SOVIET-LDC MILITARY AID AND ACTIVITIES, 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001503820005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET I
28 January 1982
Director's Briefing for Breakfast Meeting with Secretary
of Defense Weinberger on 29 January
SUBJECT: Soviet-LDC Military Aid and Activities 1981
2 5Y~
In 1981
1. Moscow continued to pursue its aggressive military ai.d
policies in the Third World arena, adding at least 55-6 billion C50.1e5,
in new weapons commitments (exclusive of Cuba) to its already
huge backlog:
Syria, $3 billion
Ethiopia, $1.7 billion
India, $300 million
Nicaragua, $100 million
The swelled Soviet order books guarantee the continuance through
the early 1980s of the record, or near-record pace of Soviet arms
deliveries that we have seen for the last several vear_s. In 1980
Soviet sales reached about 914 billion -- double the 1g79
let Va
level. Soviet military equipment sales in "e=:w were double
US equipment sales to Third World countries. (& t S(44rw h1Yi)
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2. In addition to its growing arms transfers to LDCs, the
USSR also continued to introduce more advanced (and much more
costly) military hardware to its premier customers in 1981 --
including sales of some weapons systems still not available to
East European armed forces inventories, such as the SA-8 missile
air defense system to Jordan, Libya, and Syria.
Delivery Hiqhliqhts
3. Nearly 200 Soviet merchant ships carrying arms for Third
World customers passed through the Bosporus last vear_. Despite
the early-year embargo on shipments to Iraq and Tran, preliminarv
estimates indicate that deliveries remained at, or near, peak
levels of $6-7 billion (See Chart 1).
(dCji.+e ))
Cuba: A Special Case
4. Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in 1981 reached their
highest level since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, largely under
.a new commitment made last February when a high level Soviet
military delegation visited the island. About 30 Soviet merchant
arms carriers discharged some 66,000 tons of military equipment
at Cuban ports, a sharp increase over the annual. average of
15,000 tons observed during the past decade (See Chart 2). The
accelerated pace of deliveries, coupled with the inclusion of
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Major Soviet Military Shipments to Third World
1 January 1981 to Present
Algeria 70-80 fighters, including MIG-25s, MIG-23s, MIG-21s, and SU-20s
50 tanks, including T-72s
190 other armored vehicles
100- artillery pieces, SA-9 SAMs
Libya 40+ fighters, including MIG-25s, MIG-23s, and MIG-21s
IL-76 transports (1 squadron)
20 helicopters [including some for antisubmarine warfare]
1 submarine
1 missile boat
T-62 and T-72 tanks
APCs
New early warning radars
SA-8, SA-6, SA-2, and SA-3 SAMs
Syria
Afghanistan
MIG-25, MIG-23, MIG-21, and SU-20/22 fighters
IL-76 transports
MI-8 and KA-25 helicopters
TU-22 bombers
T-62 and T-72 tanks (several hundred)
Field artillery pieces (several hundred)
Self-propelled artillery
SU-20/22 fighters
Self-propelled artillery
IL-76 transports
MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters
T-72 tanks (several hundred)
SA-8 SAMs
MIG-21 and SU-20/22 fighters
MI-24 helicopters
SCUD missile launchers
Armored vehicles
SAMs
SU-20/22 fighters
MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters
AN-26 transports
MIG-25 and MIG-23 fighters
T-72 tanks
SA-3 SAMs
MI-8 helicopters
MI-8 helicopters
AN-2 transports
Military vehicles (500)
attack boats
(En route: 2 to 4 missile attack boats, probably MI-24 helicopters)
Improve ra
New naval craft, including one frigate, two minesweepers, and guided-missile
MIG-23 (12 or more) and MIG-21 fighters
SA-6 SAMs
Self-propelled artillery
Tanks and APCs
d dar
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USSR: Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba
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5
10
1962
1963
1964
1966
1967
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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12.1
12.6
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19.5
21.6
22.2
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more advanced hardware systems has substantially upgraded Cuba's
air, ground, and naval capabilities. Shipments during the year
included:
-- At least one additional squadron of MiG-23 ground attack
fighters, and more MiG-21s;
-- Cuba's first mobile SAM missile system (SA-6).;
-- initial deliveries of self-propelled artillery, newer
tanks and APCs, and improved radar; and
- a host of new naval craft, including the first Koni-class
frigate, two minesweepers and additional guided missile
attack boats (OSA-II).
In addition, we feel confident that large quantities of
ammunition, small arms, spares and support equipment were also
offloaded and added to Cuban stockpiles.
5. Soviet shipments to Cuba, since their peak last summer,
have dropped to normal levels. As of 28 Janury, two -- and
possibly four -- additional Soviet OSA-II missile boats are
enroute, and the Cuban Air Force may be preparing to receive its
flrst. shkpmer t of_-MI 24 Hind gunshi_pheliconters_,
6. We believe Moscow's primary motivation has been to deter
a US move against Cuba and to meet Castro's concerns about US
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intentions. In addition, a combination of other factors accounts
for the surge.
-- The start of a new five-year upgrading and replacement
cycle for the Cuban military; similar increases were
noted in 1967 and 1976.
-- Soviet provision of materiel support to Nicaragua, both
by using Cuba as a transshipment point and by providing
offsets for direct Cuban military aid.
