AGENDA FOR MEETING ON POLITICAL ACTION AUGUST 5 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102750018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 5, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

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July 30, 1982
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
The attached is a first draft for the meeting next
Thursday, August 5th, on political action. I would appreciate
your suggestions for changes by close of business Monday,
August 2.
State Dept. review completed.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
RDS 7/30/02
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Agenda for Meeting on Political Action
August 5, 1982
I. Concept and Current Capabilities
A. Foreign policy and national security role of political
action (Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger)
B. Case history of what can be done by private and government
efforts--Portugal (Deputy Secretary Carlucci)
C. Need for comprehensive capabilities--covert action but also
U.S. trade unions, political parties, foundations, government
initiatives and programs to do campaigns, infrastructure
building, etc. (Director Casey)
D. Information programs (Director Wick and Chairman Shakespeare)
E. President's perspective and role (Judge Clark)
II. The Future
A. Priority to be given political action
B. Near-term needs
1. FY '83 funding for radios
2. Moving bipartisan foundation ahead
3. USG organizational structure (USICA keeps lead on
information and NSPG remains intact; NSC leads on
overall political action; all agencies examine
internal structures/capabilities for giving high
priority to political action.)
C. Long-term needs
1. NSSD on .political action (policy strategy and
permanent solution to funding).
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Political Action
I. The Concept of Political Action
The Soviet Union has a strategically oriented, heavily-
funded, professional program of "political action"--everything
from launching innumerable policy initiatives, to staging
peace campaigns, to training, organizing and financing political
cadre for takeovers in the Third World, and even in Europe.
For years they have been on the political (as well as military)
offensive and the results are all around us.
The atheistic Soviet Union organizes conferences on religion
and peace (attracting and manipulating men of integrity like
Billy Graham), while no one in the US Government is even in
systematic contact with most of the leaders of the
world's great religions -- much less organizing conferences
on our common agenda. "Peace" demonstrations are launched
against America rather than those who invade Afghanistan and
use "yellow rain". Those in an unstable Third World willing
to risk their lives for political objectives tend to be Marxist-
Leninists rather than pro-Western, democratic forces. The
U.S. has to rely on the veto at the United Nations, where once
that was the Soviet Union's role. Governments are afraid of
being too closely associated with the "reactionary" United
States; even major Allies distance themselves from us on
"progressive" issues like El Salvador.
All this is the product of decades of systematic political
action by the Soviets and relative political inaction by the
United States. They have recognized that international
politics is an extension of domestic politics -- a struggle
to appeal to people's sense of justice, their fears and hopes,
in other words, a political competition. This can be done
only by offering people a political program and taking concrete
steps to organize them, and not simply by reacting to, or
criticizing, the program of others.
The United States has had bits and pieces of the capability
to carry out political action. But some of our capabilities
have declined. And we have never had a comprehensive,
integrated,, sustained capacity for political offensives. We
tend to live day-to-day, to focus on crises others have
created, and not to launch and sustain our own policy offensives.
Even some of our European allies understand the importance
of practical political action as an element of international
power better than we do. For example, Western European
governments and parties sent money and professionals in a
successful effort to build democratic forces to the point
where they could prevent a communist takeover in Portugal.
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European parties have long been organized to help political
friends. For example, the West Germans, through their
four federally funded and party-affiliated political
institutes, have full-time representatives in certain Third
World countries who conduct political training and give
financial support. They do this entirely openly and thus
effectively, and their activities are not considered illegi-
timate interference in other nations' affairs.
The United States is largely out of the picture. Unlike
member parties of the Socialist International and of course
the Communists, our political parties have no network of
international ties to struggling pro-Western democratic
forces and offer no assistance. The CIA's current political
support efforts are a pale shadow of their programs in the
1950's, and they are inherently hampered by their covert
nature. Only the AFL-CIO conducts significant programs, but
they are restricted to helping unions and labor leaders.
