SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE, 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102690026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 22, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

22 April 1982
SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE, 1982
Throughout the world there are currently nearly 50 countries in which
the Soviets have some degree of actual or potential leverage. Out of this
group:
-- There are eight countries now under total Soviet domination.
-- Six countries actively act as Soviet proxies.
-- Eighteen countries are under a significant degree of Soviet presence
and/or influence.
.Twelve countries are facing insurgency supported by the Soviets
and/or one or more of their proxies in one degree or another.
Three countries (Iran, Madagascar,,- and Ghana) are rated as highly
unstable and vulnerable to Soviet influence.
Ten countries, in addition to being in one of the above categories,
have a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets.
These thumbnail evaluations indicate how our analysts evaluate the state
of play in these countries.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
.Soviet Domination
Afghanistan: Soviet domination of the country is enforced by the
presence of about 105,000 Soviet troops, who are essential to the
survival of the Babrak government. The Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, signed in December 1978, was used to help legalize the
Soviet. invasion and continuing occupation of the country. The
devasted Afghan economy depends heavily on Soviet assistance-
.Afghanistan is used as a base to destabilize Pakistan.
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Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy
Libya: The Soviet Union is the primary source of Libyan military hard-
ware. In 1981 Libyan military purchases from the USSR amounted to an
estimated $1 billion. There are at least 1,400 Soviet military advisers
in Libya, as well as some 1,000 civilian workers. This military capa-
bility and Libyan money are active in subversion and backing insurgencies
throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Central America. The Soviet
Union probably has little direct influence over Libyan policies, although
it possesses some leverage by supplying sophisticated weapo
tacitly consents to the uses to which these weapons are put
South'Yemen: Since the formation of the Marxist government in 1976,
the Soviets have-supplied arms valued at over $1 billion, practically
all of South Yemen's military equipment, and have been a substantial
donor of economic assistance amounting to-$200 million. The Soviets
have access to air and naval facilities as well as storage and communi-
cations installations.
Through South Yemen, the Soviets provide indirect support for the
National Democratic Forces (NDF) operating in North Yemen attempting
to promote a pro-Soviet government in Sana. Similarly, the Soviets
sponsor the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) seeking
to overthrow Sultan Qaboos.
Currently there are 1,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians in
South Yemen, and an additional 500 Cubans and 100 East Europeans.
Although the government of South Yemen appears firmly entrenched, the
Soviets probably would resist any threat to its control there.
The Soviets consider the October 1979 Soviet-Yemeni Friendship Treaty
a significant foreign policy success that expands their interests in
the Arabian Peninsula. It also represents for the Soviets evidence
of progress in the worldwide ideological struggle.
From South Yemen insurgents are supported in North Yemen, Oman, and
Somalia.
In August 1981 South Yemen'concludedla Soviet-blessed tripartite
allia ya and' Ethiopia aimed at Sudan, Somalia, and North
Yemen 25X1
Soviet Presence and/or Influence
Syria: The Soviet Union is the primary supplier of military equip-
ment to Syria. In both 1980 and 1981 Syria purchased some $1.5 to
$2 billion worth of military hardware from the USSR. There are from
3000 to 3,500 Soviet military advisers in Syria, as well as 3000
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 civilian technicians. In 1980 about 16 percent of Syria's total
foreign trade, or $1 billion, was with Soviet Bloc countries. Syria
and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
in October 1980. Syria would like to interpret the treaty as one
element of a strategic alliance between the two countries but Moscow
is wary of committing itself to Syria's defense 25X1
Algeria: In the past the USSR was almost the sole supplier of military
equipment to Algeria. More recently, Algeria has begun to move toward
a more nonaligned posture and is seeking to diversify sources of military
.supplies. There are some 1,500 Soviet military advisers in Algeria, -
but that number may be slowly diminishing. The Soviet Union has been
heavily involved in a variety of Algerian economic development projects
for a number of years, and provides technical expertise and limited
financial assistance. Algerian officials traditionally have resisted
Soviet efforts to influence Algerian policy 25X1
Ira : There are currently 500 Soviet military advisers and 5,000
civilian advisers in Iraq spread throughout the economy. Despite
political differences, Soviet military deliveries in 1981 to Iraq
were nearly $1 billion. The only nations that received more Soviet
military supplies in 1981 were Syria and Libya.
