SOVIET AND LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR S LEFTIST INSURGENCY AND RELATED PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800110004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 22, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007i05110TMRDP84B00049R001800110004-2
--" Central Intelligence,4gerxy
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Soviet and Latin American Communist
? Involvement in E1 Salvador
This document has been declassified and can be used
publicly. I would strongly recommend that. The attached
version includes some minor editing so that it can be used
in toto.
STAT
William J. Casey
Att
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SUBJECT: SOVIET AND LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN
EL SALVADOR'S LEFTIST INSURGENCY AND RELATED PROPAGANDA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since early 1980, the Soviet Union, assisted by Cuba, has been
involved in a massive overt and covert disinformation campaign on
E1 Salvador. The campaign is directed at Western Europe, Latin
America, the U.S. and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand.
Up until now Moscow's primary interest in conducting the campaign was
to divert public (mainly European) attention from the invasion of
Afghanistan.
Besides overt propaganda, the campaign is characterized by the
use of forgeries, communist international fronts, communist parties,
covert media placements and staging of demonstrations and protests.
Those involved in the campaign are the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
the DRU/FDR (policy planning organization of the insurgents and their
political front charged with international representation).
The campaign is also accompanied by diplomatic efforts and
official propaganda. Diplomatic activity includes USSR and Cuban .
efforts in international organizations to gain acceptance of the
DRU/FDR, and sponsoring travel by FDR rEpresentatives to the United
States, Europe, and Canada. Official Soviet propaganda stresses the
theme of U.S. intention to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador.
INTRODUCTION
Since early 1980, the Soviet Union has been involved in a massive
covert disinformation campaign on the subject of U.S. policy towards
E1 Salvador. The campaign is directed at Western Europe, Canada, and
the U.S. and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand. In 1980
the Soviet Union also caused weapons and ammunition to be sent to the
insurgents by the Bloc countries, the PLO and others. The Soviets are
being helped by the Cubans in the disinformation campaign, but the
campaign is ultimately a Soviet operation.
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SOVIET OBJECTIVES
Although the USSR clearly wishes to see E1 Salvador ultimately
become a Communist state, Moscow's primary interest in early 1980 in
conducting the disinformation campaign appears to have been
influenced substantially as an effort to divert public attention from
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The campaign. was designed to
criticize U.S. "intervention." Propaganda stressed "U.S.
militarism," identified the U.S. with "atrocities" in E1 Salvador, and
stressed throughout the campaign that the U.S. was poised to invade
E1 Salvador.
In early'1980, instructions went out from Moscow advising there
was a new propaganda policy. Instructions were to begin immediately
stressing "militaristic" policies of the United States in the
strongest terms.
By June 1980, the theme of U.S. militarism was particularly
important for propaganda going to Western Europe, especially West
Germany. Soviet instructions to their media offices said that both in
the short and medium terms it is necessary both strategically and
tactically to reduce world attention on Afghanistan. Instructions
also said that on E1 Salvador the Soviets should proceed with a great
deal of caution and delicacy.
BACKGROUND
The Soviets had been in touch with the Salvadoran Communist
Party (PCES) for years. The Soviets were monitoring armed insurgent
activity in Nicaragua during 1979; however, the Cubans were closest tof
the insurgents at that time.
In early 1980, Soviets, Cubans and Salvadoran insurgents (the A
PCES was represented) met on twc occasions that were significant. As
a result of the first meeting, t:~e Frente Democratico Revolucionario
(FDR) was established. As a result of the. second meeting, the United
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was established. The FDR is the
political front organization which represents the insurgency abroad.
The DRU is the central planning and tasking organization of the
insurgents. The DRU plans both internal military and international
political strategy.'
~In March 1980, a PCES representative travelled to Moscow in the
company of other insurgent leaders. He met with CPSU officials. From
there he travelled to a. World Peace Council Conference where~.~he met
with an East German official who promised financial and other.'aid for
the insurgents. From there, the PCES rep travelled to other East Bloc
countries,
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In April 1980, PCES representatives and leaders of other
insurgent groups met at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with
representatives of the GDR, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba
and the USSR, and made "certain requests," probably weapons.
In May 1980, "Aide et Amitie," an organization founded by the
late Henri Curiel to provide support to natyional liberation
movements, met in Paris to discuss requests for support and training
of cadre for the insurgency in E1 Salvador. There are reasons to
believe that Curiel had links with the Soviets and that the
organization may ultimately.be responsive~to Soviet guidance. The
Curiel groups, even at this early date, expected a major military
offensive in November, 1980.
In June, Shafick Handal (head of the PCES) traveled to Moscow and
met with the Deputy Chief of the Latin American section of the CPSU.
The Soviets suggested that Handal trave'. to 'Vietnam to seek arms and
offered to pay for Handal's trip. Hancal during June obtained
promises of weapons, training or financial assistance from Vietnam,
the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Ethiopia.
An examination of E1 Salvador related events during 1980 and
early 1981 shows that the Soviets and their Cuban and Salvadoran
clients engaged in covert activities to influence public opinion in
Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, and the U.S. These activities
included fabrication of forgeries, use of front groups, covert
placement of media items, and staging of demonstrations and protests
on E1 Salvador.
