STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 30 JUNE 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010226-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 226
• Publication Date: June 30, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 TOP SECRET 0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Staff Meeting Minutes of 30 June 1980
The Director chaired the meeting.
In response to Mr. Carlucci's query, Lipton explained the HAC hearing
scheduled for 2 J Committee's final hearing on CIA's budget
amendment request for FY 1981.0
Hetu displayed a notice he is circulating internally which invites
employees to avail themselves of OPA's recently produced slide presentation
on intelligence and the mission/function of the Agency.
Mr. Carlucci called attention to erroneous press reports over the
weekend of CIA clandestine radio broadcasts in Iran aimed at undermining
the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini (see 27 June New York Times article by
David Binder attached). Noting that Congressional inquiries can be
expected soon on this matter, Mr. Carlucci advised that OLC take the
initiative and provide appropriate denials. The Director added that Hetu
should contact State's newly appointed spokesperson(s) to ensure henceforth
that public comment by State regarding matters involving CIA be coordinated
with us beforehand. (Action: LC and PA)
Clarke expressed concern re today's Washington Post front-page column
by George Wilson "Soviets Accused of Cover-Up on Anthrax Epidemic" (attached).
He said this article stems from Representative Aspin's disregard for Over-
sight Committee procedures for release of HPSCI studies; he said it also
poses serious policy problems for the Administration in its handling of
treaty violations with the Soviet Union. He asked if there are any steps
we can take to deal with Representative Aspin. A brief discussion followed
wherein Mr. Carlucci advised that we brin the matter to the attention of
House leadership. The Director asked
to convey his and the
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DDCI's concern to Hitz, and requested SA DCI
to add this item to the
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agenda for his next meeting with Secretary Mus ie.
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Clarke reported (NFAC/OPA) has produced an exceptionally
good paper "Cuba's Castro: Reactions of An Aging Revolutionary to His
Ailing Revolution." He also displayed a new NFAC report: "Soviet Energy
Policy for East Europe." The Director noted he has already read the latter
and likes it.
noted HPSCI hearings scheduled for tomorrow re four Reserve
Releases and a Presidential Finding. Relatedly, the Director questioned
the need for from the Reserve for evacuating dependents
Lipton explained the cost and said he has coordinated this
item with SSCI and HPSCI staffers noting he anticipates approval without
serious challenge.)
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25X1
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Silver reported the U.S. Court of Appeals recently held 2-1 that State
has insufficient grounds for revoking Agee's passport. The Director said
despite the court's decision our effort in this regard has been worthwhile.
In response to a query from the Director on where we now stand in the Agee
case, Silver provided a brief update.
Briggs said he met on Friday with
consultant to the Agency re review of certain aspects o Agency opera ions,
e.g., the recently completed IG report on our recruiting system. He said
also Jim Dick, IOB Counsel, will visit today re two complaints presented to
the Board from outside the Agency; Briggs said he believes the Agency will
fare well re these complaints.
Wortman reported an accident last week caused by the roofing contractor
which involved minor injury to one of our secretaries. He said the accident
could easily have been much more serious and that other accidents in the
recent past by this contractor have now required the DDA to impose a daily
security check on the contractor's work procedures.
The Director reported briefly from his trip to Africa
that our field personnel in stations he visited were highly active an
enthusiastic. He said he enjoyed the opportunity to sit and chat with
working level personnel, e.g., commo specialists and secretaries.
The Director called attention to yesterday's Washington Post article
"The Unresolved Questions in the Letelier Case" by John Dinges and Saul
Landau (attached). He asked Briggs to look into it. (Action: IG)
TOP SECRET
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? 40
NEW YORK TIMES
27 June 1980
Anti-Khomeini ro rc c is
U.S. Co c e d It Is Bel n
WASHINGTON, June 27 - American
officials acknowledged today that the
United States was responsible for clan-
destine radio broadcasts aimed at under-
mining the Iranian rule of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini.
The programs, broadcast in Persian
from transmitters in Egypt, one believed
I to be near Alexandria and the other near
the Suez Canal, appear to have begun in
the middle of May, the officials said, and
were set up by the Central Intelligence
Agency. ,
Spokesmen for the C.I.A. and other in-
telligence agencies, asked about the
broadcasts, said they could not help in
terms of denials or confirmations. .
