TALKING POINTS FOR THE NFIB 8 DEC 1982 MEETING ON SNIE: PROPSECTS FOR ESCALATING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403520003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403520003-9
TO: DCI
FROM: NI0/LA
RE: Talking points for the NFIB 8 Dec 1982 meeting on
SNIE: Prospects for Escalating Hostilities Between
Nicaragua and Honduras (83.2-82)
Scope of the Special Estimate
This estimate examines the prospects for hostilities on
the Nicaragua-Honduras border over the next three to six
months. It briefly describes the background to the current
situation; summarizes the military assets in Honduras and
Nicaragua, and those in Cuba that might intervene in
Nicaragua; and estimates the likelihood of different types
of major hostilities.'
Reason for the Special Estimate
This Special Estimate was prompted by a number of
recent events and intelligence reports suggesting that
the level of hostilities could increase sharply. These
include:
-- The increased activity in 1982 of the anti-
Sandinista insurgency and the recent movement
of almost all anti-Sandinista guerrillas from
Honduras into camps located in Nicaragua.
-- The arrival in Nicaragua of about 25 armored
vehicles on a Soviet Bloc ship in November 1982.
-- An intelligence report, not confirmed, that MIG
jet fighters are available in Cuba for movement
into Nicaragua and that a number of trained
Nicaraguan pilots are also in Cuba.
Key judgments reached
In the next three to six months:
- The anti-Sandinista insurgency inside Nicaragua will
probably grow and military activity will increase;
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403520003-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403520003-9
- There is a - high probability that Nicaragua
will respond by stepping up its support for
subversion against Honduras;
- There is a 30% to 50% probability that Nicaragua
will increase the number and intensity of its
military attacks into Honduras;
- Cuba would probably send combat troops if the
Sandinista regime were threatened provided that the
Soviet union did not use its leverage to veto this
and if the US did not appear ready to take direct
military action to interdict or defeat the Cubans
in Nicaragua.
Areas of current controversy within the intelligence
Community
There is a difference of viewpoint between CIA/DDO DO and
several other intelligence components (DIA, DDI,
concerning the current size of the anti-Sandinista forces:
DDO sets the number at about 3,500 whereas the other
agencies want more evidence before moving beyond their
estimate of about 2,500.
cc: DDCI
DDI
C/NIC
D/ALA
Constantine C. Menges
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403520003-9