DCI STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR 10 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 10, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110009-7
TOP SECRET
DCI Statement on El Salvador
10 March 1982
I welcome this opportunity to discuss El Salvador with you today. I am
confident that as a result of our presentation you will have a clear under-
standing of the nature of the externally supported insurgency, which has made
El Salvador a military battleground.
The fact that the insurgency is and has been supported and directed by
external forces is not something that was discovered by this Administration.
In January 1981 the Carter Administration acknowledged that the Salvadoran
government was struggling with left-wing terrorism covertly supported by
Nicaragua, Cuba, and other communist nations.
On 15 January 1981, then U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White,
was quoted in the New York Times: "It is my personal conclusion that there
has been a change In the amount and sophistication of weapons coming to the
guerrillas, and I think they are coming from Nicaragua."
On 17 January 1981 in approving lethal military aid for El Salvador, the
Carter Administration stated that its purpose was to "support the Salvadoran
government in its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported covertly
with arms, ammunition and training and political and military advice by Cuba
and other communist nations."
 Approved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110009-7
TOP SECRET
Le f-
summer the Intelligence Community produced a National Intelli-
gence Estimate on Central America and I would like to quote its key judgment
to you: "...A continuation of the present trends could result in victory for
the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects
for the revolutionaries in Guatemala. It may be that those Communist and
radical Arab forces providing external support and.management help to the
insurgencies intend to make Central America a battleground over the next few
years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United States in other
parts of the world. The evolution of these scenarios would bring the revolution
to Mexico's border, thereby raising the risks of internal destabilization and
infiltration by radical leftists."
Subsequently we have learned a great deal about how the insurgency is
organized and supported. Cuba, with Soviet backing has been instrumental in
establishing ties and pulling together the various leftist Central American
groups. First with Nicaraguan groups in 1979 and then with Salvadoran elements
in 1980, the Cubans have organized and then, when persuaded that the time was
appropriate, provided increased material assistance to cement unification.
More recently, the Cuban pattern of organization has been used with Guatemalatl
and Honduran guerrilla groups. We have received a variety of human source
reports on how the external support its provided to the Salvadoran insurgents.
These sources have reported on supplies coming in by air, by trucks through
Honduras, and by sea via the Gulf of Fonesca. These reports served as the
basis for the White Paper issued by the Department of State last year. Sub-
sequent to that, German SPD official Wi'snewski spoke to Castro, who said that
the bulk of the findings of the Paper were essentially correct.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/TOP 6l C TP84B00049R001800110009-7
I want now to turn to my experts, who will brief you in detail on what
we have learned.
First, I will spell out for you the picture of the insurgehl5X1
capabilities and show how they are supplied and directed. will 25X1
then review what we have learned about the scale of the insurgent effort,
its objectives, its propaganda and its future plan
25X1
The picture to be laid out before you will disclose a well organized and
sophisticated structure which is the work not of peasant revolution, but of
experienced revolutionary leaders who have won before. I want to emphasize
the sensitivity of what you are about to see and hear. Should the information
laid before you get into public circulation, sources can be compromised, the
flow of future information taken away from us, and lives put at risk..