STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 27 FEBRUARY 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010261-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 261
• Publication Date: February 27, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 February 1980
Staff Meeting Minutes of 27 February 1980
The Director was re aring for a Presidential briefing; Mr. Carlucci
--Crash yesterday of a Taiwan airliner in Manila. He said a
U.S. courier was aboard but survived and is now at the U.S.
Embassy. McMahon reported several diplomatic pouches were
aboard, two have been located and Security presumes the
others were destroyed by fire. 25X1
chaired the meeting
McMahon reported briefly on the following:
Hetu reported Washington Post columnist George Lardner has requested
information including statistics re FOIA handling at CIA. Mr. Carlucci
said there is no reason not to provide basic data to Lardner, but he
wants to be informed if Lardner presses for information involving FOIA
exceptions. 25X1
Hetu called attention also to Michael Ledeen's recent article
"Tinker, Turner, Sailor, Spy" in New York Magazine attached ; this 25X1
prompted several critical comments from attendees.
Clarke announced the amalgamation of OSI and OWI into a single 25X1
office--Office of Scientific Weapons Research with Wayne Boring as
Director and as Deputy Director. He noted the
group (Center for Study of Foreign Personality Profiles), however,
will become part of OPA.
25X1
25X1
25X1
report that the Soviets
have provided six SU-20/22 bombers to North emen. He noted also that
since October 1979 the Soviets have provided North Yemen with nine
MIG-21s along with other military equipment including armored personnel
carriers. Mr. Carlucci said he would include this information in this 25X1
morning's briefing to the President
25X1
Clarke called attention to a
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Clarke noted a feature article in today's NID re the status of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He said this drew a comment from INR
indicating that State is holding to a Hodding Carter publicly announced
figure of 95,000 in contrast to the NID estimate of over 100,000
troops. Clarke said despite arrangements made two weeks ago for develop-
ing community consensus on such figures, State appears unwilling to budge 25X1
from Hodding Carter's public estimate.
Hitz reported HPSCI Chairman Boland has introduced H.R.6588 as a
House companion bill to S.2284 re Charter Legislation. He explained the
difficult situation re a stalemate developing between the Senate and
Administration on the issues of "full access" and "prior notification"
which have been muddied somewhat by media reporting. He said that unless
the Senate and the Administration come together on this, upcoming HPSCI
hearings will be problematical and passage of legislation would be
unlikely this year. Mr. Carlucci commented on the importance of having
Executive Order language on these issues included in the Charter Legisla-
tion to protect against misinterpretation. Relatedly, he said more
attention needs to be given to the employee benefits and death gratutity
bill. He noted the President's decision that automaticity with State
benefits for CIA is not to be included in relation to the granting of
benefits to State. Silver explained this decision by the President was
pursuant to a last minute letter from OMB, i.e., an OMB request to the
President that benefits for CIA be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Silver said he is trying to find out via Arnie Donahue, OMB, exactly
what this means from OMB's point of view and how it is to be handled and
to be sure that the language is clear. Silver advised Mr. Carlucci to
evade questions relating to this issue until the situation is made clear.
Mr. Carlucci asked Hitz and Silver to work it out. (Action: OGC and OLC)
25X1
Silver said he heard from Ken Bass (DoJ) yesterday re recommendations
from John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division) to
the Attorney General re Charters, specifically, dealing with exemptions
to FOIA where requests are for information provided by a foreign source.
Silver said also there remains a question of blanket coverage for the
entire intelligence community or CIA only. Mr. Carlucci suggested to
Silver we are at a point where a meeting with Civiletti is probably in
order. Silver noted ACLU lobbying on this issue has been a significant
factor.
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Regarding controversial concerns on the matter of intelligence
relationships with the clergy, academicians, and journalists, Silver
advised we get our house in order, e.g., establishing a true record
on the use of waivers re relationships with journalists. McMahon
said his office is pulling together the facts on this for the Director's
use today.
Briggs said there appears to be increased incidents of malfeasance
within the Agency, later noting a few recent cases being examined which
involve falsifying time and attendance records, pocketing operational
funds, and fake accountings. He noted plans to create a Grievance and
Investigative Group within the Inspector General's staff to augment
current capabilities for investigating such cases. A lengthy discussion
followed as to whether these developments constituted an increased trend.
