CUBA S RENEWED SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800100003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800100003-4
UNCLASSIFIED
Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence
in Latin America
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UNCLASSIFIED
Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence
Summary
Cuba has by far the most formidable military
force in the Caribbean basin with the single exception
of the U.S. In terms of size, its forces are larger
than any other Central American or Caribbean nation.
In all of Latin America, only Brazil--a country with
a population 12 times that of Cuba--has a larger military.
establishment.
Since 1975 the USSR has undertaken a major modern-
ization of all branches of the Cuban military, trans-
forming it from a home defense force into the best
equipped military establishment in Latin America with
significiant offensive capabilities. Equipment delivered
to the ground forces has enhanced both its mobility
and firepower. The Air Force now is probably the
best equipped in Latin America, possessing some 200
Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters. The Navy has acquired
two torpedo attack submarines and a Koni-class frigate,
all of which will-be able to sustain operations throughout
the Caribbean basin and will enable Castro to project
power far beyond Cuba's shores, posing a threat to
shipping in the Caribbean as well as intimidating
and threatening neighbors.
. As a result of this modernization program and
Cuba's combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia, the
Castro regime possesses a significant regional inter-
vention capability. Although this capability is modest
by Western standards, it is impressive in the Central
American or Caribbean context. This capability would
be most effectively employed in aiding an ally in
the region against an external invasion or in the
suppression of internal conflict. Cuba does not have
the wherewithal to conduct an outright invasion of
another nation in the region except for the Caribbean
micro-states. Havana does not have sufficient amphibious
assault landing craft, or aircraft capable of transporting
heavy equipment.
Cuba has on occasion demonstrated some recklessness
in the utilization of its capabilities. The most
recent example occurred 10 May 1980 when Cuban air
force fighters attacked and sank a clearly marked
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Bahamian patrol vessel in broad daylight inside Bahamian
territorial waters, killing four crewmembers. The
following day, Cuban MiGs buzzed a populated island
belonging to the Bahamas for a prolonged period.
In addition, a Cuban helicopter carrying Cuban troops
landed on the same island in pursuit of the surviving
crewmembers of the sunken patrol vessel.
The Cuban Military
Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba intervened in
Angola on a large scale and the Soviet Union began
to modernize Cuba's armed forces with new equipment,
the Cuban military has changed' from a predominantly
home defense force into a formidable power relative
to its Latin American neighbors. The list of Soviet
arms delivered to Castro since 1960 exceeds 2 billion
dollars. Since Cuba's involvement in Angola in 1975,
the monetary value of annual deliveries has been more
than double the value of annual deliveries made during
the preceeding 15 years. Thus far this year, the
Soviets have provided Cuba almost 60,000 tons of military
equipment, the highest figure since 1962. (250,000
tons - chart 1). Cuba's armed forces currently total
more than 225,000 personnel--200,000 Army, 15,000
Air Force and Air Defense, and 10,000 Navy--including
both those on active-duty either in Cuba or overseas
and those belonging to the ready reserves, subject
to immediate mobilization. With a population of just
under ten million, Cuba has by far the largest military
force in the Caribbean basin and the second largest
in Latin America after Brazil, with a population of
over 120 million. More than 2 percent of the Cuban
population belongs to the active-duty military and
ready reserves, compared with an average of under
0.4 percent in other countries in the Caribbean basin.
,(See charts 2 and 3). In addition, Cuba's large parami-
litary organizations and reserves would be available
to support the military internally.
The quantitative and qualitative upgrading of
the armed forces since the mid-1970s and their recent
combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia give the
Cuban military definite advantages over its neighbors
in Latin America. Cuba is the only country in Latin
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America to have undertaken a major military effort
abroad since World War II, giving both Army and Air
Force personnel recent combat experience in operating
many of the weapons currently in their inventories.
We believe that about 70% of Cuban troops that have
served in Africa have been reservists who were called
to active duty. Cuban reservists generally spend
about 45 days per year on active duty and can be readily
integrated into the armed forces. Cuba has effectively
used its civilian enterprises, such as Cubana airlines
and the merchant marine, to support military operations.
