MATERIAL FOR MEETING WITH PFIAB, 12 MAY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102690002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 7, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
SUBJECT Material for Meeting with PFIAB, 12 May 1982
1. Attached is the information and material which I have collected
from the CIA and various NFIB agencies for your meeting with the PFIAB
on Wednesday.
2. Based on a draft prepared by DDI, I pulled together your
presentation which includes references to your recent trips, the maps
showing Soviet influence and presence, and some of the issues and develop-
ments in the Intelligence Community. I am under no illusion that I have
included everything that you might want to say, but I believe you have a
good basis for structuring your presentation.
3. I envision that at the meeting you will want to pass out to each `\' ~s?''w~,
member copies of the maps showing Soviet influence and presence as well ~_l,I,~
as copies of the recently published unclassified report on Soviet Acquisitions (~
of Western Technolo If you concur, we will have 20 copies of this ~~~
material availab a to pass out. ~'''~
4. You may find useful the summary of Community interaction with
the PFIAB since January 1982 (Tab C). This will give you a feel for the
variety of issues individual PFIAB members have been investigating.
5. Included for your review also is a copy of the presentation you
gave to the PFIAB on 13 January.
6. The rest of the material consists of the inputs from various
Intelligence Community components. You may wish to glance at them to see
if anything strikes you which I have failed to pick up.
7. Please let me know on Monday if there is anything else you wish
to have in hand for this meeting. John McMahon will have a copy of the
same materials.
cc: DOCI
Executive Director
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7 May 1982
DCI Presentation to the PFIAB
12 May 1982
I am told that since we last met in mid-January, you have been busy
corporately and individually examining various aspects of our intelligence
activities. I trust that you have found community components responsive and
cooperative, and I look forward to hearing your comments.
Since we last met, much has happened on the world scene. I will come
back to that in a moment. There also have been some important developments
affecting the Intelligence Community. Most notable was the announced
retirement of my Deputy, Bobby Inman, which unfortunately has received much
play in the press. Let me assure you that Bobby's departure about this
time was anticipated from the outset:. As you probably have read, he has
for some time been eager to launch a new career in the private sector. His
tenure as my Deputy was a successful one, and we were able to achieve many
of the goals we outlined for ourselves for the first year.
Bobby will be missed, but it is my pleasure to introduce to you his
very able and experienced successor, John McMahon. John, as you know, has
held a variety of senior positions 'in the CIA and Intelligence Community.
As the current Executive Director of the CIA, he is well positioned to move
into the Deputy slot. I do not anticipate that we will skip a beat during
the transition. Assuming a speedy confirmation by the Congress, John is
set to relieve Bobby on or about the 4th of June.
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-- Eighteen countries are under a significant degree of Soviet
presence and/or influence.
-- Twelve countries are facing insurgency supported by the Soviets
and/or one or more of their proxies in one degree or another.
-- Three countries (Iran, Madagascar, and Ghana) are rated as
highly unstable and vulnerable to Soviet influence.
-- Ten countries, in addition to being in one of the above categories,
have a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets.
You have attached to the map some thumbnail evaluations showing how CIA
analysts evaluate the state of play in these various countries.
The second map compares today's situation with 1972. It is quite
obvious that the Soviets, despite some setbacks, have succeeded in expand-
ing significantly their presence and influence during the past decade. The
number of countries, in which they have significant influence, has doubled.
The resulting Soviet influence in countries like Syria, Ethiopia, Angola,
South Yemen, India and ~licaragua, among others, will continue to cause
difficulties for us and for friendly governments throughout the Third
World. Indeed, a number of Soviet friends act both as surrogates for the
USSR and, in the cases of Cuba, Libya, and PLO and Syria, as conduits for
Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that undertake terrorism.
Returning to the Middle East, Israeli forces remain in strength in
the north and on the Golan; almost any act of terrorism could bring them
into Lebanon again. The West Bank remains volatile as the deep-seated
feelings, on all sides, continue to fester. Syria scraps with Iraq which
hangs on against Iran. The moderates--Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt--are
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torn between their desire for US support and a need to protect their
domestic backsides against troublemaking by the Palestinians or the radical
states. Libya continues its troublemaking throughout the region reaching
from the Western Sahara to Pakistan. Sudan feels particularly threatened
by Libyan and Ethiopian backed insurgents.
