TALKING POINTS FOR PFIAB ON USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102700014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECREII
1 July 1982
Talking Points for PFIAB on USSR and Eastern Europe
1. Although the USSR has profited from the Falklands and
Middle East crises, its own political and economic situation is
not encouraging from Moscow's standpoint.
2. The most acute problem is the Soviet leadership
question:
rive inaicated that
Brezhnev can only work two hours a day
--Below his level the struggle for second in command
and eventual successor continues but no candidate has
yet become strong enough to impose his will on the rest
of the Politburo and give the country the direction
which Brezhnev is no longer able to provide.
-On balance, events of the last two months suggest a
strengthening of Andropov's position but he is
certainly not sure of ultimate victory yet.
4. On the economic front the Soviet situation appears
dismal.
SECRET
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1 July 1982
The Post-Falklands Environment in Latin America
I. In South America, despite cooler relations between
Washington and several capitals, there is strong
sentiment for repairing relations.
-- The utility of the OAS has been lessened, but
proposals to exclude the US are not likely to
prosper.
-- Although five countries withdrew from UNITAS naval
exercises (to avoid high profile identification
with US), this contrasts with the dispatch of
Venezuelan military teams to El Salvador (where
Caracas' concerns dictate cooperation with US
objectives).
II. Concerns over other territorial disputes have been
heightened.
-- Chile will press even harder for some US
involvement in its Beagle Channel dispute with
Argentina.
-- If Argentina's Bignone manages a transition to
civilian rule, we would not expect a return to
Galtieri's militarily aggressive policies in the
Channel. However, he might have to resort to some
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sabre rattling on the Beagle dispute to dampen
domestic discontent.
-- Greater military cooperation between Peru and
Argentina may persist, increasing Chile's fears
that the two (and perhaps Bolivia) could move
against it. Chile may take defensive measures that
could escalate tensions.
Elsewhere, the Falklands war probably has made
leaderships more chary of initial use of force.
Venezuela, however, is saying that historical
errors by the US, as well as the UK are to
blame for its longstanding territorial dispute
with Guyana. Caracas hopes Washington and
London ultimately will press Guyana to
compromise.
-- In Ecuador, even if the military comes to
power, we expect the administration to avoid
any border incidents in its territorial dispute
with Peru.
III. The Falklands episode will fade quickly in Central
America, primarily because the-area is caught up in its
own crisis and--despite some support for Argentina and
criticism of the US--depends heavily on Washington.
-- In El Salvador, US support will remain the most
critical element in the effort to avert Communist
takeover.
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-- In Hon- d _, the Falklands aftermath coincides with
growing local perceptions of US unreliability, but
this view will persist only in the absence of US
assistance, not because of the Falklands.
In Guatemala, the Falklands has permitted the new
government to reassert its claim to the former
British colony of Belize, but direct action is
unlikely; President Rios Montt hopes for a
resumption of US aid in the growing war with
guerrillas.
Nicaragua was antagonistic toward the US before the
Falklands, which simply provided another
opportunity to criticize Washington and seek wider
acceptance among fellow Latin countries.
Suriname's ties with Cuba have expanded rapidly
over the last few months. Army strongman Daysi
Bouterse, who secretly visited Havana in May, is
turning toward Cuba because he is attempting to
consolidate his Power base and finds Cuban models
and advice appropriate to his needs.
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Southern Africa Briefing for PFIAB
I. In southern Africa, there is increased political
maneuvering over the Namibia issue. All the parties to
the negotiations will begin gathering in New York next
week to discuss the modalities of a ceasefire and
elections, but the question of a Cuban troop withdrawal
from Angola has emerged as an overriding issue.
-- South Africa has shown flexibility on many
outstanding issues, but demands a Cuban withdrawal
from Angola as a condition for a settlement.
-- We believe that Angola wants a settlement to end
South African military pressure, but the government
there may be too weak and divided to carry through
on President dos Santos' apparent willingness to
trade withdrawal of at least some Cubans for a
settlement.
-- The Soviets see important geopolitical benefits
from their continued involvement in Angola, and
various clandestine and diplomatic sources have
reported consistent Soviet efforts to obstruct
settlement efforts.
II. Meanwhile, in Mozambique President Machel's Marxist
regime is shaky, largely because of its inability to
contain a South African-backed insurgent group.
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Although Machel continues to maintain close ties
with his traditional military suppliers, the Soviet
Union and its allies, he recently has made
overtures to the West, including the US, in the
hope that these countries might rein in Pretoria.
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