Furthermore, the Europeans are just as derelict as we
in terms of efforts designed to help democratic forces in
communist countries. There isn`t even much study being done
of how communist regimes can be changed -- even though it
is clear: that the potential exists (witness Solidarity,
Yugoslavia, thousands fleeing Cuba, etc.); that we will
always be on the defensive if the political competition is
played on our side of the court alone; and even more
fundamentally that we will never have a permanent, stable
peace until these systems are transformed from armed-camps
to democracies.
II. Existing Resources and Programs
Obviously as a government we cannot and should not
simply emulate Soviet methods. Nor will our political
parties be able in the foreseeable future to play the inter-
national role of European parties. But there is much that
we can do.
American political action can combine: a political
program baked on democracy, economic growth, security and
peace; Presidential policy initiatives to dramatize each
element of this program; mobilization of private forces in
the U.S. and abroad (unions, parties, youth, church, business,
etc.); international campaigns on issues like Afghanistan
and Poland; political training, organization and financial
support for pro-Western forces; covert political action
programs; USICA communications efforts, and other steps.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Since this Administration came into office, we each
have taken steps to put America on the political offensive.
o The President's November 18 speech on arms control
timed to preempt Brezhnev in Bonn was a classic
example of a "political action" with major impact.
o His speech to Parliament launched a major effort to
support democratic movements in communist and
non-communist countries around the world.
o State and the NSC, working with the European
Parliament and the Congress, put together Interna-
tional Afghanistan Day. We have established
on-going interagency working groups and programs
to: shape Europe attitudes, expose Soviet active
measures, deal with the nuclear freeze issue, and
inform the world on Central America.
o The Defense Department got out an excellent booklet
on Soviet military power. All of us have been
giving speeches on the Soviet threat.
o USICA~has undertaken path-breaking initiatives
through the use of television ("Let Poland be Poland")
and new vigor in getting out information about our
policies and the Soviet Union.
o BIB and VOA are working with all of us on dramatically
modernizing the broadcasting capabilities of RFE/RL
and VOA.
This is a solid start, but much more needs to be done.
-- Within the government, we are not yet staffed and
organized to conduct effective political action. We now have
a sound structure on the information side under Charlie
Wick's leadership. But we are weak in our ability to
generate political initiatives and conduct political campaigns,
using overt and covert resources and combining government and
private efforts here and abroad.
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-- The Soviet budget for these activities is around
$4-5 billion. American political action is a critical
contribution to our national security and deserves funds on
the same priority as national defense. For example our
radios play a major role in encouraging peaceful change in
Eastern Europe, weakening the unity of the Warsaw Pact and
compelling the Soviet Union to devote enormous military
resources to policing its own allies and own people. The
cost of RFE/RL is less than one B-1 bomber.
-- We lack the kind of government-funded, but private
political foundations and programs which the Germans have and
which could conduct political training, organizing and
provide financial support.
As Soviet dissident Lev Kopelev has said: Soviets put
in ring heavy boxer with big muscles; America puts in tiny
ballet dancer.
III. What Can Be Done
Going on the international political offensive has the
potential of being the major mark the Reagan Administration
can make on the history of America's role in the world. It
can be the vehicle for reforging a domestic foreign policy
consensus on the basis of traditional American values - a
consensus that the Carter human rights policy attempted to
reestablish but failed, due to its policy of moral double
standard. An American political offensive can underscore
the continuing vitality of the ideals of freedom and
democratic-capitalism, ideals which can capture the imagina-
tions of the world's millions -- if we only hold them
forth for all to see.
Organizing ourselves to conduct such an offensive and
providing resources must be among our highest priorities.
We must admit that the State Department has not yet been
geared up to the enormity of this task. Our regional
bureaus all too often operate in a reactive mode with
traditional diplomatic concerns rather than broader political
strategy foremost on their minds.
Nevertheless, we have begun to make some constructive
changes. We have a small core of political action officers
in Under Secretary's Eagleburger`s office. And we are
considering the establishment within State of a substantially
larger and permanent mechanism for political action. The
sole purpose of this staff would be to keep the U.S. on
the political offensive,
ICA and the other agencies from the perspective of inf uencing
foreign publics: a perspective less encumbered by the
traditional diplomatic concerns of not offending State's
usual constituency -- foreign governments.