In April 1972 Iraq signed a 15-year renewable friendship treaty with
the Soviets which calls for a consultation if Iraq is threatened.
Soviet relations with Iraq have been on a decline, however, due to
Soviet expansion in the region, the Soviet's neutral position on the
Iran/Iraq war, and Iraqi suspicions that the Soviets are working with
Iraqi communists to subvert the regime.
India: India's 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviets reflects Moscow's
longstanding -importance ' to New Delhi as a source of arms and technology
for weapons production, economic assistance for key public sector
industries, and diplomatic support on critical issues such as India's
conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. Soviet support for India's
communist parties and the extensive Soviet propaganda program in
India are points of friction between the two states. New Delhi is
attempting to improve relations with the West in order-to bolster its
sagging credibility as a nonaligned state. The Soviets are seeking
to utilize India as a military threat and base for sending insurgents
into Pakistan as part of its effort to intimidate Pakistan for supplying
Afghan rebels.
Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy
Morocco/Western Sahara: Since 1975 Morocco has been involved in a war
with the Polisario Front over control of the former Spanish colony of
Western Sahara. The conflict threatens Morocco itself only as a de-
stabilizing force together with dissidents in Casablanca and other
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cities. In addition, Polisario guerrillas occasionally conduct raids
against targets in southern Morocco. The Polisario Front has received
the bulk of its Soviet-origin weapons and other material from Algeria
and Libya.
Sudan (that a major Soviet goal in the 25X1
region is Ule m0Vd1 aipr r?t regimes in Sudan and Egypt as
steps toward dominati of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf
oil fields conviction is buttressed by the fact that Libya25X1
which he views as a Soviet surrogate,'is financing and 'sponsoring
cross-border terrorist and sabotage operations against Sudan from
Ethiopia. Recently Ethiopia has begun cooperating more freely with
Libya against Sudan and is allowi - ed Sudanese dissidents 25X1
to operate from bases in Ethiopia
Pakistan: The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, traditional
enmity between Pakistan and India--Moscow's friend--and Soviet support
of insurgents among the Baluch and other minority groups, threaten the
long-term viability of.the Pakistani state. The Soviets currently
denounce Pakistan for aiding the resistance in Afghanistan and imply
that they may take strong countermeasures against Pakistani interests.
Oman: The Popular Front for the-Liberation of Oman (PFLO) based in
Soviet-backed South Yemen, operates in Oman's Southermost Dhofar
Province. Oman's British-led troops required Iranian and Jordanian
assistance to defeat a PFLO insurgency in 1975.
North Yemen: The South Yemeni-backed NOF occupies much of southeast North
North Yemen and threatens the political stability of North Yemen through
guerrilla operations against government,forces.
Highly Unstable and Vulnerable to Soviet Influence
Iran: The Iranian revolution is still unwinding and ultimate control
of the government remains undecided. This inherent instability
combines with some key. Soviet advantages: geographic proximity, on-
going economic and military aid, a very large diplomatic presence,
and a local communist party, as well as Iran's unabated hostility to
Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy-
Ethiopia: Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The Mengistu regime has granted the Soviets access to certain
naval and air facilities in return for military assistance. The Soviet
navy uses Dahlak Island and Soviet aircraft stage naval reconnaissance
flights from Asmara. Moscow has supplied Addis Ababa with more than
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$2 billion worth of military equipment, training, and other aid. The
Soviet-equipped Ethiopian forces are employed against internal insurgencies;
Ethiopia votes with the Soviets in international bodies, but does not now
act militarily as a Soviet proxy elsewhere in Africa. Ethiopian efforts
to destabilize the pro-Western regines in neighboring Sudan and Somalia
converge with Soviet interests, and are supported b Libya, Ethiopia's
ally in the Soviet-encouraged Aden Pact of 1981 25X1
Soviet Presence and/or Influence
Angola: The Soviets and their allies are providing extensive military
assistance to the government of Angola, which is fighting a war against
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents and providing bases and logistics for
SWAPO's insurgency in Namibia, while trying to defend against South
African operations against SWAPO sanctuaries in southern Angola. There
are some 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola as well
as about 1,200 Soviet and 400 East European military advisers. The
USSR is by far Angola's primary source of military equipment and training.