The idea for the project, one of a num-
ber conducted. by the C.I.A.'s "unconven.
tional broadcasting" section, was do-
'scribed by the officials as having come up
during the winter. President Anwar el-
Sadat, who inherited a large radio-trans
mitting capacity from his predecessor,
Gamel Abdel Nasser, is said to have
given personal authorization for the use
of free time for the broadcasts. -
Broadcasts Heard in Teheran
"American correspondents who were in
Teheran in mid-May said that the nightly
broadcasts featured music by Gagoosh, a
popular female singer from Iran, and
news broadcasts aimed at undermining
Ayatollah Khomeini's Government.
The nonentertainment portions. of the
'broadcast, which were identified as com-
ing from"The Free Voice of Iran," con-
tained appeals to the Iranian Army not to
engage in combat with Kurdish rebels.
Some-of the-broadcasts indicated support
for the exiled former Iranian Prime
.Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, who has
been attempting to mobilize anti-Kho-
mein forces from his base in Paris.
The broadcasts included a call for "lib-
eration of Iran," a description of Ayatol-
lah Khomeini as "racist and fascist" and
an appeal to Iranians to "take guns into
your hands" in preparation for action. .
The C.I.A. connection in Egypt was de-
veloped late last year after a White House
meeting of the Special Coordinating Com-
mittee on Dec. 11 conducted by Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the President's national se-
curity adviser. The focus of the meeting,
about five weeksafter 53 Americans were
taken hostage, was ways to. expand
American broadcasts to the Moslem
world, including Iran and the 50 million
Moslems inthe Soviet Union.
Facilities-Thought inadequate -
The Special Coordination Committee
was appointed by President Carter two
years ago to authorize and oversee covert
operations by the C.I.A. and other intelli-
gence agencies. -
Mr. Brzezinski and his adviser on Mos-
lem affairs-and radio broadcast matters,
Paul B. -Henze, who is a former C.I.A-
officer,_were described after the meeting
as being dissatisfied with the capacity of
the Voice. of America, which was then
broadcasting two hours a day in-Persian,
and with-the-American-sponsored Radio
Liberty, which was broadcasting a rather
weak signal--in some of the languages of
t Soviet Moslems.--
'It was decided after the meeting, the
Wficia1, said. to explore the possibility of
i acgairing air time on the Egyptian traas-
'rnirers tar broadcasts to Iran and Soviet
Cecm'ai Asia.
i Pty-Sadat,.wbo was a. target of
Iranian attacks long before he provided
exile in Egypt for the deposed Shah of
Iran,.agreed to the White House request,
the American officials said. American of-
ficials said they believed Egypt had been'
promised additional transmitter facili-
ties by the United States through the
Agency for International Development to
compensate for the Egyptian facilities 1
used by the C.I.A. But a'spokesman for {
the aid agency said the only equipment of
which he was aware was a set of radar
and radio control centers designed to im-
prove communications for users of the.
Suez Canal at a cost of $17.7 million: The::.
equipment for that project arrived.?in
Egypt only last month, then spokesman,
added. ?
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? WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1980
Soviets: Ace Usei
.-
~ ~6~ ~ .
If I
er- p
o
. t o E a ea ,c
By George C. Wilson:,--
I The: House Intelligence -.oversight
subcommittee accused the Soviet -Un-
ion yesterday of -covering up the facts
about an anthrax epidemic at.:Sverd
lovsk in April 1979.
On the basis of -secret and -open
hearings, the subcommittee concluded
that the Soviet explanation that peo-?
ple died in Sverdlovsk from. eating
meat poisoned with ?anthraxis,"incom-
plete at best and at worst, k-fabrica-
tion."
W hat really, happened, accordine to
the subcommittee report. and `inter-
views with U.S. intelligence-, officials,
is that an explosion at Military Com-.
pound 19 at Sverdlovsk blew a cloud
of anthrax spores into the open air.
That compound has long been sus-
pected of germ warfare activity by
U .S. intelligence. ='=
A south wind'took the deadly an-
thrax spores to the outskirts- of Sverd-
lovsk, a city of ?1.2?million-87h-miles-i
east of Moscow. -U.S. officials estimate-,
that.: as- many . as ..1,000 - people'.., may,
have died from, breathing in the:.
...spores.
