Chilean election.
tion, which Dr. Allende won in a three-
way race by only 30,000 votes of three mil-
point.of much of the hearings -a report
from two I.T.T. officials In Santiago that
the Ambassador had finally received
"the green light to move in the name of
Richard Nixon" against the new Presi-
dent.
Repeatedly refusing to answer many
Levinson, Mr. Kory insisted that to de-
scribe confidential communications and
overthrow of the Government. official orders would be "Contrary to the
any attempt on our part actively to en-,
? -
courage a coup could lead us to a Bay of
b
Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes
only" cablegram.
In the interviews Mr. Korry constantly
ton duruig These materials raise new questions; focused on his inability to get newspapers
about the extent of C.I.A. operations 'ink to publish his view of events after he left
Chile in 1970 and the efficacy of the Sen-! Chile. But he says that he perhaps waited
ate committee's investistation. For exam- too Icing, until 1976, to begin to tell all knew of the role of the Nixon Administra-
hile. -? .
tion and its predeeessars in Chile.-
subsequent widely publicized investiga-!
subsequent
tions by Senate committees. He is now al
visiting professor of international rela-
tions at Connecticut College in New Lon-
don.
much of the new evidence, including
highly classified internal C.I.A. docu-
ments, was provided by a former intelli-
gence official who had direct knowledge
of the agency's activities against Dr. Al-
lende, who died in the course of a military
uprising against him in 1973. Corroborat-
ing information was obtained in inter-
views with other C.I.A. and White House
officials. Internal documents provided by
the C.I.A. to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence - and not published by
the committee in its reports in 1975 on
Chile -have also been obtained. Finally,
Mr. Korry made available some of his
private communications with Washing-
.U 1970 election period.
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? IV
i entire moral contract" he had entered
into with the Presidents under whom he
served. -
After The Times account of C.IA in-
volvement, he sent a barrage of letters to
editors and reporters, pointing to what he
cited as errors in the newspaper's cover-
age and insisting that his testimony was
honestly rendered and that his reluctance
to testify more fully was not based,- as
was widely assumed, on- inside knowl-
edge of C.I.A. and I.T.T. activities, . ;
Because it was difficult to believe that
Mr. Korry, as Ambassador, could not
have been privy to the Administration's
plans, few members of the committee
chose to believe his assertion that he had
not received the "green light" cable. But
C.I.A. documents summarized,: by the
Justice Department In.. L978 court pro-
ceedings but widely ignored at the time
showed that -Henry ;D. Heckmher, the
C.I.A. station chief in Santiago. had re-
ceived the messageti.and,- through Hal
Hendrix and Robert Berrell=,_ public
relations representatives for.?I.T.T. in
Santiago, had forwarded It to the multi-
national corporation's home office.
Helms Viewed as Part of Plot;,
Justice Department hivesgators con-
cluded that Mr. Hendrix, Mr. Berrellez
and other I.T.T. officials bad conspired
with Mr. Helms and other C.I.A. officials.
to commit perjury before the Senate mul-
tinational subcommittee in' 1973. Mr:
Korry, it appears; was in the position of
telling the truth about his lack of knowl-
t
edge of I.T.T. and C.IA operations at a
time when other witnesses were tion of
11
ellidiversionarystories. - -
Mr. Helms, later Ambassador to. Iran,
and Mr. Hendrix were eventuially. con-
victed on misdemeanor charges for their.
testimony. .- ,> . .,
In Mr. Korry's view, the assumption
that he was not telling the truth persisted
in the 1975 investigation by the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence, which
was also headed by Senator Church, into
illegal activities of the C.IA.. Mr. Korry
was only permitted to testify for a few,
moments before a public hearing, he re-
lated, and that testimony was not sought
until the committee bad published two re-
ports on C.I.A. activities in Chile; both of
them critical of his term as envoy.
His pleas of innocence and his protesta-
tions against what he describes as unfair
treatment by_ Congress and the",press
have generally been ignored.."