The USSR and noola sin d a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in
October 1976 25X1
Mozambique: The government of Mozanbique is embroiled in a war against
South African-backed insurgents and relies heavily on Soviet military
aid. There are around 500 Soviet and 800 Cuban military advisers in
Mozambique, and the USSR in Mozambique's main source of.military equip-
ment. The USSR and Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation in March 1977 25X1
Zambia: The USSR has been Zambia's principal military supplier since
1977, and the military relationship has deepened considerably over the
past several years. An arms accord worth at least $200 million was
concluded in 1979- The Soviets have approximately 50 military advisers
in Zambia 25X1
Tanzania: Tanzania relies on the USSR for the bulk of its military
equipment, although it is trying to diversify its sources of military
aid in order to reduce its dependence on the Soviets. There are
approximately 125 Soviet military advisers in the country 2 X1
Congo: Soviet influence is exerted primarily through military assistance.
The USSR is Congo's largest military arms supplier and has provided 120
military advisers and 12 MIG-21 aircraft.. The Congolese signed a watered
down friendship treaty with the Soviets in May 1981
sought naval access and base rights in Pointe Noire 2X1
Mali: The USSR has been Mali's primary source of military equipment.
From 1976 to 1980 Moscow reportedly delivered over $105 million in
military hardware to Bamako. Mali reportedly recently received two
MIG-21s from the Soviets and ex ects more in the near term. There
are 180 Soviet advisers in Peal i 25X1
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Guinea: The Soviet Union is the chief supplier of the Guinean military,
providing virtually all arms, training, and most technical and military
advisers. The USSR continues to be Guinea's primary trading partner and.
furnishes the majority of foreign instructors in Guinean universities.
There are some 50.Soviet military advisers in Conakry 25X1
Benin: The USSR is the principal supplier of arms to Marxist-oriented
Benin and has some 90 military advisers and civilian technicians in
the country. Several cabinet and military officers are considered
to be under Soviet influence. Benin allows Libya a fairly free hand
in the country which is a growing base for Libyan subversion in the
region. President Kerekou recently ousted a number of far leftists
from his government, fearing among other thi plans
to replace him with a more malleable leader. 25X1
Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy
Namibia: The South-West Africa People's Organization has been fighting
for the independence of Namibia since 1966. Operating out of Angola,
SWAPO receives arms, money, and training from the Soviet Union and
its surrogates, particularly Cuba and East Germany 25X1
Zaire: The main insurgent threat in Zaire comes from the Angola- and
Zambia-based Front for the National Liberation of the Congo, which
invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and again in 1978. Members of
the Front have received training from Cuban military advisers in Angola,
and there are reports indicating that the USSR is providing material
to the Front in preparation for another, intrusion into the Shaba.
Chad: The USSR was never directly involved in Chad's 17-year-old civil
war, but Moscow did eventually endorse Libya's military intervention in
Chad in late 1980 and quietly sent a small number of military technicians
there to help main-:ain Libya's Soviet-manufactured aircraft and armored
Vehicles. The Soviets recently have seemed concerned that a victory by
rebel leader Habre will lead to a resurgence of Western influence.