Despite insurgent and Indo-Soviet pressure on Pakistan, support for
the Afghan resistance continues uninterrupted. My visit
convinced me that continued Western support will prevent the USSR
from successfully sucking Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit, despite the
fact that the size of the Soviet force has grown since last year.
In sub-Saharan Africa, conditions remain volatile. For most of
these countries, the global recession, slowed exports, and tightening aid
disbursements have sharply raised the already high risk of economic
disaster. For many, sporadic military action, aging national leaders,
and/or growing factionalism invite heightened Libyan, Soviet, or Cuban
adventurism. In southern Africa, frustration is mounting over the
Namibia stalemate. Areas of concern for the US over the next half year
are likely to include the fall of a pro-Western government in Mauritius
next month, the scheduled OAU pullout from Chad (also in June}, recur-
ring South African military incursions into Angola, seriously deepening
economic problems in Zaire and Zambia, and growing financial and pre-
election tensions in Nigeria.
We are also concerned about the economic and internal political
problems of our friends in the Horn of Africa. Any weakening of the
regimes in Sudan, Somalia, or Kenya would undermine our efforts to off-
set the strong Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia.
 Meanwhile, prospects for the pro-Western Central American governments
have improved somewhat over the past months due to the guerrillas' political
and military failure evidenced by the March 1982 election in E1 Salvador,
and the actions of the Rios-Montt government in Guatemala. While a
combination of effective intelligence and better military tactics
served to reduce the damage caused by guerrilla operations in E1 Salvador
this year, they remain a strong threat, as do the 4,000-5,000 guerrillas
in Guatemala. We expect Cuba and I`Jicaragua to use the next months to
build up the military and political power of the guerrilla forces in both
countries while continuing to use terrorism and propaganda to intimidate
Honduras and Costa Rica into a position of neutralism or even tacit
acceptance of guerrilla support networks on their territory. Despite
the boost to the anti-Sandinista forces by the recent statements by
Pastora, Nicaragua has intensified its repression of the genuinely
democratic groups while continuing its export of subversion and the
military buildup. Meanwhile, Soviet arms shipments to Cuba are running
at a higher level than any time since the missile crisis. P1any of these
weapons are new and sophisticated. Some are intended for transshipment
to Central America; others will free older Cuban weapons for transshipment.
I must, of course, say a few words about the Soviet Union--our number
one priority. The Soviet leadership is in the midst of a succession; that
is the meaning of all the unkind press stories about grezhnev's relatives,
the proliferation of Moscow rumors, and the shifting protocol standings of
Politburo leaders, most dramatically brought out by varied appearances on
the Kremlin reviewing stand.
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in early April that Brezhnev would. make a public appearance in 3-4 weeks.
This was borne out at the Lenin Day ceremonies on 22 April and at Niay Day.
It appears that of the earlier leading candidates, Kirilenko may be too old
and in poor health, while Chernenk.o may have peaked too soon. There seem
to be two principal candidates left in the field, Andropov and Gorbachev,
the dark-horse young agriculture chief. If I had to pick a bet, it would
be the former on the nose and the latter across the board.
Soviet economic performance remains dismal. Nard currency shortages
are affecting not only purchases in the West, but traditional support for
troubled East European economies. Even if Soviet agricultural output
recovers from several terrible years, slower growth in the labor force,
declining productivity, and poor prospects in the energy field are
systematic problems that are likely to worsen.
We see the results in a variety of ways--cutbacks for the consumer,
tougher terms for the East Europeans and third world aid recipients, and
the high priority given to the export gas pipeline to Western Europe.
We cannot say that we have seen effect of economic stringency on the
defense budget which we believe will continue to grow at a rate of 4
percent a year, taking an even larger share of GNP than it does now. The
Soviets are still in Afghanistan, seeking to improve their capability
vis-a-vis China and NATO and are deeply concerned about the resources the
US is committing to defense.
