MOROCCO: INCREASING DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403550020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 26, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Attachment C
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MOROCCO: Increasing Domestic Difficulties
King Hassan faces the prospect of an upsurge of domestic
unrest because of deteriorating economic and social conditions
compounded by the worst drought in almost 40 years. Civilian
dissent is fragmented, however, following the King's crackdown on
his most troublesome opponents last summer. Military and security
forces are fairly effective and generally loyal to the monarchy,
even though morale slipped after Moroccan forces at an outpost in
dall"T were routed by PoZisario Front guerrillas in October.
25X1
Morocco has been quiet since the riots in Casablanca
last June, caused by price increases on basic necessities.
about by the austerity program imposed in 1978 following
years of excessive spending and the collapse of the
phosphate market. Continued high defense spendinq and
a sizable foreign debt also are burdensome. 25X1
The drought has destroyed over half the fall grain
crop and delayed winter planting. Shortages of food are
becoming acute, and prices are skyrocketing. Purchases
abroad of cereals have nearly exhausted scarce foreign
reserves, and substantial concessionary financial assist-
ance will be required for the next few years. u 25X1
The arrest and trial of socialist political and labor
leaders and a crackdown on other activists by the King
temporarily intimidated his opponents. Meanwhile, the
government's efforts to come up with a program to deal
with the wors g economic situation have not been
impressive.
Economic Difficulties
The economy is suffering from a slowdown brought
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J
Spain
RAB
Casahian
Morocco
Algeria
Western
Sahara
Mauritania
Mali
0 150
Kilometers
630860 12-81
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25X1
There is little prospect of reducing unemployment,
which is up to 20 percent in major cities, or of improv-
ing the falling standard of living. The real inflation
rate probably exceeded 20 percent this year, and wages
lag far behind.
Growing Disenchantment
The government's failure to cope with these problems
has increased popular concern about the future of Morocco's
"democratic experiment." US Embassy sources recently have
reported that there is growing resentment toward the
government and the King himself even in the countryside,
where his standing has always been high. 25X1
US diplomats also have noted a mounting uneasiness
about the costs of the Saharan conflict and a growing
linkage in the public view between the economic situation
and the war. The Embassy believes that although most
Moroccans evidently support Hassan's peace initiative, a
failure of the King's overtures would prove politically
costly. F_ I 25X1
In addition, the wealthy commercial, technocratic,
and military elites are becoming more uneasy. Businessmen
frequently decry the seeming lack of an economic policy,
the deteriorating business climate, and the freeze on
consumer prices and other regulations.
The unity of the military leadership also is begin-
ning to show signs of cracking. Many highly placed mili-
tary officers believe that the King's allegation that the
reason for the defeat in October was the Polisario's use
of sophisticated new weaponry is a coverup for incompe-
tent commanders. Some reports have pointed to cleavages
between senior officers and their junior- and middle-level
counterparts. F7777 I 25X1
Criticism of the regime now extends to labor union,
student, and Islamic groups. Although these groups were
hard hit last summer by the King's crackdown on their
activities, they can still cause trouble for Hassan? 25X1
especially if the economy does not improve.
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Hassan's Prospects
Some Moroccans believe that Hassan is out of touch
with the growing potential for instability, but, in fact,
the King is not blind to political realities. Although
he is aloof and aristocratic, he knows that the monarchy
has lost much n its stique, particularly among young
intellectuals.
Hassan is unlikely to ignore completely the intel-
lectuals' discontent or to fail to accommodate some of
their demands because he wants to perpetuate the monarchy.
Moreover, Hassan--who survived two coup attempts by the
military in the early 1970s--is aware of the need to
trim the wings of those officers around him who could
pose a threat to his position.
Nonetheless, Hassan may not move soon enough to
forestall new popular outbursts. Such unrest, however,
probably would be contained by his loyal and efficient
security forces.
Over the longer term, Hassan's position appears
less secure. His extraordinary self-confidence, intelli-
gence, and political sagacity thus far have enabled him
to maintain the upper hand over his opponents. On the
other hand, the King's arrogance, supreme faith in his
own judgment, and reluctance to entertain criticism and
advice combine to promote his growing isolation and will
increase the risk of miscalculation. He is particularly
vulnerable to changes in the economic situation, about
which he lacks both knowledge and interest. 25X1
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26 December 1981