STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 16 JUNE 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010230-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 230
• Publication Date: June 16, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Staff Meeting Minutes of 16 June 1980
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McMahon called attention to an 11 June 1980 memo from the SSCI requesting
information on the nature and scope of U.S. intelligence relationships with
since the early 1950s. He said this 25X1
wherein Mr. Carlucci advised the DDO and OLC to review the Waller report to
identify what might be passed to the Committee without compromising sources
and methods. Because the SSCI request encompases the entire intelligence
community, Mr. Carlucci asked to gather appropriate inputs from 25X1
community elements. (Action: , and CTS) 0 25X1
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request will be difficult to handle. He noted that the SSCI year-long
study on this topic is nearing completion. A brief discussion followed
General Gorman have quelled the teapot tempest regarding net assessments.
Clarke said he believes his talks last week with General Pustay and 25X1
He said a colloquium with Defense representatives will begin today
as planned, and the session will focus on comparative general purpose
Clarke reported Dick Giza, HPSCI Staffer, has requested a copy of our
post-mortem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. Clarke said he told Giza a copy
would be provided at the appropriate time, noting that NFIB principals have
not yet reviewed the post-mortem.F I 25X1
Clarke called attention to General Tighe's memo of 30 May requesting
DCI assistance, i.e., DCI signature on letters to Senators Bayh and Nunn
and Representatives Boland and White, endorsing legislation authorizing the
Defense Intelligence School to award the degree of Master of Science in
Strategic Intelligence. Student enrollment includes officers from NSA, DIA,
CIA, FBI, and military services. This precipitated a brief discussion
wherein it was a reed this matter should be carefully coordinated with OTR
and OLC. 25X1
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Clarke noted an item in today's Executive Summary that a Panamanian
air force plane crashed this morning in El Salvador. He said the plane was
carrying weapons including 22,000 rounds of ammunition destined for
Salvadorian leftists.
Clarke reported the Soviets are getting ready for a third testing of
the Typhoon missile, noting the two previous tests had failed. He said our
Mr. Carlucci reported a long but successful session with the IOB last
Friday, noting that Tom Farmer queried him on our interest in transnational
data flows. Mr. Carlucci asked if we have anyone working this problem,
e.g., interlinking of computer systems, banking systems, etc. Davis
commented that this matter was a major feature of PRM-35 a year ago; he
said the Office of Political Anal sis among others delved deeply into this 25X1
problem. Mr. Carlucci requested to prepare a note for his signature
to Farmer on what has been done on is topic. (Action: NFAC) 0 25X1
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said the HPSCI will mark up S. 2284 on 18 June and will introduce
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from the Attorney General. Mr. Carlucci noted also to that the
precises he provided which were prepared for the President on specific
covert actions can be used in briefing our oversight committees without
making them aware that these are the same precises rovided to the President.
McMahon concurred that this would be helpful. 25X1
its companion bill re Charters Legislation. He said also we will see today
the Republican version of Charters Legislation. Relatedly, Mr. Carlucci
said he was disappointed that Attorney General Civiletti intends not to
testify on Identities Legislation and, on OLC's advice, he will phone
Associate Attorney General Shenefield in an effort to gain active support
Wortman reported yesterday's heavy thunderstorm resulted in damage to 125X1
camper parked on the Headquarters compound.F__1 25X1
looked into for possible breach of security.
McMahon noted that Loch Johnson, a professor at the University of
Georgia and former HPSCI Staffer, authored an article in the recent issue
of Foreign Policy--"The CIA: Controlling the Quiet Option"--copy attached.
He said the substance of the article raises serious questions re any
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FOREIr':, ':1LICI
Summer 1950
The CIA:
CONTROLLING THE QUIET OPTION
by Loch K. Johnson
In the new mood of American assertive-
ness, 'the cry is going out from Washington
and the nation to unleash America's spymas-
ters. With startling abruptness, the inteili-
gence pendulum is plunging back through the
modest arc of reform achieved painstakingly
over the past four years. Its momentum
threatens to sweep aside all vestiges of mean-
ingful control over the U.S. intelligence agen-
cies instituted by Congress and the executive.
From the moment intelligence reform be-
came a serious possibility in 1975, strong
forces resisted it. The abuses and failures doc-
umented in detail, that year by Senate and
House investigating committees were suffi-
ciently serious to overcome these forces, at
least long enough to establish permanent in-
telligence committees in both the Senate and
the House. But the more than 90 other recom-
mendations for reform presented by the inves-
tigators languished. The single significant ex-
ception was a 1978 statute tightening pro-
hibitions on the heedless use of wiretaps.