-Subcommittee Chairman Les Aspin
(D-Wis.) said."all arms. control conven .
tions -are 'threatened by, the. Sverd+
lovsk cover-ups ',_
Rep. John Ashbrook of Ohio, rank-
ing Republican on the subcommittee,-,
said that Sverdlovsk proves that the,
United States should not sign any,
treaties with the-Soviet Union "unless
they are self-enforcing or if we -have
the capability to fully monitor them."
On the basis of reports :from per:
sons-inside the Soviet-Union. at the
time of the epidemic and -other evi `
dence;-U.S. intelligence officials-have
concluded that 'the' symptoms dis-
played by the.. afflicted Russians at,
Sverdlavsk:-could:. have, come ?only>
-from breathing- in anthrax germs,: note
from eating them in diseased meat, as
Moscow-said--was the case-2--,--
BY: calculating how many anthraat
spores it would take to kill -the.=4O'ttr
1,000 Russians who are believed ` ta
,have died at-Sverdlovsk from. the,anA
thrax, U.S., intelligence-- officials be-.
lievelthe- quantity,far exceeded'the,
amount needed:,=for-.the laboratory.:ex-j
periments allowect_"under, the 1975 bio !
logical warfare treaty.=:
One U .S.- lnfelligence, estimate.";I
that 5,000 to- 26,000 ; anthraxc spores
were released -into - the open` air at'.
mittee noted in its-report yesterday,
no U.S. intelligence agency has made
the corporate judgment that the-'Sovi-i
ets definitely violated the treaty.-., . ~.
The -1975 treaty,: signed; treaty,-
.b
United States;-the Soviet Union. and.'.
111 other countries, prohibits the pro-.,:
duction of anthrax or any other bio
logical agent for germ warfare. How-`i
ever, laboratory quantities, .of such
germs can be produced to enable a na
tion to develop defensive measures.or.
conduct peaceful experiments: ' -
The - subcommittee 'in ".its report
noted that the 1975 treaty did not set
a specific' limit on how much anthrax.
or other biological agents could be
produced before the, quantity would4
amount to a violation. Therefore, said
the subcommittee;- it--would be diffi-
cult to prove on the.basis of current
information. whether the Soviets -vi o--'
' lated the treaty or not....
This leaves it to the nations' that'-
the epidemic in Sverdlovsk dem9n-11
a- Soviet. violation, the' !sub-
committee said.
It said it .had' looked into reports.;
that the Carter administration had
suppressed evidence and hampered
probes by U.S.?'intelligence agencies
of the Sverdlovsk epidemic for fear
the findings- would keep the strategic .
arms limitation treaty (SALT II).from
being approved by-the Senate.
Concluded the subcommittee:'."
"There- is no persuasive evidence to
support allegations that the U.S. gov-
ernment suppressed intelligence
about the outbreak of anthrax in
Sverdlovsk, or that it delayed acting
on this matter out of concern fora
SALT II or any other political mo-
tive."
Speaking for -himself, Aspih said,
"The evidence is fairly good: that the
Soviets have. cheated on,,the -treaty
dealing with. biological weapons. That:j
combined with, the lousy way this has J
been handled. by the ' administration
threatens not-only this treaty, but all-
arms control conventions." ..: a
The State Department insists that it
is pressing the Soviet Union to dis
close the full story on Sverdlovsk but
is trying to do it. within diplomatic
channels rather than publicly. How-
ever, the department concedes that "it .I
has not yet received satisfactory rep-
lies to' its -questions-about the epi- ?-)
demic. '
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? WASHINGTON POST -
29 June 1980
OOPERATION' with `friendl3r" uitelligence:
agencies was: the established-practice `of.U.S.S
embassies and:the CIA abroad,'and that included
granting visas toaknown agents to conduct intelli
gence missions, in the United. States- ; But some `
Landau received: in late July 1976 from'a Para
guayan government official' i -Asuncion; aroused'`
The official,-a top aide to Paraguayan Pi*side
Alfredo Stroessner, assured Landau. that Chilean;;.
President Augusto -Pinochet himself .was` asking:,
for a favor.'The: official said 'he_needed.visas-fin-a}
mediately for two Chilean Army: 'officers - using
Paraguayan passports to travel from Asuncion to,--'
Washington on an intelligence:.missio- =- . The.
sion, he said, had.been deared.with. the?CIA?sta
tion in: Santiago' and the two men would be in
-touch with-.CIA-.Deputy Director: Vernon Walters'
in Washington_ . __ ;.
