POSSIBLE SUBJECTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH JUDGE CLARK, 22 DECEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001202880017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIO/LA
21 December 1982
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: NIO/LA
SUBJECT: Possible subjects for your meeting with Judge Clark,
22 December 1982
Suriname:
In my view, the current Administration has experienced the first new
communist success with the 8 December actions of the Suriname military
dictator, Bouterse, in murdering the democratic labor, political and other
opposition leaders. Right now the US Government and media seem to be deceived
about what has occurred just as following the April 1978 communist coup in
Afghanistan, the New York Times dismissed it as a "Cabal in Kabul."
You will recall my August 1982 Memorandum which summarized the
intelligence on Cuban plotting with the military dictator Bouterse as follows:
--Bouterse made a secret visit to Cuba in May 1982;
--Bouterse, however, did likely receive a small number of arms during
his Cuban visit and checked on four military personnel then
receiving training in Cuba.
--Narendorp, the Foreign Minister, visited Cuba in June 1982;
--Intelligence reports on 50+ Cubans arriving in July 1982.
Now the process of deceptive power consolidation will be underway, and
the issue for action is finding the means to reverse the pro-Cuban elements
creating an irreversible hold on power. As I said to you on 16 25X1
December, time is short. Every week will make the Cuban hold tighter (see NID 25X1
It1 1 , ~ L
NSC/Central America Assessment I 'e'-
.ft4,", S L c/ .
You will recall that Judge Clark wrote a memorandum on 25 October calling
for a Central America Assessment to be completed by 15 November 1982. My EYES
ONLY chronology of how this assessment and a previous effort by Judge Clarkin
March 1982 became sidetracked is attached. The question now is will Judge TAB A
Clark pursue this much-needed assessment of: (1) what has actually been done
to implement the President's NSDD decisions; (2) is enough being done to
defeat the extreme left in Central America? This last question was not
explicitly stated in the Clark assessment tasking, and in my view needs to be
addressed as soon as possible.
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Nicaragua:
The attached 7 December 1982 tasking memorandum from Judge Clark to TAB B
Secretary Schultz on US policy toward Nicaragua has, I am told, been
cancelled. Nevertheless, note that Item 3 asks: "what plans do we have if
this
the present policies falter - an important timely question." In my view,
suggests Judge Clark is far too confident about the outcome of events in
s
Nicaragua, as seen in the concluding paragraph which captures the tone ofohis
7 December memorandum: "These thoughts are prompted by what may appear
an anomalous concern over 'what do we do if we win'." I repeat my regretably
pessimistic judgment that the current level of anti-Sandinista forces is
highly unlikely to be able to threaten seriously the current regime or even
stop its export of subversion. In my view, despite some positive efforts,
most trends in the region and the international political arena are
negative. This last is partly true because U.S. in public communications
efforts have been too few and unsystematic.
Public Diplomacy about Central America Since since November 1981:
I attach my short evaluation written for you last week in case you want TAB C
to bring this up. Note, that on 17 December 1982, State sent its preliminary
plan for an improved public communications effort to Judge Clark. It is a
useful start (though 13 months late), but it still lacks specific
implementation ideas with respect to Mexico and the Socialist International
(which holds its World Congress in Sydney, Australia on 8 April 1983).
Argentina:
The demonstration by 100,000 people and ensuing violence on 14 December
crystalizes the enormous difficulty facing Argentina as the military regime
tries to make an orderly transition to constitutional government. It is my
judgment that the Soviet bloc and Cuba will be active to simultaneously
improve state-to-state relations and use subversion to create problems for the
transition, hoping to either provoke massive military repression or accomplish
some degree of penetration of a "left nationalist" civilian govenment. In my
judgement, now is the time for the US and other democratic countries to become
more active to: (1) prevent Soviet bloc/Cuban subversion and (2) in behalf of
democratic institution building in labor, the parties and moderate civic
groups. This could be the subject of an NSPG. Note that I have initiated a
SNIE to be titled: ARGENTINA: A TROUBLED TRANSITION, which State will draft
to be completed in Fe ruary .
Attachments: as stated
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StLKLI
22 November 1982
EYES 0'''tY
NOTE FOR: DCI
FROM?: NIO/LA
SUBJECT: Chronology of NSC Reviews on Central America --
as you requested today
Latest NSC Cuba/Central America Review
Early August 1982
--Mr. Fontaine of the NSC Staff informs NIO/LA and others that he is
trying to organize a Review to begin in mid-September 1982.