They also engaged~~in overt diplomatic activities to gain
recognition for the insurgents in international organizations, and in
overt propaganda. R
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STRATEGY
~-'` The Salvadoran DRU, central planning and tasking organization o
e insurgents, was established in a meeting in Havana at which the
Sovie .~we~re~presen~t~ in June 1980. a exac r
t~etin is uncle'? cr~th~ "v e~ s at
,~_ _?.w_ ___~~,~ a ~me-et`ing~ ~est~ablished a strategy fo
~n e~-r atonal,,~.po itical campaig,~:~Eleinents of'~tha~-str to egy; t' en
~r'am captured documents,. are as follows:
1. Propaganda: Spokesmen should emphasis that the Salvadoran
revolution represents the people. The people are fighting against
oppression, for independence, and for freedom from outside
intervention. The people oppose the imperialistic designs of the
U.S. The U.S. seeks to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador to keep
the Junta in power. .
=.~~nternational Support~/Representatives should gain
ecognition na d support"~for a insurgents in the following
organizations: Non-Aligned Movement, International Christian
Democratic Movement (to undermine support for the Junta), European
Parliament, Socialist International, Council of Europe, UN, OAS, and
the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. They should also gain allies
'n: the German Christian Democratic Party, West German Parliament,
Italian Christian Democratic Party, Italian Communist Party, the
Italian Parli~l~ent, and the COPEI party in Venezuela.
3.~ U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties
with the National Council of Churches and sectors of the labor
movement. Representatives should make approaches to Senators and
higher levels of the Conu~ess to gain allies for the FDR.
4. Other Initiatives: Representatives should seek endorsement`
from the World Council of Churches, Amnesty International, and the
International Tribune of the Peoples (Russell Commission).
5. Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should call
for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict. "The policy of a
dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden our alliances, while at the
same time splitting up and isolating the enemy." Representatives
should take up the banner of peace, and maintain that we seek only
lasting peace and justice.
6. Humanitarian Or anizations:: The DRU should establish a
front organization to unnel aid and money from European and. Canadian
Catholic, Protestant and Humanitarian organizations, like the
Catholic Relief Services, International?Committee for the Rec2?Cross,
and others.
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A comparison of DRU strategy laid out in captured documents with
actual events shows that the insurgents followed this strategy very
closely.
CUBAN AND SOVIET STRATEGY
A Cuban official ~~told a leader from a radical leftist party in
Central America that the Soviet Union and Cuba were engaged in a world
wide campaign to block U.S. aid to E1 Salvador. The campaign "will
denounce U.S. assistance to and training of Salvadoran military" at
U.S. bases in Panama. The campaign will also expose an allegedly U.S.
sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence, to invade
E1 Salvador using the armies of Honduras- and Guatemala with
assistance from Brazil, Argentina and Colombia. The campaign will
characterize the U.S. plot as a last ditch effort by the U.S.
President to turn the situation in E1 Salvador in favor of the JRG
prior to the D.S. elections in November, 1980.
The themes from the Cuban official's statement were echoed in
propaganda put out by the FDR (the political front of the insurgents
which represents the insurgents abroad), the FDR's Solidarity
Committee abroad, pro-Soviet communist parties, and official Soviet
propaganda. Soviet media showed particular interest in printing and
broadcasting alleged U.S. plotting to invade E1 Salvador.
COORDINATION
Captured DRU documents revealed that the DRU coordinates the FDR
and the latter's international activities (in the U.S., Canada, and
Europe) out of Mexico City. The Soviets ?.n Mexico City have been in
contact with the Salvadoran insurgents; however, logistics and
international relations policy'is all handled out of Havana. In
fact, the Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, handles international
communications for the FDR and its representatives abroad.
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THE COVERT CAMPAIGN
The following sections describe the covert activities conducted
outside E1 Salvador.
Forgeries and Documents of False Origin
1. Purported NSC Document Entitled "National Security Council
Back round Pa er on Mexico." This document reportedly covered a range
of alleged issues in U.S. Mexican relations, but the relevant thrust
was that the U.S. was dissatisfied with Mexico's independent stance on
Central America. On 26 August 1980, the Mexican press regorted on the
contents of the alleged NSC Report; however, there never was any such
NSC Report. The U.S. Government has ne-~er been able to obtain a copy
of the document from which the article was written.
2. Bogus Dissent Pa er on E1 Salvador and Central America.
This paper, dated November 6, 1980, was mailed with no return address
to several executive departments in Washington and the Congress. It
was also mailed to selected government officials in E1 Salvador. The
paper charged that an energetic but mainly covert U.S. intervention
took place to prevent the crisis in E1 Salvador from climaxing prior
to the elections.
It has been determined that the document was never entered in the
State Department's Dissent Channel (as the paper claimed); however,
the provenance of the document still remains uncertain.
*Because these activities are designed to conceal the true identity of
their originator,?it is often difficult to attribute each activity.
Therefore, some activities will appear below unattributed. Where
there is clear evi~ence that a~particular group was responsible for a
particular deed, the responsibility is noted. Moreover, though there
is evidence the campaign was carefully coordinated among the parties
to it, one cannot assume that coordination was in such detail that
every group had knowledge of every act of every other group.
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The paper makes several false allegations that support Soviet CA
goals in Central America. It alleges that the Q.S. has been training
(in 1980) Salvadorans at its bases in Panama, "in the largest training
program it has ever sponsored for any Latin American country in a
single year." The paper also claims that Argentina has become the
second largest trainer of Salvadoran officers, and that Chile and
Uruguay (two frequent victims of Soviet propaganda) are providing
intelligence, logistics and urban and rural counterinsurgency
training. The paper goes on to allege that the U.S. knows. of a para-
military strike force in Guatemala made up of members of Somoza`s
former National Guard., anti-Castro Cubans, Guatemalan military
personnel and mercenaries.