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Our recently published strategic forces estimate gives the USSR the
capability to destroy close to 80 percent of our Minuteman silos today and
over 90 percent by 1990. Strategic defenses are moving forward as well,
with vastly improved air defenses being deployed, and the potential for
deployment of a large-scale ABM system beyond the Moscow area. The potential
capability of the latter is uncertain.
Meanwhile, some 300 operational SS-20s plus other improved intermediate
systems pose a particular threat to Europe, and, of course, account for the
Soviet reluctance to accept the President's zero option proposal.
Moscow is continuing to build up the capabilities of its already
formidable conventional ground anti air forces, both those opposite NATO
and those positioned for contingencies in the P1iddle East. Our most
recent estimate on military issues in the Middle East credits the Soviets
with the capability to mount a fulll-scale invasion of Iran to the Persian
Gulf (involving some 20 divisions after a month's preparation) with no
significant reinforcement from either their NATO or Sino-Soviet border
fronts. In short, the Soviets can simultaneously threaten Western Europe
and the Persian Gulf.
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The Soviet military buildup, combined with weak resistance, has also
encouraged Soviet activities in the Third World. Using proxies and a
diversified arsenal of arms sales, military training, support for internal
security forces, logistical assistance, propaganda and economic aid, the
USSR, as we have seen, continues to foster and exploit indigenous unrest
in many regions.
Finally, Poland remains a problem and an enigma. The Soviets have
continued to be uneasy about the internal situation and the ability of
the regime to cope. Violence had been promised, but all observers seemed
to have been somewhat uncertain as to what form it would take. The military
regime seems to have been especially surprised by the willingness of the
Polish people to risk life and limb on behalf of the freedom they lost
with martial laa~. The regime showed, however, that it is willing to use
whatever force is required to maintain its control. This problem will
not go away, and the authorities in Warsaw must now reevaluate their
policy on the pace of easing martial law restrictions.
Let me turn now to some of our recent activities in the Intelligence
Community.
-- We recently launched a new counterintelligence stud through
the SIG (I) in response to the White House's desire to have
a comprehensive review of the foreign intelligence threat to
the US.
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-- Meanwhile, the CIA is working on its program to beef up our
counterterrorism capabilities. During my recent trip, I
stopped in Paris and Rome to discuss terrorism and improve
our coordination with the local services.
-- Efforts in the technology transfer area continue, but there
is more to be done. I understand that you have received
copies of our recently published unclassified and "non-
attributed" study on Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology.
The French, by the way, have become increasingly sensitized
to this issue.
-- We are maintaining the momentum in implementing the Intelli-
gence Community's lon -ranee intelligence plans. Future
needs, collection assets and support capabilities are being
molded into a strategic plan. Meanwhile, CIA recruitment is
going well--recently we reached our FY 82 authorized ceiling
of 15,568. We are seeking OMB concurrence to begin slipping
up to our higher FY 83 proposed ceiling.
-- The new Executive Order on the classification of information
was approved by the President and becomes effective on 1 August.
It includes a presumption that there will be damage to the
national security if sources and methods are disclosed. It
also permits classification until any doubt is resolved. Qoth
of these measures are a big improvement.
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-- Our Identities Legislation is now in conference. Both the House
and Senate versions contain provisions which penalize disclosures
of activities by a person "with reason to believe that such
disclosures would impair or impede" US foreign intelligence
activities.
-- Legislation dealing with former spouses has been introduced in
both Houses of Congress. The House version is preferable in
that both CIARDS and CSP,S benefits are subject to equal burdens
in favor of former spouses assuring equivalent treatment of all
similarly situated CIA personnel.
-- Congressional investigations into Wilson-Terpil continue.
Several bills have been introduced, and CIA is discussing
legislative remedies with the oversight committees.
-- It is doubtful that we will get FOIA relief this year, given
the lengthy budget debates on the Hill.
-- Speaking of budgets, the NFIP may lose some~~out of the
FY 83 budget because of expected cuts in the Defense budget.
This will affect NRO for the most part.
