TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 20, 2006
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 28, 1982
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9.pdf | 156.44 KB |
Body:
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28 September 1982
Talking Points for the DDCI
I . Stafi~, she South African Mi 1 itary Activity i nto Angola
The six week long South African military operation into southern Angola
ended in late August, but military activity in the area is again on the
Sough Africa pt'gt~biy has expanded .,3ts zone of control i n southern
Aege~e~~lvhch may now extend further to the north and to the west as the
result of the July-August operation. (see map)
II. Status of the Cuban Withdrawal Issue
With most details in the Namibia negotiations wrapped up, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Wisner's current trip to Luanda to secure specific
commitments on a Cuban troop withdrawal occurs at a time when Pretoria.
leas fu~~-.t~te~d-::its;~osition.on the issue,,
-- South Africa now demands that all Cuban troops leave Angola
three months after the settlement's implementation phase
begins.
-- According to press reports, Prime Minister Botha also reserves
the right to keep some South African troops in Namibia even
after a settlement.
While this and other recent tough talk may be due to political pressure
from the riyht wing, it will` make concessions on the Cutiar~ questson more-
di f fiot~lt<
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The private Angola pQSiton an_Cuban troops is not yet knowrr-~ but Luanda
continues to take a tough public position on the issue. South African
military pressure, however, will strengthen the position of MPLA
hardliners who do not want to allow the Cubans to leave Angola.
Other African players in the negotiation process meanwhile appear to be
on the sidelines.
-- SWAPO has been largely cut out of negotiations on Cuban troops.
-- The Frontline States publically support Angola's position that
there can be no linkage between a Cuban withdrawal and a
I~a~nibia settlement. We do not believe that they are being
helpful behind the scenes.
We have no new evidence that the Cubans and their Soviet backers are
more willing than before to see the Cubans leave or the Western-backed
settlement effort succeed.
III. UNITA
A ~najar Angolan-Cuban offensive evidently was launched late last month
against UNITA-controlled southeastern Angola.
-- UNITA leader Savimbi says that his forces lost some ground,
including two towns, in the early stages of the offensive, but
they have since regained some positions.
-- UNITA has recently claimed that the Cubans and Angolans are
preparing for yet another offensive against them in southern
Angola.
An Angolan and Cuban push against UNITA would be part of a more
intensive effort in the southeast in comparison with previous operations
there.
-- The number of Angolan and Cuban troops at Menongue, the main
garrison in this region, is three times what it was a year ago.
-- Supply lines to the region have been also improved in recent
months.
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UNIT[; ~r :its ~~ ~:ntr"etes to conduct guerrilla operations
thrcn+ghQUt _ ~osir iii` _ sduthern two-thirds of the :,.Fount ry.
-- Operations include raids on small Angolan garrisons, ambushes
of government convoys, and disruptions of the Benguela
Railroad.
-- The guerrillas have continued to be particularly active in
west-central Angola, where their tribal supporters are
concentrated.
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-- Although reliable information on the guerrillas' numerical
strength is limited, we believe, on the basis of 25X1
press sources, that the insurgency has een growing
fairly steadily and now has around 20,000 men, includiny some
10,000 to 15,000 full-time armed combatants and the rest
"auxiliaries" in various stages of training.
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Pretoria sees the southern Africa region as containing several
fundamentally troubling forces: exile guerrilla forces linked to
domestic dissidents, hostile neighboring black states either in the
Soviet orbit or heading that way, and a growing presence of the Soviet
Union and its allies who are manipulating the Africans for their own
needs.
By hitting various transport and other facilities in Angola and
Mozambique, the insurgents also reinforce Pretoria's economic hegemony,
ensuring that South Africa's landlocked neighbors to the north are
unable to reduce their dependence on transportation routes through South
Africa.
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