3. Bogus Press Release Purporting to be from the Mexican
Secretariat of Foreign Relations. This release was sent to a number
of newspapers in Mexico City. It falsely announced that the
Government of Mexico had decided to break diplomatic relations with
the Government of E1 Salvador. A report out of San Salvador suggested
that the Salvadoran insurgents hoped for a rupture in relations
between Mexico and EI Salvador.
4. Purported Identity Document Taken from a U S Soldier Killed
in Action in E1 Salvador. In September 1980, during a secret meeting
between members of the Salvadoran Communist Party and the Salvadoran
Christian. Democratic Party, the PCES representative alleged that there
were U.S. troops fighting on Salvadoran soil, and produced a U.S.
social security card allegedly taken from a dead soldier as "proof."
Subsequent propaganda echoed this claim while charging that large
numbers of U.S. troops were fighting in E1 Salvador.
Communist International Fronts
The Soviets employed their large front organizations in su~nor
1 . ?'r'h~~tiro~al Union o~ Students ~. This Soviet front group,
based in e, f~unden~m -e-r o idarity meetings on E1
~-
Salvador. From~e'arly to mid-April a representative of IUS travelled
throughout Central America to organize solidarity functions.
2. World- Federation of Democratic Youths This Soviet front
group was p an ing~`Fi'?'~~xn~rnational cori? a ence on solidarity with
E1 Salvador to take place in late July or early August 1980. It was
.planning to co-sponsor the conference with the International Union of
Socialist Youth, the youth arm of the non-Communist Socialist
International. ''
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1
Though the conference was never held, it is noteworthy because it
indicates that the front groups .were already beginning to plan their
support for the Salvadoran insurgency as early as March 1980.
,~
3. World Peace Council. In December 1980,the Ecuadoran
government gave its approval for a World Peace Council- sponsored
"Solidarity on E1 Salvador" meeting. The Conference took place in
April 1981. The Conference was to be jointly sponsored by the Latin
American Association for Human Rights, the Socialist International,
and the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties. The
WPC was to play a discreet role, perhaps because it is so widely known
as a Soviet front.
Communist Parties
~Commu~s~t=--pai~t"ies i;ri Europe, Latin America, Canada, and
Australia participated in the propaganda campaign and helped organize
d emon s tra t i~_r on ~ ~~~i-e~%gr~b~i a E'`i~n ~- ~rr~=i~rur~t~y~'pr i n ~e d-~~-n.~~-`','
t a ion in E1 Salvador, and contributed to the disinformation
circulating about the country. For instance, the Communist party of
Spain, in its magazine "Mundo Obrero Semanal," amid pictures of
blood-covered bodies, accused the U.S. of surrounding E1 Salvador wit~+:
the aid of Honduras and Guatemala, of sending tanks and helicopters '
"piloted by yankees," of invading E1 Salvador, and of murdering
Archbishop Romero (a leftist Catholic bishop murdered early in 1980 in
E1 Salvador).
Others examples are the Quebec Communist Party in Canada, which
organized a demonstration and carried it out even in a driving
rainstorm, and the Australian Socialist Party (pro-Soviet) which
joined with Trotskyites and other leftists to stage a demonstration._:
against U.S. intervention."
In Central America. the Communist parties carried out clandestine
activities at the behest of the DRU. They were involved in
gun-running, and in planning acts of violence against U.S. Embassies.
(This is treated in more detail in a separate section.) No
information is available re any Soviet role in the DRU tasking.
Fidel Castro also attempted to have the Communist Parties in
Central America stage uprisings in support of the Salvadoran
insurgents. He tried to have them contribute. personnel to fight in E1
Salvador.. However, he was not successful.
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Solidarity Committees
The DRO directed the establishment of Solidarity Committees
throughout Europe, in Canada and even in Australia and New Zealand.
Their purpose is to serve as outlets for information (propaganda), to
serve as conduits for aid contributions, and to organize solidarity
meetings and demonstrations in support of the insurgents.
In many cases the insurgents established these solidarity
committees as. part of a broader "Nicaragua-E1 Salvador Solidarity
Committee" or "Guatemala-E1 Salvador Solidarity Committee." In other
cases the committees stood alone as "E1 Salvador Solidarity
Committees" or "E1 Salvador Support Committees."
These committees helped plan, in conjunction with Communist
parties and local leftist groups, many of the demonstrations that took
place throughout Europe, Latin America,. Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. These demonstrations were planned in anticipation of the
"final offensive" to be conducted in E' Salvador.
Nicaraguan television announced in March 1981, that the
"Nicaraguan Solidarity Committees," through agreement with the World
Peace Council, would join the fight against TNF modernization in
Europe. TNF {Theater Nuclear Force) is an issue on which Soviets have
been active in Europe, but the issue has not received any significant
attention in Latin America. The World Peace Council; is the Soviet
Front Organization that has been in the forefront of opposition to TNF
in Europe.