Direct Order for Intervention
-
the Senate intelli-
Iii published reports
gence Committee disclosed that Press,
dent Richard M. Nixon, at an Oval Office
meeting on Sept. .15,. 1970, ordered Mr..
Helms to prevent Dr. Allende's accession,
to power. He was told that he was tooper
ate- in great secrecy and not to - info
anyone in the State Department, includ-
ing Ambassador Korry, of his orders. ;
This effort was called Track II by the
committee to distinguish it from the so-
called Track I,. essentially a series of
political maneuvers also aimed at pre-
venting Dr. Allende's election, that were
carried out with.Mr. Korry's knowledge
and approval.
Approved For
The former- Ambassador defends ,his
role in Track I as constitutional and
maintains that it did not call for military
overthrow. In this period, he said, hel
worked closely: with Dr. Eduardo Frei
Montalva, the outgoing President, and It
was reluctance to mention Dr. Frei's in-
volvement that posed problems in the
1973 Senate bearing.
Mr. Korry's testimony before the Intel-
ligence Committee, which he concedes
was: incomplete, clearly contributed:to
his credibility problem. While he denied
receiving the green-light message,, he re-
peatedly refused to answer when he was
aske ,:.about his instructions regarding
Dr. Allende. He did not claim executive
privilege,. telling the subcommittee: "I
am not falling back on any legal rights: I
am speaking entirely of my own personal
perception of my moral responsibility to
the :Presidents.: I. cannot in good con-
: science wreck an institutional process for
Belated Recognition of Bad Choice..
`"` Mr. Korry concedes now that he might
:testifying more openly before the multi-
national L subcommittee and also by not
being more candid with the press about
some of the-suspicions he had then about
American involvement in .- activities
`,against Dr..Allende. Those suspicions, for
which he had no. direct evidence, were
heightened, he said, when he was repeat-
edly complimented by senior Govern-
ment officials after the 1973 hearings.
"Everybody was pleased as pink with my
testimony," he- explained. -"They be.
lieved 1 lied."
He recalled his sorrow and distress at
being Informed in July 1973 by a staff
member of.the Senate Intelligence Corn
mittee of the Track II efforts. The C.I.A
program, as the committee later report-
ed, indirectly led to the assassination of
Gen..ReneSchneider, commanderbf the
Chilean Army, a constitutionalist consid-
ered an obstacle to a coup.
"Until that date," Mr. Korry said, "I,
had . naively assumed I.T.T. was mis-
taken about my activities in Chile" - in
its various messages and reports that
were-obtained and published by Jack An-
derson. 'It:,finally was apparent to me.
that there was a calculated scheme to lay
off the blame for.Chile upon me," he went
on "This. disclosure shook a reference
point in my. life. In other words, the I.T.T.
green-light cable had-been. true in sub-
stance, if wrong about me. I.T.T. plus
C:I.A..officials and others in government.
had in fact lied under oath to the Senate
and had then conspired to hide froma the
public and me its activities."
Approaching reporters again, Mr.
Korry was determined to tell his full
story. But with the exception of a series of
articles in 1976 and 1977 by J. Trento of
The News Journal of Wilmington, Del.,
his account was ignored. This corre.
spondent, in long conversations with Mr.
Korry In 1975, concluded his account was
too self-serving to be credible.
In the recent interviews Mr. Korry ac-
knowledged that he was concealing infor-
mation about C.I.A. operations in Chile
when he refused to testify before the Sen.
ate subcommittee in 1973, but his special
'knowledge dealt not with 1970 and Dr. Al.
lends but.with the extent of C.IA. pene-
{ tration. of all aspects of Chilean society
`? under the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis.
trations. Those C.I.A. activities were
known to Ralph A. Dungan, his predeces.
.to President Frei, head of the Christian !
