NEXT STEPS IN US/NICARAGUAN DIALOGUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 20, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
ROUTING AND RECORD, SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) Briefing Papers regarding Honduras and Costa Rica for the
D4.X's Breakfast with Secret y Haig on 25 May 1982
EXTENSION
NO.
Chief, Latin America Division
DATE 24 May 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DCI
Attachment A is Ambassador
2.
Negroponte's cable on "Next
Steps in the U.S./Nicaraguan
Dialogue."
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Attachment E contains talking
12.
points that you may wish to
consider using with Secretary
Haig regarding Costa Rican
13.
President Mange's decision to
expel Eden Pastora from
Costa Rica.
14.
I would suggest that you con-
sider using the above
15.
material with Secretary of
Defense Weinberger at your
meetin on
FORM ~~ O USE PREVIOUS
1_79 EDITIONS
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001dW3O00
S E C R E T 20220OZ MAY 82 VIA PRIVACY. CHANNELS
FM AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE TEGUCIGALPA 229
TO ,,THE DCI AND CHIEF LA DIVISION
RELAY OF TEGUCIGALPA 4201 TELEGRAM
S E C R E T TEGUCIGALPA 4201
NOD I S
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/ 19/02 (NEGROPONTE, JOHN D.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, NU, HO
SUBJ: NEXT STEPS IN US/NICARAGUAN DIALOGUE
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WITH NICARAGUA MAY BE.
EMPHASIZING EL SALVADOR AND SUPPORT OF REGIONAL INSURGENCIES
AT EXPENSE OF OTHER IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES, NAMELY
RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND AN END TO SOVIET/CUBAN ORIENTA-
TION OF NICARAGUAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE MORE OUR POLICIES
TOWARDS SALVADOR SUCCEED v AS THEY NOW SEEM TO BE DOING, THE
GREATER THE RISK NICARAGUA WILL ACCEPT OUR SO-CALLED SINE
QUA NON IN EXCHANGE FOR OUR ACQUIESCENSE IN THEIR DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL MARXIST ORIENTATION. WHILE POSSIBLY
APPEALING IN THE SHORT TERM, WE CAN VISUALIZE NO SUCH
NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT CAPABLE OF ENSURING THAT NICARAGUA
WOULD NOT COME BACK TO CAUSE TROUBLE TO ITS NEIGHBORS SOME
OTHER DAY. INDEED, SUCH A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WOULD BE A
TROJAN HORSE NOT UNLIKE THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE ARRANGE-
MENT WHICH FACILITATED CONSOLIDATION OF THE CUBAN
REVOLUTION. RECENT NICARAGUAN DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING
THE EXTENSION OF EMERGENCY RULE AND THE ORTEGA VISIT TO
MOSCOW WOULD APPEAR TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO
REVIEW OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS
THAT OUR OBJECTIVES OF RESTORING DEMOCRACY TO AND
REMOVING SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE FROM NICARAGUA BE ACCORDED
EQUAL PRIORITY WITH CURBING NICARAGUA'S SUPPORT FOR
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
PAGE 2 TEGUCIGALPA 4201 S E C R E T
INSURGENCIES. END SUMMARY.
3." WHILE THIS EMBASSY FULLY APPRECIATES THE POLITICAL
IMPORTANCE OF BEING AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN TALKS
WITH NICARAGUA, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE NEGOTIATING
DYNAMIC IN AND OF ITSELF MAY HAVE UNWITTINGLY ERODED SOME
OF OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TO BE
FOURFOLD:
-- FIRST, THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY TO NICARAGUA;
-- SECOND, AT A MINIMUM MAINTAINING A NON-ALIGNED
NICARAGUAN FOREIGN POLICY STANCE AND PREVENTING A SOVIET/
CUBAN ORIENTATION;
-- THIRD, CURBING AND REVERSING NICARAGUA'S ARMS
BUILD-UP; AND
-- FOURTH, PREVENTING NICARAGUA'S EXPORT OF REVOLUTION.
4. AS FAR AS WE UNDERSTAND, THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE ENJOYED
RELATIVELY EQUAL PRIORITY AND WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY
DELIBERATE DECISION TO GIVE ANY ONE OF THESE OBJECTIVES
DECISIVE PRIORITY OVER ANY OF THE OTHERS. INDEED, JUDGING
BY OAS RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
IN NICARAGUA FIGURES MOST PROMINENTLY AMONG THEIR CONCERNS.
AN INDIRECT BUT PERSUASIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THIS
PRIORITY HAS BEEN NICARAGUAN REGIME'S OWN TIRELESS EFFORTS
TO CONVINCE INTERNATIONAL OPINION OF ITS PLURALIST AND
NON-ALIGNED NATURE. THIS EMBASSY BELIEVES A CASE CAN EVEN
BE MADE THAT PLURALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT FOR NICARAGUA
DESERVE HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ANY OF OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES
BECAUSE, WITH THESE FIRST TWO OBJECTIVES ASSURE, WE
THINK IT LIKELY THAT ANY THREAT TO THE LATTER TWO WOULD
QUICKLY DISSIPATE, NICARAGUA'S ANTI-SOCIAL REGIONAL
BEHAVIOR IS AFTER ALL A MERE SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER POLITICAL
DISEASE. IN ANY EVENT, ALL FOUR OF THESE OBJECTIVES
DESERVE AT LEAST EQUAL PRIORITY.
