NIO/AF THOUGHTS ON THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403370016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1403370016-2
SECRET
MIS/AF Thoughts on the Namibia Problem
We have agreed with the South African government that by July 15 some
arrangement will have been reached with the Angolans and Cubans for the
departure of Cuban troops from Angola. The South African government has
indicated that whether or not this agreement is reached, it will proceed with
an election in Namibia in March 1983. If the Cubans have departed, the
election would be held under UN auspices; otherwise there will be an internal
settlement.
This leaves. out the whole problem of the role and place of UNITA and
Savimbi. Tlwe are three alternative scenarios:
(1) Savimbi reaches a reconciliation with MPLA -- very unlikely and in
any case if Savimbi went to Luanda he might well be killed.
(2) Savimbi could be persuaded to depart Angola voluntarily under
pressure from the international community. This is equally unlikely.
(3) Angola could be partitioned, de facto if not de jure. This would
leave Savimbi as the "Duke of southern Angola" and would provide a buffer zone
from the South African point of view against possible Soviet influence on a
new Namibian government. Obviously, many problems would have to be resolved,
but in my view this scenario should be examined closely. The domestic
political cost in the US of applying pressure to Savimbi to desert the
leadership of UNITA would be very high, and it is possible that partition,
even for a limited period of time, may be the best solution. A fuller
speculation on this possibility can be supplied if it would be of interest to
you.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/06/29: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1403370016-2