POLAND: UPDATING MEASURES - - THE FRG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303190009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 5, 1982
• Content Type: CABLE

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ACTION: NONE _ INFO: FILE,_RF? CI/FL, CMASS-E. ORES/ARO,
EPS/EG-2, EUR-3. D/FBTS-2, TAD/CAS-3. MASS/EC. NICAG/MFA. NICAG/NWE,
NI0/PE. NIO/USSR. NIO/WE,_QALAIME/LA?.OALAIMIL..D/OCR-1. ODPH+H,
ODPN-N, ODP1j-U,_.OER-3,_OGI/EC/IF. OGI/EC/IT? OGI/IIPI. OGI/R/AT,
OIA/ERRS. OIA/LFMEA. QNESA/MILe_OOE/EE/R?_pOE/EEEG-3#_nOE/EEPO-3.
OOE/EI/P, OOE/GB. DOE/WE. OPA/II. OSA/CS/CA. QSA/CS/CF. OSA/CS/EN,
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E.0..12065: RDS-3 01-05-2001 (WOESSNFR. WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PL. GE
SUBJECT: POLAND: UPDATING MEASURES THE FRG
i REFS: (A) BONN 61 (NOTAL).
t8) 81 BONN 25319 (NOTAL)
(C) 81 BONN 25338 (NOTAL)
(D) BONN 60 (NOTAI)
(E) STATE 218
? 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY !-NO. CONC1r1J$TONS
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SINCE OUR LAST. APPRAISALS (REFTELS) AT THE END OF
DECEMBER FRG ATTITUDES . TOWARD THE POLISH CRISIS HAVE
CONSOLIDATED AND SHIFTrI) ONLY_SLIGHTLY TOWARD POSITIONS
MORE FAVORABLE TO.OURS.._ FOREIGN MINISTER GFNSCHER HAS,
FOR EXAMPLE. PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE SOVIET RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR WHAT HAPPENS. IN POLAND AND HAS EMPHASIZED
THE COMMONALITY-OF WESTERN AND U.S. OBJECTIVES. AT THE
SAME TIME. THE FRG HAS PURSUED AN.ACTIVE POLICY (THE ._
RAKOWSKI VISIT. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S LETTERS TO BREZHNFV
AND JARUZELSKT._AND EC CONSENSUS-BUILDING) WHICH IT CAN
PORTRAY AS CONSTRIJCTTVF AND-POSITIVE AND WHICH IT TENDS-
TO USE AS A BOLSTER FOR CONTINUING TO ESCHEW A.POLICY f1F
SANCTIONS. PUBLIC AND MEDIA CONTROVERSY OVER THE
SANCTIONS ISSUE AND THE FRG ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.
CONTINUES. BUT THE SENSF OF CAUTION STILL PREVAILS..
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS GONE PUBLIC WITH HIS CALI
' FOR "SIGNALS".FROM THE POLISH REGIME IN RESPONSE TO HIS
"THREE EXPECTATIONS":
-- RELEASE OF THE INTERNEES._TERMINATION OF.-MARTIAL LAW!
AND RESUMPTION: OF DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY.
THESE "EXPECTATIONS" ARF ROOTED IN THE BUNDESTAG RESOLII-
TION OF DECEMBER-JO. WHICH FRG OFFICIALS ARE CITING AS
THE BASIS OF POLICY.
3. WE DOUBT THAT-BONN WILL SOON ALTER ITS POLICY
SIGNIFICANTLY. BUT IT_MSY COME UNDER PRESSURE TO DO SO
IF THE POLISH REGIME FAILS TO OBLIGE WITH THE DESIRED
SIGNALS. OUR APPROACH-FOR NOO SHOULD (AS OUTLINED IN
REFS A AND B ) OF TO TNSIST,THAT THE-FRG NOT CONTRAVENF
OR CONTRADICT OUR BROADER EFFORTS AT COMPELLING THE
POLISH REGIME TO HOLD TO ITS PROMISES. WE COULD ALSO
STRESS THE COMPLEMENTARTTY OF-OUR STICK AND BONN'S
CARROT APPROACH AND THF_NFED,FOR CLOSE COORDINATION
IF EITHER IS TO BE EFFFCTIVE. FINALLY. ALTHOUGH
AFTER THE JANUARY 4 EC MINISTERIAL IT NOW APPEARS
LESS LIKELY THAT-BONN WILL ENCOUNTER UNBEARABLE
CRITICISM FROM ITS EC #1LIES, WE SHOULD TRY TO CAPI-
TALIZE ON ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT MIGHT ARISE TO.BUILD
SUPPORT FOR TOUGHFR POSITIONS-AMONG BONN'S EUROPEAN
PARTNERS IN HOPES THEY CAN BRING THE GERMANS ALONG.