5. IT STANDS TO REASON THEREFORE THAT THESE POLICY
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
 11 , Approved' For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
PAGE 3 TEGUC IGAPLA 4201 S E C R E T
OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION
WITH RELATIVELY EQUAL WEIGHT. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR
POSITION APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO HAVE SHIFTED PROGRESSIVELY
AND ALMOST IN IMPERCEPTIBLE INCREMENTS TOWARDS A SEVERE
RELAXATION OF OUR FIRST TWO OBJECTIVES (PLURALISM AND
NON-ALIGNMENT), HALF-HEARTED PURSUIT OF THE THIRD
(REDUCTION OF FORCES AND REDUCTION OF DEFENSE SPENDING)
AND ELEVATION OF THE FOURTH OBJECTIVE (END TO SUPPORT FOR
INSURGENCIES) TO SUCH A PROMINENT POSITION THAT MANY
IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS COULD EASILY INFER THAT IF SATISFIED
ON THIS POINT WE WOULD BE SATISFIED COMPLETELY.
6. TO BE CONCRETE, WE NOTE THAT PLURALISM AND NON-
ALIGNMENT ARE LUMPED TOGETHER AS EIGHTH IN OUR EIGHT-
POINT PLAN, ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT AND NEGOTIATING
THROW-AWAY. POINTS CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS,
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES ARE
ENUMERATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE
POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF NICARAGUA. IN THE FORM EXPRESSED
AND WITH THEIR APPARENT LOW PRIORITY, WE BELIEVE OUR
POLICY OBJECTIVES OF RESTORING NICARAGUAN DEMOCRACY AND
PREVENTING A SOVIET/CUBAN ORIENTATION ARE INADEQUATELY
REFLECTED IN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION.
7. LIKEWISE, FROM WHERE WE SIT, A NEGOTIATING POSITION
CALLING FOR A BAN ON HEAVY WEAPONS AND A REQUIREMENT
THAT MILITARY/SECURITY LEVELS BE "KEPT" TO LEVELS COM-
MENSURATE WITH SECURITY NEEDS DOES NOT FULLY ARTICULATE
WHAT WE SEE TO BE THE PROBLEM. NAMELY, THE POINT DOES
NOT FULLY DEAL WITH THE ASYMMETRY THAT HAS DEVELOPED
SINCE 1979 AND THE CORRESPONDING NEED FOR A REDUCTION OF
FORCES ON NICARAGUA'S PART; OR AN "ADJUSTMENT" IF YOU
CHOOSE TO USE THE PREFERRED HONDURAN TERM. FOR EXAMPLE,
HOW DOES OUR POINT AS PRESENTLY WORDED DEAL WITH FACT THAT
NICARAGUAN FORCES ARE ALREADY TWICE SIZE OF HONDURAS'.
AND THAT THEIR MILITARY BUDGET, NOT COUNTING ARMS
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0
PAGE 4 TEGUCIGALPA 4201 S E C R E T
DONATIONS, MAY BE THREE TIMES HONDURAS'? PERHAPS OUR
FORMULATION ON THIS QUESTION DESERVES ANOTHER LOOK.
8. OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THIS EMBASSY IS FACT THAT
ENDING EXPORT OF REVOLUTION HAS BEEN ELEVATED TO A POSI-
TION OF APPEARING AS AN ALMOST UNIQUE PRIORITY AMONG
OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES. GIVEN THE SUCCESS OF SALVADORAN
ELECTIONS AND INCREASING SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH
INSURGENCY THERE, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT NICARAGUA MAY
BECOME INCREASINGLY AMENDABLE TO PROVIDING SOME FORM OF
ASSURANCES REGARDING INSURGENCIES IN EXCHANGE FOR OUR
ABANDONING OUR OTHER POLICY OBJECTIVES. THIS TRADE-OFF
WOULD PERMIT THE COMANDANTES TO CONSOLIDATE POLITICALLY
AND THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSOLIDATE STRATEGICALLY. THE
PEACE IN EL SALVADOR AND ON THE ISTHMUS WOULD BE
TEMPORARY AT BEST AND, FACED WITH REVERSES IN SALVADOR
AND TROUBLE AT HOME, NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE MADE A VIRTUE
OF NECESSITY.
9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT EVENTS SURROUNDING NICARAGUA ARE
FLUID AND DYNAMIC. TO MENTION BUT A FEW RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS THERE HAVE BEEN THE EMERGENCY DECREES, THE ORTEGA
VISIT TO MOSCOW AND, NOW, EDEN PASTORA'S RE-ENTRY ON THE
SCENE. IN LIGHT OF THESE HAPPENINGS AND THE FACT WE
HAVE JUST COMPLETED A ROUND OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES
WITH NICARAGUA, WE WONDER IF THE TIME MAY NOT HAVE COME
TO PAUSE, TAKE STOCK AND EVALUATE WHETHER OUR CURRENT
NEGOTIATING POSITION REALLY CONFORMS TO OUR LONG-TERM
POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR NICARAGUA AND THIS ISTHMUS.
10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO MANAGUA,
SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR, USINT HAVANA AND MOSCOW.
NEGROPONTE
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001303330004-0