CUBA/CENTRAL AMERICA STRATEGY ISSUES FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG, 1 OCTOBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001203100015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 30, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NSC review completed.
30 September 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Cuba/Central America Strategy Issues for Your Meeting
with Secretary Haig, 1 October 1981
1. The Current Policy Alternatives Being Considered
If Increased US economic, military, intelligence support for
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras ("fight defensively in Central America")
II/ As above plus increased pressure on Nicaragua to stop their aid
for guerrillas including a naval quarantine between Cuba/Nicaragua
(described to me as the "negotiating process approach", which leaves the
Sandinista regime intact).
III/ As in I plus replacement of Sandinista Directorate by Third
Force moderates to include the use of US forces to deter or interdict
Cuban reinforcement of Nicaragua.
IV/ Direct pressure on Cuba in two phases -- (1) demonstration and
threats/talks; (2) a series of coercive actions (oil blockade, etc.).
3. The Main Area of Current Disagreement Within State
There is virtual consensus among Defense, most of CIA and State that
Alternative III makes the most sense. You expressed this view on Monday to
me, and this is the position I took at the McFarlane meeting.
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Those at State who favor Alternative II believe that US pressure
on the existing Sandinista regime can bring an end to their support of
revolutionary forces. The test of the Sandinista willingness to do this ~ 25X1
was to
be based on whether "our intelligence reports Showed the arms trattic alling
off". Documents at Tabs A, B are for the next meeting of this issue.
Tab A is a CIA compilation of evidence that demonstrates that
Nicaragua has continued to provide help to the guerrilla forces in the region.
It is also worth bearing in mind that these hopes for Sandinista restraint
have been part of the US relationship with that regime since 19 July 1979 and
that two weeks ago a member of the Directorate stated bluntly
"When will you Americans ever understand that nothing and
no one will prevent us from helping our fellow guerrillas in El Salvador
and Guatemala."
Tab B is an interpretative CIA analysis of possible Cuban reactions
to the four alternative US policies listed above. I concur with the views
that Cuba will use covert and aggressive means to react against Alternatives
I and II and that Cuba will not attack US military forces used as in
Alternative III to protect those who are replacing the Sandinista Directorate.
However, I strongly disagree with the introductory judgment of NFAC
that says, "We believe the approach having the best chance of success (30-40
percent) would be the presentation of a private ultimatum to Castro that he
either cease his support for subversive movements or suffer specific con-
sequences." This has been tried and it has failed again and again. And NFAC
goes on to say that, "Such an approach would have only a temporary effect;
Castro eventually would find an alternative method to pursue his revolutionary
goals."
Tab C provides an overview of the help for guerrilla/terrorist
forces in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala that is coming from the following
anti-US forces: Cuba, Nicaragua, Soviet Union, Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and East Europeans. It is a synthesis of
current intelligence knowledge and demonstrates that the entire network of
support for the extreme left in the region is growing and becoming more
diverse.
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TAB A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
30 September 1981
MEMORANDUM
Nicaraguan Support for Central American Revolutionaries
The Sandinistas remain fully committed to supporting the
Salvadoran insurgents,
nfil-
trating arms into El Salvador land, sea,' and air. Because of
interdiction efforts by Honduran authorities, the Sandinistas are
again emphasizing air deliveries over land shipments. Neverthe-
less, while the ongoing supply effort appears to be sufficient to
sustain the current relatively low level of guerrilla activity,
we believe it would have to be increased significantly to support
a major insurgent offensive.
Meanwhile, Salvadoran guerrilla headquarters continues to
coordinate the insurgency In 25X1
addition, Nicaragua is sending small numbers of military advisers
to El Salvador. The Sandinistas also continue to support leftist
extremists in Honduras and Guatemala. 25X1
El Salvador
The Sandinistas are convinced that a leftist victory in El
Salvador is essential to the security of their own regime and
probably doubt that the US would resume economic assistance to
Nicaragua even if they halted their support activities. National
Directorate member Bayardo Arce recently told
is memorandum, covering the period from 13 August 1981 to 30 September
1981, was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence. It was prepared
by Latin America Division, Office of Political Analysis, and
coordinated with the Clandestine Services. Questions and comments should be
directed to Chief, Latin America Division, OPA,
L 25X1
Nicaragua is 1
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that nothing Washington can say or do will induce the
dinistas }^ ^?- *h-4, -Acci c1-an-A i-n f-ha Ral varlnran
guerrillas.
atteste
line. P
During the past seven weeks,
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ave 25X1
continue operation of the Sandinista arms pipe-
Three Salvadoran insurgent groups, supported by Honduran
leftists, operate separate arms-distribution networks in
Honduras.
25X1
25X1
weapons continue to depart
Nicaragua's Pacific ports for El Salvador. 25X1
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Cuba and the USSR have supplied most of the weapons smuggled
to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, but Libya apparently is taking
a larger role.
In addition to channeling arms to El Salvador, the
Sandinistas are now sending advisers.
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Other Activities
Managua also is continuin
we believe that
Managua continues to provide small amounts of arms and other
assistance to Guatemalan insurgents, and that revolutionaries
from various Central American countries continue to receive para-
military training in Nicaragua.
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TAB B -- Being prepared by NFAC, will be available
Sy HIt34 0"
1 October 1981, as originally
requested.
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