Mr. Carlucci instructed that Briggs continue to size the problem but
explained it would be a mistake to detract from the grievance role of the
IG by coupling it with an investigative function which would be starkly
emphasized by the label "Grievance and Investigative Group." He also
endorsed Briggs' and Fitzwater's observation that management must be
attentive to its disciplinary responsibilities since a few of the cases
reflected inactivity at the mid-management level. He asked Deputy
Directors to bring attention to this matter at staff meetings.
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MI'CLE 1?P
011 PAGES 7
N HIS STATE OF THE UNION AD-
dress, President Carter called for
the end of unwarranted restric-
tions. on American intelligence
agencies. "An effective' intelli-
gence capability," he said, "is vital
to our nation's security." Although
the remark drew an ovation, there have
been no dramatic initiatives from the
Carter administration to revitalize what
is' generally considered to be a demoral-
ized and often dangerously ineffective
American intelligence community. Yet
the president's words demonstrate that
the mood of the administration-and
with it, by all indications, that of the
country-has changed dramatically from
the time when the Central Intelligence
Agency was considered to be a "rogue
elephant" dangerously out of control.
What is required to realize the presi-
dent's goals? According to those who
have spent their lives in and around
the intelligence business, the primary
requirement is a change in- the domes-
tic attitude toward the CIA. Such per-
? sons including former directors and
top officials of the agency-say the CIA
must be freed from some of the more
exaggerated forms of congressional
scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment, which gives more than
200 senators and staff members ac-
cess to agency data. They also urge
that those members of government and
the media who have harassed the
intelligence community for the past half
decade must now recognize that a vi-
able intelligence agency is urgently
needed. And, they say, the agency and
the. intelligence community as a whole
badly need the finest possible leader-
ship, both from the White House and
from the office of the director of central
intelligence (DCI). That post is cur-
rently occupied by Admiral Stansfield
Turner, and in the view of an impres-
sive number of intelligence experts,
Admiral Turner is not able to lead the
CIA back to respectability..
ITHIN MONTHS OF HIS
1977 appointment- as
DCI, Stansfield Turner
had acquired the nick-
name "Captain Queeg"
in CIA headquarters
in Langley, Virginia.
NEW YORK MAGAZINE
3 March 1980
'MA
One morning in January 1979, he
came to work to find the bulletin boards
and mailboxes full of a forged edition of
his own "Notes From' the Director."
Dated January 15, it has become an
underground classic in the intelligence
community:
I was in my office fairly exhausted last
evening after stopping work at 10 P.Ivt. As
is my wont after a long day. I asked the
Michael Ledeen is executive editor of
The Washington Quarterly.
StansfieldTurner;critics. say, has
demoralized and politicized The CIA.
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steward to bring me a bowl of s1berries
and cream. Iles a good enough fellow-
if a bit shiftless-and it wasn't long before
he shuffled back to report that someone
had stolen the strawberries from my re-
frigerator. It was my hardest blow since
coming here . . . but I did without.
I could leave it at that. After all a new
supply of strawberries can be purchased.
But it's not that simple. I deem this a
personal attack by someone who knew of
my propensity for the fruit, using innocent
strawberries to get at me.
I am therefore ordering that until the
strawberries are returned to my refrigera-
tor, no one will leave the building. The
General Services Administration will be
asked to augment meal service while we
wait. As an added stimulus I am rifting
100 people per day until the wrong is
righted. Any person helping to identify
the thief will, beside an immediate qual-
ity step increase, be given a pair of stain-
less. steel spheres similar to those T use
for thinking the unpalatable thoughts our
Communist adversaries force us to think.
I will keep you informed on our p
Tess in this as we move along. Chances
are the pinko commie strawberry-fetish
fink will see the error of his ways and
surrender. I'd almost bet my Navy pension
on it. Finally and again, I feel some re-
morse in having to do this but national
security is hardball and not for softies.
The admiral did not find the docu-
ment amusing, and he ordered the CIA
Security Office to find the persons re-
sponsible-a task which has proved a
failure. But as Turner must have real-
ized, the forgery reflected the conviction
of a large number of agency officials
past and present that the former ad-
miral is the wrong man for the job, and
that he should be removed before fur-
ther serious, even irreparable, damage
is done to the CIA.
My own investigation-.including an'
hour-long conversation with Turner
in his office at CIA headquarters
Turner has resisted independent
checks and balances on spying
at Langley-has largely confirmed this
gloomy analysis. Leading CIA offi-
cials-some of whom have left only
within recent months, and others
who are in the process of leaving
-say that Turner has done more
harm to the CIA than all the recent
congressional investigations combined.