Havana has dedicated significant resources to modernize
and professionalize its armed forces and to maintain
a well prepared reserve. Cuba has demonstrated that
when supported by the Soviet Union, logistically,
it has both the capacity and the will to deploy large
numbers of troops and can be expected to do so whenever
the Castro government believes it to be in Cuba's
best interest.
Equipment delivered to the Army since the mid-
1970s, such at T-62 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles,
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and ZSU-23-4 self-
propelled antiaircraft guns,-have begun to alleviate
earlier deficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capability,
as well as providing increased firepower. In addition
to its qualitative advantage, the Cuban Army has an
overwhelming numerical superiority in weapons holdings
over all of its Latin American neighbors.
The Cuban Air Force is one of the largest and
probably the best equipped in all Latin America.
Its inventory includes some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG
jet fighters, with one squadron of MiG-23s. The MiG-
23s have the capability to reach portions of the South-
eastern United States, most of Central America and
most Caribbean nations (Chart 4). Cuban-based aircraft,
however, would be capable of conducting only limited
air engagements in Central Ameerica on a round-trip
mission. Cuba's fighter aircraft could be effectively
employed in either a ground-attack or air superiority
role, however, if based on Central American soil--
a feasible option given the.closeness of Cuban/Nicaraguan
relations. A similar arrangement would be possible
in Grenada once Cuban workers complete the construction
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of an airfield with a 9,000 foot runway there. If
the MiG-23s were to stage from Nicaragua and Grenada,
their combat radii would be expanded to include all
of Central America including the Panama Canal, the
Caribbean and the northern. tier of South America.
The Cuban Navy with a strength of 11,500 personnel
remains essentially a defensive force, although its
.two recently acquired FOXTROT-class submarines and
single Koni-class frigate, once fully integrated into
the operational force, will be able to sustain operations
throughout the Caribbean basin, the Gulf of Mexico,
and, to a limited extent, the Atlantic. The primary
vessels for carrying out the Navy's defensive missions
are Osa and Komar class missile attack bojts whose.
range can extend well into the Caribbean. They are
armed with SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship missiles, (See
Chart 5). Although not equipped for sustained operations
away from its main bases, the Cuban Navy could conduct
limited interdiction missions in the Caribbean. In
addition to the Navy, Cuba has a 3,000 man coast guard
organization.
Cuba's capability to intervene in a hostile environ-
ment using its indigenous transport assets is modest
by Western standards, but considerably more formidable
in the Central American context. As in 1975, when
a single battalion of Cuban airborne troops airlifted
to Luanda at a critical moment played a role far out
of proportion to its size, a battle-tested Cuban force
interjected quickly into a combat situation in Central
America could prove a decisive factor. Moreover,
since the Angolan experience, Havana has increased
the training of airborne-qualified forces, which now
consist of a Special Troops contingent and a Landing
and Assault Brigade, and has improved its air and
sea lift capacity as well.
The Koni has an operating range of 2,000 nautical
miles without refueling or replenishment. The FOXTROTs
have a range of 9,000 nautical miles at seven knots
per year and a patrol duration of 70 days.
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Cuba continues to lack sufficient transport aircraft
capable of supporting long-range, large-scale troop
movements and would have to turn to the Soviets to
achieve such a capability.. Cuba does not have the
capability to transport large numbers of troops and
supplies within the Caribbean region, however, using
its military and civilian air assets. Since 1975,
the Cuban commercial air fleet has acquired seven
IL-62 long-range jet transport aircraft and some TU-
154 medium-to-long range transport aircraft, each
capable of carrying 150 to 200 combat-equipped troops.
(By comparison, Cuba conducted the airlift to Luanda
in 1975 with only five medium-range aircraft, each
having a maximum capacity of 100 troops). Cuba has
recently acquired is the AN-26 short-range transport.
The most effective use of this aircraft from Cuban
bases would be in transporting troops or supplies
to a friendly country, but it is capable, with full
payload, of airdropping troops on portions of Florida
and Belize, of Jamaica, Haiti and the Bahamas, and
most of the Dominican Republic (See Chart 6). If
based in Nicaragua, however, the AN-26s would be capable-
of reaching virtually all of"Central America in either
role. In addition, more than 30'smaller military
and civilian tranpsort planes, including the veterans
of the Angola conflict, could also be used to fly
troops and munitions to Central America.