END SUMMARY.
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4. PUBLIC POSTURE
- --------------
AS NOTED REFTELS, THE OFFICIAL FRG PUBLIC e05TURE ON
POLAND HAS BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DECLARATORY TN
NATURE. BASED ON THE EVIDENT ASSUMPTION THAT STRONGER
t MEASURES WOULD BE COUNTFRPRODUCTIVE WITHIN-POLAND AND
AT THE SAME TIME HARMFm. TO FRG POLITICAL AND FCONOMIC_,
INTERESTS. IN RECENT DAYS, THERE HAS BEEN SOME OFFICIAL
MOVEMENT AWAY FROM GOVFRNMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN BECKER'S
DECEMBER 30 STATEMENT (THAT THE FRG "DOES NOT SHARE
THE VIEW" THAT THE USSR INSTIGATED MARTIAL LAW IN
POLAND); IN BRUSSELS ON JANUARY 4, FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER DECLARED THAT "THE-SOVIET UNION BEARS A
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FVENTS IN POLAND."
C
NEWSPAPERS BELONGING TO_THE CONSERVATIVE SPRINGER CHAIN
(DIE WELT, WELT AM SOWNTAG, STLD, ETC.), AS WELL AS THE
c INDEPENDENT, PRESTIGIOUS FRANKFURTER ALLGEMFINE 2EITUNr?
O
HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY rRITICAL OF WHAT THEY PERCEIVE
TO BE AN EXCESSIVELY CAUTIOUS IF NOT_COMPLIANT ATTITUDF
ON THE PART OF.THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THE ELECTRONIC
T PARTIES
NMEN
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MEDIA AND NEWSPAPERS CLOSE TO THE GOVER
HAVE FOLLOWED THE LINE ESPOUSED BY THE SPD/FDP COALITION.
6. CRITICISM OF THE U.S. DECISIONS REGARDING SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND IS USUALLY COUPLED
WITH REFERENCES TO "A MORAL-DOUBLE STANDARD" BEING
APPLIED BY THE U.S. IN DEALING WITH VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND, ON THE ONE HAND.
AND WITH TURKEY. CHILE. - SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA,
ON THE OTHER. MEDIA CRITICAL OF THE U.S. POSITION ALSO
SUPPORT THE FRG GOVERNMFNT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT
POLISH SITUATION AS A PURELY POLISH AFFAIR (THE "LAST
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i ?????????-?.?-?-?????-??????????.???????????????.??-?????-??-?-?--?-???????rd
POLISH CARD" BEING PLAYED OUT TO AVERT.SOVIET INTER-
VENTION), THAT JARUZELS91 IS A POLISH PATRIOT COMMITTED
TO THE CONTINUATION OF-THE REFORM AND RENEWAL PROCESS.
AND THAT HE NEEDS ALL THE HELP HE CAN GET IF HE IS TO
SUCCEED.
?
7. OTHERS (E.G. 'SPIEGFL" PUBLISHER_RUDOLF..AUGSTEIN'S
EDITORIAL IN THE JANUARY-4 ISSUE OF THAT MAGAZINE)
POINT TO ROOSEVELT AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR "HANDING
OVER POLAND" TO THE SOVTETS AT YALTAI-THEY MAINTAIN
THAT A ROLL-BACK POLICY NOW WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO
COURTING OPEN CONFLICT._ THE "MALTA" ARGUMENT IS LIKELY-
TO BE USED MORE FREQUENTLY TN_THE FUTURE IN DEFENDING THE
FRG POSITION ON "NOT ROCKING THE BOAT."
8. ALL THIS T$-INTERLARDED WITH REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE
HISTORICAL INEFFICIENCY. OF SANCTIONS. BUT ONE GETS THE
FEELING THAT MANY OF THFSE_COMMENTS ARE SO AGGRESSIVELY
DEFENSIVE OF THE FRG POSITION-BECAUSE THERE MAY BE A
PERHAPS SUBCONSCIOUS-RFCOGNITION THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLF
AT LARGE ARE NOT_COMFORTABLE WITH THE VARIOUS FORMS OF.