Now, the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pah-
lavi of Iran, the kidnapping of U.S. embassy
officials, and the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan have thrown most intelligence reform ef-
forts from neutral into reverse.
In May 1980 the omnibus charter pro-_
duced in 1978 by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence concluded its lengthy and
complex metamorphosis. Originally a huge.
263-page bill, the legislation rested momen-
tarily at a second major stage of 172 pages
earlier this year before emerging rapidly and
dramatically in a final, spare form of three
pages. This end stage was given the name In-
telligence Oversight Act of 1980. Ina curios-
ity of nature, the frog has become a tadpole.
LOCH K. JOHNSON is an associate professor of political
science at the University of Georgia, Athens.
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For the most part, the debate on intelligence
reform has run counter to the direction of
greater legislative control envisaged by Seri
ator Frank Church (D.-Idaho) and then Rep-
resentative Oris Pike (D.-New York) fou_
long years ago. Indeed, in light of the current I
mood, many fear that as the superpowers'
slide toward a new cold war, the intelligences
agencies will slip back quietly into their famil- I
iar ways. Most of what they did in the old+
days was laudatory, often indispensable.
sometimes heroic. But with lax external;
checks, abuses inevitably arose. Surely Amer-'
icans have not forgotten so quickly the undis
puted findings of the J 975 congressional i -!
quiries: the unlawful mail openings. the+
break-ins, the wiretaps, the interceptions ofl
cables and telegrams, the questionable opera-
tions abroad, the bungling, the inefficiency,)
and the sheer stupidity of so many schemes.
This unhappy evidence sums to far less:
than the total performance -of the Central l
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau l
of Investigation, or any other intelligence l
agency. The congressional investigators came
away from their inquiry with a high regard:
for the overwhelming majority of men andj
women in these demanding services. Nonethe-
less, these sad events-horrors, in some in-
stances-did occur, and they cast a dark
shadow across the entire intelligence estab-
lishment. They cannot be allowed to happen,
again. Yet if the counsel of those who wishI
to brush aside the few safeguards now in'
place is followed, a recurrence of these night-
mares is a distinct risk. This is why the cur-.
rent debate on intelligence reform is so impor-
tant.
The CIA's Bete Noire
A central topic in the debate is an amend-
ment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act,
sponsored by former Senator Harold E.
Hughes (D.-Iowa) and the late Representative
Leo J. Ryan (D.-California). It is known as.
the Hughes-Ryan Act. The legislation - re-
quires the president himself to approve in
writing all important covert actions, namely.
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those designed secretly to influence events in
a way favorable to U.S. foreign policy. It also
establishes a procedure for informing Con-
gress of these decisions.
Known by the euphemism special activi-
ties in the current administration and often
called the quiet option at CIA headquarters.,
covert action is a step between using diplo
mats, on the one hand, and sending in the
Marines, on the other. Covert actions repre-
sent only a small fraction of the resources
expended by the CIA. In the estimate of for-
mer CIA Director William Colby, they con-
sume around 5 per cent of the agency's
budget. a sharp decline from a decade ago.
The option remains controversial. however.
because much damage can be done even`
within this low budget ceiling and because
the pressures are strong in high places to ex
pand dram atically the use of covert action.
Critics of the Hughes-Ryan Act view it as
the major obstacle to the expansion of covert
actions.
Bluntly put, the CIA wants to rip the
Hughes-Ryan Act right out of the U.S. code
book. The offending language reads:
No funds appropriated under the author-
ity of this or any other Act may be ex-
pended by or on behalf of the [CIA] for
operations in foreign countries, other than
activities intended solely for obtaining
necessary intelligence, unless and until the
President finds that each such operation is
important to the national security of the
United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such
operation to the appropriate committees
of the Congress... .
The primary bete noire of Hughes-Ryan,
from the CIA's point of view, is found in the
last phrase. Appropriate committees came to
mean four in the House and four in the Sen-
ate: the committees on appropriations, armed
services, intelligence, and foreign affairs. CIA
officials felt eight were simply too many.
The agency has a ready solution to the
Hughes-Ryan problem: repeal the act alto-
gether. If this proves impossible, then at least
limit the reporting requirement to the House)
and Senate intelligence committees. Better
still, combine these two committees into a
single joint committee on intelligence.