Ambassador - .Landau, according to his later=
testimony, issued. the visas for the two men the.:.
next morning.-But his suspicions led.him to take
:.'two precautionsc'He=had the. 'agents! false Para-.
.guayan' passports= photographed,. and he sent the
--photographs to' QlAiieadquarters. with a_ full. acme--
count-of the affair - just in case : the Chilean
agent were lying about why they'?were going tai
-- Landau's action.wasthefirstbrushby a US of-'
ficial with- Chite'sLsecret operations' leading. up to
the assassination:' of--Orlando: Letelier : six, weeks.'.
later. -In-the-weeks preceding. the"assassination of
the leftist former'ambassador and foreign minis-
ter; a flurry: of cables and official communications-;
went back and-forthbetweenthe U.S. Embassy in
Asuncion, the State Department; the. CIA and the
Immigration and Naturalization. Service concern-`:;
.ing. the two Chilean. agents;.. whose; real identities
- not learned until almost:two.years later w_ ere=
Michael Townley-rand- Armando Fernandez; the
Chilean secret police-agents who led the operation::,
to kit .Letelier..
CIA Director George Bush and his deputy;.Gen.:_:
Walters, were- among those who personally re
ceived and. acted on Landau's warning. The -.am-
bassador's cable, sent via a top secret State De-
partment "back channel," went first to, the office'
All that raises a series of disturbing questions.
U.S. officials at the highest levels knew. in advance
about Chile's undercover mission in Washington]
and possessed photos and passport information.
Was that information sufficient foreknowledge to
have prevented the murders? Once the assassina-
tion- occurred, was the information turned . over
immediately to the FBI-by the persons, and agen-
cies possessing it? . a, -, ..
The pictures and the advance information olr?
tamed by Landau and others ultimately .pravided ..
the keys to solving the case. But,. unlike fictional
spy mysteries,. all the pieces of the puzzle did?not..
fall into place with.the identification of the gudty."
Instead, the US, agencies involved in . the case? im -'
;posed an extraordinary.mantle.of secrecy over the
actions of U.S. officials before and after.the assns
?sination and over the records and files relating-
those actions. Given the secrecy about theextent;.
those
of. U.S. goverment,foreknowledge,..the,questions :..
we raise can only be parti lyyanswered..#.,1,, Y E;
According to.our reconstnictionof
-events, the Letelier assassination.:
was set in motion in late June 1976...
Pinochet's intelligence service had.
received ''reports of Letelier's recent-:
visit to Holland to lobby against a:-
$63 million investment by a Dutch::
company in Chile and of confiden-
tial meetings in New York between
Letelier and a prominent leader of
Chile's ' ,ntri t Christian` Demo.
cratic: Party. Congress had' just cut?
off Chile's- military aid because of
human.rights violations.
Over the next three Yinontbs, Co!.
Manuel Contreras,' chief of '?DINA,
the Chilean secret police, dispatched
five of his agents on four separate.,
but interrelated missions to. Wash-
ington to carry out the order to killLetelier. Of the four missions that
'made up the Letelier assassination
operation, at least two were detected
-by U.S. authorities.
,:.The first operation got only as far
es Asuncion. DINA agents Townley,
and Fernandez went there to obtain`,
false Paraguayan passports from the
Paraguayan intelligence service and
proceed on to Washington. After
days of delay, they received the
passports under the false names of 1
`Juan Williams" (Townley) and !
"Alejandro Romeral"' (Fernandez).
According to Paraguayan intelli-
gence chief Col. Benito Guanes, they
said they needed the passports fora
trip to the United States to buy,
weapons and intelligence equipment
"for which [they said] they could l
count on cooperation from the
. A bassador Landau was told the I
CIA was aware of the mission, but
that it involved surveillance of Chil-
ean Marxists who had infiltrated the
U.S. offices. of the Chilean copper
corporation.
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'.-%Aftariasuing thevises and photo
graphing-. the,. - ,"Williams": - and"
"feral" passports, Landau wrote- I
a long top secret cable to: CI.V
Deputy Director Walters, who h6,--
bad been told would be meeting th&~
two Chileans in. Washington.. That'
cable remains secret, but we learned'
some of its contents. In it Landau-
asked Walters to confirm that the
Chilean- intelligence mission had:.
been worked out with the CIA. He
also sent copies of the passports to.'?
the CIA via diplomatic pouch.
