CENTRAL AMERICA -- TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001503700030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: October 15, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET NIO/LA
15 October 1981
CENTRAL AMERICA--TALKING POINTS
NICARAGUA
Current
? MarxistLeninist Directorate of Sandinistas in virtual full control.
? New secret police, new army/security forces, new mass organizations.
? Democratic groups still exist and iI could be a more effective 25X1
They include: democratic a or unions (70,000 members), 25X1
business federations (60,000-90,000 members), churches, some media, 5 parties.
Military Buildup Continues
? Well-armed security forces, 19,000-24,000.
? 16 new military facilities.
? Clear plans for jet fighters--3 airfields, pilot training.
? Full support to guerrillas continues--arms, training, funds, covert action.
Probable Trends
? Arrival"Cuban elite troo s may portend further Cuban troops there--
? DIG-21s to Cuba, reports of F-5s from Vietnam--may be new air force
EL SALVADOR
Current
? Guerrilla forces - about 4,500 plus 6,500 part time; about 2,000-3,000
wounded and killed in 1981. Continuing attacks on the government and
economy; receiving good arms supplies.
? Government - about 25,000 forces; casualties in 1981 about 2,200.
- coalition holding together; helped by the 15 nations' support.
Probable Trends
? If current pattern continues, most analysts see stalemate in 1982.
Some believe with continued strong Cuban/Nicaraguan support there is a
50% chance of victory for the guerrillas.
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SECRET TALKING POINTS, PAGE 2
GUATEMALA
Current
? Guerrillas - sharp growth from 250 in 1979 to about 2,200 today.
- attacking people and the economy.
? Government - security forces about 15,000.
- new effort to improve control of forces and become more effective.
- problem of extreme rightist violence destroys moderates
politicizes indians and reinforces international isolation.
Probable
? If El Salvador falls, there is little chance that Guatemala would be able to
cope with the new strength of the extreme left (Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador)..
Otherwise, there is some chance depending on events in the region and internal
policies.
HONDURAS
Current
? Government - movement toward restoration of constitutional government;
November 1981 elections; cooperation with El Salvador,
Guatemala.
? Extreme Left - unity meeting in Havana, mid-September; was followed by
upsurge in terrorism.
?
Clear Cuban/Nicaraguan
it helping against the
Nicaragua.
intentio
guerrill
n to destabilize Honduras in order to prevent
as or being a base for operations against
Probable
?
Nicaragua has entered
Honduran
territory a number of times.
likely that extreme left guerrillas will grow in 25X1
strength and pose a threat similar to that in El Salvador within two years.
CUBA IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Current
? I Cubans in Nicaragua, including police/military personnel. 2.1X1
? Active, continuing the pattern beginning 1979; confident of success.
? Ready for military action to help Nicaragua--if US forces do not oppose.
Probable
? Preemptive expanded military, political propaganda help to all revolutionary groups.
? Possible efforts to subvert Panama, Belize.
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F
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE SITUATION AND PROBABLE TRENDS*
This discussion will summarize the current situation in
then project the probable trends
NICARAGUA
NIO/LA
15 October 1981
Current Situation
The Marxist-Leninist Directorate of the Sandinista Party in Nicaragua
continues to build the coercive apparatus for completely controlling the
society: a new secret police, powerful army, and pervasive mass organizations.
Moderate groups continue to exist trade
business associations, the Catholic and Portesta uwppn
and two radio stations with a broad following. A hard core of the pop
remains supportive of the Sandinistas (about 25%), some proportion is opposed
(estimates vary from remairatendegror i~ntoladstrongerepolitical
Though outside help co
force, right now the Communist Directorate is believed able to control the
population.
The steady buildup of the Sandinista military-security force apparatus
continues as seen by these facts:**
? Current strength of the security forces is about 19,000-24,000 well-
armed regulars.
? About 25 Soviet T-54/55 tanks are there.
? An extensive Cuban air and sea bridge has brought large quantities of
weapons including artillery, antiaircraft guns, armored personnel
carriers; total flights from Cuba to Nicaragua were 435 (Sept. 80-Jun. 81)
and 40 plus shiploads of weapons arrived (Apr. 80-Jul. 81).
