REMARKS BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE AIR DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA SEPTEMBER 28, 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002560020-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REMARKS BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE AIR DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA
SEPTEMBER 28, 1981
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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REMARKS FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE AIR DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA
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I welcome this opportunity to present the Administration's
case for selling AWACS aircraft and other air defense enhancements
to Saudi Arabia. The President's decision to sell this equipment
to the Saudi Government has stimulated deep emotions, and intense
debate, which have obscured the core issues. It is time that the
real issues be put before Congress and the American people so that
they may be examined as dispassionately and fully as its importance
requires.
The case for the sale of this air defense enhancement package
to Saudi Arabia is simple: AWACS and the other air defense equip-
ment will make a significant, necessary contribution to the security
interests of the United States and all of our allies and friends,
including the NATO Nations, Israel itself, Japan, and, of course,
the mid-East countries, in a very volatile part of the world.. The
President's decision to proceed with this sale was based upon this
central fact and was reached only after considerable review and
agreement with the basic decision reached by prior Administrations.
As you are aware, the Saudi air defense enhancement package
consists of four components: E-3A Airborne Warning and Control
System aircraft, or AWACS, to provide necessary low-altitude sur-
veil'lance and early warning of air attack, along with associated
ground-based command, control, and communications equipment to
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provide a complete air defense surveillance and control network;
conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and mission endurance of
Saudi Arabia's F-15 fighter aircraft; AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles to improve their F-15s' defensive aerial combat capability;
and KC-707 aerial tankers to refuel both the F-15s and AWACS. The
total cost of this equipment to Saudi Arabia will be some $8.5
billion.
This Saudi equipment package is an important part of a compre-
hensive U.S. strategy for the Southwest Asia region designed to
increase the security of friendly countries in an area of the world
which is vital to both the United States and our Western allies. In
? this context, the proposed sale will directly serve U.S. national
interests in the following ways:
First, it will help the Saudis defend their vital oil
facilities against surprise air attacks. In this manner,
the sale responds to the legitimate security requirements
of a country whose cooperation is central to the defense
of the entire region's security -- and thus our own.
It also will help to rebuild confidence in the U.S. as a
reliable partner in the region. This sense of confidence
and security is essential in encouraging countries in the
area to take the political risks a durable peace in the
Middle East demands.
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Further, it will advance our goal of increasing the
security of states in the Gulf region by providing a
foundation for closer U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation and
for Saudi?efforts to develop cooperation with all of her
mid-East neighbors in other security related areas.
Finally, it will increase the effectiveness of our own
military capabilities if we were ever called upon to
deploy U.S. forces to the area. The extensive logistics
base and support infrastructure that will be a necessary
part of this equipment package will be fully compatible
with the defense needs of this whole vital area.
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Saudi oil resource's are vast and irreplacable. We need them,
and our allies need them. The flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the
region immediately bordering it in the Gulf is crucial to interna-
tional finances, domestic production, employment around the globe,
and world trade. In fact, the destruction of the oil gathering and
loading facilities in Saudi Arabia, or their control by a hostile
power, could tip the balance of power in the world.
Saudi oil resources are vulnerable and threatened. Virtually
all of Saudi Arabia's oil production facilities are located in the
East, near the Arabian Gulf coast, easily accessible to attack from
across the Gulf. The conflict between Iran and Iraq disproved one
widely held assumption: that oil-producing states acting in their
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own self-interest would not threaten each other's oil fields,
refineries, or transport facilities. But Iran and Iraq have done
just that; each has been required to curtail oil exports vitally
needed by the West. .1 might add at this point that Saudi Arabia has
increased its oil production to accommodate that oil loss while
keeping prices below those of its OPEC colleagues. This is simply
another of many instances of Saudi assistance to our national
interests.
As the anti-Communist leader of moderate Arab Gulf states and
as the largest Free World oil producer, Saudi Arabia needs a strong
defense against potential military threats from unstable, revolu-
tionary Iran; from radical Iraq; and from Marxist South Yemen.