Cuba's ability to mount an amphibious assault
is constrained both by the small number of naval infantry
personnel and by a dearth of suitable landing craft.
Cuba would, however, be capable of transporting signifi-
cant numbers of troops and supplies--using ships belonging
to the merchant marine and navy--to ports secured
by friendly forces if the US did not become involved.
Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations
Cuba's several paramilitary organizations involve
hundreds of thousands of civilian personnel during
peacetime and would be available to support the military
during times of crisis. Although these groups would
be far less combat-capable than any segment of the
military, they do provide at least rudimentary military
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training and discipline to the civilian population.
The primary orientation of these paramilitary organiza-
tions is internal security and local defense. (See
Chart 7, which provides the mission, strength and
subordination of each group).
The extent to which the military is involved
in the civilian sector is further reflected by its
activity within the economic sphere. In addition
to uniformed personnel, The Ministry of the Revolutiona-
ry Armed Forces (MINFAR) has over 30,000 civilian
workers employed in factories and repair facilities
in Cuba and in building roads and airfields in Africa.
Many are employees of MINFAR's Central Directorate
for Housing and Construction which, in addition to.
military construction, builds housing and apartment
complexes for military and civilian personnel of both
MINFAR and the Ministry of the Interior. The Youth
Labor Army also contributes to economic development
by engaging in activities such as agricultural, industrial,
construction, and transportation projects.
The Soviet Presence
The Soviet military presence in Cuba includes
a ground forces brigade, a military advisory group,
and an intelligence collection facility. There are
6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisors and 2,000 Soviet
military advisors in Cuba. Military deployments to
Cuba consist of periodic visits by naval reconnaissance
aircraft and task groups.
The ground force brigade, located near Havana,
has approximately 2,600 men and consists of one tank
and three motorized rifle battalions, plus various
combat and service support units. Soviet ground forces
have been present in Cuba since shortly before the
missile crisis in 1962.
Likely missions of the brigade include providing
a small symbolic Soviet commitment to Castro, implying
a readiness to defend Cuba and his regime, and probably
providing security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet
facilities, particularly for the Soviets' large intelli-
gence collection facility. The brigade almost certainly
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would not have a role as an intervention force, although
it is capable of tactical defense and offensive opera-
tions in Cuba. Unlike such units as airborne divisions,
the brigade is not structured for rapid deployment,
and no transport aircraft capable of carrying its
armed vehicles and heavy equipment are stationed in
Cuba.
The Soviet Military Advisory Group on Cuba consists
of at least 2,000 military personnel, who provide
technical advice in support of weapons such as the
MiGs, surface-to-air missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines;
some are also attached to Cuban ground units. The
Soviets' intelligence collection facility--their largest
outside USSR--monitors US military and civilian communi-
cations.
Since the naval ship visit program began in 1969,
21 Soviet naval task groups have deployed to the. Caribbean,
virtually all of them visiting Cuban ports. The most
recent visit occurred in April and May 1981 and included
the first by a Kara-class.cruiser--the largest Soviet
combatant to have ever visited the island. Soviet
intelligence collection ships operating off the US
East Coast regularly call at Cuba during their patrols,
as do hydrographic research and space support ships
operating in the region. In addition, the Soviet
Navy keeps a salvage and rescue ship in Havana for
emergency operations.
Soviet TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have
deployed periodically to Cuba since 1970. Typically,
these-aircraft are deployed in pairs and stay in Cuba
for several weeks. The flights have historically
been associated with US, NATO, and Soviet exercises;
the transit of US ships to and from the Mediterranean;
and periods of increased international tension, suchas
the Angolan and Ethiopian wars.
The Soviets apparently sent a significant number
of pilots to augment Cuba's air defense during two
periods--early 1976 and during 1978--when Cuban pilots
were sent to Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet pilots
filled in for Cuban pilots deployed abroad, 'and provided
the Cuban Air Force with enough personnel to perform
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its primary mission of air defense of the island.