RATIONALIZATION.THEY ARF BEING OFFERED BY THEIR,GOVERN-
MENT. (COMMENT: MEDIA QUOTES SUPPORTING THIS ASSESSMFNT
OF THE PUBLIC-MOOD HAVF BEEN ANQ ARE BEING-TRANSMITTED
VIA DAILY USICA BONN MEDIA REACTION'REPORTING. END
COMMENT)
?
9. ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR-MEASURES AGAINST PQLANQ AND THE
? SOVIET..UNION
THE U.S. REQUEST FOR.PARALLEL STEPS BY THE ALLIES
COMPARABLE TO U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
SOVIET UNION AND POLAND HAS CREATED A STORM. OF DEBATE
IN GERMANY. AS EXPECTED. THE INITIAL-REACTION OF THE
FRG - WITH BOTH THE REMNANTS OF DETENTE.AND CONSIDERABIF
ECONOMIC INTERESTS POTENTIALLY AT RISK ? WAS NEGATIVE.
ECONOMIC MINISTER LAMBRDORFF WAS PERHAPS THE SHARPEST
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CRITIC WHEN IN A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW HE QUESTIONED
THE MOTIVES BEHIND.IJ.S._SANCTIONS. HE ARGLED THAT
U.S.. BY ALLOWING.ITS GRAIN SALES TOGO FORWARD, WAS
EXEMPTING ITS MOST IMPORTANT TRADE ITEMS FROM-
RESTRIC-TIONS. WHILE URGING EUROPEANS TO TAKE RESTRICTIVE
MEASURES AGAINST THEIR.. MOST IMPORTANT TRADE ITEMS.
THE FAMILIAR THEME, HEARD AFTER_AFGHANISTAN,.THAT
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE_AN INPRECISE AND. INEFFECTIVE
POLITICAL TOOL WAS RESTATED BY FRG OFFICIALS AND
GERMAN INDUSTRY SPOKESMFN SUCH AS.WOLFF VON AMERONGEN.
REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES THAT WOULD BE
DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS T SUCH AS
FIRMS INVOLVED IN THE y9TBERIAN PIPELINE w WERE ALSO
QUICK TO PROTEST THE U.S. MEASURES.
10. NEVERTHELESS, THE GEBMAN.REACTION TO THE SANCTIONS
POLICY IS EMBRYONIC, ANO THE FRG IS STILL. IN THE EARLY
STAGES OF ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLI-
CATIONS OF PARALLELLING U.S. SANCTIONS WHILE CLOSELY
WATCHING THE REACTIONS_OF ITS-EC PARTNERS. SEVERAL
EXCELLENT EDITORIALS IN THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMFINE
ZEITUNG AND HANDELSBLATT. JOURNALS HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL
IN GERMAN BUSINESS CIRr.iES. HAVE RIGHTLY FOCUSED. ON THE
SANCTIONS ISSUE AS A KEY TEST-OF GERMAN RELATIONSHIP TO
THE ALLIANCE AND HAVE CRITICIZED. PRESENTLY TIMID FRG
STANCE. PRELIMINARY. EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH-INDUSTRY
REPRESENTATIVES EVINCES A GREATER DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING
AND SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS MEASURES THAN IS EVIDENT IN
OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.
0 11. DIVERGENCES
llniLt Int. LuU/Lzu urruo! i Lurv OAS rncvtu I ACL.I L.r VL. L'
STRONG VERBAL FIRE-ON THE SCHMIDT/GENSCHER.GOVERNMENT,.
ANU SEVERAL OPPOSITION. POLITICIANS (NOTABLY ALOIS MERTFS
AND NORBERT BLUEM) HAVF,STRESSED MOSCOW'S ROLE TN THE
POLISH EVENTS, THF_OPPOSITION_HAS NOT TAKEN A POSITION.
i. OF EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR A POLICY OF SANCTIONS. AND THERF
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IS NO INDICATION IT PLANS TO DO Sp. -INSTEAD. THE CDU/CSU
HAS STRESSED THE JOI'NT_GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION BUNDESTAG
RESOLUTION ON-POLAND OF DECEMBER-18 (@1 BONN 25097).
.WHICH DOES NOT GO BEYOND URGING THAT THE GOVERNMENT
"SUSPEND" GOVERNMENT ECnNQMTC_ASSISTANCE TO-POLAND
AS LONG AS THE "MEASURE OF SUPPRESSION" CONTINUES.