And it is difficult finding any Turner
supporters. When I asked National
Security Council press man Jerry
Schecter to arrange some interviews
for me with NSC officials and staffers,
he called back a fe%v days later to
say that nobody wanted to discuss the
CIA and Admiral Turner. Not for
the record, not on background, no way
at all. Later, when I advised the
CIA's information office that I had
been given a great quantity of infor-
mation critical of Admiral Turner, and
that I would like to go over it with
agency- officials in an effort to get a
more rounded picture, I was permitted
to speak with just one man: Bruce
Clarke, the elegant and erudite head
of the.- National Foreign Assessment
Center. But Clarke is only recently re-
turned to the CIA after five years in
Vienna and thus is in no position to
evaluate Turner in context. And I was
not even permitted to be atone.with _
Clarke; Director of Public Affairs
Herbert Hetu, a man with a reputation
for loyalty to the admiral, sat in. Simi-
larly, during the interview with Turner
himself, three assistants--including the
redoubtable Hetu-were at the table.
I encountered a similar reluctance to
discuss Turner in the intelligence com-
mittees of Congress. Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Chairman Birch
Bayh was not available for comment,
nor was Staff Director William Miller.
In short, Turner's critics are talking,
while his allies-if there are any-are
lying low.
The -charges against- Turner.are seri-
ous ones. According to his critics he
has- undermined the morale of the in-
telligence community, wantonly and ar-
bitrarily fired hundreds of valuable offi-
cers, presided over a steady decline in
the quality of intelligence, and politi-
cized much of the information flowing
from Langley to the White House. -
HEN HE ARRIVED IN
the spring of 1977,
Turner found a memo-
randum left behind by
the survivors of the last
year of the Nixon-Ford
period. Drafted by Bill
Nelson (a top officer in the?DDO-the
Directorate of Operations, that director-
ate concerned with clandestine activity),
the memo claimed that there had been
a "Vietnam y?bt;1ge" .in the clandes-
tine services: Nelson has accordingly
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argued that several hundred its fact, the purge was not a total .surprise,om the earlier ones. Even James
Is -
could be phased out of the clandestine for Turner had conducted two extended Schlesinger. whose purge in his brief
side without any substantial damage to briefings on the matter in August, in
the CIA's effectiveness. In fact, no such the secure "bubble" at Langley. On
"bulge" existed--or ever had. The size each occasion the house was full: 500
of the Operations Directorate's Far East persons at a time. Yet, he claims, not a
Division increased enormously during single senior official in the DDO told
the Vietnam war, along with the size him not to proceed.
of that division's overseas contingents. Others in the CIA tell a different
in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. But story. Two senior officials say ' they
this increase in manpower was achieved personally implored Turner to adopt a
primarily by depleting the ranks of more traditional method of reducing
the other divisions of the clandestine the number of officials in the clandes-
services. Overall, the strength of the tine services. Moreover, according to
clandestine services actually 'declined these and other sources, Turner was
during the decade 1965-75. intimately involved in the process from
Stansfield Turner may not have beginning to end.
known all this, and in any event most This was not the first time in the
observers agree that the clandestine agency's history that a new DCI had
services were overstaffed when Turner wielded his authority like a Sword of
came aboard. But some of his more re- Damocles over the heads of his employ-
lentless critics have argued that Turner ees, but Turner's approach-whichever
accepted the conclusions of the Nelson version is correct-was quite different
memo because they fitted so nicely.
with the political mood of_ the early
days of the Carter administration. The
admiral denied this to me with con-
siderable intensity, and.he was almost
certainly telling the truth. For had
Turner wished to perform a politically
acceptable purge of the ranks of the
clandestine services, he would not have
done it as he did.
Nelson had proposed that the number
of clandestine officers be reduced grad-
ually over a five-year period. Turner
did it in two 'years. And he did it in
a way calculated to produce great. re.
sentment at the agency itself. For in-
stead of entrusting the task to the
various divisions, Turner turned the
matter over to the personnel office, with
instructions to computerize the process
and thin out.the ranks of the senior
people to make room for younger men
and women to move up.
? Computerized profiles were used to
draw. up the lists of those who were
to be compelled to leave. All officers,
in each grade level, were competitively
ranked by the computerized formulas.