The increased military deliveries also would improve the
effectiveness of Cuban forces operating overseas.- In Angola, for
example, Cubans trained to operate the mobile SA-6 would provide
a valuable complement to other less accurate systems currently
defending against South African air incursions.
7. Moscow's decision to accelerate equipment deliveries
probably was made in late 1980 or early last year, motivated
primarily by concern about Cuba's defenses and a device to
strengthen the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
SL 141-x'
6 %A %A^ W1L.Y
Soviet Military Assistance to the Third World in Perspective
8,.-:. The-_:.USSR- has sold or given;_away...some _ 550 bit I i.on worth
of military assistance since the mid-1970s, about four times the
amount Moscow committed altogether during previous two decades.
Capitalizing on the new-found oil wealth in the Persian Gulf and
North Africa, the USSR moved swiftly to accomodate ambitious
rearmament plans drawn up following the 1973 War. Three-quarters
of total Soviet arms commitments made since then have gone to
Middle East/North African customers. The presence of Soviet
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military personnel in the Third World has increased in tandum
with-the rise in equipment transfers. More than 15,000 Soviet
military advisors and technicians were stationed in non-Communist
LDCs in 1981, a 95 percent increase from 1.975 (See chart 3).
.A Political Tool
9. Arms sales are Moscow's most direct and valuable
instrument to gain influence in the Third World.'
-- Capitalizing on regional and local conflicts, it has been
willing to supply modern weapons to most LDCs on short
notice.
-- Most Western suppliers are unable to match Moscow's fast
delivery schedules and in some cases have hesitated to
supply certain LDCs with advanced weapons.
10. Moscow hardened payment terms in the mid-1970s, with
the rise in Arab wealth, but the Kremlin still bends its policy
where it sees a political payoff.
-- Deals with Ethiopia and India are prime examol_es.of
recent Soviet concessions on arms sales.
Oil-rich Arab buyers are willing to pay the steep prices
Moscow charges for its sophisticated arms.
11. Over four-fifths of Moscow's military sales have gone
to Libya, Iraq, Syria, India, and Algeria. Ethiopia, Iran, South
Yemen, and Afghanistan have also been major recipients since the
mid-1970s. The remainder is spread over almost 50 Third World
.
countries, including Angola, Peru, and Tanzania.
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Soviet Presence in Non-Communist LDCs
Thousand Persons
Africa
East Asia
Latin America
Middle East
South Asia
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The Arms Mix
12. Before 1970, .the USSR was basically a supplier of
outmoded, reconditioned equipment. The equipment, however, was
simpler, more rugged, and easier to maintain than Western
materiel and proved adequate for most LDC requirements. Since
1970, Moscow has opened much of its modern arsenal to the LDCS.
MiG-25 jet fighters have gone to Algeria, Libya,~and Syria; SA-8
surface-to-air missile systems (this month) to Libya and Syria;
T-72 tanks to Algeria, India, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The more
sophisticated, higher capability weaponry requires extensive
4 arm.
Soviet training and services, prompting amimMMp- increase
Sovta
since the mid-1970s in advisory personnel.E 3C r.0 ;plow- I
often serve. LDC basic needs
more complicated
Despite frequent complaints to Moscow about expensive
maintenance, lack of spares, and unsuitable equipment,
sales relationships have not been severed on technical
grounds.
Western equipment.
-- Indeed, clients come back for more.
13. The Soviet equipment has been outclassed by US hardware
in confrontations in the Middle East. The LDCs, however,
generally respect the operational qualities and performance of
Soviet equipment (especially for ground and air defense).
-- With simpler design and easier maintenance, Soviet arms
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Aims and Leverage
14. Arms aid to both nationalist movements and mili.tarv
governments helped the Soviets to obtain a foothold in black
Africa; it facilitated Ethiopia's move out of the Western camp,
albeit at the loss of Somalia, and it is the basis for the Soviet
position in the radical Arab states. As for more tangible
benefits, the Soviets have:
-- Earned S4-5 billion in hard currency annually in the past
several years.
-- Received access to port facilities in Syria, Ethiopia,
and South Yemen.
-- Established continuing ties with many LDC military
leaders.
15. Moscow has discovered, however, that there are limits
to the leverage that can be derived from an arms supply
relationship. Soviet threats to suspend or reduce shipments have
been ineffective against Indonesia (1-965), Egypt (1-974), Somalia
(1977), and Iraq (1980-early 1981).
ntlook-
16. We see no let up in the pace of Soviet military
assistance to Third World countries in 1982. In January, alone,
the Soviets have exported for the first time outside their
borders-the SA-8 low-altitude surface-to-air missile system.
Based on the order books and expected new contracts, it is more
than likely that the transfer of Soviet arms will break all
previous highs this year.
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17. The tempo of future shipments to Cuba, however, is less
certain. If Moscow decides to signal greater displeasure over US
policy in the Caribbean, the Soviet deliveries could qo higher
than that seen last year, and would include augmentations of the
types of weaponry deliveries last year. The increased
inventories can be expected to boost Castro's confidence, to
assist Nicaragua, and to continue to offset for Cuba's
maintenance of it substantial forces overseas.
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SECRET II
USSR: Military Agreements and Deliveries
to Non-Communist LDCs
Billion US $
Agreements
00 cj
r1
w
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