Demonstrations and Protests
Throughout 1980 press reports, k~oth Soviet inspired and others,,
on E1 Salvador in Europe, Latin America, Canada and the U.S., had
generally portrayed the Salvadoran government as a "rightist,
repressive regime" and created a poor public image. Missionaries and
other clergy returning from E1 Salvador also brought with them stories
of oppression. The murders of Archbishop Romero, and other Amerman
religious workers in E1 Salvador contributed to the perception that
the Junta government was responsible _for. outs es._a ainst_ its own
peoples. g- g- -
rvllowing the January 10 "final offensive" in E1 Salvador and the
~Januarv 16 UsG dPC i c i nn +-n ,-e....._... _ r , _ ._ _ . _
u~,~~~~i~ ~L aL ivns oroxe out in Europe , Canada - -^- ~ _...,_'
,vie U.S. Over 70 dPmnnc+-r~#-;,,.,~ ~....__ ~_ __ ~ Australia, New Zealand and
spo'trtaneous; -they had been planned
in anti
i
~
v
W
oL
.
c
pation
of
the
final
offensive.
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The pattern of dates and places of the demonstrations shows that
they were the result of a well-coordinated world-wide effort. Their
sponsorship, for the most part, by Communist parties and "E1 Salvador
Solidarity Committees" also demonstrates that this was a coordinated
effort.
However, other groups participated in the demonstrations as well,
indicating that parties and solidarity committees were able to draw
the participation of others interested in E1 Salvador. Some of the
other groups were Trotskyite parties, leftist student groups, and some
labor organizations. The largest demonstration thus far was held
31 January 1981 in Frankfurt, West Germany.- Fifteen thousand people
attended the demonstration and marched on the U.S. Consulate General.
See Apendix for listing of many of the demonstrations.
Violence Against U.S. Persons and Installations
The DRU urged violence against U.S. persons and installations as
a means to protest U.S. "interference"~in El Salvador. Following are
examples of violence that took place or had been planned.
1. 28 January. The U.S. Ambassador's residence in Tegucigalpa
was under surveillance. A check of the license number of the car used~~
by the surveillant revealed he was a member of the Honduran Communist
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2. 3 February. The U.S. Consulate in Milan received a threat to
"take measures against you" unless the O.S. stopped giving arms to
E1 Salvador. The caller identified himself as part of the "Movement
of 28 February," a Salvadoran guerrilla organization.
3. 5 February. Tha U.S. Embassy in Stockholm received a letter
warning that the Embassy would be bombed in two weeks unless the U.S.
stopped economic aid to the Junta in E1 Salvador.
4. 5 February. :The U.S. Consulate General in Amsterdam was
attacked and physical damage was such that it closed for five days.
This was the sixth security incident since mid-December ~in Amsterdam.
No group claimed credit for the incident, but it probably
was the work of groups protesting either the neutron bomb or E1
Salvador.
5. 23 Februar ~. The E1 Salvador Committee, which had been
protesting U.S. aid to the Junta in E1 Salvador, threatened to
assassinate the U.S. Ambassador in The Aague.
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Covert Media Placements
Placing material supporting a viewpoint in local media has
also been a feature of Soviet and Cuban propaganda activity in
E1 Salvador. An example of covert placement of material is indi-
cated by the activity of a Cuban E-^bassy official .in one Latin
American country, who obtained a copy of a color video tape made
by a gxoup called the "Association of Churches." It depicted
atrocities allegedly committed by the Salvadoran Army. The
~fficial!s intention in obtaining the tape i~*as to show it to the
President and Vice President of the country and place it on one
of the television networks. The official stated that one of the
most important things was to show the credits on the tape accurately
so that Cuba's non-involvement is made clear.
THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT
International Organizations ~~`~~
Captured documents indicate that the DRU intended to seer ~'~
recognition of the FDR in international organizations and obtain
condemnation of alleged "U.S. interference" in E1 Salvador. The
DRU also expected to obtain financial support as well as relief
supplies from international humanitarian organizations. The organ-
izations specifically targetted by the DRU fora diplomatic effort
were: the UN, OAS, NAM, European Parliament, and Council of Europe.
Some of the Humanitarian organizations selected for approach were:
Catholic Relief.Services and International Committee for the Red
Cross. Captured documents also indicated that the DRU expected
the Socialist International to be its ally in this effort.
Given the complexity of the Salvadoran situation and the
strategy of the DRU, the congruence of positions taken~b
such as the Socialist International and other target organizations
and the position of clearly identified Communist front. groups should
-12-
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not be construed necessarily as proof that. all these opposition
groups are tools or fronts for the Soviets. Nevertheless, a
certain parallelism can be seen.in some of the communiques
and statements coming out of Socialist International meetings
dealing with the Central America area. European Socialist
and social democratic leaders involved in SI matters, such as
A'illy Brandt, Have stated that the SI European parties usually
defer to the views ~f their colleagues in the area concerned
on matters concerning these areas; i.e., the views of the leaders
of the socialist parties in San Salvador, Venezuela, the
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica have been reflected in SI
Latin American communiques. Since these Latin American
socialists, particularly the leaders of the Socialist party
in E1 Salvador, are strongly influenced Tiy DRU positions,
there is significant convergence of Soviet/Cuban positions
on the E1 Salvador situation and that of the ST.
There also are instances of apparent Soviet manipulation
of SI statements. For example, a fetter reportedly from the
Hudson Institute to the U. S. State Department surfaced at a
crucial time. This letter conveyed a list of persons whom, is
alleged, that the U.S. Government might wish to call upon to
help influence European parties and governments on. the issue
of E1 Salvador. One of the names in the letter was that of a
delegate to the conference who was falsely identified as from
the U.S. Government, if not the CTA, and thereby limited his
effectiveness.