From each grade level, including the
highest (GS-18), a number of victims
were chosen. In November 1978, these
unlucky souls received pink slips signed
not by Turner but by William
Wells, then DDO. Wells himself was
then fired as DDO partly because of
the fallout from the purge.
Turner told me he was "aghast"
when he saw the harsh, terse letter that
went out to the persons on the com-
puterized hit list, and he says he toyed
with the idea of issuing a second, more
gentle note. He also told me that he
was not intimately involved in the
procedures that led to the selection of
the names, and that he had received no
complaints from the agency's senior
ranks prior to the actual firings. In
tenure at Langley is still legendary, had
the good sense to assign the selection
of the victims to other intelligence offi-
cers, not a computer. While there was
great resentment of Schlesinger's ac-
tions, there was consequently a general
appreciation of his methods, since the
implementation of someof Schlesinger's
cuts was tempered by the more com-
passionate judgment of some of his
senior subordinates, notably his direc-
tor of personnel. With Turner, the hu-
man touch was far more distant. Ofn-
?cers with years of experience were
summarily dismissed without the slight-
est flexibility. Men a few months short
of higher pension levels were thrown
out, although no one within two years
of retirement was fired.
The Turner purge was not simply
the result of a misunderstanding about
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the "Vietnam bulge,' for the admiral.
had been approached by a group of
younger officers claiming that channels
for advancement in the clandestine serv-
ices had been blocked for years by
the "old-boy network." Turner took
these complaints seriously, and one of
the reasons for the purge was his sin-
cere conviction that it was necessary
to provide greater opportunities for the
younger officers. While the motive is
an admirable one, the analysis turned
out to be unfounded: Last year one of
the country's top management-consult-
ancy firms was asked to look at the
personnel policies of the clandestine
services, and these policies were pro-
nounced outstanding. Thus, two ma-
jor motives for the great'\,purge--the
Vietnam bulge and the' theory of
favoritism in the clandestine services--
were both unfounded. . .
The realization that Turner's actions
were based' upon misunderstandings
and misconceptions only heightened the
bitterness toward him, especially among
senior officers. But even in the middle
and. lower ranks, morale was badly
undermined, for they saw officials
struck down who were among the finest
persons at the CIA. In. one cele-
brated case, for example, the computers
printed out the name of one of the top
clandestine operatives in Western Eu-
rope, a man who was on a first-name
basis with many-chiefs of state 'and
heads of government, and who had
been operating successfully for over
twenty years. When challenged on that
particular selection, the admiral an-
nounced that he would not overrule the
computer. By last October, over 800
positions had been closed down in the
clandestine services, and more - than
1,100.persons had been driven from the
ranks. And even though Turner says
that only 160 people left involuntarily,
one must wonder if some of these per-'
sons are not sufficiently angry to coop-
most talented and experienced members.
Late last summer, on successive Fri-
days, there were retirement parties at
Langley for three of the CIA's most es-
teemed officers: Ted Shackley, George
Carver, and Dan Arnold. None was
fired; all were driven out by Turner's
behavior. Shackley and Carver were
forced to choose between retirement
and accepting a post that would have
represented a de facto demotion. Ar-
nold left because he was appalled by
what was happening to the clandestine
services and because he had lost all
respect for Turner's integrity and his
capacity to exercise leadership.
A spokesman for Turner told me that
the admiral did not encourage these
people to leave, and the official line at
the agency is that resignations are only
to be expected at a time when the
agency finds it hard to compete with the
private sector in salaries, fringe benefits,
and vacations. -
But the Shackley case is -instructive
on this matter: Widely considered one
of the most talented members. of the
DDO (he was instrumental in organiz-
ing the highly successful defense of Laos
in the undeclared war of the late 1960s),
Shackley was associate- DDO when
Turner arrived. He was asked to serve-
as deputy to Army Lieutenant General
Frank Camm at the newly created Na-
tional Intelligence Tasking Center. This
offide was supposed to- coordinate the
collection assignments of the entire in-
telligence community, but it never really
got off the ground, despite an impressive
bureaucratic expansion to a staff of
some 150 persons. Camm, a military
man of no particular distinction and
no real knowledge- of intelligence,
stayed on for a couple of years and then
left early in 1979. ShackIey was ob-
viously -in line to replace him, but
Turner stalled, apparently unable -to
make 'up his mind. After months of
waiting; and by now convinced that
.erate with the agency's enemies.. Turner had no interest in promoting
him, ShackIey resigned. Turner has said
URNER HAS LONG BEEN that the resignation came as a total
known as an aloof, almost surprise, and that he. regretted it.
