TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001603950007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 18, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001603950007-6
State Dept. review completed
Fa114Iarkcts
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
I. Political uncertainty following the ouster of President
Galtieri is continuing in Buenos Aires, but the
reconstituted junta is expected to meet soon to select a
new President.
A. Galtieri was forced to resign when army commanders
withdrew their support for continuing the conflict
with the UK. His successor as army commander is
Major General Nicolaides, a staunch anti-communist
and critic of civilian politicians.
II. Who will succeed Galtieri as President is less clear but
Interior Minister Saint Jean is temporarily serving as
interim-president.
A. Current speculation centers on Air Force Commander
Lami Dozo. His reputation as a moderate and his
services' distinguished record during the Falklands
conflict have won him widespread popularity among
all civilian sectors and much of the military.
B. Rumors that the post may be given to a civilian or
rotated among the three service chiefs seem less
likely at present.
III. A major priority of the new administration will be to
repair the damage to the military's credibility because
of Galtieri's handling of the crisis and to deal with
rising demands from the civilian political sector for a
greater voice in government.
A. The country's major political parties can be
expected to take advantage of the present political
changeover to press their demands for an early
return to constitutional civilian rule. ,
IV. The selection of Lami Dozo as chief executive would
serve military ends and help insulate the military from
the need for further housecleaning.
A. Lami Dozo has a wide array of civilian contacts and
would be likely to move more rapidly than his
predecessor in returning the country to civilian
rule, perhaps with an accelerated political
timetable.
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B. His reported comments yesterday also suggest he
favors scrapping the liberal economic policies of
present Economy Minister Aleman, probably in favor
of a more heavily state managed program.
C. While cultivating the civilian sector, Lami Dozo
still will have to find a way to contain any
resentment of army officers that a member of a
junior service heads the country.
D. Moreover, he or another successor would still have
to oversee the surrender and repatriation of
Argentine troops from the Falklands and seek a
consensus among the presently divided military on
how to proceed next on Argentina's claims to the
islands.
1. According to the Foreign ministry, repatriation
of prisoners--possibly through Montevideo--will
begin today. Both Argentina and British ships
will reportedly be utilized.
V. The British government has not yet officially reacted to
developments in Buenos Aires but they will be pleased if
reports that Galtieri's successor and a majority of
military commanders favors a general cease-fire are
true.
A. Continued confusion in Buenos Aires or a delay in
signaling the new government's policies could stall
an end of hostilities and leave the Thatcher
government no alternative but to maintain a costly
presence in the islands.
B. The US Ambassador believes that the changes in
Argentina's leadership offer the possibility that
moderates will have a dominant voice in determining
the new government's policies not only on ending
hostilities soon but also possibly on issues
directly related to the US.
Implications for US Relations with Latin America
VI. The apparent inclination of Argentina's new regime to
pursue its Falklands claim through talks in lieu of
continued hostilities will ease pressures on the US but
will by no means eliminate them.
SECRETI
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A. The invocation of Latin America solidarity for
Argentina tapped the pervasive strain of anti-
Americanism in the region.
B. A general dislike for Argentina's military rulers
was submerged in a wave of strident criticism
directed at US disregard for perceived Latin
American interests.
C. The consequent effect on US ties will vary from
country to country but will be more pronounced in
South America than in the Caribbean Basin, where the
net effect on US interests will be minor.
VII. Some Latin American leaders, particularly in Venezuela,
Peru, and Panama have called for revision of the Rio
Treaties; others have demanded reorganization of the OAS
or the creation of a purely Latin American political
organization.
A. While these demands for change will give way to more
sober and realistic assessments, US relations with
several countries probably will be cool for some
time.
B. Five Latin nations--Peru, Venezuela, Brazil,
Argentina, and Ecuador--have declined to participate
in UNITAS maneuvers this year. Uruguay's position
is still unclear.
VIII. Over time losses can be partially, even substantially
redressed. Much will depend on the efficacy of US
damage-limiting measures.
A. The need for foreign funds and skills will cause
Latin leaders to resume a more pragmatic approach to
Washington.
B. US willingness to respond to economic concerns in
such areas as trade, access to capital, and policing
of transnationals should hasten the regaining of
lost ground.
C. Nevertheless, the decades old trend toward greater
independence from the US will continue regardless of
US actions.
IX. The Soviet Union will attempt to expand its influence in
the region; Latin suspicions of Moscow's purposes and
its inability to play a major role in economic
development will limit Soviet gains.
SECRET
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A. Soviet weapons may be more attractive to some
rearming Latin nations, but attempts to gain
political advantage from arms sales will be
resisted.
B. The report in yesterday's respected Buenos Aires
Herald that Argentina was about to conclude a
purchase of 100 Soviet MIG aircraft has been labeled
"ridiculous" by an air force spokesman and we have
no information suggesting any such dealings.
X. The Cuban and Nicaraguan attempts to exploit Latin
resentment to undercut US influence in the region will
be only marginally successful.
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