COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES STUDY COMPLETED--NSC NEXT WEEK.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102700001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 July 82
In-house
Counterintelligence capabilities study completed--NSC next week.
- Hostile intel threat growing in size, aggressiveness, sophistication
- Falling behind in ability to cover--Sovs tasking proxies--PRC
- In place recruitments--FBI here--CIA abroad--have offset lag in
ability to detect, conduct surveillance, investigate foreign agents
- Highly vulnerable to Soviet--polygraph--indications of interest
- Many vulnerabilities in personnel, physical, communications, computer,
industrial security, open collection, active measures, technology
threat
- Measures to reduce threat--limit presence, restrict travel, FOIA,
lift restrictions on information available for personnel investi-
gations
- Net assessments--presence, communications
- Enhanced capabilities--more FBI agents and CIA case officers
full-time CI referents in key stations, substantial beefing up
and broadening of CI analysis, additional technical support to
FBI, CIA, DoD to make officers more productive
- Resource requirements yet to be developed by agencies--protective
security, large funds upward of half a billion a year, counter-
intelligence--steady buildup over 5 years--200 FBI, 100 CIA, 300 DoD
Major products under way include a study on Soviet life and society--first
draft at a comprehensive look at living standards, health, alcoholism, ethnic,
dissidence, labor, consumers (long-term)
Estimates on arms control monitoring capabilities (1979)--Soviet objective
in arms control (1971)--nuclear proliferation world-wide (early seventies)
Estimates on post-Falkland-Lebanon developments in arms production, arms
market, and modernization of military arsenals around the world.
The implication of the Falklands crisis for other territorial disputes
in Latin America. An updating of last year's estimate of potential instabilities
around the world in the light of new tensions arising from events in Lebanon,
Iran, and the Falklands and economic pressures in the Third World.
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An estimate called the Atlantic Bridge diagnosis and prognosis, which
will be the first broad Community-wide look at the pressures and prospects
for the Atlantic Alliance in a good many years. We also have in draft
across-the-board estimates on the Soviet challenge to US security interests
and on the USSR in the Third World, both of these being scheduled for
completion sometime in the fall. Narrow estimates are due
economic relations, the Philippines, the Caribbean, Zaire,
the political succession in China, Soviet ballistic missile defense, Soviet
civil defense, reliability of the Warsaw Pact allies, and Soviet space
programs.
To keep us from going stale, I, together with our Arms Control Staff,
am scheduled for a three-hour briefing of the General Advisory Committee on
Arms Control tomorrow morning. Next week John McMahon is scheduled to testify
before the Senate Intelligence Committee on intelligence support for our anti-
narcotics effort worldwide and I am scheduled to brief the House Intelligence
Committee on Soviet active measures, forgeries, disinformation and propaganda
campaigns, etc.
I believe I had delivered to you a summary report on a survey conducted
on the reaction to intelligence products of 100-odd senior intelligence
consumers of the Carter Administration. They seem to be asking for conflicting
views, not watered down consensus, more predictive estimates, careful definition
and assessment of reasonable alternative outcomes, more timely estimates, not
too soon and not too late. That's pretty much what we have been trying to
do through the new estimating procedures, functioning of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board, the weekly Watch Report designed to force recurring judgments
on likely developments in situations deemed to be critical.
Today the live tie to intelligence consumers comes from participation in
NSC and Cabinet meetings and the daily briefing of NSC principals followed by
a daily conference which the briefers and editors of the President's Daily
Brief have with me for the purpose of defining the live issues and making
assignments for the next day's PDB and briefings. All this is reinforced
by the dispatch of special written material prior to NSC meetings and oral
presentation at the NSC table. I found interesting that the user survey
indicated 70% of senior officials report actual use of intelligence while in
the case of Assistant Secretaries intelligence is filtered through their staff
and mixed with policy views into working papers. This report has led us to
consider some change in the formal requirements system which, as expressed in
the National Intelligence Topics, has become quite sterile. We plan to bring
key policymakers into developing Terms of Reference for estimates and improve
the system for distributing intelligence products in order to minimize delays
and assure attention. We welcome any suggestions on these products by your
review of this report.
I have come to the opinion that further improvement in the value and
quality of intelligence is most likely to be achieved not so much by improving
the relationship between consumers and producers as by moving analysts to
more assiduously and specifically task the collectors. We have a very
productive and far-flung apparatus. I am rather pleased with the job we are
doing in determining the issues of key national security interest on which
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that apparatus needs to be focused. What can be improved is the collection
of additional information to make that analysis more solid and substantiated
and it's the experts who are doing the analysis who can best define the raw
material they need and the special taskings for ammunition. Outside of
overhead photography, tasking is not nearly as prolific as it should be and as
the apparatus can deliver.
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The Soviets seem to be set back by Middle East developments. They have
been careful not to let themselves get drawn in, to the disappointment of their
PLO and Syrian dependents. The Israeli devastation of their vaunted T-72
tanks, MIG aircraft and SAMs has given their military equipment a black eye
and must cause their military leadership considerable worry. Brezhnev seems
to be losing his grip. Several East European sources tell us that he can
work only two hours a day. Andropov seems to be heading the struggle for
succession. Incidentally, we were a little encouraged by a pretty reliable
report that Andropov has been displeased with the foreign intelligence
produced by the KGB. He thinks that too many of their officers are more
interested in not getting into any trouble which could cost them their
relatively soft life abroad than they are in producing good intelligence for
the Politburo. Economic developments in Eastern Europe and a financial
squeeze on the Soviet Union cannot give the Politburo any cause for satis-
faction either.
In Poland, a political stalemate prevails with the government unable
to impose its will, Solidarity and the Church unwilling to accept total
surrender, creating a situation which results in sporadic demonstrations and
government use of force. Industrial production has stabilized at about
60 percent of capacity.
In South America, the aftermath of the Falklands does not appear to be
as bad as we thought it would be. In Argentina the diehard sentiment for
continuing hostilities seems to be quite isolated. The military needs to
concentrate its energy on holding a government together and does not seem
to be either free or have the appetite to act on the Beagle Channel dispute
in a way which we had feared could bring Chile, Peru and Ecuador into military
action on territorial disputes running up the west coast of South America.
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In Central America, the military situation in El Salvador seems at the
moment to be stabilized at about the level it had reached before the election.
The government is a little stronger militarily and the guerrillas more divided
and short of ammunition. But the supply line from Nicaragua into El Salvador
is still in use. The big change is a successful civilian government in
Honduras with a subordinated military strong enough to put military units
in blocking positions to help the Salvadoran government forces in dealing
with the guerrillas close to Honduran borders and to continue support of
Nicaraguan dissidents. Continued Honduran support of US policy in the area
can fade away quickly if US did not come through with needed economic and
military support and President Suazo may be in trouble if he comes to
Washington next week and has to return empty-handed. The key developments
are Nicaragua, where internal resistance is growing, and exiled forces in
Costa Rica and Honduras are becoming more aggressive, and are gaining support
in both Latin American and European nations. The international support which
the Sandinistas had enjoyed is fading away. In toto, it's still a mixed
picture but more encouraging than it was six months ago.
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