unapproachable individual Sources close to Shackley respond in
when it comes to dealing two ways: First, it certainly seemed
with people. When he was - that Turner wanted Shackley out, for
in charge of NATO's south-
ern command in Naples,
was notoriously awkward in
otherwise he could have told Shackley
dealing with his subordinates. When it
was learned that Turner had been re-
called to Washington early in 1977 by
Carter, his navy colleagues told any-
one who card to listen that they
hoped the admiral would not end up
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or back in
their service. ' -
Most damaging of all to the morale
of the CIA has been Turner's insensi-
tivity toward some of the agency's
something positive. Second, if Turner
in fact-did not realize the impact of his
behavior, he should not be in charge
of a large organization whose proper
functioning depends primarily on the
existence of a strong esprit de corps.
Turner does not seem to appreciate
this fact. In our conversation, he re-
peatedly stated his satisfaction with the
..new personnel policies" he has insti-
tuted, and he boasted that the CIA is
now more "balanced and representa-
tive" than ever before. He said that
in the old days, agency personnel came
primarily from the Ivy League uni-
versities (a charge made in the late
1950s by Senator John F. Kennedy,
but found to be false even twenty
years ago), whereas it now has better
geographical balance.. Moreover. ac-
cording to Turner, there are now more
ethnics, more blacks, and more women
in the agency. There. is even a woman
at - the head of - a. major station . over-
seas. and there will be another female
station chief in the near future. And
Turner takes great personal interest in
the younger officers. A few weeks ago
he surprised everyone by having lunch
with five of the new recruits; he told
me that he was "inspired" by their
qualities of intelligence and enthusiasm.
The admiral's concern for the younger
officers and his up-to-date interest in
equal opportunity are genuine, but in
a properly functioning intelligence or-
ganization great care must also be paid
to the senior ranks. According to sev-
eral senior diplomats I spoke to, the
quality of -CIA performance overseas
has dropped steadily for the past few
years, an inevitable consequence of
drooping morale and less experienced
officers. Finally,. there is the story
(apocryphal, perhaps) of a person in.
structed to get in touch with a CIA
clandestine operative in a Central
European capital. He was given a
meeting place in a busy part of town
and went to the appointment only to
find that his CIA contact was a very
tall, and very black, man who was the
major curiosity in the area. Obviously,
undercover conversation was impossible.
U RNER'S DIFFICULTIES WITH
his employees might be
} overlooked if the quality
of reports and estimates
had improved- under his
stewardship. Unfortunately,
-this has not happened. In-
stead, there has apparently been a new
and alarming politicization of intelli-
gence.
To be sure, there is nothing new
about the DCI's taking an active role in
tailoring intelligence estimates to fit
policy needs. Indeed, it is a vital part
of his job. But Turner seems to be par-
ticularly sensitive to White House pre-
dilections. Aside from the case of Iran,
in which CIA estimates were atrocious,
but which can be charitably laid at the
feet of several directors and administra-
tions, his critics cite three grave failures:
the Vietnamese invasion of 'Cambodia,
the Cambodian famine, and the Soviet
brigade in Cuba.
In the Cambodian cases, Turner had
repeatedly received detailed information
from officers ' in' the field that indicated
what was about to happen. Yet in both
AnT
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instances-in two successive y4-he Baader-Meinhof band. Yet in a close?Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB),
passed on estimates to the White'Wouse briefing to congressional oversight com- charged with taking an independent
that took the opposite position. Were mittees, CIA representatives argued last look at the quality of the intelligence
there simple failures in analysis, or
were they, as some of those involved in
the estimates angrily claim, examples
of preparing estimates to suit the pre-
vailing mood in the White House? The
president and some of his top advisers
were eager to normalize relations with
Vietnam, and predictions of an immi-
nertt invasion of Cambodia-with full
soviet support-were likely to irritate
the policymakers. Similarly, reports of
the disastrous famine in Cambodia a
year after-beginning as early as Janu-
ary-were not likely to be well received
by an administration that claimed to
have "lost its inordinate fear of Com-
munism." Thus, as late as June 1979,
the CIA said there would be no famine.