Meanwhile, Townley and Fernan-'.
dez, unaware their pictures were
now in the hands of the CIA but sus-
picious of the long delays in obtain-r''
ing their false documents, returned
to Santiago instead of flying to
Washington as originally planned.
Landau's cable, sent July 28 via
the State Department's "Roger"
Channel" to bypass regular distribu-
tion routes, reached the desk of CIA
Director George Bush. Bush handled,:
the matter because . Walters, who
was about to retire from the agency,
was on vacation in Florida. At State,'
the cable was routed from Kissing-
= er's office to that of Harry Schlaude-
man, assistant secretary of state for
inter-American affairs.
Landau expected Walters, who
had visited Paraguay on agency
business only a month before; to
'take quick action. "I sent a message
to Gen. Walters outlining the whole
matter and suggesting that I pre-
sumed that this matter fell within
the scope of his agency and that he
was aware of all this. I said that if he
did not, I suggested he deny them
[`WilLams' and `Romeral'] entry at
the port of arrival," Landau said in a
later deposition.
The CIA reaction was peculiar. A
week passed during which Townley
and Fernandez, had they followed
= their original plan, could well have
had 'time to arrive in Washington ;
and kill Letelier. Walters and Bush
conferred about the matter, and fi-
nally on Aug. 4 Walters called Lan-
dau in Paraguay to tell him that the
CIA was "not aware" of the Chilean
mission, and wanted nothing to do
with it. But Walters, as far as is
known, ordered no CIA action to ?
stop the Chilean mission or control
it in any way.
Judging from his actions, Ambas-
sador Landau was alarmed. He im-
mediately informed the State
De- partment that the visas issued to'
_ "Juan Williams" and "Alejandro
Romeral" were revoked. He de-
manded that the Paraguayan official
who had requested the visas retrieve
the passports from the Chileans and..{
return them so that he could pbysi-
cally cancel the visas.
Landau considered the matter so
serious that he . ordered lookouts
posted at all U.S. consulates and
ports of entry to arrest "Williams"
and "Romeral" if they tried to enter-
the United States and to prevent
theta from applying for visas in any
' other country. Landau also made to
telephone calls to a high Para
ofl:cial over the follo gu$yao
insist that the Paraguayans weeks to
the passports,buayana return
' In Santiago, preparations bega
for the second and third DINA mie.aions. Four false Chilean official
passports were sent to the U.S. con-
sulate in Santiago with government
requests for visas to the United.
States. On 'Aug. 17. the visas were
issued for passports in the names of
"Juan Williams," ' . :"Alejandro:
Romeral," "Armando Faundez" and
"Lilian Walker."
Although two . of the names were
the same as those used in Paraguay,
the DINA agents using the identities
of Williams and Romeral were not
Townley and Fernandez. They were
Capts. Rene Riveros ("Williams")
and Rolando Mosqueira ("Romer-
al"), who arrived in Miami Aug: 22,
.,apparently' on a-mission"to "clear"
the use of the names in Paraguay by
acting as decoys to test whether U.S.
authorities would react to their en-
tering the country.
Although the two men-were not
stopped at Miami Airport, their ar-.
rival was detected and reported to
Washington., The circumstances and,-
records of that detection,. presum-
ably made by INS officials-as a re-
sult of Landau's lookout notice, re-.-_:
main unclear even within the FBL
The agents, clearly intending to
call attention to their presence, in--
formed Vernon Walters' CIA office
by' phone that they, "Juan Wil-
liams" and "Alejandro Romeral,"
were in Washington. On Sept. 1, the.
two men arrived' back in Santiago.
^ ^
What did the CIA do, if anything?
We don't know. It would -have been
logical for those who knew of Chile's
ongoing covert operation in Wash
' mgton to try to find out what Chile
was up to, especially in light of the
"Romeral-Williams" team's claim in {
Paraguay that their mission had CIA
clearance.. It is beyond belief that-l'
the CIA would simply have ignored.
a clandestine operation by a foreign
intelligence service in Washington, .i
or anywhere in the United States.'
