PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET UNION S AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SUAWACS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002560006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET DDE-1370-4-81
is
DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Special Defense
Intelligence Estimate
Prospects for the
Soviet Union's Airborne
Warning and Control
System (SUAWACS) (U)
SEPTEMBER 1981
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PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S AIRBORNE
WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SUAWACS) (U)
This estimate has been coordinated with the Intelligence Chiefs of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. All concur in the estimate as written.
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Acting ; si ant Vice
Director' or Estimates
DDE-1370-4-81
6 August 1981
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
Classified by Multiple Sources
Review on 6 August 2001
Extended by DIA DE
Reason 2-301.c.5
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Prospects for the Soviet Union's Airborne
Warning and Control System (SUAWACS)
This estimate provides background discussions and
long-range judgnents regarding the Soviet Union's Air-
borne Warning and Control System aircraft and their
operations. The estimate is primarily intended for use
in support of US studies and acquisition programs,
notably those dealing with a new US banter and with
countermeasures to the SUMACS. (U)
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Discussion
1. (S/NOFORN) The Soviet Union has been involved in Airborne Warnin and Control
System aircraft development since at least the mid-1960s.
2. (S) As an airborne air battle command post, the AWACS would enhance command
flexibility and responsiveness in both strategic and tactical applications. As a
situation and intelligence synthesizer, the AWACS would contribute to the success
of a ground-based authority in planning and executing operations. The Siauliai
unit, home of the MOSS AWACS, is viewed by the Soviets as an experimental squadron
which has an inherent operational capability for use in time of war. Its
peacetime employment has been exploratory in tactics, equipment, and operations.
A full AWACS operational capability can be obtained only with mass production,
deployment, and routine daily operations.
* PVO Strany has recently absorbed the national staff of PVO Sukhoputnykh
Voysk (Air Defense of the Ground Forces); other changes have also occurred.
Voyska PVO is the title for the new organization and is best rendered as
"Troops of National and Ground Forces Air Defense."
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Figure 1. (U) MOSS AWACS
The MOSS AWACS and Its Follow-Ons
4. (S) The TU-126/MOSS is the first Soviet aircraft used to perform airborne
warning and intercept control.
6. (C) The three onboard operators are responsible for identifying and tracking
targets, extracting and forwarding data to the automatic control system, and
directing fighters for interceptions. The levels of proficiency expected for the
average operator are simultaneous direction of three to seven intercepts and
simultaneous tracking of six targets. A trained operator should be able to
identify about nine targets per minute. This level of activity would require a
"loose" control--i.e., general vectoring of the interceptor by the Air Combat
Intercept (ACI) operators--as opposed to a "tight" control (i.e., control by the
ACI operator until actual weapons release).
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Air Defense Operations
16. (S) The General Staff, probably through the Troops of National and Ground
Forces Air Defense Headquarters, would allocate AWACS resources according to
availability and needs. AWACS employment would include homeland air defense,
theater war in Europe or the Far East, and, eventually, air surveillance support
of power-projection operations abroad. We believe the Soviets will use AWACS in
support of a fraternal ally only when risk to the platform is very low.
17. (S) Resources permitting, air defense operations will be conducted on the
most probable avenues of enemy approach, with air defense fronts or armies formed
to combat air threats. The, general tactic is one of attrition in depth, beginning ?
with forward fighters and coastal SAM barriers, followed by further fighter zones,
and finally terminal defenses. But AWACS patrol zones are not projected to be
established as a homogeneous barrier encircling the USSR. The requisite number
of AWACS platforms is too great, there are insufficient numbers of peripheral
interceptor regiments, and complementary air defense capabilities are inadequate
in some eastern regions. Instead, as in theater war, we believe the AWACS will be
deployed to cover the expected axes of major ground and air operations to priority
targets. A national defense problem for the 1990s will be extending and
supporting forward defenses to defeat airborne, cruise-missile launch platforms.
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19. (S) The CANDID AWACS will become the central element in the air defense
battle. The ability of the CANDID AWACS to conduct semiautonomous operations
derives from its capacity to vector fighters or groups of fighters against
multiple targets. CANDID AWACS operations are expected to be integrated into the
national air defense command and control system. Patrol zones are likely to be
contiguous to areas of good GCI radar coverage to facilitate placing continuous
pressure upon an attacking-force. Initial AWACS operations are expected to be
over water, but, with improvements in technique, experience, and numbers, AWACS
patrols will be standardized over land as well.
