SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 31, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03119 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650014-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.JATIONAL FOP.EIGN ASSESSaENT ~. ENTER
SLnC~.~?d
The So:riet Union employs a aophisticGted miw of tactics
in its eff orta to penetrate This~d Nand areas ar.~ i,.ftuence
events and o_~ganizations in ways that benefit So::et political
purposes. ~!oscoc~'s most dramatic gains 1~.ave core ~ ra^~ its support
of raduat, non-Cor.mcnzst elements that ultt.^~atel~ became anti-
Nestern r^.~3ir:g groups in such crn.~ntries as Algeria, So:~th Yemen,
and A~aota.
}, ..
Nrere the USSR has no fozr.;al relations With t%~e established
goverr.~-er.;?s being challenged by such gro;~ps, its s:cp; ort for t3:e
radicals tends to be open and large-scale, enkarc:rq its creden-
tiaZs,as arevolutionary power. Iri othe~? c.~~eas, :'.'os~ous att~rpts
to protect its relations with tar;atek aoverrm;er.?a by dism~zsing
and ch;rneling its assistance to the subversive a?Daps tHxough
third p?rties.
;`. .. ,
. ~ 1!oscc~ ~s most erdu2?ing Third Nortd policies, 3~awever, have
been' ir. its relations with Z,~f+.ist,, anti-US regi.::+rs rahi.ch tit .
frequertty props up Urith rri.titc~y a.:sistarce. ? :^nesa regimes
undertaye a variety of aotions, sometiTes encour~~ ed by 1!oseow
cou',sor:eti.:,es rot, that tend to serve So~~iet poliMa interests.
~
?'he
~So:;iets occasionally have coc;e to the open rrititaru suppc+rt
of some government8, such as l~asir's EgyYt, or fa^:Zitated Zarge-
sctixle r yti ~i-y ventures by others, such as t::e Et%:iopians and
This r:e::oraraum was preparec~by of t~:e Office of Potitica~l5x1
Anatusis at :re request of the Director of Central Ir.:eZZigenee. Cv+~ments
and questions siould be add d to the Chief, USSR-ic Di,visior., Office
of Political Analysis,
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r,
1?loacov's eubet~~:tiat raortd??~ ::deg interacts cause it constantly
to t~ei;l1: itn e~,~iti~s and shift. rte ~,oZieies betr.~een co:~:trieo ;.ri.th
t~hiel: it Manta tor.~+ttair: gor` ,re~.atwns and their often subversive-
mindcd neig::~ Wis. _~: these a: ~ other iratar:res, tl:e Soviets rr ZZ
frequentt~ trr,! to :~;a Zocat assets, inc?ud?ing Cor:~rurtist panics, to
affect evcras in tl:a favored dirsation.
The Soviets have extended billicns of dollars of military
-- assistance and sent thousands of military advisors to the
Third ~~orld in an attempt to foster dependence on them by
the local regiMes. Trey also have been willing to provide
assistance to their clients directly, engaging in airlifts
in times of crisis and even participating directly in military
engagements. Some of the most dramatic provisions of military
-- Egypt and Syria during the war with Israel in 1973.
-- Ethiopia is 1978-79.
--. Angola in 1975-76.
? = ~r Vietnam during the Vietnam tsar and tha Sino-
Vietnamese conflict of 1979-80.
Soviet personnel have been in combat in:
-- Laos on behalf of neutrals and leftists in 1960-62.
-- North_Yemen in support of the republican government;.
Pilots as well as air-dfense combat personnel were active
in Egypt during the "war of attrition" with Israel in 1970,
and air-defense personnel were active in Vietnam in 1965-66.
Soviet transport aircraft and crews have been helping ferry
men and material in Cambodia since 1980.
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The most direct and dramatic Soviet military intervention,
of course, was t:ze invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
This o~:eration was designf~d to ensure the Communist, pro-
Soviet orientation of this border nation. Since the invasion,
the Soviets have maintained their forces in Afghanist~-n,
usfngL?heir own airborne and ground personnel to prop up the
Use of Surrogates
not necessarily approved such actions in advance, they`have
invLatin America falls-into this category as do the Libyan
Soviet prompting. Much of the Cuban support for militants
j%Soviet clients frequently act on their own without
severs challenges--for example] paying for Cuban military
also encouraged cla.ents to help bolster regimes faced with
.-l ~..
efforts to overthrow Sudanese President Numayri. They have
charging-the status uc~o; they have backed Vietnam's efforts
Tho Soviets have supported clients and allies bent on
Non-Communist militants
gave the Soviets access to radical, strongly anti-US regimes.
` The nature and extent of Soviet assistance to s>>ch
~, forces has varied greatly. Open, large-.`.Cale support has
gone only to groups that have Lroad regional support and in
situations where the USSR had virtually no relationship with
the existing government. The Palestine Liberation. Organization
(PLO) , South-t~Test African Peoples Organf zation (5taAP0) ,
the African National Congress (ANG), and Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAI'U) fal]. into this category. Although
`~mflitary Rupplies have been funnelled through their regional
pL?otectors, 2?ioscow has openly proclaimed its support, believing
this enhances its credibility. as a revolutionary power. ~_.
y
``movements in Algeria, South Yemen, Angola, acid Mozambique
Communist parties, their potential is greater because their
roots aro indigenous. They are attractive to the Soviets
'because their orientation is generally anti-trtestern.