DINA and the CIA were in con
atant touch with each other through
normal liaison channels. Walters'
duties as deputy director included
liaison with foreign intelligence serv. 1
ices and he knew DINA chief Con- {
treras personally. Did he or director
Bush order, their representative in
Chile to tell his liaison counterpart
in Chilean intelligence, "Hey, we
know you're up to something in {
Washington, so either tell us what it
is or stop it"? ' -
Moreover, it was well known in in-
telligence circles that DINA had car-
ried out assassination of exile lead-
ers in foreign countries. Given. -.i
DINA's macabre reputation . and.
Letelier's prominence in Washing-
ton, it would not be difficult - to speculate that if DINA were plan-
ning an assassination in Washing-
ton, the target would be Letelier.
One thing is clear. DINA chief
Contreras would almost certainly
have canceled the remaining opera-
tions to kill Letelier if the CIA or
State Department had raised ala-
P 'c ai
. rums i about-. - tha:?:" Rorietel".: aiid.,
"Williama"' missions. and expressed:
their displeasure to the Chilean gov-.
familiar with the case said that any,
to cause the assassination to be scut-. 4
tied. :; ? 2..:t.?
It wasn't. 01i Aug. 26', Lt. Fernan-
dez, traveling as "Armando Faun-
dez," arrived in Washington with-
DINA agent'- "Liliana -Walker"'
(whose real identity has never been
established). 'They ,: - conducted
'preoperational' surveillance on
Letelier.
On Sept. 9, Townley, traveling on
an official Chilean passport in the
name "Hans -Peterson' Silva," ar-
rived to head the fourth and final
stage of the assassination operation.
He received Fernandez' surveillance 1
report, then arranged with fourI
members of a Cuban. exile group in,
l
Union City, N.J.,.to help him build
and plant,the bomb. On Sept.. 21 it_,
-exploded under Letelier's legs, killing him and Ronni. Moffitt, who
happened to be riding to work that
day with Letelier, and her husband.
Michael; who survived.'. .,t. J:
El....D..
:
_ -` Immediately, the..-': assassination .,
was put. in the context of prior- at-,
tacks: on prominent -Chilean~. exiles
opposing the Pinochet government...
Two years earlier, in a hauntingly :
similar car bombing in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, the former' chief of the
Chilean armed forces, Gen.. Carlos
Prats, and his wife were murdered:
One year before, exiled Christian
Democratic leader Bernardo Leigh-
ton, an advocate of a leftist-centrist
front against Pinochet, was shot
down with his wife on a Rome street
Both survived. DINA was widely be-
lieved to have been responsible.
It would seem to go without saying
that those who had detected DINA's.
covert operation in, Washington -
prior to ?Letelier's 'assassination
would immediately tell the FBI all
they knew. The passport photos of
"Romeral" and "Williams,'; the
Paraguay incident ' and. the actual
entry into the United States of Chil-
ean intelligence agents were obvi-
ously important leads worthy of
highest priority in the investigation.
Moreover, the FBI's man in South
America, Special Agent Robert
Scherrer, made a major intelligence
breakthrough one week after the as-
sassination. He reported that Chile
had organized a -six-nation intelli-
gence network called Operation
Condor, whose functions included .
interchanging passports for use on
missions to'assassinate exiled leftist
leaders. Paraguay was one of the.
members, with Argentina, Uruguay,
Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. Scherrer,
even without knowing about the
"Romeral" and "Williams" affair in
Paraguay, concluded in his Sept. 28
cable to Washington that the Letel-
ier assassination "may have been
carried out as a .:. phase of Opera.
tion Condor." Scherrer's cable was
distributed to the CIA and State De-
partment. '
What then did Bush, Walters,
Landau and others in State and the.
CIA do with the "Romeral" and
"Williams" photographs and infor-
mation after the assassination?
The Letelier investigation had
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? ?
been i =Assistant US- At:
torney-Et Propper and Speccial'
Agent L. Carter Cornick of the FBPs
Washingtofield'; office. 'Propper,?-`
realizing that the investigation could:
not go far without cooperation from
the CIA, met-Bush two weeks after,
the *assassination.` According to one:
of those present-, in than meeting,'
Bush talked about the importance of
Operation. 'Condor to the Letelier:'
..case, but, did, not,say a word about
the "Romeral'-'` and "Williams" pio
tares and 'thee-Paraguay, incident.:'.