The Saudi Kingdom also must increase its defense against Soviet or
Soviet-inspired military threats from Ethiopia, Soviet forces in
Afghanistan, and from the USSR itself. The new entente between
Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen -- each of which has significant
amounts of Soviet military equipment and increasing numbers of
Soviet and Soviet bloc advisors -- introduces a new, most unwelcome
dimension into the threat calculus of the region.
Given this situation, the Saudis face several difficulties in
deploying an adequate air defense. This large country has widely
scattered, concentrated population centers, military installations,
ports, airfields, and oil facilities to protect. Most of these
valuable targets are on or near the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea coasts,
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which means that it is not possible to place early warning radars
and air defenses far forward -- say between the oil facilities and
potential threats from across the Gulf -- to provide adequate
protection. With current Saudi capabilities, an attack by low-
flying aircraft could not be detected by ground-based radar until it
was within two to four minutes of the oil fields. Even under the
best conditions, no air force could respond to this threat in time.
AWACS would allow the Saudi Air Force to detect low level
attacking enemy aircraft up to 200 miles from the oil fields. The
Saudi Air Force would then have enough time to scramble and inter-
cept enemy aircraft before they reach the oil fields. Without
AWACS, this early warning capability would not exist, no matter how
many ground radars might be employed.
AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would give the Saudi Air
Force the capability to intercept attacking aircraft head-on. This
capability would greatly improve the chances of shooting them down
before they are able to bomb the oil facilities or other Saudi
targets. Without the AIM-9L, Saudi interceptors would have to
maneuver behind attacking aircraft to fire their older, less capable
Sidewinder missile, virtually assuring that hostile aircraft could
reach vital coastal targets before being engaged and shot down.
Conformal fuel tanks and KC-707 tankers would allow Saudi F-15s
to be based in west central and southwestern Saudi Arabia where they
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would not be vulnerable to a surprise enemy attack and from which
they could sustain combat over the oil facilities even if bases in
eastern Saudi Arabia were put out of action. KC-707 tankers also
would allow AWACS to remain on-station for extended periods of time.
Consequently, we believe that Saudi Arabia has a legitimate
defense requirement for the AWACS and the other air defense enhance-
ment equipment. The air defense package would improve Saudi capa-
bilities to deter and, if necessary, defend against air attacks.
The result would be a more secure Saudi Arabia which would be an
anchor of stability within the region (and the region, of course,
includes Israel) and a bulwark against challenges and coercion from
outside the region. Such a stable and secure Saudi Arabia clearly
serves the security interests of the United States, and certainly
serves the security interests of Israel, the NATO countries, and
Japan.
Last fall, soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the
United States Government responded to an urgent Saudi request for
assistance by deploying four U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft to Saudi
Arabia to augment Saudi air defenses. They are still there today,
providing the surveillance and early warning capability necessary
to defend the oil facilities. This continuing response by the
United States has helped in the process of rebuilding Saudi -- and
regional -- confidence in the United States as a reliable security
? partner. However, the Saudi government, like any sovereign state
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recognizes its right and responsibility to provide for its own
legitimate defense requirements. It is in this spirit that the
request to purchase AWACS and the other air defense items was made
by Saudi Arabia. Consummation of the sale of this equipment,
which both we and they agree they need urgently for their security
requirements, will further reinforce the military-to-military
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This in
turn will strengthen the security of the entire region, and it will
permit us to work with the Saudis toward a more peaceful and stable
situation in the whole region, specifically including Israel.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that future U.S.-
Saudi relations would be very adversely affected by rejection of
this proposed sale. Such a rejection would cause the Saudis to
doubt the reliability of U.S. commitment and the ability of American
President:; to conduct foreign policy. Such an impression will also
make it far less likely that Saudi Arabia and others will agree to
the kinds of security cooperation, joint planning, combined exer-
cises, and advanced preparation for sharing of facilities and
support which we feel are needed if the United States is to defend
shared security interests in Southwest Asia. Furthermore, rejection
of the sale would confirm a too widely held opinion in the mid-East
that the United States is solely concerned with the wishes of the
Israeli government to the exclusion of all other interests.