Likewise the Soviet brigade. Carter
had been working for better relations
with Castro's Cuba and had also been
striving to minimize the degree of So-
viet adventurism at a time when the
image of the Kremlin was crucial for
selling SALT II to skeptical senators.
As a sign of his good faith, Carter had
ordered the suspension of dJ 2 surveil-
lance flights over Cuba. The National
Security Agency continued its general
interception of foreign communications
but was not instructed to "listen" for
specific bits of information. Moreover,
human sources in Cuba were reduced:
Thus, when claims. of a new Soviet
military presence on the island were
brought forward by Senator Richard
Stone of Florida, the CIA. denied hav-
ing any such information. Once the sur-
veillance flights were resumed, the So-
viet troops were quickly. identified, but
no clear picture of their purpose
emerged. That could reliably come only
from experienced human sources. Thus,
Turner's critics accuse him of failing
to insist on maintaining surveillance
over Cuba, failing to take seriously the
warnings that arrived, and failing to
use human intelligence properly. They.
add that it is no accident that hu-
man intelligence is currently in short
supply, given the admiral's desire to
open the way for less experienced offi-
cers and his actions to remove so many
of the old hands. Yet the admiral told
interviewers from National Public Ra-
dio last December that the discovery of
the Soviet brigade in Cuba was one of
the triumphs of his stewardship.
The same bending to the prevailing
political winds can be seen in the CIA's
curious handling of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. ?For years; the
agency's primary interest in interna-
tional terrorism had centered on this
organization; it paid perceptibly less
attention to other groups like the Ital-
ian Red Brigades and the German
fall that it would be improper to term
the PLO a "terrorist" organization, that
the group was actually "moderate" and
simply maintained a facade of terrorism
to curry favor with "radical Arabs."
This opinion fits nicely with the convic-
tions of the White House that the PLO
must play a major role in a future Mid-
dle East peace settlement and that its
leadership is basically "moderate."
OT ONLY HAS TURNER
overseen a politicization of
intelligence, but he has re-
sisted efforts to provide on-
going independent checks
and balances within the
agency and the community.
Turner supported the questionable deci-
sion to eliminate the President's Foreign
u er; using a computer printout;
fired ninny of the CIA's top..-agents.
community's product. PFIAB had or-
ten been able to recommend to the pres-
ident and the DCI courses of action
that .had not occurred to the community
"regulars," and most CIA veterans re-
garded it as extraordinarily useful. Now
there is no independent body with the
same broad authority to make recom-
mendations directly to the president'.
Instead, Turner characteristically cre-
ated an in-house body-the Senior Re-
view Panel-that examines intelligence
estimates at an early stage in their pro-
duction and can suggest different lines
of analysis. - - -
Finally,. Turner has insisted on main-
taining maximum control over the entire!
community and over the day-to-day op.
erations of the agency. When he becamee
director, the number-two position at the!
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According to s&irces,Turner has
tailored intelligence analyses to
fit the nito House viewpoint.
agency and in the community-the dep-
uty director of?central intelligence, or
DDCI-was held by E. Henry Knoche,
'a longtime agency professional. Under
Turner's predecessor George Bush, the
DDCI had been in charge of most nor-
Mal activities at the CIA, while the di-
rector had been concerned with overall
planning, liaison with Congress and the
executive branch, and the coordination
of the intelligence community. Turner
indicated his desire to assume many of
the DDCI's roles himself, leaving
Knoche with a greatly diminished task.
Knoche lasted less than six months
and-left on July 5, 1977. According to
high-level CIA sources, Knoche quit
because Turner had made it clear he
did not want a deputy director with a
substantive role, and Knoche was con-
cerned that under Turner the agency
was losing ground with respect to the
other components of the intelligence
community.