Nor did- Bush, - Walters or anyone
-'else from ? the ? CIA subsequently-
volunteer= their -information about
Chile's covert missions to Washing
ton .6
Instead, the CIA seems to have
done just the opposite. Stories ap-'
peared in Newsweek, The Washing-
ton Post, The Washington Star and
The New York Times saying the
, CIA had concluded that DINA had
nothing to do-with the Letelier as-
sassination. In one of the stories,
-Bush was reported"to have person-
ally informed Kissinger of his con
clusions about-DINA's innocence.
The source cited in the articles
suggested a "martyr theory" for the ,
assassination,' . according to which
leftists may have killed Letelier in
order to create a martyr and dis-
credit the Chilean government at a:
. time. Pinochet was improving, his
human rights image.
At the State Department, some :1
but not all of the pertinent informa. 1
tion. about Chile's secret missions
was turned over to the FBI on Oct.'
22, one month after the assassina-
tion. The - information-,, included
copies of the photographs of .
"Romeral" and "Williams" and the
fact that two men using-those names
and official' Chilean passports had
entered Miami on Aug. 22 (but not =
that they had also come to Washing.,'.,
ton). - ? ,4 .
But the "Romerat-Williams" in-
formation and photographs played
no active role for the first 10 months
of the FBI investigation. When, in
July 1977, the photographs were fi--
nally put to use, the "Williams" Pic-'..
tune was identified and the case was
on the way to being solved. The man 'I
in the picture, Michael Townley, was I
turned over to the FBI the following,
March in accord with a secret agree-
ment signed by Chile under heavy
U.S. diplomatic pressure. Townley
confessed and became the prosecu
ti on.'a chief, witness.
Q 0
In the course of the investigation, ?'
there were at least five cases of with-
holding, destruction or concealment
of key evidentiary documents. These
incidents raise the possibility that .
an attempt was made from within
the U.S. government to sabotage the
FBI investigation and divert its
governmentr' s
i. For more than a year ea"ter-the :-.:
ney Propper and the FBI did. not re-
ceiveiAmbassador Landau's~cable to
Vernon. Walters fully-explaining the
2:.. State Department. Me: desk':.
officer.: Robert. Driscoll, who told a
superior in a memo that "Romeral"
. and "Williams" were in Washington
around the time of the assassination,
ignored instructions.to inform the
FBL The memo was given.to the
FBI from Chile desk files more than
j a year after the assassination. . . .
?. Immigration
based on Service
forms filled out by all foreigners en-
' tering the United States - on three
of the five members of DINA's as-
sassination. missions were removed.
' from , INS ? computers. The missing
listings were "Romeral,". "Williams"
(the Aug.. 22 Miami entry with Chit--
ean passports) and "Hans Petersen"
(the name used by Townley to enter
New York Sept. 9,1976). Moreover,
INS officials conducted a fife search
in 1979 and discovered the..disap-
pearance of all paperwork that nor-
malcy would accompany lookout no-
tices such as those the State Depart-
' ment ordered posted for "Romeral"
and "Williams." ?
4. Someone ,with access to U.S.
citizen registration files in the U.S,
consulate in Santiago removed the
photograph of Townley on file there.
. 5. Other evidence in the consulate
files was destroyed as well. After
Townley's expulsion, FBI agent
Scherrer, discovered that U.S.. Con-
sul Josiah Brownell had ordered the
shredding of consular files that
would have included the letters from
the Chilean Foreign Ministry re-
questing visas-- for `agents. "Hans
Petersen," "Armando Faundez" and
"Liliana Walker." ' In mid-1977,
Scherrer had warned Brownell that
the files might. contain-evidence in
the Letelier case and should not be
destroyed.
The unanswered questions do not
diminish the achievement of the-U.
S. investigators who solved the as-
sassination and whose . evidence
stood the' test of a jury trial in which
three Cuban exile accomplices were
convicted. But the actions taken
willfully to divert the investigation
from its course and delay it for at
least a year are also crimes. Those,
actions should be subject -to the
same scrutiny as the assassination
itself. If there are innocent explana-'
. tions; they should he made public
along with all relevant documenta-
tion in. the' case. Only then will the
prosecution of the.Letelier-Moffitt
murders stand as. untainted exam-
.ples of the triumph of American jus-
tice. - -
Pct, 3 ab 3
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