Democratic Party, which had C.I.A. sup-
L
He was concerned in 1973, be said, that
if he began talking about intelligence ac-
tivities, he would lose the right to with- '
hold such potentially embarrassing
points of information as these:
9American funding in support of the
Frei presidential campaign in 1964 to-
taled well over $20 million, much of it fun-
neled through C.I.A. and Agency for In-
ternational Development conduits, not
the $3 million reported by the C.I.A. to the
Senate Intelligence Committee.
'IWith the full knowledge of Chile and
the United States, millions in C.I.A. and
A.I.D. funds were allocated to Roman
Catholic groups opposed.,- to "laicism,
Protestantism. and Communism. Key
unions also received election funds. .
9Pre`sident Kennedy was personally in-
volved in urging large United States cor-
porations, -including LTM. and the'
Kennecott and: Anaconda:-copper con-
cerns, which had big and profitable hold-
ings in Chile, to work closely with the in-
telligence agency in bribing local offi-
cials and supporting political parties to
further American foreign policy.
BHush money was paid. to senior Chil-
can politicans who aided the White House
in its pro-Frei programs in 1964. One of
the defeated candidates In the 1964 elect
lion was Dr. Allende.
Predecessor Supports Account
9Ambassador Dungan, on leaving
Chile, provided Mr. Korry - with the
I names of 15 residents of Santiago whose
companionship and friendship he particu-
larly commended. All, amongthem three
clergymen, had been "funnels and instru-
ments of important C.I.A. programs."
Mr. Dungan, told of Mr. _Korry's re-
cos~xT~~a
 S M, -I, lL4 - I-"
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marks, commented: "That's true. Any
ambassador who wasn't aware of C.I.A.
activities in his country wasn't worth a
hoot." The former envoy, now a United
States executive director of the Inter
American Development Bank, added that
he consistently sought to make the Chris-
tian Democratic Party more viable while
he was in Chile in the mid-1960's in an ef-
fort to reduce the scope of the C.I.A.
Mr. Korry is most critical now of the
Senate Intelligence Committee investiga-
tion, which he insists was biased, incom-
plete and distorted. He was not permitted
to testify fully about his extensive knowl-
edge of earlier C.I.A. activities until Feb.
ruary 1976, he said, when he appeared be-
fore an executive session largely at-
tended by staff members. His full state-
ment was not made public, nor, he said,
has he been able to obtain a transcript of
his remarks. He maintained that Mr..
Church and other Democrats on the com-
mittee deliberately suppressed his testi-
mony about C.I.A. activities in the early
i1960's to shield the reputation of_Presi-
dent Kennedy as well as to prevent em-
barrassment to the Roman Catholic
Church and unions. -
"No one in authority," Mr. Korry said,
"wished the full 11-member committee,
even in secret session, to be compelled to
confront the past."
Senator Church has repeatedly denied
Mr. Korry's allegations.
Mr. Korry also accused the committee
of suppressing hundreds of his confiden-
tial cables that he turned over in 1975 and
that show, he maintains, that while Am-
bassador he sought to reach a "fair un-
derstanding" with Dr. Allende on many
key issues.
A Charge of Suppression
The committee, Mr. Korry maintained,
also suppressed evidence showing that in
the fall of 1970 he repeatedly urged Presi-
dent Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then
the President's national security adviser,
not to get involved in scheming with the
Chilean military. Mr. Korry has copies of
documents that appear to demonstrate
that he did give the White House such ad- t
vice, but no mention of this aspect of his
role was included in the committee's final
reports on Chile. Mr. Korry also asserted
that committee staff members made no
effort before publication to discuss with
him the messages and other documenta-
tion about his role, with the result that the !
Mr. Korry emphasized that he did not
believe any individual or group conspired
to deny him a chance to get his views
known. What did happen, he said, is that
those who were being investigated and
t cse who were investigating set limits on
the extent of the facts they wanted known
and thus "conspired to cave r eh o her "
"Their common interest in preventing
the full Senate committee from having'
them confront the truths I would tell in se.
cret led to my exclusion as a witness and
to the issuance of reports concerning
Chile which coupled each truth with a lie,
with a half truth or with a deliberately
misleading statement," he said.
