THE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS: OBSTACLES AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications
Secret
ALA ~i2-10120,E
August 1982
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The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications
Key Judgments The pace of the Namibian talks has quickened recently, largely as a result
of South Africa's initiative in presenting an accelerated timetable for a
settlement and its new flexibility on a number of Namibian issues. But
Pretoria's demand that a settlement be linked to withdrawal of Cubans
from Angola poses a formidable obstacle.
Although important details on the cease-fire and other aspects of the UN
plan still need to be worked out, we believe that the remaining differences
over strictly Namibian issues are not insurmountable. Any one of the
unresolved issues, however, provides ample opportunity for either side to
procrastinate or even to break off talks. Unexpected military developments
could also derail the settlement talks.
The prospects for agreement on the withdrawal of Cubans are far less
certain. The critical issue is whether the Angolan regime is willing or able
to send a sufficient number of Cubans home and in a manner that satisfies
Pretoria's demand that Cuban forces be withdrawn. South Africa appears
uncompromising in its current demand for the verified withdrawal of all
Cuban troops. It may eventually settle for less-although we believe it will
insist upon the departure of considerably more than half of the 20,000 to
25,000 Cuban troops that we estimate are in Angola.
Pretoria recognizes that the political strength of the South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) has not been diminished by South
Africa's military operations during the past year, and this, in our view,
underlies South Africa's linking of a Namibian settlement to withdrawal of
Cubans from Angola. The Botha government probably believes that it
needs the political ammunition of a Cuban withdrawal to defuse a domestic
rightwing reaction to a probable SWAPO electoral victory in Namibia.
Although the issue of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) has remained largely on the periphery
of the negotiations, calculations about L'NITA's strength relative to that of
the Angolan regime heavily influence the thinking of the ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola. (MPLA) about the Cuban issue.
Information available as of 17 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
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We believe that Luanda could not afford to lose more than 5,000 to 7,500
members of the total Cuban military force without suffering appreciable
territorial losses to UNITA.
Luanda probably has neither the desire nor the ability to reach a
reconciliation with Savimbi at this time. Moreover, the Frontline States for
the most part support Angola's view that Savimbi is a "traitor" and a
South African "puppet" and are unlikely to press reconciliation on
Luanda. South Africa, on the other hand, views UNITA as a valuable
source of leverage that costs very little. Consequently, we expect the
UNITA issue to remain in the background as negotiations continue on
Namibia and Cuban withdrawal.
The manner in which the Cubans would withdraw is also important to both
Luanda and Pretoria.. Angola, with strong support from its African and
Communist backers, has repeatedly rejected any explicit linkage between a
Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal, insisting that the Cuban
issue is an internal Angolan matter and that the Cuban troops would leave
as a natural consequence of a settlement. In view of repeated South
African public statements, however, we expect the South Africans will
insist that they be allowed to state publicly that the Cubans will withdraw
before beginning implementation of a Namibian settlement.
A Namibian settlement that included the withdrawal of substantial
numbers of Cuban troops would be widely viewed as a major success for
US policy toward southern Africa. For such a settlement to occur,
however, we believe that the United States is likely to be pressed to make
several formal and informal commitments to the various parties-promises
which could have long-term consequences for US interests. The Angolans
probably would demand assurances about Western economic assistance
and future South African behavior. The South Africans, in return for
concessions on the Cuban issue or on policies toward their neighbors, might
insist on improved relations with the United States. 1 or example, in
addition to wanting greater US tolerance for the pace of racial reform in
South Africa, they have expressed interest in closer cooperation on nuclear
matters and a relaxation of US restraints on trade in items that could be
used for military purposes.
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If the Cuban issue proves intractable and the settlement talks collapse, we
believe the South Africans, disclaiming responsibility for the failure, will
proceed with an "internal" settlement-that is, holding elections next year
that exclude SWAPO and the UN-with the expectation of some degree of
support from the West. The South Africans might decide to conduct
military operations of unprecedented scale in southern Angola. Such
operations would be aimed at inflicting a humiliating defeat on SWAPO
and punishing its Angolan and Cuban backers. The South Africans may
also decide to increase their support to Savimbi's insurgency.
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