UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY MEETING WITH NORWEGIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, JOHAN HOLST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560025-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: July 16, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

\ ! i L IL I
Approved For Release 2007/06/22 CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560025-1 7 49
OFFICSF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY O?EFENSE G: ;
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 SECRET,"ARY OF DEFENSE
16 JUL 1981
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
SUBJECT: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Meeting with Norwegian Deputy
Foreign Minister, Johan Hoist (U)
(U) Mr. Johan Hoist, accompanied by the Norwegian Ambassador to the US, the
NIFA Political Director General, and two counselors from the Embassy met with
Dr. Ikie for forty minutes on 13 July._ The meeting was at Norwegian request.
Also present for the US were MGen Boverie and Mr. Anderson.
(S) The meeting was part of a. major Norwegian. attempt to communicate. with the
US, on disarmament in general and the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in parti-
cular, and forestall problems here if possible.
(S) Mr_ Hoist initiated the discussion by noting that the Yugoslavians had
indicated a desire to purchase the Norwegian Penguin II, surface-to-surface,
naval missile and that Norway found this an "interesting" request. He asked
what our views were on the proposal. Dr. Ikie said that we would study it
and respond directly to him.
(S). He then noted that there were rumors. that US funding for prepositioning
was in trouble. The Norwegian Government, he said, had invested considerable
political capital in this concept and was apprehensive over the rumors. Dr.
Ikie observed that-every program has funding problems but that he knew of none
here. The FY 83 budget, he continued, would be hammered out next month within
DOD but the results would not become the President's budget until next January.
He promised that Mr. Hoist would be informed of changes if any were to occur.
(S) Gatorizing was brought up, almost in a "let's get this over with" manner.
Hoist said that he regretted the US decision but understood it, that State
had informed him that the. turn down was not on security grounds but on grounds
of-"competitiveness". Dr. Ikie regretted that we could not be more forthcoming
at this time.
(S) Hoist then asked about TNF, arms control, how the HLG work related to it,
and if the US had changed positions on TNF. Dr: Ikie replied that the US was
staying with the two track approach and had not altered its position. The HLG
was looking at the threat and functional requirements as a basis for developing
an arms control negotiating position, while the SCG was looking at psychological
and diplomatic aspects and that sooner or later in the process of review they
would have to merge. Mr. Hoist noted that the two groups had worked together
OSD review completed
Classified by: Dir, EUR F NATO Policy
Declassify by: 16 July 1987
c g r V SEC DEF CONTR No. X 15 275
Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560025-1 ~~~~~
 Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1403560025-1
? SLLKLJ ?
(S) Mr. Hoist mentioned the considerable interest in Norway in arms control
and on SALT, wondered how Defense and ACDA worked together, and if there were
any new developments. Dr. Ikle briefly discussed the IG/SIG coordination
process and said there had been meetings already and that intellectual work
was well. advanced. He mentioned that.new approaches were being considered.
These new concepts were aimed at bringing about stability and were especially
needed as the current concepts were dated, being fifteen years old. Mr. Holst
observed that some movement here would be good public relations in Europe and
that simple, straight-forward, understandable motion was needed. This would
help hold and consolidate TNNF.
(S) At this point Mr. Holst gave a short, apparently well rehearsed, state-
ment on Norway's current positions starting with the domestic political
pressures that had. been created by an "overload." This overload, in turn,
had been generated by cumulative decisions: the neutron bomb, which had
been badly handled; TNF which had been "too loud;" prepositioning, which had
also been badly handled; too much pressure on the three percent defense budget
growth; and misguided pressure;-by the US on the Olympics attendance issue. All
this had stirred Norwegian political reaction.against the image that Norway
was NATO's "good, submissive little boy." He suggested that we must be careful
if we don't want many things to come unraveled.
(S) Turning to the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, he said that Brezhnev's
entry-into the picture complicated matters and that the media thought that
Brezhnev had offered more than actually was the case. In response to internal
pressures, the GON was emphasizing NATO ties and the fact that "we" cannot
negotiate alone but "we" can not turn down the proposal entirely. On the
other hand he also said that GON has not changed our minds since the Kekkenon
proposal. was launched and that Norway can only deal with the proposal in the
larger European context bearing in mind (1) the heavy concentration of Soviet
military forces on the Kola Peninsula which included SALT type forces and
(2) Soviet long range missiles east of the Urals. He said that Norway was
trying to limit damage in the public opinion sphere, while not unsettling
diplomatic relations.
(S) At this point Dr. Ikle asked if supporters -of the NNWFZ included Kola
in the zone, to which Holst replied that Norway has avoided talking of a
Nordic area. This could include Greenland and Iceland, which should be
excluded at least for the present, and it would be unreasonable to ask the
Soviets to include Kola because of the strategic weapons they have there.
Additionally, negotiating such a zone would give the Soviets some control
in the area which would be undesirable. The Swedes have been helpful, he
said, and concluded his statement by noting that "it is a matter of managing
the process rather than arriving at a decision." 'T4y role," he post scripted,
"is to tell you that we know what we are doing." (The implication throughout
the statement was that the US didn't understand Norwegian politics or public
opinion very well.)
(S) Dr. Ikle observed that sometimes ideas go far afield, have unexpected'
results. Mr. Holst agreed that this was true, that for example, there was
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1403560025-1
 Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560025-1
i SECRET i
a de facto NNWFZ, that this might be expanded via the UN, but that this is
sensitive since it affects German domestic policy. He said he talked to
Chancellor Schmidt about arms control and that the Schmidt told him he didn't
appreciate Brandt's recent advice on the subject. Hoist added that we all
like to export advice.
(S) Dr. Ikle said that we liked to think we exported solutions and turned
to DoD developments noting that we were stressing the weapons acquisition
process. One problem, he said, was that US defense industries are under
capitalized and cannot produce weapons quickly.
(S) As the meeting closed, Hoist asked about the draft and Dr. Ikle replied
that a manpower commission was looking at the issues but that we were trying
to make the volunteer system work. Pay and other aspects were improving and
at present it looked as though there would be no need for a draft at least for
some time, although it would be instituted under crisis conditions.
DWA S . ANDERSON
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560025-1