--NiO/LA informs DCI/DDCI by memo.
Mid-September 1982
--NSC Staff tells NIO/LA the Review has been delayed for "unknown
reasons."
25 October 1982
--Judge Clark's memorandum initiates a "Cuba Policy Review" with
materials due to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam by
10 November 1982
--Judge Clark's memorandum indicates that: (1) Deputy Secretary of
State Kenneth Dam will convene an Interagency Group to review the
materials, and (2) the President will consider them at an NSPG, "no
later than 15 November."
10 November 1982
--Acting DCI McMahon sends NFIB-coordinated Interagency Intelligence
Assessment to Deputy Secretary Dam.
Week of 15 November 1982
informs NIO/LA that the Interagency Group meeting has
been a ayed until undersecretary Eagleburger returns to preside
rather than Deputy Secretary Dam.
18 November 1982
--State official tells NIO/LA NSC Review likely to be delayed
"indefinitely"
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22 November 1982
--NSC meeting of 23 November to focus on President Reagan's trip from
29 November to 6 December 1982.
--Secretary of State Schultz scheduled to be in Europe from
6 - 19 December 1982.
--NSC Cuba Review likely delayed for some weeks (January 1983 usually
is taken with State of the Union, the national budget and the
opening of the new Congress).
Chronology of Last NSC Review on Central America
15 March 1982
--Judge Clark orders a post-Salvadoran election review with
30 March 1982 deadlines for papers.
30 March 1982
--CIA submits its Intelligence Assessment
2 April 1982
--Falklands War begins. Period of intense diplomacy lasts through
22 April.
Early May 1982
--Various Executive Branch officials (including the NIO/LA) press for
NSC review of Central America.
Late May 1982
--NSDDs 37 and 37A issued without any NSC meeting.
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90982
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SENSITIVE
December 7, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua (S)
L82-13375)
As we enter the third year of the Administration'.s involvement
in Central America, I believe it appropriate to examine the
progress we have made; what further involvement we should con-
sider; what adjustments can or should be made in our policy; and
what options are available to us. (S)
Accordingly, the President has asked that you undertake a series
of studies that examine the following subjects:
(1) Generally speaking, the trends in Nicaragua may be
viewed as favorable to the extent that opposition to
the government is growing and becoming more effective.
It is appropriate to ask what changes might conceivably
take place if these trends-continue. For example,
could opposition elements effect a change in the
government? If that appeared likely, what would be
the reaction of the GON; of Cuba? Would Nicaragua
seek to increase subversion in neighboring countries?
How should we react to alternative Nicaraguan shifts in
policy with or without Cuban support? (S)
(2) What is the status of the Nicaraguan civilian opposition?
Is it now able to provide effective leadership for
Nicaragua should that become necessary? If not, what are
we doing to improve this situation? Are there remnants
of the National Guard leadership which could pose problems
to the civilian opposition? (S)
(3) What plans do we have if the present policies falter?
What plans do we have to buttress opposition elements
within Nicaragua? At what point does it become too
costly, politically, for us to continue to support these
groups? By what date do you expect this to become a
problem?. What plans have we made for this eventuality? (5)
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DECLASSIFY ON: 'OADR
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 William P. Clark
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-(4) What measures ought to be taken to sustain and
broaden where possible our support internationally?
These thoughts are prompted by what may appear to be an anomalous
concern over "what do we do if we win?" No doubt you have already
given this some thought, but I believe it would be useful for
you to provide your assessment to the President near the commence-
ment of the new year together with any recommendations you may
have for altering current policies and programs.
