LIBYA: MILITARY AID PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001503840011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 25, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/09/21: CIA-RDP84B00049R001503840011-4
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
LIBYA: Military Aid Program
byl
Since late 1978, Libya has provided grants totaling about
$700 million for arms deliveries and financial disbursements to a
number of governments and to about 60 insurgent and dissident groups
in the Third World. In addition, over 13,000 foreigners have been
trained in Libyan camps. This aid, however, has only marginally
strengthened the capabilities of most recipients and Libya's in-
Libyan leader Qadhafi provided an estimated $500
million in weapons and money over the last three years
to select governments, mainly in the Middle East and
Africa, and trained about 3,000 government troops, mostly
from the sub-Sahara. Although Syria received the most
aid--$283 million, s relations with Libya remain ten-
uous.
Iran became the second-largest beneficiary of Libyan
military aid with the delivery in 1981 of some $150 million
worth of tanks, artillery, air defense weapons, ammunition,
and spare parts. Libya's assistance reflects months of
negotiations that began with the war between Iran and
Iraq in September 1980. It is based on Tripoli's aid to
Iranian dissidents before the Shah's fall and on Qadhafi's
empathy for another pariah state--regardless of the im-
pact on relations with other Arab countries. Libya be-
stowed $50 million in financial aid in 1979 on Uganda;
the Libyans also sent troops to Uganda to help former
President fend against the Tanzanian incursion.
Virtually all of Libya's smaller government clients
are in sub-Sahara Africa. Several, including Burundi,
serve as bases or transshipment points for Libyan-
supported insurgencies in other countries in the region.
Djibouti and other moderate states that have accepted
small amounts of Libyan arms or limited training aid
usually have done so to gain leverage with traditional
Western suppliers.
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 ized courses, including pilot training, are given to
small groups of select clients at special facilities.
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Top Secret
Primary recipients among insurgent and dissident
groups have included radical and more moderate Palestini-
ans, Lebanese leftists, North African dissidents and
expatriates, the Somali Democratic Salvation F. I
and--
before independence in 1980--guerrillas in Zimbabwe. Many
of these groups, with little military or paramilitary
capability, have benefited from Libyan instruction. In
the last three years, several thousand trainees--possibly
more than 10,000--were processed in Libyan camps.
Libya also has provided some $175 million in weap-
onry and funds to these groups. Most of the arms and
ammunition are suitable for small unit and paramilitary
operations. In some cases, they represent the bulk of
an insurgency's inventory.
Training Assistance
Training of insurgents and dissidents at numerous
sites in Libya has become an increasingly important
feature of Qadhafi's program. The total ated cost
of this training is $60 million.
Libyan military and paramilitary training emphasizes
basic tactics, some familiarization with armor and crew-
served weapons and--for nongovernment groups--guerrilla
tactics, including sabotage and assassination. Special-
The training program still relies heavily on foreign
instructors, although Libyans have assumed growing re-
sponsibilities for basic training since the late 1970s.
The Soviets help provide specialized or advanced training
and may assist in running the overall program. Some
foreigners probably receive training in conjunction with
Libyan trainees from East European instructors, while
Palestinians, Egyptian Tunisians usually instruct
non-Libyan trainees.
Effectiveness of the Program
Libyan assistance has only modestly improved the
capabilities of Qadhafi's clients. Most governments
have not depended on Qadhafi for the bulk of their arms,
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Top Secret
although Libyan funds have allowed a few states to buy
weapons that they themselves could not have afforded.
Aid provided to insurgents and dissidents thus far has
not helped any of them to assume power.
Tripoli generally has not been able to convert its
increased assistance into greater influence. Qadhafi's
continued failure to fulfill his pledges have seriously
harmed the program. In addition, potential retaliatory
measures by more moderate states have led some govern-
ments to reconsider the value of accepting aid from
Nonetheless, Qadhafi continues to be driven by deep-
seated ideological motivations. He believes that in the
longer term he will fulfill his mission of leading the
Third World in a global revolution that will end the
dominance of the East and the West.
Outlook
Qadhafi evidently intends to continue his increased
military aid program despite its limited returns. Con-
tinuing sharp declines in oil revenues, however, could
impose limits on future arms deliveries and financial
transfers. Moreover, opposition by moderate states to
Qadhafi's subversive efforts--especially if the govern-
ments or insurgents he supports seem actuall to be
posing greater threats--could grow.
If these conditions materialize, Libyan aid disburse-
ments probably would become more uncertain, further under-
mining Qadhafi's reliability as a supplier. Nonetheless,
Qadhafi's zeal to support anti-US regimes and radical
groups indicates that he will have no shortage of customers
for his military goods and money.
e ruary 1982
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