21. (S) The AWACS may function as an active source and relay for general air
battle information for the ground-based command authority. A principal function
would probably be that of conducting air intercept operations. In the near term,
the kind of direction given the fighters is expected to be general or zonal. In
low-intensity battles or in more advanced AWACS, air intercept instruction will
probably become more discrete and specific, except possibly when directing
Modified FOXBAT-type aircraft in strategic defense operations.
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24. (S) Although equipped with some self-protection devices, AWACS is an exposed
and vulnerable platform. Its value increases with the intensity of the air
defense operation and the degree of reliance placed upon it. The essential
functions to be preserved are surveillance and communications. To preserve these
functions, altitude-change maneuvers may be required to avert certain dangers.
25X1
Tactical Battlefield AWACS
25. (S) The Soviets have foreseen a need for an AWACS in a tactical battlefield
situation. In the European theater especially, the combat situation is likely to
be complex and rapidly evolving, requiring the larger, integrated-air-situation
capability of an AWACS. Soviet experience with airborne reconnaissance has
already indicated a strong need for real-time coverage over broad areas. An
overland-capable AWACS can provide real-time processing and large-scale
integration functions.
26. (S) The mission of a Soviet tactical AWACS would be collecting and com-
municating air battle data and the efficient application of fighter assets in
escort and counterair roles. The establishment of an environment for air battle
management is accomplished through extending the zone of air control to facilitate
the operation of air warfare assets over hostile territory. Enroute strike
guidance to low-altitude aircraft outside the range of navigation emitters,
intercept vectors to the target, as well as 'threat information, are unique
battlefield AWACS functions. Front air defense support operations are also
enhanced by AWACS participation. Specific offensive AWACS applications indicated
in Soviet writings include air surveillance, the "isolation of the battlefield"
(i.e., limited air supremacy operations), close air support, air interdiction,
airborne landings, and airlift operations.
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27. (S) Soviet doctrinal emphasis on combined-arms combat stresses the inte-
gration of aviation with the conduct of ground operations. With advances,
probably by the late 1980s to early 1990s, in signal processing to allow detection
of moving ground targets, we believe a Soviet tactical AWACS would also likely be
used for limited battlefield ground-force surveillance where circumstances
permit. Carrying encoded beacon transponders could permit monitoring the
movements of friendly troop formations. Otherwise, ground resolution of the AWACS
radar is not expected to be sufficient to detect individual pieces of equipment.
Another battlefield use would be passive search wherein the AWACS would not
radiate but instead would monitor airborne radar and IFF as well as ground-based
threat radars and jammers. We believe the AWACS will possibly be equipped with an
IFF jammer for tactical employment.
28. (S) In open source literature, the Soviets have expressed an interest in
multistatic, or "diverse," radar operations in which one transmitter may be
synchronized with other receive-only radars. A tactical innovation which could
yield significant advantages is the adaptation of bistatic operations between
SUAWACS pairs. Through digital coding of the transmitted signal, computer
processing is enhanced; forward-scatter radar energy received and decoded by a
second AWACS would provide additional detection and tracking information,
especially against small RCS, low-altitude targets. Technical difficulties,
however, are formidable in airborne bistatic operations but such operations have
been proven feasible. Bistatic operations against a noncooperating AWACS would be
even more difficult.
29. (S) The principal commanders with which the tactical AWACS would interact are
the air and air defense authorities at the front. Army- and division-level
headquarters may also be provided with the.capability to monitor air or ground
battle developments. The AWACS is expected to have an up-li.nk satellite capa-
bility to relay battle information to higher echelons, such as a theater of
military operations (TVD) and national authorities. This projected facility would
enhance General Staff assessment and control of inter- and intra-theater
developments.
Naval Applications
30. (S) Operational requirements for naval applications include support of
surface units at sea as well as in port. The latter function would be subsrumed
under homeland air defense. Fleet units operating in peripheral offshore areas,
particularly those units with SAM capability, could coordinate their air defense
efforts with land-based air defense forces. Shipboard fighter controllers may
augment AWACS controllers in meeting local air threats and in defending the AWACS
platform itself.
31. (S) Support of distantly deployed naval forces will be limited to areas
within SUAWACS radius of action (about 1,000 nm for CANDID) from land bases, which
need not necessarily be limited to the Soviet Union. Within these areas, AWACS
could support such functions as antiship-missile defense/antiair warfare
(ASMD/AAW), over-the-horizon targetting for antiship cruise missile systems, and
carrier-based antisurface warfare (ASUW). However, this will not fulfill all
naval air surveillance needs.