Moscow has. moved to strengthen ties with beleagured President Goukouni's
regime, is considering-reopening the Soviet embassy in N'Djamena, and
is trying to arrange for the overland transport of limited arms to
Goukouni via the Congo and Central African Republic. There is a con-
tinyting thy-02+ Libya will resume'occupation of portions of Chad. 25X1
iad regime, an important U.S. supporter in the Gulf of
Aden area, is challenged by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front,
a 3,000-man force controlled by Ethiopia and funded by Libya. The
narrowly based Front would not pose a serious security threat in the
absence of outside aid. Libyan aid in the form of training, cash grants,
and equipment--including tanks and APCs--totalled about $10 million
last year. Moscow reportedly maintains close ties to political activists
in the SSDF, is recruiting Somali exiles for the Front in Europe, and
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for a time last year provided the Front with a few advisers. But
Moscow is reluctant to become directly identified with the Front,
and for this r son favors Libyan and Ethiopian efforts to aid the
SSD
Highly Unstable and'Vulnerable to-Soviet-Influence
Ghana: Ghana's instability lies primarily in its mismanaged and
deteriorating economy and, since the Rawlings coup, the destruction
of its administrative and military infrastructure. The.Rawlings
government has blamed the country's ills on neo-colonialism and
Western imperialism and has sought unsuccessfully to attract sub-
stantial new economic assistance from the Soviets, East Europeans,
and the Libyans.; The Soviets are dubious of Rawlings' survival,
but their influence could.grow if he becomes firmly e
if. a more socialist-oriented regime-came to power 5X1
Madagascar: The instability of the Malagasy government results
from the Island's desperate economic straits. The Ratsiraka regime,
threatened by endemic urban unrest and alleged coup plotting in the
army, has been further weakened recently by its inability to deal with
the aftermath of several months of cyclones, torrential rains, and
heavy flooding. The Soviets have attempted to exploit their position
as Madagascar's main source of weapons and military training by
pressing for access to naval and air facilities at Diego Suarez.
President Ratsiraka, hoping for najor economic aid from the West,
continues to put them off, but he or a successor migh e
Soviets military access if the West does not respond.I 25X1
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
Soviet Supported Aggressor/Proxy
Cuba: The Soviet Union has probably maintained ground force units
in Cuba continuously in some form since.1962. The military presence
performs multiple functions serving the Soviets as well as the Cubans.
The Soviet advisory mission in Cuba is commanded by a Colonel-General,
a recent upgrading of this position. The Soviet Military Advisory
Group of about 2,000-2,500 is headquartered in the Havana area. About
1,500 Soviet military personnel are assigned to the Soviet communi-
cations intercept facility at Lourdes. The Soviet Brigade, which has
a strength of 2,800-3,000 is headquartered near Santiago de las Vegas.
The brigade consists of four maneuver battalions--one tank and three
motorized rifle units--plus combat support elements. The brigade
provides a symbol of Soviet commitment to the Castro regime, some
portion of it provides security at Lourdes, a 'pate in 25X1
training exercises in Cuban military elements
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There may be as many as 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba.
They provide management guidance, economic training, technical
assistance to various Cuban ministries and many industrial projects
including Cuba's nuclear power plant. Over 400 technicians are helping
the expansion of the Cuban nickel industry in eastern Cuba. Soviets
also provide ideological. and oraanizatinr,al assistance to various 25X1
enti
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government
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Nicaragua: There are some 100 to 125 Soviet personnel in-country, of
whom about 45 to 50 are military advisers reportedly assigned to the
Nicaraguan Armed Forces General Staff and the Sandinista Air Force.
Most Soviet military aid to Nicaragua is sent through Cuba, Algeria,
and other third countries. Deliveries so far include T-55 tanks,
BM-21 rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and
anti-aircraft weapons. In addition, Moscow has directly delivered
to Nicara ua two MI-8 helicopters and six AN-2 light transport
aircraft.
Soviet Presence and/or Influence
Peru: Peru remains by far the largest purchaser of Soviet arms in
South America, and the approximately 350 Soviets in Peru comprise
the largest Soviet presence in Latin America outside of Cuba. Since
1972 Lima has purchased over $1 billion worth of Soviet eugipment,
including SU-22 jet fighters, ZSU-23/4 anti-aricraft and gun, systems,
MI-6, MI-8, and MI-25 helicopters, some 260 T-55 tanks, as well as trucks
and artillery. In addition, the Soviets and the East Europeans have
extended some $500 million in economic aid since 1976. Lima's reliance
on Moscow for arms influences its foreign policy on matters directly
related'to the USSR and Cuba, but the military and economic aid have
not given the SnAd oncomitant influence in Peruvian domestic 25X1
politics
Threatened by Insurgency backed by Soviets or Proxy
El Salvador: Moscow has-confined its direct involvement to encouraging
the formation of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, the insurgent's
umbrella organization headed by a 15-member ruling body made up of
three representatives from each of the five guerrilla factions.