In this context it is interesting to note that a signed
PRAVDA editorial on 1 October, named this person as a CIA
agent and said that fie had previously participated in the
pacification program in Vietnam during the 1960's and was now
"main" advisor to the Salvadoran Junta on agrarian reform. In
reality this person worked for the AIFLD in El Salvador as an
advisor on agrarian reform. PRAVDA'S accusation against him
circulated kTidely among Congress delegates, further ruining
his credibility. .
Non-Ali ned Movement Ministerial in New Delhi (9 to 12
February At t e N i Ministerial, t o Cubans a sought a
strongly worded condemnation of the U.S, and the Salvadoran
Junta. They arrived at the conference with a delegation of
30 people and coordinated activities closely with six Soviet
diplomatic personnel who were also working the conference.
The language of the final communique condemned interference
in E1 Salvador from all external parties, and called upon
governments to abstain from supplying arms and rendering
other forms of military assistance.
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Thus there was no direct condemnation of the U.S. on
E1 Salvador. Tfie final communique did call., however, for
the witfidrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan, something
whicji could not fiave pleased Asoscow.
Human Ri fits Commission in Geneva (2 3 February) . Cuban
representatives intro uce a resolution criticising the
government of E1 Salvador and received help from the Soviets
. in lobBying the Western European delegations. They circulated
supporting papers on letterFiead of tfie FDR which referred to
captured DRU documents and said tfiat "falsification of
documents is a daily duty of American. intelligence agencies
such as CIA." They also circulated the Hudson Institute Letter
about tfie Socialist International meeting in Madrid, a Nicara-
guan denial of Soviet arms sfiipments tfirough its country, ?
a.New York Times article Headlined "Solicitor General Call
Two Amer cans.Killed in EI Salvador 'Under Cover,"' and an
article from? The Washi~n t_o_n Post headlined "Vietnam from the
Phoenix Program to El ~ ador:'T Despite tfie heavy lo~,bying
effort afar more moderate resolu~ion introduced by the
Netherlands..delegation.was adopted.
Other Organizations
-~ .The DRU had targetted otfier organizations to obtain
either publicity, financial assistance or otfier forms of
assistance. The insurgent's cause was taken up in the
following organizations:
1. EC Commission -~ The EC proposed to send $400,000
EUA in cash assistance and one million in food assistance to ?
humanitarian organizations in EI Salvador tfirough tfie ICRC.
2. ?International Permanent Commission of the Peoples
(Russell Commission. Tfiis group field a !'trial" of the U.S.
for "invading E1 Salvador, and of tfie government of F1 Salvador
for "genocide." _
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3. European/Latin American Parliamentary Conference--Socialist
delegates to this conference sought a condemnation of the Salvadoran
Junta and U.S. support for it. However, a gentleman's agreement
among European delegations dropped condemnation of the USSR's
inva$fon.of Afghanistan in return for dropping condemnation of
the U.S.'s support for the Salvadoran Junta.
Travels ~ FDR Representatives
Representatives of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR),
including Guillermo Ungo and Hector Oqueli, travelled extensively
in Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Same FDR representatives
visited Australia. The FDR also sent "permanent representatives"
to live.in many European capitals. The Cuban news service, Prensa
Latina, provided communications facilities for the FDR representa-
tives. ?
During .their travels, FDR representatives met with heads of
state, members of parliament, socialist leaders, religious leaders,
and others to talk about E1 Salvador and secure political support..
They also spoke at demonstrations and rallies. Public statements
? by these representatives generally followed the propaganda line
established by the DRU and repeated in Soviet and world-wide Com-
munist party propaganda. These ranged from statements that the
U.S. is planning to intervene militarily in E1 Salvador, to claims
- that invasion was already a fact accompanied by great detail on.
the ''thousands" of U.S, troops, tanks, helicopters supposedly in
the country. FDR representatives always maintained that the insur-
gents were ready any time to "dialogue" with the Junta, and charac-
terized the Junta as "rightist, military, repressive, and genocidal."
~OFFICIAL? ?FROP.4GANDA
Soviet Media Commentary on E1 Salvador ~~
Overt Moscow media comment on E1 Salvador has attempted to dis-
credit U.S. policies by convincing inter-national audiences that U.S:
actions are?motivated by narrow self-interest and constitute a
threat to all of Central America. As in its comment an other Third
World areas, Moscow accuses Washington of supporting tyranny and of
attempting to suppress popular struggles for legitimate social,
economic, and political goals. The Soviet Union is portrayed in
this propaganda as a champion of .people fighting for freedom and
.sovereignty. rioscow publicly acknowledges Soviet political and
moral support of the Salvadoran insurgents but dismisses :.charges
about Soviet arms supply as fabrications aimed at justifying U.S.
interference in the country. ?
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Moscow's propaganda line is conveyed to foreign audiences in
.more than 1,800 hours of broadcasts per week. Of these broadcasts,
slightly over 108 hours per week are beamed to Latin America, pri-
marily in Spanish and Portuguese. The major part of this broad-
casting comes from the official Soviet radio, Radio Moscow. Some
14~hours per week are beamed to Latin America over the purportedly
u~lofficial Radio Peace and Progress--a~radio using Radiv Moscow
transmitters but claming to speak for Soviet public opinion. In
addition, the Moscow World Service, established in June 1978, is~
An the air around the clock in English to international audiences;
some of its programs can be heard by English-speaking people in
Latin America.