Threat to Hemispheric Strategic Defense
Cuban military ties with the Soviet Union, the
Soviet presence in Cuba including the presence of
a large Soviet telecommunications facility, and the
periodic Soviet air and naval presence pose significant
military threats to US security interest in the hemis-
phere. Because of Cuba's proximity to vital sea lanes
of communication, the Soviets or Cubans, in wartime,'
could attempt to interdict the movement of troops,
supplies and raw materials in the Gulf of Mexico and
Caribbean sea and could strike key facilities in the
area.
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USSR: Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba
*January-September
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For Selected Latin American Countries*
Country
Population
People in
Military
Percentage
of Population
Cuba
(in thousands)
92900
(in thousands)
226.5
in Military'
2.29
Argentina
272000
139.5
.51
Bolivia
5,285
23.8
.45
Brazil
126,000
272.55
.22
Chile
11,200
88.0
.79
Colombia
26,520
65.8
.25
Ecuador
7,900 -
38.8
.49
Paraguay
3,300
16.0
.48
Peru
17,400
95.5
.55
Uruguay
39300
30.0
.91
Venezuela
15,400
40.5
.26
Dominican Rep.
5,620
19.0
.34
Guatemala
6,950
14.9
.21
Honduras
3,700
11.3
.31
Mexico
.71)500
107.0
.15
* Data is from Military Balance, 1980-81.
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-Relative Military Strength of Selected
Caribbean Basin Nations.
Percentage of Population in Armed Forces
X2.5
~~ Ja o{ aS ~~ ?~a ~~
11(~ to NO
G
 Op l.inlt v e-A lif ' CV11 ffitURh1.11103-4
.of Cuban Mig-21s and Mig-23s
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
Key: l Mig-21/23 Base
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Operating Areas of OSA- and Komar-class Guided Missile Patrol
Boats from Cuban Ports*
OSA 1/11 Radius:
400nm at 25 kts
Komar Radius: ?
200nm at 30 kts
?Operating areas shown are based on each craft's normal tactical speed, and could be up to 50 percent less if high-speed operations were
being conducted. The maximum speed of the OSA is 36 knots and that of the Komar 40 knots.
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Range and Radius of AN-26s from Havana
Gulf pf Mexico
Combat
U Radius
I with
I Normal
Payload V to,
,(supplies)
Jamaica Haiti
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
'Combat radius is the outbound distance attainable on a flight carrying payload to a destination, with sufficient onboard fuel reserves to
return to point of origin. For a paradrop mission, stated radius allows for sufficient time-on-station to airdrop paratroops. For the
delivery of supplies, stated radius allows for landing and take-off at destination, and assumes that entire payload is delivered before
return. Combat range is the total distance attainable on a one-way flight carrying payload the entire distance.
Combat
Radius
with
Paratroops
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'Strength and Missions of Cuba's
Paramilitary Organizations..
Organization . Subordination Strength
Youth Labor Army MINFAR 100,000
(Ministry of the
Revolutionary
Armed Forces
Civil Defense Force MINFAR 100,000
Territorial Troop MINFAR More than 500,000
Militia
Border Guard
Troops
at present; still
forming.
MININT 3,000 full-time,
(Ministry of the plus unknown
Interior) number of civilian
auxiliaries
National Revolu- MININT 10,000, plus 52,000
tionary Police
civilian auxiliaries
Mission
Civic action force, receiving
little military training in
peacetime. One wartime
mission would be to operate
and protect the railroads.'
"Military" units would
assist in providing local
defense; non-military would
provide first aid and
disaster relief.
Regional security/local
defense.
Help guard Cuban
coastline.
Responsible for public
order in peacetime; could
help provide rear area
security during wartime.
Counterintelligence and
prevention of counter-
revolutionary activities.
Department of MININT 10,000-15,000
State Security
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UNCLASSIFIED
CUBAN ADVISORS
Nation
Total Number Estimated
Military
Civilian
Ethiopia
11,000-13,000
approx
600
Angola
15,000-19,000
approx
6,000
Nicaragua
(1,000)
5,000 total
(4,000)
Grenada
(30)
approx
300