12. ANOTHER POTENTIAL SOURCE OF PRESSURE FOR A TOUGH
STAND ON POLAND IS THE?pOWERFUL GERMAN LABO? FEDERATION-
(DGE3). YET. IT IS-SO FAR FOLLOWING THE CAUTIOUS OUTLOOK
OF THE POLITICAL-FCONOMTC ESTABLISHMENT FOR REASONS
OUTLINED IN REF D.
C STEPS WE SHOULD_TAKF._
? w w w .. w. w w-.- w w w w w w
WE DO NOT FORESEE SIGNTFICANT_CHANGE IN FRG CAUTION-
OVER THE NEXT. WEEK OR an, PARTICULARLY IF THE SITUATION
IN POLAND CONTINUES A STOW RFTURN TO "NORMAL." CONTINUED
. FAILURE OF THE_POLISH RFGIME TO PROVIDE CONVINCING
SIGNALS OF AN INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE PRE-DECEMBER 11
REFORM COURSE COULD PRODUCE PRESSURES ON THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT FOR TOUGHER ACTION, BUT IT IS PROBABLY TOO
EARLY FOR THAT NOW.
13. IF THE POLISH REGIME DOES NOT SOON PRODUCE THE
"SIGNALS" GENSCHER WANTS. THEN WE COULD BEGIN TO
'PRESS THE FRG ON THIS POINT. -40DITIONALLY,-WE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO BE ALFRT To POTENTIAL. PRESSURE THAT-MIGHT
BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE FRG BY ITS LESS PATIENT
EUROPEAN PARTNERS. WE SHOULD ALSQ TAKE CARE TO REASSURE
THE FRG THAT FIRM ACTION.AGAINST THE POLISH-REGIME OR
THE SOVIET UNION NEED NOT JEOPARDIZE RESOLUTION OF
SUCH CRITICAL EAST-WEST ISSUES AS..ARMS CONTROL.- AT
THE LEAST. WE SHOULD INSIST THAT THE FRG RESPECT THE
NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARITY OF ACTIONS IF WE ARE TO
OBTAIN OUR SHARED. OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING-THE-POLISH
REGIME TO STOP ITS REPRESSION AND THAT. ACCORDINGLY.
THE FRG SHOULD NOT UNDERMINE OUR ACTIONS IF IT CANNOT
JOIN THEM.
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.. '.....TOR>;.0521p5Z.JAN.02 ..._..._.___._.._.. ._ ..
14. AS THE DEBATE ON PANCTIONS DEVELOPS IN GERMANY. _
WE WOULD ALSO ADVISE U.4..OFFICIALS TO KEEP-THE FOLLOW-
ING POINTS IN MIND IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS!
-? THE GERMANS WILL BALK AT AN OPEN ENDED COMMITMENT
TO SANCTIONS. WE.SHOUID STRESS BOTH THE.IMITED_NATURE
OF THE SANCTIONS AND THE OBJECTIVES WE WISH TO ACHIEVE
THEREBY.
?? WE SHOULD ATTEMPT-TO DEFUSE-THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
U.S. IS ASKING MORE OF THE FRG THAN IT IS WILLING TO
DO ITSELF BY OUANTIFYINC IN $0 FAR AS POSSIBLE THE
ECONOMIC SACRIFICE THE,U.S. 18-ASSUMING THROUGH SANC-
TIONS. IN COMPARING U.S. AND FRG TRADE WITH THE _
SOVIETS. THE BASE YEAR THAT SHOULD BE CHOSEN IS PRE-
AFGHANISTAN 1979 (WHEN.U.S. AND FRG EXPORTS TO USSR
WERE ABOUT EQUAL) RATHER THAN 1981.
-- WE SHOULD.STRFSS U.S. CONSULTATIONS. BOTH BILATER-
ALLY AND WITHIN NATO. SOME OTHERWISE SYMPATHETIC
GERMAN INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE OBSERVED THAT
U.S. CALLS TO JOIN IN SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT APPEAR AS
A DIKTAT: FINALLY
4040 WE SHOULD.CONCENTRATE ON OTHER EUROPEANS FIRST.
THIS WILL.AVOID THE CRITICISM_THAT.I$_E.SPECIALLY_.UNCOM-
FORTABLE TO-THE PRESENT COALITION THAT THE U.S. TREATS
THE FRG AS ITS EUROPEAN VASSAL. AND IT MIGHT MAKE THE
FRG MORE CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF ISOLATION WITHIN
EUROPE. WOESSNER
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