The argument for the reduction from eigh~~
to two committees holds great surface appeal.
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Fewer committees might shrink the potential
for leaks, and agency briefers would no longer
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need to hop from one committee to anotheri
But the argument has serious flaws.
In the first place, the possibility that sensi-
tive material might-be leaked out of commit
tee has been greatly exaggerated. Opponents
of Hughes-Ryan often claim that 200 or more:
individuals must be briefed on covert actions.'
In reality the true figure is around 46 mem-
bers and 17 staffers, or a total of 63 people.
Moreover. since the establishment of the in
telligence committees, leaks regarding covert,
action have been almost nonexistent. Further-i
more, a leak could come just as easily from the l
executive branch, where far more people-at
times over 100-are aware of impending
covert action.
The CIA lobbied hard for the reduction to
the two reporting committees now included in
the Oversight Act. The agency will no doubt
discover, though, that other key members,
whom it can ill-afford to refuse, will want in-
formation directly. Today, more members
demand to know these plans-and rightly soI
if they are to perform their duties in harmony!
with the rest of the government.
But to speak of appropriate committees is
to overlook the more important provisions
of the Hughes-Ryan Act. If anything, that
law needs to be strengthened, not diluted or
revoked. The act applies only to the CIA. All
a president has to do in order to avoid.Con-
gress is assign the covert action mission to
another agency. The military would be the
obvious choice.
Another shortcoming of the act concerns
the language defining covert action as."opera-
tions in foreign countries, other than activi-
ties intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence. This means that what the CIA
actually spends much more time doing-col-
lecting intelligence covertly-does not have;
.to be reported to Congress. The agency must)
inform the congressmen only of what it con-~
siders important secret political, economic,
paramilitary, and propaganda operations.!
Not only is intelligence collection excluded,,
but so are'counterintelligence operations, de-
spite the fact that both of these activities can
hold high risk for the nation.
The National Security Council (\'sC) be i
came aware of the need to be informed of all.
sensitive covert operations. not just covercl,
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actions. Unfortunately the two intelligence)
committees remain hesitant to do what the
\SC has done already: establish procedures
for the routine reporting of sensitive covert
action, counterintelligence operations. and
collection proposals., Not everything the CIA
does in these areas should be reported: most
of these activities are uncontroversial. The
appropriate rule of the thumb for Congress
should be: What is significant enough to go
to the NSC should go to the intelligence com-
mittees and, arguably, to the leaders of the
other six committees as well.
A Tangled Knot
Other improvements in the Hughes-Ryan
Act would include clarification of the phrases
"in a timely fashion" and "unless and until"
and the word "important." Normally under
Hughes-Ryan the CIA will contact the con-
gressional committees within 24 hours-
usually immediately following the presi-
dent's approval. The wise inclination of the
CIA is to test congressional opinion before)
proceeding, especially within the intelligence
committees where CIA budgets are authorized.
Since the passage of Hughes-Ryan, only once
has congressional reaction been sufficiently j
negative to reverse a presidential decision. In
that instance, the committees were informed
prior to implementation. But nothing in the
Hughes-Ryan- Act guarantees that the CIA;
will always provide 24-hour notification.
The recent covert action involving the se-'
cret transport of Americans out of Iran with;
the help of Canadian officials in Tehran was
not reported to Congress until over a week
after its approval and implementation- The,
ill-starred U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iranl
also reportedly relied in part upon CIA sup-
port, yet apparently no members of Congress
were informed of the operation in advance.
Another tangled knot in the Hughes-Ryan
Act is the definition of what is important.
A tendency reportedly has grown within the
CIA to forward only a few broad covert action
categories to the president and make in-house
decisions on all the supposedly routine ones.
Although these routine operations are al-
legedly offsprings of earlier presidential find-
ings, this permits the agency to by-pass
the White House and Congress.
Here lies danger for real mischief. To avoid i
excessive CIA discretion, Congress ought to
specify explicitly what is important. Certainly
any covert operation costing much money
(perhaps over 5200,000). representing radical
departures from previous policy, targeting'
terrorist groups, employing false propaganda,
funding prominent foreign Ieadersorpolitical
parties, or involving paramilitary action seems ~
to deserve presidential approval and a report
to Congress.