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- 5 -
We already have the interagency groups on specific
areas for political action which we mentioned earlier, and
should consider the formation of new ones where needed.
In the same vein, we need high-level mechanisms to
maximi:ae our common potential. We already have the informa-
tion SIG which Charlie Wick chairs, and the NSPG for covert
action. Both are critical and obviously should continue.
But we need a central place to coordinate the daily aspects
of our overall political action programs. The NSC seems
the logical choice -- particularly with its recently
strengthened staff in this field. We also believe that a
periodic review of the overall political action effort would
be useful (policy initiatives-information-covert action-
private sector}. We could consider whether we have succeeded
in shifting from a reactive mode to a broad political
offensive, and what are our priorities for future efforts
and resources. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
seems to us the logical person to call together such a
political action group.
We also need to develop government-private sector links 1
and mechanisms. The most important of the President's initia-
tives in this area is the establishment of a U.S. political
foundation and programs. This has strong bipartisan support
including Lane Kirkland, Chuck Manatt and other Democratic
Party leaders, the Chamber of Commerce and owes much to
Bill Brock's efforts over the years. Pete McPherson has
found some USAID money for the study to establish the founda-
tion. Even the "New York Times" has called for the establish-
ment of such a foundation. But we need to move ahead now with
the study.
We want to offer political aid, training and organization
to democratic forces struggling for influence in communist
and non-communist countries alike. Next time a Portugal is
ready for political change, we need not rely largely on
the German foundations to provide a politically organized,
pro-Western, democratic alternative to a communist takeover.
We know that members of our staff have been discussing
"political action" for months with serious interest, a
common perception that we were moving in the right direction
but that much more needed to be done. That is why we
thought it would be useful to have a meeting at a.senior level.
You undoubtedly will have additional ideas and proposals to
make. We look forward to the discussion.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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~~~~~
Illustrative Needs for FY '83 Funding for Political Action
The following is a partial list designed to be illustrative
and stimulate the discussion. In almost every case an effort
has been made to:
(1) build on existing entities which are effective but
vastl underfunded or to
(2) provide seed money to activities which are consistent
with the "Democracy Institute" and may ultimately
be funded by such a body
(3) launch a study or examine a problem area worth
significant policy attention and resource commitment.
The Agencies and Departments will likely, under further examination,
wish to identify major selectively targeted program areas (State,
AID, ICA) that could be developed or expanded. Significant FY '84
expansion of this range of activity will be required.
Million $
1. RFE/RL/VOA Enrichment 103.0
2. Project Truth programs:
Afghanistan
Yellow Rain 20.0
INF/TNF debate in Europe
Central America
3. European Dialogue (Support to unfunded/underfunded)
existing institutions which will support policies 3.5
parallel to US initiatives/interests--including
study centers; strategic institutes; seminar
programs; East-West programs; radio
4. Initial steps to implement President's June 8 speech
in London calling for support to democracies 1.0
- Survey to create foundation for political
democracy {0.5)
- Elections seminar (0.250)
- Communism and democracy seminar (0.250)
5. Regional labor institutes (Africa, Asia, Latin
America) 9.0
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6. Subsidy to European Labor Information Office
7. The Asia Foundation - Supplement to core grant
(Key vehicle to implement Presidential democracy
initiative in Asia)
8. Strengthen democratic forces in Central America
- Support formation and programs of a "coalition
for democracy" institute led by President Monge
of Costa Rica, democratic leaders of the area
and private Americans (ICA, AID seed money,
co-funded with Latin funds and US private)
9. Assistance (worldwide) in the preparation of the
institutional framework for a transition to
democracy. (EK; Liberia).
Seed grant; funding subsequently from Democracy
Institute
10. Expand programs of selected practical study and
training in US of emerging elite groups (military ,
communications, trade unions, government, young 10.0
party leaders, etc) Counterpart selected provision
of US experts to assist overseas. Program geared
to highly selective, high yield advisory assistance.
11. Counterpart study program to energize US sectors
(labor, political, civic, religious, business) to 0.5
participate and to generate significant private
funding.
12. Expansion of government resources (personnel,
production) to support these activities 2.0
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