Soviet international broadcasts first stepped up attention to
E1 Salvador in early January 1981, with commentary supporting
Salvadoran guerrilla plans for a "final offensive" against the
government. The volume of broadcast attention to the subject
peaked in mid-January in reaction to the U.S, decision to resume
military assistance to E1~Salvador. While the volume of comment
then diminished, the tone became much more strident in early
February in response to statements by U.S, officials linking the
soviet Union with international terrorism and charging the Soviets
with helping to arm the Salvadoran guerrillas.
The preponderance of Soviet broadcast comment on E1 Salvador
_in the past three months has been directed at audiences in Latin
America and West Europe. The targeting and content of this
material suggest a dual purpose: to exploit. Latin American
opposition to increased U.S. involvement in the Salvadoran con-
flict, while isolating the United States from its NATO allies.
The use of Soviet international broadcasts to serve both objec-~-
tives was demonstrated in mid-February, when U.S. envoys were
visiting Europe and Latin America to seek support for U.S. policy
and to document Soviet and Cuban involvement in the"Salvadoran
conflict. During the week of the vis=ts, 16-22 February, 99
percent of sampled Soviet broadcast comment on E1 Salvador was
beamed to audiences in ..Latin America and West Europe.
While the volume of Soviet braodcast attention to E1 Salvador
has been greater in recent weeks than the negligible attention
Moscow usually gives to that country, it has not approached the
magnitude of other propaganda campaigns. A week's sample of Soviet
broadcasts in mid-January, at the, height of Moscow radio attention
to E1 Salvador, revealed that only 5.5 percent of Soviet commentary
was devoted to the topic. B?y contrast, a comparable sampling. of -'~
Soviet broa_ dcasts during the anti.-neutron~iomb;~issue. In normal
times Moscow radio se -om mentions E1 Salvador. Even~at the time
of the coup in E1 Salvador in~October 1979, less than one percent
of Moscow radio comment dealt with events in .the country.
/b
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The principal themes of current Soviet media commentary on
U,S, policy toward E1 Salvador are identified below in descendin
order of frequency: g
1? The?United States is fomenting trouble in EZ SgZvador by
arming an unpopular regime and sending. in agents disguised as
technicians, Moscow has attempted to refute recent statements b
Secretary of State Haig that the United States is not going to y
expand the scope of its. current military assistance to the Salva-
doran regime, Soviet corr`mentators~have argued that Haig's assur-
' ances.regarding the limited scale of U.S, involvement in EI Sal-
` vador are unconvincing, Typical char es a
radio broadcast in Spanish to Latin Americaponr2dMarch;Moscow
As reported by the American press itself, Washington is
planning to allocate to the anti-people regime more than
.. 200 million dollars--a fabulous sum for such a small
country, ,We do not even mention the fact. that the
number of Pentagon and CIA "advisers" in E1.Salvador is
continually growing; they are not only acting as instruc-
tors to the punitive detachments of the junta but are
taking a direct part in the operations aimed at smashing
the patriots,
2, U. S. charges of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the su
arms to the Salvadoran guerriZtas are contrived to ppZy of
military intervention in the ,conflict. Soviet propagandists~con-
tend that U.S. statements about arms shipments from Moscow and
Havana to the Salvadoran insurgents are a smokescreen that has
failed to mask increased U.S, intervention. Thus Moscow radio
f,.
told Spanish-speaking audiences in Latin America on 4 March:
The main claim of U.S, propaganda is that international
conspirators and not the Salvadoran people are fighting
the Salvadoran regime, However, despite all their
efforts the North Americans have not managed to make
anyone believe their lies,
3. The United States is attempting to revive gunboat diplomacy in
Central America and is contributing to the repression of the
Sa,Zvadoran masses in order to protect U. S, interests in the region.
Moscow routinely plays on the theme that U.S. actions in E1
Salvador run counter to the legitimate interests of the Salvadoran
people. The fallowing example is drawn from a commentary by Latin
American affairs commentator Leonid Levchenko, broadcast by Moscow
radio on 4 hiarch to a variety of audiences:
The U,S. Administration tries to shore up -the reactionary ?
regime in EI Salvador and protect the order against which
the people of that country have risen in rebellion. ,.
/7
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-~
The people of E1 Salvador have risen against a system of
oppression and repression. In these conditions the
United States has made a choice in favor of a tyrannical
regime responsible for the deaths of many thousands of
' people.
+4: Washington has failed in its e
European allies for U. S, initiativesoinsEZoSaZvadore sSeekin otoits
undercut the U.S, position that external communist militarygznvolve-
? went has become a crucial factor in the Salvadoran conflict, koscow
portrays West Euro can
arguments and as persuadedeTOnethe contrary,jthat UYSwaintegfon's
is the troublemaking factor. The Levchenko commentary cited abovee
also touched on this theme:
The public of Western Europe and Latin America are
showing concern over America's increasing military
interference in. El Salvador. The majority of
America's allies have mzde it quite plain that they
do not only refuse to give support to the American
intervention~in E1 Salvador, but treat very negatively
Washington's attempt to keep the junta in power.
5.. U. S, interference in EZ Salvador is only part of a larger U. S.
plan to put an end to revolutionary upheaval in Central America.