? About 2,300 Cuban military/police personnel are there--550 "elite
troops" who entered in September 1981 with large amounts of equipment
? A total of o16 been built while the
9 existing
This final paper nas seen cooraina.u
See Appendix I for overview of uerrilla strengt
SECRET
_arowth rates, 1960-81.
-
'
25X1
MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO
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SECRET WHEN SEPARATED
FROM APPENDIX II.
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Nicaragua continues to provide arms, training, funds, communications and
covert support to the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. There has been
no real positive response to three proposals made during the US initiative of
mid-August 1981. In fact, hostile anti-US propaganda increased; guerrilla
support increased and repression of moderates continues.
Probable Trends
Nicaraguan military help for the guerrillas will continue and might even e
augmented by Nicaraguan and other Latin American "volunteers" who could be easily
infiltrated into insurgent groups within Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras.
The Nicaraguan military buildup will continue, and the clear signs are
that it will include a new air force of jet fighters and possibly additional
Cuban troops. Indicators of this include:
? Extension of runways and military construction/activities at three
airfields in addition to the building of revetments at the main
airport in Managua.
? Nicaraguan pilot training in Bulgaria to be completed in October 1981.
? Airborne training has begun at one of the airfields.
CIA estimates another 40 tanks will arrive next year
? Two Soviet mobile tank ferries have been seen practicing with the
tank forces.
? Estimated total military/security forces in the next year: 40,000
regular; 40,000 ready reserve and about 40,000 with militia training
for the irregular territorial forces.
This military/police apparatus would permit Nicaragua to intimidate Costa Rica
and Honduras into neutrality.
EL SALVADOR
Current Situation
The extreme left continues with three main aspects of its strategy: attacks
on government security forces, destruction of the economy with the current
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harvest a particular target to cut export earnings, and an international
propaganda campaign to gain support and discredit the Duarte Government. There
are increasingly serious splits among the guerrilla groups, however these have been
resolved in the past.
Estimated current strengths and casualties since the start of 1981:
? Guerrillas - strength about 4,500 fighters plus about 6,500 part-time
"militia supporters". Casualties about 2,000-3,000 killed and
wounded, about half of which are militia supporters.
? Security Forces - strength about 25,000; casualties about 2,200 killed
and wounded.
The government continues to function, despite civil-military distrust and
growing economic problems. Support from 15 Latin American nations (including
nine democracies) in rejecting the Mexican-French initiative, the impressive
public attendance (50,000-60,000) at the 15 September 1981 National Day
developments. However,
The Socialist
international again condemned the Duarte Government and US support.
Probable Trends
Arms supplies to the guerrillas are increasing, and there are many signs
that their operations will expand both in military and political/propaganda
terms. They will try to stop the March 1982 elections and accelerate the
economic and political breakdown of the country.
The Cuban-supported extreme left in Honduras and Guatemala will try to
step up violence in order to prevent military cooperation which could help
El Salvador. That, and increased Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran
revolutionaries combined with further international isolation of the Duarte
Government could lead to major gains for the guerrillas in 1982. Some expect
continued stalemate, but others believe that there is a 50% or greater chance
for the extreme left to take power next year and that this would be followed
by dramatic expansion of the Guatemala insurgency.
GUATEMALA
Current Situation
The strength of the extreme left guerrillas increased from about 250 in
1977 to 1,000 in 1979 and about 2,300 today. The combination of leftist
terror and counter-violence by the government and extreme rightist groups has
produced a monthly death toll rising in 1981 from about 300 in March to about
500 in August. Formerly neutral or passive Indian communities in the highlands
have become increasingly politicized, and there is evidence that one group
(ORPA) has had success in recruiting among the Indians.
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? SECRET
Cuba and Nicaragua provide active support of all types, and the guerrilla
strategy is similar to that in El Salvador and Honduras--use violence to frag-
ment the governing coalition and bring about counter-terror as well as economic
breakdown and international isolation.