The CIA opposes the statutory establish-
ment of precise definitions or rules. preferring !
the flexibility of its own internal guidelines,
which, upon request, it is prepared to share
with the intelligence committees. The diffi-
culty with this arrangement is that CIA di-
rectors quietly waive guidelines when they
wish, without informing Congress. Rules
this easily bent are poor deterrents against
abuse.
Therefore, several improvements' in the
Hughes-Ryan Act are necessary for the. effec-
tive oversight of covert operations. The num-
ber of individuals, although not the number
of committees, briefed on covert operations
needs to be reduced: The act needs to apply
to all components of government, not just to
the CIA; to cover all NSC-approved covert
operations, not just covert action: to stipu-
late prior notification before planned execu-
tion; and to define what is important with
more precision to assure that Congress is
informed about all high-r~iik operations.;
Against these strong prescriptions, how does
the Senate Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980
measure up?
Built-in Escape Hatches
In several respects the diminutive Over-
sight Act takes a surprisingly long and cer-
tainly lonely step toward the reforms recom-
mended originally by Church and Pike.
_ First, the Oversight Act requires reporting
only to the two intelligence committees, as
desired by the CIA. More important, the act
also requires by law-not just by resolution,
as before-that each intelligence committee
"shall promptly call to the attention" of its
parent chamber or appropriate committees
"any matter relating to intelligence activities"
that requires attention.
With this provision. the CIA will not have
to run from one committee to another eight
times over, and, at the same time, all com-
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mittees will have access to intelligence infor-11
mation. Oddly. the net result is to transfer''
the obligations of a CIA briefing from the
agency to the intelligence committee. Surely
the CIA would prefer to explain directly its
own policies to interested congressmen, if
only to protect itself. Whether the flow of
information permitted by the act will work
in practice, only time can tell- Much will
depend upon how aggressively the six tradi-
tional committees press for information.
They may be content to rely simply on their
representatives to serve as listening posts on
the intelligence committees, or they may de-
mand additional avenues of access to the CIA
for their leaders.
Second, the Oversight Act encompasses all
components of the government engaged in
intelligence, not just the CIA. Third, the
act takes a reasonably strong stand on the key
issue of prior notification. It requires that the
intelligence committees be kept "fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activi-
ties ... including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity. . . ." The legislation
notes, however, that the actual approval of
Congress for a covert action is not required,
skirting a constitutional confrontation.
The act has built-in escape hatches for the
president. He may avoid advance notice,
according to the preamble, in order to protect
"sources and methods," or if he "determines
it is essential to limit prior notice to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital
interests of the United States." But, even in
"extraordinary circumstances," the president
must report in advance to the chairman and
ranking minority members on each intelli-
gence. committee, plus four other congress-
men: the Speaker and minority leader in the
House, and the majority and minority lead-
ers in the Senate. And. "in a timely fashion."
the president must inform the full committee
about the operation and "provide a statement
of the reasons for not giving prior notice."
The act has additional strengths. Brevity
is one. Earlier versions were sufficiently com-
plex and lengthy to alienate all but the most
dedicated students of intelligence reform in
Congress. More substantively, the act stands
steadfastly in favor of congressional access to
intelligence data in the executive branch. Its.
language requires the executive to furnish
any , information or material conce.rning
intelligence activities.- including illegai intel-
ligence activities and significant intelligence!
failures. Stating this, even in law, is one
thing, of course: actually obtaining docu-
ments is quite another, as Church and espe-
cially Pike discovered in 1975. Finally, the.
legislation abandons some dubious provisionsi
included in its earlier stages, such as ambigu-
ous references to the War Powers ResolutionI
of 1973, which requires the president to con-
sult with Congress before entering into hos-
tilities, as another means of avoiding prior
reporting.
If nothing else, the three pages of the
Oversight Act provide admirable relief from
normal government long-windedness. Un-
fortunately, the brevity often reflects evasion
of key issues rather than devotion to pithy
regulations.
First among its apparent weaknesses is and
ambiguity over what operations should be!
reported. Through silence on that point, the,
act endorses the recent CIA failure to report
on covert operations if the NSC-hardly an
impartial observer-decides that those opera-
tions are covered by a category of already
approved special activities. A category may-
grant sweeping authority, for example, to
conduct counterterrorist operations on behalf
of U.S. interests in Latin America.This kind
of blank check could conceal many sins and,
the agency would never have to report back to
Congress on the details of the counterterrorist
program. Questions such as what groups are
truly terrorists, as opposed to legitimate pro-
testers. and what methods should be used
against them are too important to be left to
a few covert action specialists in the CIA and;
the NSC. The intelligence committees shouldl
insist that the CIA steer clear of categorical
requests, except in the most innocuous
mstances.
