VIETNAM MODIFIES ITS KAMPUCHEAN STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303320016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 14, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01303320016-8
Vietnam Modifies Its
Kampuchean Strategy
Over the past several months, Hanoi has been em-
barked on a new strategy aimed at discouraging
ASEAN support for the Kampuchean resistance
while eroding international opposition to Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea. This approach, which
couples an aggressive military campaign along the
Thai-Kampuchean border with stepped-up diplomatic
contacts, already has shown signs of success that will
reinforce Hanoi's determination to remain in
Kampuchea.
Setbacks in 1981
During the last dry season (November 1980-May
1981) Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea remained
mostly in defensive positions, where they concentrated
on extending Vietnam's administrative control of the
country. Much of this effort was aimed at supporting
national elections held in April 1981 that were intend-
ed to build domestic support for the puppet Heng
Samrin regime. With the exception of one unsuccess-
ful assault against a Democratic Kampuchean (DK)
base, there were no large-scale military sweeps
through contested areas. As a' result, DK forces were
able to extend their areas of operation and make gains
in strength and organization
The Vietnamese also lost ground on the international
political front during 1981. Their bid at the United
Nations last fall to have the DK unseated as the
legitimate government of Kampuchea failed. Two key
resolutions passed at the International Conference on
Kampuchea in July, calling for the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Kampuchea and the holding of
UN-supervised elections, constituted a major defeat
for Vietnamese policies in Kampuchea.
New Approaches
These security and diplomatic setbacks apparently
convinced Hanoi to alter its strategy. The 1981-82 dry
season has seen the Vietnamese launch the most
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aggressive military campaign in Kampuchea since
their invasion three years ago. Several important
guerrilla bases have been overrun, and resistance
forces have been compelled to regroup. This year the
Vietnamese are strengthening their positions in newly
gained areas, apparently intending to remain in for-
ward positions through the coming rainy season.
The Vietnamese also have stepped up diplomatic
activities aimed at portraying a conciliatory image.
Communiques from the Indochina Foreign Ministers
Conference in February, for example, reaffirmed
Hanoi's willingness to participate in a regional confer-
ence on Kampuchea and establish a demilitarized
zone along the Thai-Kampuchea border. Hanoi has
also used recent visits of French. Indian, and UN
officials to project a readiness to hold bilateral discus-
sions with Thailand on the Kampuchean issue. Viet-
namese Foreign Minister Thach is currently visiting
several West European countries to discuss economic
aid. 25X1
This kind of diplomatic and military activity is aimed
in part at creating dissension within ASEAN, and
Hanoi has some reason to be encouraged. Indonesia
and Malaysia have already voiced misgivings over the
long-term viability of ASEAN's hardline policy,
By stepping up
contacts with West European countries, Hanoi also
appears to be trying to build on recent breaches of
Western support for ASEAN's approach, such as the
renewal of French economic aid and the granting of
EC humanitarian assistance to Vietnam.F
Prospects 25X1
Hanoi's new strategy is unlikely to produce an imme-
diate change in ASEAN policy. Vietnam's already
strong position in Kampuchea limits ASEAN's policy
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14 April 1982
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options. Moreover, ASEAN's consensus that Viet-
nam's invasion of Kampuchea and the growing Soviet
presence are serious threats to regional stability has so
far outweighed arguments-particularly by Indone-
sia-to adopt a more conciliatory approach.
Hanoi's other goals will be equally difficult to achieve
quickly. West European officials are unlikely to grant
large amounts of aid, and they may use Thach's visit
to express concern over Vietnamese actions. More-
over, it remains an open question whether Vietnam
will ever be able to break the back of the resistance.
There are less than three weeks remaining in the
current dry season, and the resistance is sure to
recoup some of its losses when the rains begin to bog
down Vietnam's already strained logistics system.
Nevertheless, Hanoi probably believes its strategy will
pay off in a few years. Continuing military successes
over the next several dry seasons would further dis-
credit the resistance in the eyes of the Khmer popula-
tion and weaken the commitment by both domestic
and foreign supporters to aid anti-Vietnamese forces.
Moreover, if Hanoi can confine the resistance to the
peripheries of Kampuchea, political, social, and eco-
nomic development could be expanded under the
banner of the Heng Samrin regime.
Such developments would increase Hanoi's maneuver-
ability, perhaps allowing a token withdrawal of troops
from Kampuchea. The Vietnamese are betting that
this, coupled with even small, additional offers of aid
from sympathetic countries, will eventually erode
international opposition to their occupation of
Kampuchea and compel ASEAN to make its peace
with Vietnam.
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East Asian Journal 25X1
Southeast Asia Vietnamese Strengthen Control Along Kampuchean-Thai Border
The Vietnamese are establishing forward bases in territory along the Thai border
captured from Democratic Kampuchean forces during the ongoing dry-season
campaign. 25X1
In Battambang Province, the scene of heavy fighting in recent months, the
Vietnamese reportedly are conscripting Kampuchean civilians for road construc-
tion, moving supplies into forward areas, and relocating villagers away from the
border. 25X1
The Vietnamese ev-id-entlyy
greatly enhance logistic support for units planning to remain along the border.
want to maintain an aggressive posture going into the coming rainy season in an
attempt to forestall strengthening of the resistance forces' position. During last
year's wet season, Democratic Kampuchean forces made substantial improvements
in strength, organization, and areas of control, and Hanoi probably fears that any
easing of Vietnamese pressure could result in similar gains this year. The recent
Vietnamese moves will not only facilitate continuing military operations, but also
Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01303320016-8