NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920011-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/03/03. CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920011-5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PT ESIDENT
Subject: Next Steps in Lebanon
From: Casp r W. Weinberger
(S) As we move on
make some key decisi
foreign forces and G
Lebanon. However, w
cannot currently ass
withdrawal and will
and more likely a y
avoid the prolongat
There are three cou
ve
fashion
0-11
i because without- 11HP a tea
drawals. Try =vi
(commonly known as
Stretch out further
r the ne
and accept a year o
withdrawal. Seek i
(S) 1. Withdraw t
(g) We do not rec mmerdcbanceoof
ements ave a g breaking down leading to to-
e
~
-- agr
- -
e-scale iolence.
r
l
g
a
newed
the
t
2. The secon option is to negotiriitical rglue forutheinex
l be the
a the H?
that the HNF, not he LAP, Wil
We mu t then act to expand
alsraelis,HSyrians
n
the
r or so
of
yea. quickly, if our ego 1 is the withdrawal
-_ PLO by Years nd. This probably mZanuireme 0 may b
REV eNmet byp
and 3 ,000. part of this 4
REVIEW - ' or as many as because of the
*?yIFI A major M tomassumetcowould be.
ntrol.in LEbanonyoutsidid (tie
COMPLETED ck o of LAP capaci bid y
that the us could av
in
r
N?
O
y
.
central part. It s ve
articipation in such an M
is
leadership role an a major participation
the woul be necessary to gain that others, and
aVnts security. UB
he symbol of our olitical commitment
ofb
fors could. . in this th tion, long-term involvement
because the MN? wuldd be high risk s assist
for
and operate close with the LAP, there
hostilities.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920011-5
State Dept. review completed
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
egotiations regarding Lebanon, we need to
id
ns. we seek a rap
soseLeignty throughout
vernment of Lebanon.
d Forces (I.
~
believe the Lebanese Arme
a
me the security role required by such
bs
least
at
bble to do "r
note aand,we have wanted to at. On the other
ded US involvement.
d exten
n of the MNP, an
ses of actione
e multinational Force (19SF~i before Christmas
bfre full Y
more delayeo mediate politilagreements
cefor ntraleLeb non
irunediate disengage _
tep 1 Phase Il)
witrawa sNFn a step-syisnep
i
foreign force
t year or more.
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920011-5
- 2 -
(S) We do not reco rend this options because it would require a
substantial increase in-the size of the MNF (including possibly
the US contribution) as.well as a greater risk to the forces com-
mitted.
(S) 3. The third o
strengthening the Le
Force, while tempora
Israelis and PLO agr
central Lebanon, the
vide political and p
Both MNP and LAF uni
same time, over the
strengthening the LA
to provide a zone of
be drawn down as LAP
and probably a year
control and the full
can occur. The grea
will not cooperate,
period.
(S) We recommend t
places responsibilit
longs: with the Leb
firm with Israel and
others be equally fi
effort to strengthen
(S) The JCS have a
disengagement involv
forces would be need
Israeli plan: two br
forces would have to
current MNF in Beiru
tions and some form
other words, MNF req
could be met by the
(S) Whichever opti
already carrying a h
and our 6th Fleet Ca
activities, intellig
to revitalize LAP an
bear consideration:
Other patio
Spain, Morocco, Xore
tion is to place primary emphasis upon
anese Armed Forces and Internal Security
ily expanding the MNF role. If the Syrians,
e to a first step disengagement of forces in
MNF role should be expanded somewhat*to pro-
chological backing for Gemayel and the LAP.
would occupy the vacated areas. At the
ext several months, we would concentrate on
, including one brigade which might go south
security for the Israelis. MNF forces-could
improves. But it will,be at.-least-six months-
r more before the l::t ~t tes~tc b1 *e tt-
withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and ? trQ91
est risk at this point:night\be that the PLO
ying the MNP down in Lebanon for a long
is option, since it diminishes US risks and
for the security of Lebanon where it: be-
nose armed forces. To succeed, we.aquat be
Syria, we must -insist that.:ths Saudis and
m with the PLO, and we:must make a maximum
alyzed requirements implied by Optioo_-3 for a
ng MNF interposition deployments.. Not* )O F-
d to man key terrain. (One brigade under
gades if Southern Bekaa included.-) These
be supported by logistics. personnel,:plus the
plus intelligence and surveillance opera-
f Inernational Observer Force (IOP): .In
irements under option 3 would be larger than
N? now in Beirut.
n is chosen, it should be noted that US is
avy MNF burden, with our Marine Ready_Group
rier Battle Group tied down, plus logistics
nce and surveillance activities, and. efforts
ISP. There are a number of factors which
s must be brought in, e.g., Ulf gorway,
Indonesia, Greece, ate. These nations
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SECRET
- 3 -
should recognize the large, indirect contribution the US is al-
ready making.
Us forces need not be increased as the source of infantry
battalions for Optio 3; if others participate.
- A major US rash effort to strengtben.LAF and IS?. This
will mean large US M litary Assistance Group in Beirut, at least
100 US military trai erg, substantial diversion from US Army
stocks and a sizable FY m1983 FMS illion) aspvelleasafism pressusetoa ?.
neighborhood of $
Prance and Saudi Ara a to contribute.
Specific Recommendat one
(S) 1. That you di ect extraordinary measures., including with
the Congress and oth r nations, to strengthen Lebanese forces..
(S) 2. That you di ect
PLO out of the north
(S) 3. That you di ect
immediate disengagem nt.
?
us support for negotiations aimed at
a maximum diplomatic effort to cove the--
Lebanese-Israeli negotiations
Lebanese-Sy ian negotiations
with-us participation
US insistence upon diplomatic and 'financial leverage to
move out the PLO
(S) 4. Authorize r negotiators to say the US is positive about
US participation in an iterim'MNF deployed along the Beirut-
Damascus highway between the Syrian and Israeli forces which had
pulled back from their current locations. At the same time,
.direct efforts to bring in other nations.
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Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920011-5