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40. (S) We project the Soviets will use a new airframe for a Follow-on AWACS. The
requirements for longer on-station loiter times and a larger cargo compartment for ?
on-board processing equipment and crew rest area will probably drive the Soviets
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Reactive Changes in AWACS Doctrine
44. (S) The current AWACS concept is predicated upon the perceived threat in
terms of technical characteristics, numbers, and radar observables. Emergence in
the 1990s of a US stealth bomber and advanced cruise missiles would call for new
Soviet tactics and capabilities, F
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25X1
45. (S) A decrease in the cruise missile threat, perhaps through arms control,
would reduce somewhat the emphasis'on AWACS development. An increase in the
numbers of penetrating bombers would be met by corresponding increases in the
numbers of AWACS, but there may be less need for extended defenses.
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1
DIA/JSI-2F
ED50
1
AFSAC/INOC-1
L126
1
101 AREFW/DOXI
8782
1
DIA/DB-1C3
E054
1
HQ USAF/INER
L127
1
126 AREFW/DOXI
1
DIA/JSI-2
E100
10
TAC (460 RTS/LDD)
L128
1
128 AREFG/DOXI
TAC (460 RTS/LDD)
0785
1
DIA/DB-1G3
E104
1
4513TH TTG/NIPT
L129
1
134 AREFG/D OXI
E)00 3
AFEWC/ESRI
8789
1
USDAD AUSTRIA
E130
1
ADWC/IN
L130
1
141 AREFW/DOXI
E436 1
ELECT SCTY CMO
H
B855
8859
1
USDAO BULGARIA
E200
2
AAC
L131
1
151 AREFG/DOXI
Q
E706 1
0862
1
USDAD CANADA
E231
1
HQ USAF/LERX (CM)
L132
1
157 AREFG/DOXI
8872
1
USDAO DENMARK
E280
1
AFTAC/DOI
L133
1
160 AREFG/DOXI
B876
9
1
1
USDAO ENGLAND
USDAD FRANCE
E303
E304
I
1
HQ USAF/INEG
HQ USAF/INES
L134
L135
1
1
161 AREFW/DOXI
170 AREFG/DOXI
HIOI 4 USAFE 497RTG (IRC)
SS BN (PROV)
887
893
1
USDAO ITALY
E317
I
HQ USAF/SAKI
L136
1
171 AREFW/DOXI
H303 1 5020 I
URLANT
8
0896
1
USDAO JAPAN
E401
1
AFLC/IN
L137
1
189 AREFG/DOXI
J51S 1 FICE
TH MAU
B908
1
USDAO NETHERLANDS
E403
1
AFSC/INA
L138
1
190 AREFG/DOXI
J578 1 34
ONDMARDIV (CFU)
2
1
USDAO NORWAY
E408
1
AFWL
L139
1
11 SG/DOXI
J818 3 SEC
091
927
1
USDAO SWEDEN
E409
1
AMD/RDI
L140
1
305 AREFW/DOXI
K115 1 5TH AF
RARY)
8
B928
1
USDAO SWITZERLAND
E410
1
AD/IND
L141
1
7 AD/IN
K300 I IPAC (LIB
13 933
1
1)SDA0 TURKEY
E411
I
ASD/FTD/NIIS
L142
1
306 SW/IN
K505 1 FICPAC
B934
1
USDAO USSR
E415
1
OC-ALC/XRO
L144
1
922 S5
K605 1 FMFPAC
W/DAA
E420
4
FTD/NIIS
L145
1
307 AREFG/DOXI
L040 3 SAC 544 SI
E429
1
HQ SPACE DIV/IND
L146
1
308 SMW/00221
L110 1 15 AF/IN
E436
2
AFEWC/ESRI
L147
1
319 BMW/IN
L161 1 452 AREFW/DOXI
C020
8
DCS-OPS & PLANS
E437
1
AFI5/INOI
L148
1
320 BMW/IN
C030
3
CH ROSA
E438
1
3480 TCHTG/TTVL
L149
1
321 SMW/00221
0043
1
USAMIIA
E450
1
AIR UNIV
6916 ESS
L150
L15)
1
1
340 AREFG/DOXI
341 SMW/D022I
PLOD 1 NAT SEC COUNCIL
227
I
101ST AI DIVRNE DIV
E555
1
HQ ELECT SCTY CMD
2
1
351 SMW/0022I
-------------------------
231 1
234
1
1
2N0 ARM DIV
1ST CAV DIV
E706
1
L15
L153
1
376 SW/IN
TOTAL 51
Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01002560006-7
 Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01002560006-7
SECRET
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SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049RO01002560006-7