ITH KNOCHE'S DEPAR-
ture, Turner had a
clear field for the selec-
tion 'of a new- deputy
director. At first it
seemed he was content
to leave the post vacant,
and in fact he told a group of CIA offi-
cers in the- late summer of 1977 that
on those occasions when he was absent
from Langley, operations responsibility
could simply be assumed by the chief
of operations of the DDCI. But Turner
did set about finding an acceptable re-
placement for -Knoche,' and his- first
choice was Lyman Kirkpatrick, one of
-the oldest of the old hands. All seemed
clear for his appointment as deputy
when Turner suddenly changed. his
mind. After discussing the question with
senior White House officials, Turner hit
on former ambassador to Portugal Frank
Carlucci. Despite press reports that Car-
lucci.-was imposed on Turner, the ad-
miral told me that the selection was en-
tirely his own.. It was, in any event,
a remarkable choice, for it was one of
the few times since the agency's incep-
tion that the two top men in the organi-
zation came from outside the intelli-
gence community". Yet there was reason
to believe that Carlucci would give the
CIA what it.so badly needed: an inde-
pendent and courageous person willing
to - fight for real professionalism. His
the CIA has done well, even remark-
ably so, in areas where it had been
weak in the past. In particular, the
CIA's information and analysis regard-
ing some parts of Africa have been ex-
ceptionally good of hte, as has been i
the material regarding China. To what
extent this has been due to Turner's
leadership is impossible to say, but it
may well reflect-positively, for once-
the increased interest in these areas by
background in Lisbon, where he suc-
cessfully challenged Henry Kissinger's
dismal view of the future of that country,
gave those unhappy with Turner cause
for optimism, as did his behavior in the,
first few weeks at Langley.
. Every deputy director receives from
the director a written delegation of
authority, defining the DDCI's role and
authorizing him to see some or all of
the information that passes over the
director's desk. Turner dragged his feet
for weeks and then tried to get Car-
lucci to accept a limited document.
Carlucci refused, saying that he felt he
had to see everything that Turner saw
-a reasonable request, for the DDCI
can be asked to substitute for the direc-
tor in various circumstances and would
have to be fully in formed in such events.
In the end, Turner gave in. There may
well be some private understandings be-
tween the two, but in theory Carlucci
knows what Turner knows. -
Yet despite this promising start, Car-
lucci has not played a major role within
the agency. Now, known as Hamlet to
his colleagues, Carlucci has played the
part of loyal lieutenant to Turner. So far
as is known, he has never tried to chal-
lenge Turner on a matter of substance.
his old friend and Annapolis class-
mate to the post of director of
central intelligence. But Turner is
not without his strengths, and de-
- spite the current closed-mouth
policy regarding his achievements, he
can point with considerable pride to
some -substantial accomplishments. For
one thing, he has taken seriously the
deteriorating security at the CIA and
has acted to cut down on the number
of leaks, both to the press and to
other outsiders. CIA analysts are no
longer permitted casual contact with
the press and are now required to have
journalists file formal requests for con-
versations, listing the time and place of
the meeting along with proposed sub-
jects for discussion. Turner has also
insisted upon vigorous action against
those such as Philip Agee who emerge
from the CIA and write their "con-
fessions." -
Furthermore. the quality of Intel-
ligence has improved in some areas.
Foreign-intelligence. sources insist that
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Finally, there is the case of SALT
11, where Turner showed unusual tour- i
age and integrity as well as striking in-
dependence of the desires of the ad-
ministration. Turner told the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that
he could not guarantee that the United
States would be certain of knowing
about Soviet violations of the terms of
the treaty. Given the loss of crucial
listening and observation posts in Iran.
Turner said it might be years before
these capabilities were replaced: He
spoke his mind, despite the feverish ef-
forts of,the president, the secretary of
state, and the secretary of defense to
convince the Senate that the reverse
was true. -
Thus, whatever his critics may say,
Stansfield Turner has shown that he
is capable, on occasion, of standing
by his guns, even when such a stance
is unpopular with his commander in
chief. This is a rare quality in Wash-
ington and is much to be admired..
Paradoxically, it is precisely this breach
of political discipline that has made it
so unlikely that Turner will be re-
moved from his post in the near fu-
ture. For Carter and his colleagues
fear that firing Turner would inevi-
tably give rise.-to suspicions that he-
was removed because he failed to sup- . F
port the administration on a policy mat
ter like SALT.
In the long run, however, Turner
will have to go. No matter how sub-
stantial his achievements (and there
are undoubtedly several that are, and
will remain, unknown for a long time), 's
his failure of leadership at the CIA is
a fatal one. For in the next half
decade,the United States will face a
series of challenges that cannot be
solved by the mere application of su-
perior might. America no longer holds a
decisive advantage over its adversaries
--indeed, in many categories the rela-
tionship has been inverted. Therefore, .
the country will have to find more
subtle ways of dealing with crises.
This inevitably requires a ,first-class,
well-functioning, and highly motivated
CIA. Without the finest caliber of
leadership, the CIA cannot function as
it will have -to .in-?the years ahead.
Unfortunately, Stansfield Turner is not
the man for the jog. ..