Indirectly, however, the Soviets are closely collaborating with Havana
on the flow of Eastern and Western arms to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas
have therefore been able to free-up many of their Western-manufactured
arms--captured durin the victory over Somoza--for use in El Salvador
by the insurgents. (S NF NC OC)
Guatemala: Soviet contacts have focused largely on the orthodox
Communist Party. The USSR has been instrumental in persuading that
group to join the insurgency and is providing funds and paramilitary
training to its members. As in El Salvador, the Soviets have promoted
unity between the four active insurgent groups 25X1
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Colombia: Since 1980, the Colombian government has confronted sharply
increased activity by Cuban-supported revolutionary groups. At least
400 M-19 guerrillas--about half the current active strength of the
organization--have received some training in Cuba. In addition, the
Castro regime has helped the guerrillas to purchase and transport arms
into Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is
the paramilitary arm of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia
(PCC), and is one of the most effective and long-lived of the guerrilla
organizations now active in Colombia. The FARC is responsive to the
PCC but is not subservient; some of its top leaders have received
training in Moscow. In addition, the FARC receives some aid and training
from Cuba. Cuban efforts to get the various guerrilla groups to unite
thus far have foundered on mutual rivalries and suspicions.1 125X1
EAST ASIA
Soviet Supported Agressor/Proxy
Vietnam: The Soviets provide massive amounts of military and economic
aid to Hanoi. Deliveries of the military equipment (more than $1 billion
worth in 1979 and about half that amount in each of the following two
years) have enabled Hanoi to quadruple the size of its forces opposite
China and have helped, arm the more than 150,000 Vietnamese occupation
force in Kampuchea. The Soviets provided some $800 million in economic
aid to Vietnam last year, and Soviet civilian advisers--some 5,000 of
them--work.in almost every civilian and military institution in Vietnam.
The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on
3 November 1978.
Soviet Presence and/or Influence
Laos: The Soviets also deliver large amounts of economic and military
aid to Laos, much of it funneled through Vietnam. There are about
1,000 Soviet advisers-in Laos, and hundreds of Laotian students receive
training in Soviet bloc Countries in administrative, technical, or
military skills.
Kampuchea: The Soviets have provided economic, military and logistical
support to the Vietnamese-backed regime in Kampuchea. Anxious to have
greater control over their aid program, the Soviets plan to increase
the level of project aid--and probably advisers--going to Kampuchea.
There are probably about 300-400 Soviet civilian advisers now in Kampuchea.
North Korea: The Soviet Union, like China, has a mutual defense pact with
North Korea, signed in 1961. Moscow has not supplied any major weapons
systems to Pyongyang since 1974, although North Korea continues to receive
spare parts for the equipment supplied in earlier years. There are perhaps
100 or so Soviet economist specialists and technicians in North Korea.
Although we are not aware of any Soviet military advisers, a small number
may be present to oversee the supply of spare parts. North Korea
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undoubtedly would like to receive more Soviet military equipment,
especially modern fighter aircraft and missile systems. But
President Kim I1-song's insistence on preserving his freedom of
action evidently has served to dampen Moscow's enthusiasm for
responding to P'yongyang's needs.
Soviet Domination
GDR: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.
Poland: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Small Soviet troop presence..
Czechoslovakia: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.
Hungary: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. Soviet troop presence.
Bulgaria: Member of CEMA and Warsaw Pact. No Soviet troop presence.
Romania: Member of CEVA and Warsaw Pact. No Soviet troop presence.
Independent foreign policy.
Soviet Presence or Influence
Yugoslavia: Not a member of CEMA or Warsaw Pact and no Soviet troops.
Soviet trading partner. Communist government. Nonaligned foreign policy.
Finland: 1948 treaty commits Finland to oppose--with Soviet assistance
if necessary--any attempt to invade Finland or the USSR via Finland.
25X1
One-fifth of Finnish exports go to USSR.
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