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Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8
 both allies of the Soviet Union, and in
China. The specialists in terrorism re-
ported that other training had been pro-
vided in Czechoslovakia for-Italy's Red
Brigades and in. North Korea for the
Japanese Red Army.
Cuban Link Is Seen
Cuba is also thought to have trained
terrorists for action in Latin America and
to have been a conduit through which
weapons, either captured from the
United States in Vietnam or obtained
from the Soviet Union, have been shipped
to Latin America. _ -1.,
The diplomatic note from the Soviet
Union that was reflected in a dispatch
carried by Tass, the Soviet press agency,
said that the Soviet Union had supported.
Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8
=it"=ice'''u1
eel ?..tQ ,~4'
NEW YORK TIMES
9 FEBRUARY 1981
'roof of : Soviet-
By RICHARD HALLORAiN
''
SM"toTheNowYork Times.
.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 8-Officials with
Government said it was important to dis- ' measures to prevent air piracy. Another
tingush between Soviet support for what i Tass dispatch said that the Soviet Union
the Communists call national liberations had criticized the seizure of the Ameri-
cans diplomats in Iran.
movements
which the Soviet U
i
,
n
on
ices say they have little evidence to sub- I avowedly supports, and genuine terror-1-The note defended a Soviet right to as-
...ate auu "Uti ala- '--- _.??~?? ~? . Ucperu-
Haig ,. Jr.'s allegation that .,the Soviet) ing its allies in Vietnam and the Palestine ; ence. The Tass dispatch said that Mr_
Union, as part of a "conscious policy,-. groups, the specialists said, would most
undertook the. "training, funding and . likely have-appeared whether they had,
equipping" of international terrorists. He, Russian. help or not because they were
f
i asserted that Moscow:- fostered, sup- products: of political. forces -within their
ported and expanded that activity. own countries. .
But officials in the Central Intelligence .'`.The specialists said, however, that
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency some Russian help to terrorists might
and the State Department, asked to docu- have come-from. Libya, which has been
meat those charges, said. they were.un- the recipient of large shipments of Soviet
able to do so. "There's just no real evi- arms that later were sold or distributed
dence for it," said-an official: to terrorists.
B1ocHasHad Few Attacks Some organizations that have carried
out terrorist attacks, such as the P.L.Q.,
Mr. Haig also asserted that Soviet sup. have also sent people to the Soviet Union
port for international terrorism.:: was for training, the specialists said. A Pales-
"surprising" because "the Soviet,.Union tinian terrorist, Adnan Jaber, who is in
itself has been victimized by it.'.' prison in Israel, said last year that he had
Reports made public by the C.IA said been given six months training. in. the
A hat about 5 percent of the victims of ter- ' Soviet Union in weapons, tactics and ex-
rorism were nationals of the Soviet Union , plosives, .
omits East European allies. Relatively .'t . He also said that similar training was
-1"Z UaLCLY
for international terrorists. concealed its.help to Communists in'21ir-
Soviet diplomats said that their Gov- key.
,ernment had filed a note of protest to Mr. - Little Evidence Is Available
Haig, denying that. the Soviet Union en-
gaged in terrorism and, labeling Mr. But those specialists said there was lit-
Haig's accusations a "gross and, mall- tle evidence to show that the Soviet Union
cious deception." _ S xa ; had formed,- trained or directed terrorist
Secretary: Haig said on. Jan._28 in his organizations such as the Red Brigades
first news conference that., the. Soviet ! in Italy or the Japanese Red Army. Those
rasen pace insiae the Soviet bloc.
A recent study of 18 embassies under
siege, written by Brian M. Jenkins of the
Rand Corporation, a research institute,
showed that no diplomatic posts of the
Soviet Union- or its. allies had been at-
tacked and that only one. embassy in a
Communist country had: been invaded.
An and-Castro Cuban kidnapped the Bel-
gian and French . ambassadors at the
French Embassy in Havana in1973,
rorists out of George Washington and
other early American leaders.
Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010416-8