The 15,000-man army is under new leadership which intends to improve the
effectiveness of its counterinsrugency operations. There have been some
recent uccesses against the guerrillas, but economic problems have
produced a temporary slowdown in government operations.
Probable Trends
There is every sign that the arms supplies to the guerrillas will continue
and that their international friends, Cuba and Nicaragua, will continue their
support--therefore their operations will expand and the Guatemalan economy will
deteriorate further. If El Salvador holds, there is a high probability that
Guatemala could defeat the insurgents. However, if the extreme left wins in
El Salvador, there is a high probability that the extreme left could be successful
in Guatemala. That in turn raises the probability of the revolutionary govern-
ments in Central America providing support for radical and extreme left groups
within Mexico.
HONDURAS
Current Situation
Elections for the first phase of a return to constitutional government
were successfully held in 1980, and the final end to military government is
expected after the elections scheduled in late November 1981. Honduras has
begun to work cooperatively with El Salvador and Guatemala against what is
perceived as a common threat, and until recently it was the optimistic
exception to its neighbors.
In September 1981 Cuba invited the various extreme left groups to Havana
for a unity meeting; and in the pattern which has now been repeated four times,
offered additional help and encouragement for more effective terrorist action.
An upsurge of violence followed. This, in turn, has provoked unprecedented
extralegal activity by the security forces--possibly heralding a spiral of
violence.
Probable Trends
It is highly likely that extreme left violence and terrorism will increase
in the next months as Cuban-trained Hondurans and other terrorist cadre are
infiltrated into the country.
CUBA IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Current Situation
A continuation of the pattern since late 1978--encouragement for the
extreme left counseling unity, deception with attention to international
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propaganda and the provision of a wide arra of military and covert support.
Cuba seems confident that
its current political-parami nary strategy can be successful in bringing
Central America under revolutionary governments.
Probable Trends
Cuba will probably increase
its suppor to all the extreme left groups in Central America. This is likely
to occur at a faster rate in order to give the Nicaraguan regime more time to
consolidate its position and to take advantage of the current momentum favoring
the guerrillas on the ground and in the international and Western public
opinion arenas.
Cuba also wants to
ion, it
In addit
e
d E
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.
urop
help their Soviet partners in the Persian Gulf an
is highly probable that Panama and Belize will be the focus for a Cuban-led
subversion effort which might employ Nicaragua or Grenada as agents. Cuban
military help will be given to the Sandinistas at whatever level needed--
including the use of troops'
US rhetoric
d b
y
Cuba will not be deterre
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APPENDIX I
Central America: Guerrilla Strengths, Economic Growth Rates, 1960-81*
Nicaragua No of Guerrillas
6.000
4,000 10
3,000 0
2,000 * -10
1 000 - 20
1960-70 71-i7 78 79 80 81
'60-70
'71-'77
'78
79
'80
'81 est.
Nicaragua No of GuerrillasNo of 150
300
300
2,000
2,000
4,500
4,500
0
0
0
0
GNP (4..) +64
+5.5
-5 5
-25.8
+10
-6
El Salvador No. o' Guerrillas 0
300
850
2,000
3.500
4,500
GNP (?) +5.5
+4.9
+44
-35
-10
-10
Guatemala No of Guerrillas
300
250
600
1,000
1,500
j 2,000
GNP I?. l 45 2
T
+6 2
+5 2
+45
+3.5
-2
*From Insurgency & Instability in Central America, NIE 82/83-81, Sept. '81.
f +15
a.3/79-Havana
meeting re Nicaragua
b. 7/79-FSLN
victory in Nicaragua
c.12/79-Havana
meeting on
El Salvador,
Guatemala
d. 3/80-Land reform in
El Salvador
f. 1/81-Failure of
offensive in
El Salvador
e 5/80-Formatior of
FDCR/Guatemala
Notes: Red line designates
numbers of guerrillas
Black line designates
annual percentage
of GNP growth
in comparison with
previous year
For 1960-77,
the data refer to the
average for the years
indicated
The GNP axes do not
all refer to the same
quantity of change
. -yam y,r .. ,yy ~F'i?-! ~?~
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