?~ Assistance--even though meager--to ultimatel
successful~T
supporting radical, non-Communist elements. While such
~forccs are not as susceptible to Soviet.Control-as are
The Soviets have made their most dramatic gains by
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Often, however, Moscow seeks to disguise its involvement
with radical militants in order to protect its formal relations
with the target government and avoid stirring regional or
international antagonism. Soviet assistance to E1 Salvadoran
insurgents, for example, has been delivered clandestinely
through surrogates; aid to t:ie National Democratic Front ,
(NDF)--a group targeted against North Yemen--is channelled
through South Yemen. The Soviets provide some support to the
Somali Salvation Front (SSF) through Ethiopia and are apparently
considering support of the Shaba (Katangan) rebels through
Angola . '::
The Soviets also maintain contacts with many ethnic
nationality groups, mostly along their southern border. They
have links to Al 2ulfikar, the Pakistani anti-Zia terrorist
group based ix: Afghanistan, as well as with Kurdish, Armenian,
Baluch, Azeri and other such elements in Iran and Turkey.
The extent of their actual assistance is not clear, but they
have probably provided limited aid to some of them fzvm time`
to time. The purpose of these contacts ranges from the
gathering of in~ormation and development of assets?ta the
pressuring of neighboring governments and enuring future
access to potentially successful radical movements. ?
Communist Parties
Moscow has consistently backed pro-Soviet Communis t
parties in the Third World. MGSCOW often sees this support
as an importWnt element in its claims to leadership in the
world Communist movement and its competition with China
rather than as a viable tool for gaining political influence.
. In some-cases, however, links to local Communist parties
.,,give :?Ioscow a degree of leve_age over the ruling regime and
~
.
provide access to the
litical s
stem
po
y
.
.~`
' ~~Soviet guidance to local Communist parties depends~on
the nature of the USSR's relationship with the ruling regime
and the party's chances of success. In South American
countries where the USSR is seeking economic ties to existing .
'governments, the parties are told to maintain low-key po~itical
activity. In Central America, however, where the Soviets
have few bilateral equities and where they see a chance of
success, they are urging the Communist parties to shift from
political activity to participation in armed struggle.
Soviet-backed Communist parties in the Third World have
had little success gaining power internally since the Chinese
Communist takeover in 1949. A major exception was the
Communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978; although the
extent of Moscow's knowledge of the coup remains unclear,
its subsequent commitment to defend the regime has proven
substantial. In Cuba, an originally broad ?eftist grouping
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SECRET
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developed into a pro-Soviet Communist party,after it gained
power, but this casE :gas proved to be the exception in ?
spite of Soviet ofsorts elsewhere to encourage rational-
istic leftist regir..es to adopt ~ammunist ideology and structure.,
Yiorl.d states such as Aiauritius. The~? also engage in large-
scale cultivation of members of student, labor and professional
organizations, hoping that their contacts will eventually `
The Soviets support individual pro-Soviet goverr~ment-
mr.mbers as well as lzgal opposition parties in some Third
cultivate and recruit key government members,
Political Contacts
Moscow's most effective policy in the Third t~'orld has
been the straightfo:~ard developMent of L,ilateral relations
with existing leftist, anti-L'S regimes. Combining political
support with their ability to supaly large quantities of
arms on favorable terns, the Soviets have developed close
relations with such important and diverse states as India,
Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and the Congo. Some of their
favorite tactics include cn^peration agreey^~ents in areas
such as party-to-party relations, intelligence, and security.
The Soviets then seek to exploit these relationships to
gain positions of power and prove sympathetic to sovaet
support fox the Iraqi Communist P~~tty over the years has
created severe strains in their rq}.ations with the ruling
.Iraqi Baath Party. Generally, ho-~rever, this flexibility
.gives the Soviets considerable leeway in their persistent
and patient probing for opportunities and in selecting the
;,The willingness of the Soviets to employ bath overt aand
covert tactics and even to pursue seemingly cant-adictary
policies gives their Considerable flexibility in Third ~orld~
.states. Zt also creates dileiaxaas; their natural inclina:.ion
to support the Polisario guerrilla mo?.reiiz~nt in tiie fs7estern
Sahara, for example, is temFere3 b~}their desire tea protect
their economic relationship with r~i ;recce. Si:^~ilarly, their
most promising targets and courses of action.
j~
This entire memorandu-n is classified SECRET.
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i - OCO :;oreign Liaison Staff
SUBJECT: Soviet Penetration of the Thir3 t;orld
Original. -
DCI
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L`/DCI-DDCI/ES
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D/NFAC -'
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NIO/USSR
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1"= DC/OPA/USSR-EE
1 - OPA/EAP
1 - OPA/LA
1_-~uPA/USSR-EE Chrono
l - OPA/USSR-EE%SRE Chrono
1 - OPA/NESA ~ ~ -,
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