This theme underscores Moscow's charge that Washington's support
for the Salvadoran junta may presage more forceful U,S. action
against other leftist movements in the region, particularly against
the Sandinist-led government in Nicaragua, A commentary by Leonid
Levchenko broadcast by Radio Moscow's World Service on 17 January.='
said:
According to the U.S, magazine NATION, a.war in Central
America would be a fine excuse for sending U.S. Marines
and crushing revolutionary upheavals in that region
once and for all. As it is preparing for a direct armed
intervention in E1 Salvador,_the United States would
like at the same time to bring down the democratic
system in Nicaragua and to help the dictatorial regimes
in Guatemala and honduras to make short work of the
mounting opposition movements in those countries.
6. U. S, charges against the Soviet Union to the contrar
the United States, not the Soviet Union, which uses terrorism as
an instrument_of foreign policy. Moscow commentators typically
avoid coming to grips with rthe substance of the U.S, charges, dis-
missing them as attacks against the Soviet Union's policy of sup-
porting "national liberation struggles." The following passage
appeared in a Moscow radio commentary broadcast to Soviet domestic
as well as worldwide foreign audiences on 3 February: ,~
/B
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The efforts of those Washington figures who are blithely
huxling accusations at the wrong target and are at the
same time giving moral, political, material, and mili-
tary support to repressive and terrorist regimes look
- like hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness.
7~ The ~U~zted States has prepared a number of military options,
tineZuding direct U. S, armed intervention in EZ Salvador, to prevent
a takeover of power ~y Salvadoran leftists. Seeking to bolster the
view that Washington is resolved to save the Salvadoran junta at
any cost, Moscow has long contended that the United States is pre-
paring to intervene in E1 Salvador, either directly or through the
use of Latin American expeditionary forces. Moscow first warned of
possible U.S. military involvement in E1 Salvador in mid_February
1980 following Washington's decision to provide.military aid to the
junta. These warnings peaked in December 1980 and January~198I as
the~scale~of the war between the junta and the leftists intensified.
Recent Soviet media commentary on the Salvadoran conflict has
included mention of a possible U.S. military role, but with Less
frequency than. during the December-January period. Touching on this
issue last December, .a commentary by Leonid Levchenko broadcast over
Radio Mosco?~r's World-Service on the 24th said:
The special presidential expert commission on EI Salvador
is knovtn~to have recommended direct military intervention
__ in that country. This intervention is to be launched in
different forms. The commission suggests, for example,
sending into E1.Salvador troops of the member countries
of the Organization of American States.~But if this
tactic cannot be applied this time because of the oppo-,~.?
sition by most members of the organization, then it is
proposed to support the junta by sending in troops of
the United States, Guatemala,. and Honduras.
/9
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APPENDIX
Demonstrations and Protests A ainst U.S. Polic in E1 Salvador
DATE
PLACE
NO.~
SPONSOR
13 Jan.
Montreal
40
Comite Unitaire De Solidar.ite P6ur
Sa.l.vadone
16 Jan.
~
Bern ~
800
"Usual run of left-win
third-world interest groupsh mostly
Swiss but with a smattering of Latin
American participants .'~ _
16 Jan.
.
Panama City
_
Federation of Panamanian students,
Revolution Student Front. There was
also an~attempt to firebomb the Embassy.
16 Jan.
-~---~
Sydney
' -
40"
- ::
"Australian Social~'st k~orkers Party"
(TrotyfCYite) (NOTE: Some Chileans were
to participate, according to permit,
'fiat were.not seen at site,
16 Jan.
Managua
300
Al] U.S. Citizens, mainly Plaryknolle~s,
and others describing themselves as
tourists,
17 Jan.
Georgetown
40
peoples Progressive Party (Pro-Soviet
17 Jan.
Brussels
250
"A sma]1 local 7rotskyite,.party'_'..and
other.Leftist groups.
19 Jan.
Bilbao
40
~iem6ers of the Faculty of Theology
of the University of Deusto
20 Jan.
Barcelona
50
Liga Comunista Revolucionaria,
Movimiento Comunista de Catalun.ia
20,Jan.
Vancouver
75
E1 Salvador/Nicaragua Support
Committee.
20 Jan.
4lellington
8 ~
Nicaragua Solidarity~Committee
20 Jan.
Quito
unk
~~ '~ ~ ~
Leftist students from Catholic
University - ~ .
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20 Jan.
Rome
Unk
Committee of :,?olidarity with the
Salvadoran People. Speakers included
Brazilian labor leader and Communist
"Lula" Uruguayan Ernesto Gogi, and others
22 Jan.
USUN
200 -
Committee in Solidarity with the People
of E1 Salvador
22 Jan.
Bilbao
3
Communist Party of Euskadi, Basque
Regional Branch of Spanish Communist Party.
22 Jan.
Bogota
35
Colombian Communist Party (pro-Soviet]
22 Jan.
Managua
15
Group describing itself as American
Professional people.f.rom New York and
Cal ifornia
22 Jan.
-San Jose
un[c
Unidentified group, mainly foreigners.
.
Tfie Government of Costa Rica subsequently
expelled l6 foreigners including 3 U.S.
citizens for demonstrating illegally.