Second. like the Hughes-Ryan Act, some
portions of the Oversight Act also seem to
allow CIA avoidance of reports on risky col-
lection and counterintelligence operations.
In one section, the president is required to;
report on "all intelligence activity," but later
he is permitted to remain mute. on operations
"intended solely for obtaining necessary in-
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telligence," the same exemption included in
Hughes-Ryan. What the language requires!
in one clause, it gives up in another.
Third, the act-and for that matter the
entire debate-ignores the central issue of
when, if ever, covert action should be used.
What is its place in U.S. foreign policy? The
Oversight Act fails to set clear standards,
other than retaining the Hughes-Ryan re-
quirement that the president find the covert
action "important to the national security."
Congress should set more explicit limits on
the executive branch. The word "important"
is rarely,, if ever, interpreted in the strict
sense understood by Church in 1975. When
former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testi-
fied that the covert action option should be
employed only if "absolutely essential to they
national security." Church agreed and recom-
mended this option only when necessary "to
deal with grave threats to American security."
Preventing Mischief
The intelligence committees have drifted
far from this demanding and wise criterion.
A high priority of the intelligence commit-
tees, and the committees on foreign affairs,
should be to examine this issue more closely
in order to evaluate the continued usefulness
of this policy and its compatibility with
American principles and ideals.
Many other intelligence issues of great im-
portance to foreign policy have been shelved
on Capitol Hill, such as the rights of Ameri-
cans to be free of CIA surveillance abroad or
the hiring by the CIA of U.S. Journalists,
clergymen, and professors as espionage agents.
But while further legislative debate and
lawmaking remain important. statutory im=
provements alone are insufficient. To achieve
a thorough examination of covert operations,
members must be willing to study thick
briefing books, wade through complicated
budget requests, sit through long hearings,
visit field stations, and ask tough questions
in closed sessions where there are no television
cameras to provide an extra incentive. Some
members are willing to do this. others are
not. Ultimately, this dimension-call it
-motivation-is far more significant than
changes in the Hughes-Ryan Act.
During the debates on intelligence reform
-in the past, now, and in the future-par-
ticipants give attention to the merits of
various legislative proposals; but beneath the
staff research, the speeches, the colloquies,
the lobbying, and the press conferences
flow the strong currents of predisposition.
Before seeing any reform proposal. some
members will be deeply wedded to the ex-
pansion of covert action discretion, regardless
of risk. For them, the words of a 1954 report
on government operations, the Doolittle Re-
port, still ring true: "If the U.S. is to survive,
long-standing American concepts of 'fair
play' must be reconsidered. We must develop
effective espionage and counterespionage serv-
ices. We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and
destroy our enemies by more clever, more so-
phisticated and more effective methods than
those used against us."
For others, a traditional deference to the
president in foreign affairs will weigh against
congressional supervision of intelligence ac-
tivities. During the debate on the 1973 War
Powers Resolution, Senator Jacob Javits (R.-
New York) said to Senator Barry Goldwater
(R.-Arizona): "So really you are opposed to
my bill because you have less faith in the
Congress than you have in the president.
Isn't that true?" Replied Goldwater. "To be
perfectly honest with you. you are right."
Who supports what during the delibera-
tions over intelligence reform depends fre-
quently upon opinions far more deep seated
than questions of prior notification or cate-
gorical findings. Ultimately, this discussion
represents yet another chapter in the great
debate over U.S.-Soviet relations and over the
proper balance between Congress and the f
president in the conduct of foreign policy.
Following the Vietnam war and the
Watergate scandal, Congress sought to trim
-executive powers and restore some semblance
of constitutional balance. Now as U.S.-Soviet'
relations deteriorate amid threats to American I
citizens around the world, legislators wonder
aloud if they have gone too far. Torn between
a distrust of presidential power, on the one
hand, and dangers from abroad, on the other,
hand, their response has been ambivalent:
unleash the CIA or tighten the reins?
So far the answer has been equivocal on
several key issues, as wary legislators joined
with a distracted White House in an uneasy
alliance based on ambiguity. Although im-
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portant, if left to stand alone the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980 will represent no more
than a few fence posts around which the
intelligence agencies may pass with little
effort. In the past. slack safeguards had an
unfortunate result: uncontrolled mischief
abroad and erosion of liberties at home.
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