cc The Secretary of Defense
~fiie Director of Central Intelligence
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17 December 1982
Public diplomacy concerning Cuba/Central America - since November 1981
In November 1981, President Reagan decided that a major component of the
strategy to contain Cuban subversion and help the governments of Central
America should be a domestic and international public diplomacy effort (NSDD
17). This decision was repeated in subsequent NSDDs and the shortcomings of
implementation were suggested by the repetition in the May 1982 NSDD
A number of useful steps were taken. However, far too little has been
done and the result is that we have lost the positive shifts in domestic and
international opinion in the US, Europe and Latin America which began
following the September 1981 Latin American repudiation of the pro-guerrilla
Mexican French initiative and briefly after the March 1982 El Salvador
elections. Right now the international coalitions supporting the extreme left
and those supporting moderates and the threatened governments are as follows:
Supporting the Extreme Left
Soviet Bloc and Cuba
PLO and Libya
Mexico
Many social democratic parties
Many church/liberal groups
Supporting Moderates/Target Governments
US
Most Latin American countries
(but with a shift away by
Venezuela/Colombia
International Christian Democrats
AFL-CIO and much of international
democratic labor
(though this is eroding)
Positive Steps to Date
Most important were the President's speech to the OAS (February 1982),
his trip to Latin America and the consistently good testimony of the
Administration before Congress. In addition, State has produced several good
unclassified background papers (see list below) and a number of one page GISTs
which describe US policy in Central America. There also has been a concerted
effort to meet with leaders of the print and electronic media by the State
leadership (though NSC/Defense has been excluded despite their interest in
helping) and a program of sending speakers to a number of college campuses.
This effort has been coordinated by a State public diplomacy group under
the overall direction of Assistant Secretary Enders which has met about once
every three weeks during the last year. At these meetings, the critical
comments made below were consistently voiced by my representative.
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Problems with Implementation
The level of effort has been far below the requirements of the task and
the national security stakes (keeping Central America and Mexico from becoming
communist). Probably not more than 10% of the effort allocated to the AWACS
issue in the fall of 1981 has gone into this public diplomacy effort and most
of what has been done has been focused on the Caribbean Basin Initiative
rather than the facts of Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion and terrorism.
Secondly there has been no systematic and thoughtful advanced planning to
use international communications opportunities such as upcoming meetings of
the Socialist International, the ICFTU international free trade unions, COPPAL
the Mexican international political action organization nor to defend against
predictable communist propaganda/disinformation activities linked to the six-
month certification cycle and other known events. My staff prepared the
outline of a comprehensive communications strategy along these lines in
November 1981, shared them with State, found no interest and on other
occasions we have made written and other proposals for more effective
international communications which have been ignored.
As a tangible example of the desultory and unsystematic quality of the
efforts to date, in June 1982 a senior State 25X1
official to brief Socialist International leaders in Europe and found that the
US Embassies in Paris, The Hague, Bonn and Vienna had virtually none of the
State and intelligence briefing materials which had already been made public
between December 1981 and April 1982 (including the dramatic U-2 photos of the
Nicaraguan military buildup and the 42 intact and then destroyed Indian
villages along with the two new detention camps in Nicaragua).
Specific shortcomings include the following:
Cuba - virtually no effort has been made to expose the internal repressionrof
tTie-Cuban regime (political prisoners, executions over
etc.) or to bring out the human consequences of the international subversion
undertaken by Cuba during the last 22 years (meaning the numbers of victims in
Africa, Latin America and the Middle-East of Cuban-supported terrorism and of
the brutal Marxist-Leninist regimes propped up with Cuban troops and secret
police, eg., Ethiopia, etc.)
Social democratic parties and governments:
The Socialist International include 43 social democratic parties which
etc). The US has
involve most of our major allies (the German SPD . . .
failed to systematically provide information about Central America to the
moderate social democratic leaders and factions within the parties of Latin
America (eg., Costa Rica) and Europe (eg., Portugal) and then work well in
advance of the known Socialist International meeting dates to forge a moderate
coalition which would rescind the endorsements of the extreme left guerrilla
groups.
The same needs to be done with the international democratic trade unions
which are mostly associated with the social democratic parties.
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Mexico
Despite the fact that de la Madrid was selected as the next President of
Mexico in October 1981, elected in July 1982 indDecember 1982
-- virtually no effort has been
advisors. His current Foreign Minister was Mexico's Ambassador in Washington,
D.C. during most of 1982 and to my knowledge, received no briefing.
Christian democrats/AFL-CIO/international labor
The democratic transnational groups which condemn the communist
guerrillas as well as the extreme right have met and passed positive ars. This resolutions on many uring and thetUSwhasedone almostvnothingytoever
gets into the regular med 9
spread and amplify the positive actions and statements of those organizations
which share our perspective.
Examples of useful background literature
--Nicaragua: The Stolen Revolution ICA - November 1982
--Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence State - December 1982
in Latin America
--US/Soviet Cuban military aid/ Dr. Ikle, March 1982
presence in Latin America
1962 - 1981 -- charts
--Communist Interference in El Salvador State - February 1981.
This is good information, but far too little has been done to distribute it
here or abroad to key leadership groups.
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