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This Saudi air defense enhancement package has been designed to
meet the significant Saudi defense requirements I have discussed
while improving the security of Israeli and all the other states in
the region. Israel.has increased its margin of military superiority
over its Arab adversaries since the 1973 war. With or without the
AWACS and F-15 enhancements, the Saudi Air Force realistically poses
no significant threat to the security of Israel. This is true even
in the context of a general regional conflict. This assessment is
supported by the U.S. intelligence community.
These are the technical facts: AWACS is an unarmed flying
radar platform which has no intelligence collection capabilities.
It cannot detect ground targets such as tanks and it cannot operate
effectively with air forces of other countries without extensive
joint training and a sophisticated communications network which only
the United States could provide. The five AWACS aircraft which
would be sold to Saudi Arabia are sufficient to maintain only one
continuous 24 hours per day, surveillance orbit.
Israel's air defense system makes all these arguments against
the AWACS academic. The Saudis fully recognize that Israel's air
defense is extraordinarily capable. Saudi missions into Israeli
airspace, either to engage Israeli aircraft or to strike Israeli
targets, would be prohibitively costly and would leave Saudi Arabia
vulnerable to air attack from every direction.
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The simple fact is that this sale will not alter the Arab-
Israeli balance of power materially nor jeopardize Israel's security.
President Reagan is committed to protecting Israel's security and to
preserving Israel's qualitative edge and its ability to defeat any
combination of hostile forces in the region. The proposed Saudi
sale neither casts doubt on that commitment nor compromises Israeli
capabilities.
There is also an additional point which is related to the
issue of Israeli security. The Saudis do not face a choice between
U.S. AWACS or nothing. The British NIMROD airborne early warning
aircraft, currently under advanced development, has capabilities
comparable to the AWACS, and which could be enhanced. NIMRODs will
be operationally deployed shortly and the Saudis would turn to the
British to purchase these aircraft should AWACS be denied.
Therefore, the issue is not whether the Saudis will obtain an
enhanced air defense capability; rather it is whether we lose all
credibility with the Saudis, their moderate neighbors, and many
other countries and the ability to develop a mid-East policy by
refusing to sell. We have the choice of benefiting from the closer
security cooperation (and the economic benefits, including jobs)
which would flow from the sale of the U.S. equipment package to
Saudi Arabia, or of yielding the friendship of valuable allies. For
the Israelis, the question is whether their long-term security
interests are better served by a continuing and strengthened U.S.
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role in Saudi Arabia, or by a Saudi Arabia with all the increased
military capabilities the AWACS would bring, through the NIMROD
purchase, but far less friendly to the U.S. and with continuing,
perhaps unneeded hostility of Israel.
Before I conclude, let me address one other point. The AWACS
is a very capable system, but selling it to Saudi Arabia does not
pose serious risks that sensitive technology will be compromised.
The AWACS does not represent the ultimate in U.S. radar and computer
technology. The radar is mid-1960s Pulse Doppler textbook tech-
nology. A comparable computer is available commercially. While
these systems are superior to anything the Soviets currently have in
their operational inventory, a new Soviet airborne early warning
aircraft has been under development for some time and is expected to
have a capability quite similar to our own AWACS. This new Soviet
system should be in the operational inventory quite soon, before the
AWACS is delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1985.
In any event, the Saudis have an outstanding record of pro-
tecting sensitive U.S. equipment and information, and the Saudis
recognize and accept the need for special safeguards in this case.
Consequently, they have agreed to extensive, jointly planned and
monitored security arrangements that satisfy stringent U.S. require-
ments for the safeguarding of our equipment.
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Let me conclude by saying that we are convinced -- and the
President is convinced -- that detailed and dispassionate analysis
shows that the proposed air defense enhancement package for Saudi
Arabia will make an'important contribution to the security of all
states in the region -- Israel as well as Saudi Arabia -- and that
it will promote our efforts to create a strategic consensus in the
Southwest Asia region, and thereby further our national security
interests.
The proposed sale successfully balances the imperative of
Israeli security with the need to respond to threats to essential
natural resources and regional stability. It provides equipment
which meets the defensive requirements of a close friend and key
state in the region in a way which also protects sensitive tech-
nology and makes a tangible contribution to U.S. military
capabilities.
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