-- SAFE is still a problem for us. We have several outside experts
assessing the situation. We may end up scrapping SAFE and moving
to an entirely new approach. I will keep you posted.
-- CIA/State telecommunicatvons are still being discussed. No
resolution of this issue is yet in sight.
I have covered a lot of territory and now would like to open up for
questions. Because John works more closely on a day-to-day basis with some
of the issues I have raised, I invite him to jump into the discussion as
appropriate.
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7 May 1982
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Anne Armstrong, Chairman
Leo Cherne, Vice Chairman
David M. Abshire
Martin Anderson
William 0. Baker
Alfred S. BloomingdalE~
Frank Borman
W. Glenn Campbell
John B. Connally
John Stuart Foster, Jr'.
Leon Jaworski
Clare Boothe Luce
Thomas H. Moorer
Peter O'Donnell
Ross Perot
Joe M. Rodgers
Paul Seabury
Robert F. Six
Seymour Weiss
Edward Bennett Williams
Intelligence Oversight Board
W. Glenn Campbell, Chairman
Frank Stella
Charles Tyroller
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-- Various NSA personnel briefed Chairman Armstrong and Dr. Baker
on: Reg~onal Highlights, Cryptoanalysis, Technology Transfer,
Soviet C in Afghanistan and Poland, and the National SIGINT
Operations Center. (Mar)
-- Deputy Director for Administration briefed Admiral Moorer's Task
Force on personnel recruitment, unique requirements, problems,
and request for legislative initiatives. (Mar)
STATE -- INR representatives met with Economic and Natural Resources
Task Force to discuss role of economic intelligence and
policymaking. Seymour Weiss of the Task Force visited several
offices in the Department. (Apr)
-- Unclassified documents prepared during past year were provided
at Mr. Perot's request to help in studying the situations in
Cuba, E1 Salvador, the Caribbean Basin, Central and South
America.
-- State offered a get-together between Mr. Montgomery, INR, and
Mr. Perot to assist in Mr. Perot's reviews of the Libyan Hit
Team incident and the kidnapping of General Dozier. (Apr)
NAVY -- At PFIAB plenary session in January 1982, Admiral Shapiro, DNI,
briefed (overview--no details) on Navy's Special program and the
necessary security requirements.
FBI -- Bureau representatives provided two briefings (Feb and Mar) to
Board members, mainly overviews of the FBI Foreign
Counterintelligence Program, the nature and extent of hostile
service activities in the US, and the Bureau's program to combat
the hostile threat.
-- A summary (memo) on Bureau involvement and support regarding the
Libyan Hit Team incident and the General Dozier kidnapping was
provided to Mr. Perot. (Apr)
DIA -- Various representatives of DIA have brief ed Board members and
Task Forces since Janaury 1982:
- DIA's Role in the Intelligence Community--covered OSD and
JCS roles, budgetary issues, and other items of
interest/concern. (Jan)
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~Fr.RF~
DIA's Role in the National Intelligence Process--covered
procedures, organization, production, etc. (Feb)
DIA's Role in Economic Intelligence--covered highlights,
areas of responsibilities/expertise, products, and
consumers. (Feb)
Soviet Energy Outlook--estimate of capabilities to satisfy
domestic needs, prospects for export to East Europe/Free
World, and areas of disagreement within the Intelligence
Community and efforts to resolve. (Feb)
DIA's Organization, Management, and Personnel--covered
authorizations, manning levels, personnel types, current
resource allocations, and future requirements. (Mar)
Technology Transf er--addressed scope, magnitude, and
complexity of the problem, including acquisition efforts
and impacts. (Mar)
OTHER
DIA Assessment of Situation in Central America--overview
with detailed discussions on external influence and control
of factions, planning and execution of insurgency
operations, and arms flow into the region. (Apr)
Will present a full exhibit (12 May) of hardware and space
systems (models and mockups) in the PFIAB quarters. SAFSS
officers will give a brief overview and respond to members'
questions.
Through the ICS, the Board, Task Forces, and individual
members have been provided, from time to time, with
varieties of intelligence products from Community
organizations.
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