24 Jan. ~
Stuttgart
80
Amnesty International., Association of
German Catholic Youth, Action Committee
Stuttgart, Communist-Party of Chile,
-_-_ -
~
Latin American Comm., Stuttgart, Movement
of-the Revolutionary Left, Socialist
Party of Chile, Socialist Party CNR,
Chile. '
24 Jan.
-Calgary
2Q0
Committee of Friends of E1 Salvador
New Democratic Party, the U.S. Association,
tfie Inter-Church Committee on Numar Rights
in Latin America - .
29 Jan.
Vienna
1,500
Anti-U.S, campaign spearheaded by
Austrian Communist Party.
29 Jan.
Dusseldorf
-100
Working Group for E1 Salvador, Neuss;
Central America Committee, Wuppertal;
Nicaragua Information Office, Wuppertal;
Initiative Group for the Third World,
Neuss;
Working Group of BCKJ For The Politics -
of Development;
ASTA (Combined German Student-:Committee;
Professional Group of the PN,' Neuss;
 ~p~ovec~Fo~'~ 4-2
~'
29 Jan. Dusseldorf 100 (Cont'd.)
Evangelical Student Committee, Dusseldorf;
. 4lorking Group for Alternatives in Social 4lork;
The Foreigners Group, Bilk;
' Action Alovement for Housing, Dusseldorf;
Independent Medical Group;
Biker-Base Central Book Assn.;
. Saegewerke, E. V.;
Children's Book Store in t~uppertal, Third
? ~torld Section;
Provincial Association for the North
Rhine-Westphalia "The Green Ones"
(An Environmentalist Political Party);
Free International University..
31 Jan. Mexi'co~ ~ 10,000 (Not attributed 6y Embassy report
31 Jan. Frankfurt 15,000 Informationsstelle E1.Salvador. Marchers
included several hundred masked leather-
jacketed rowdies" and "a number of orderly
Turks and Chileans." The keynote speaker
. Nras. Karsten Voigt. There. were acts of violence.
31 Jan,
Stockholm
400
Guatemala-El Salvador Committee. Vast
majority of demonstrators were Latin
.. _._
_ Americans, from Latin American exile groups.
3 Feb.
Milan
--
~ r
Telephone threat against U.S. Consulate in
t4ilan 6y group calling itself MOVEMENT OF
28 FEBRUARY. Caller said in Spanish that?~
U.S. must cease giving arms to Salvadoran
~~unta or his organization "will take
measures against you."
6 Feb.
Melbourne
unk
Nicaragua Reconstruction Committee,
Socialist Workers Party, Spartacist
League of Australia, Tnternationai
Socialists, Communist Party of Australia.
10 Feb.
San Jose
8
Partido Revolucionario de Los 7rabajadores.
Demonstration followed series of radio
?
announcements claiming Feb. 10 would be
day of world-wide demonstrations against
E] Salvador 6y the Fourth International
"
'
Partido Mundial De Los Trabajadores."
10 'Feb.
Mexico
150
Partido 06rero Socialists, Liga Obrero
.
Marxists, Partido r4arxista De Mexico,
Juventud Democratica Mexicans
10 Feb.
Lima
15
"Leftist and C ommu-~ist Demonstrators,
organized and led by Senator Cesar Napuri
(POMR) and Diputado Enrique Fernandez (PST
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10 Feb. ~
Paris
500
Organisation Com~nuniste Internationaliste.
10 Feb.
Hamburg
10.
Unattributed
10 Feb.
Frankfurt
5
Protest letter delivered by reps of
Internat~onaler Arbeitskreis Frankfurt.
'
10 Feb.
Lima
15
~ Persons representing various political
.
parties, including the trotskyites.
11 Feb.
Quebec_
8
Communist Party - These demonstrators
showdd up during a driving rain storm for
.
demonstration.
13 Feb.
Perth
6
Unattri6uted (Perth OOgO}
14 Feb.
Amsterdam
2,500
E1 Salvador Committee, together with the
the support of other local anti-American
protest groups and United Uruguayan Group
In Solidarity With El Salvador.
International :." Communist League,
Convention tlacional de Trabajadores del
__.._ ~
Uruguay, IKB - Grupo Combate.
17 Feb.
D-~61in
35
E1 Salvador Support Committee. (Note:
the Embassy in Dublin reported this was
the Fiftfi demonstration by this group.) .~,?
20 Feb.
Oslo
200
iinattributed.
25 Feb.
Paris
1,000
Comite Soutien au Peuple du Salvador,
Comite du i~icaragua, Comite du Guatemala.
(all These groups were organized by the
.
Organisie 4E Internationale, a Trotskyist
groupj.
26 Feb.
Stuttgart
15
Same groups as Jan 24 demonstration.
26 Feb.
Rome
35
Partito Democratico Unione Proletario
Movimiento La6oratori Per I1 Socialismo.
`Among the group were six parliamentary
.
reps of the PDUP.
27~Feb.
Edinburgh
75 ~
Latin American Solidarity Campaign Of
Edinburgh. Some damage was done to the
Consulate door?by battering it.
28 Feb.
Vancouver
5f70 ~~
?-~E1~ Salvador/Nicaragua Committee.
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28 Feb.
Quebec
500
Quebec/El Salvador (~1FI) '
6 Mar.
Adelaide
30
Socialist Party of Australia, Socialist
Workers Party, Communist Party of
Australia.
3 i'gar.
Copenhagen"
1,500
"Several Danish political organizations
from Center-left of Communist"~ Chile-
Nicaragua Allende-Uruguay Co~-unittee.
10 Mar.
Toronto
200
E1 Salvador Support Committee.
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