SOVIET ACQUISITIONS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND PROJECTED SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL NEEDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002450020-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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SOVIET ACQUISITIONS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
Appendix I contains tables of technology and equipment acquired by the
Soviets, and where the end-use of the acquisition is known or the likely
benefit to the Soviets appears clear such information has been included. In
many instances, however, the technology acquired can find application in
various Soviet weapons programs. This is probably most true in the elec-
tronics and computer areas. In these cases the candidate applications that
have been estimated are by no means complete. Finally, the reader should note
that each entry frequently represents several transactions or transfers that
are related to the same technology, and that probably contributed to a given
Soviet program. Appendix II contains brief descriptionsof Technological areas
where the Soviets are deficient and will be thus likely to attempt to acquire
Western technology.
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Soviet Acquisitions of Western Technology
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The Soviets' strategic weapons program has benefited substantially from
the acquisition of Western technology, including those shown in Table I.
Their ballistic missile systems in particular have, over the past decade,
demonstrated qualitative improvements that probably would not have been
Western
achieved without acquisitions. The most striking example of this is the
marked improvement in accuracy of the latest generation of Soviet ICBMs--an
improvement which, given the level of relevant Soviet technologies a decade
ago, appears almost certainly to have been speeded by the acquisition of
Western technology.
Missile Test Range Instrumentation of this type collects data
Instrumentation System critical to postflight analysis. As such,
and/or Its Documentation it may well have expedited Soviet weapons
development programs, particularly those for
ballistic missiles.
Minuteman ICBM Silo There are striking similarities between the
Technical Data Minuteman silo and the Soviet SS-13 silo.
Acquisition could have expedited deployment
of this, the first solid-propellant Soviet
ICBM.
Machines for the Manufacture The precision of ballistic missile guidance
of Precision Instrument components and, hence, the accuracy of these
Bearings systems is largely dependent on the quality
of their bearings. Much of the Soviet
equipment used in the manufacture of these
bearings was obtained from the West.
Precision Cinetheodolites The Soviet acquisition of these instruments
could measurably improve the optical tracking
capability at several of their ballistic
missile test ranges, and thus expedite flight
test programs.
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The Soviets' acquisition effort in the naval area reflects well the two
major factors that motivate their requirements: the acquisition of technology
not readily available to them--yet critical to their programs-- and the acqui-
sition of equipment which, while producible in the Soviet Union, allows them
to divert resources to more pressing naval programs. Table II shows that
Soviets appear to have concentrated their acquisitions in areas related to
aircraft carriers, deep sea diving capabilities, sensor systems for antisubma-
rine warfare and navigation, and ship maintenance facilities.
TABLE II: NAVAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUIRED BY THE SOVIET BLOC
EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY COMMENTS
Very Large Floating Drydocks The Soviets purchased two of these from
Western suppliers. These are the only
drydocks that the Soviets have available in
their major fleet areas for servicing their
largest combatants--including the new carrier
for high-performance aircraft that is under
development. Additionally, these drydocks
could not have been produced at Soviet ship-
yards without facility modifications that
would require major capital expenditures and
cause interruptions in present weapon programs.
Aircraft Carrier Catapult We suspect that the Soviets may have acquired
Equipment and/or Documentation this technology which, though relatively
common in the West, is outside the Soviet
experience. Directly applicable to their new
aircraft carrier development program.
Underwater Low-Light-Level Provides the Soviets with a capability for
Television Camera and Systems close-up observation of Western equipment
for Remote Operation and for maintenance and repair of their
own systems.
Machine Tools for Cutting These gear-cutting machines are required to
Large Gears produce the very large gears used in ship
propulsion systems.
Used in producing titanium plate of
a size applicable to their submarine
program.
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Oceanographic Ships & The surveys these ships conduct support
Equipment activity for both their strategic and
tactical naval effort. Ocean physics and
chemistry studies provide data necessary
for antisubmarine warfare sensors.
Navigation Satellite Useful for any naval application where
Receivers precision positioning is desired.
While much of the Soviet acquisition in the aircraft area appears
directed toward the development of countermeasures against Western systems,
the Soviets appear to target data on Western aircraft primarily to acquire the
technology. Furthermore, while they have acquired a large amount of hardware
and data from planes downed or captured in Vietnam and elsewhere, they
continue to attempt to acquire the most advanced technologies through both
open and illegal transactions with the West. Assimilation of Western tech-
nology has been of great benefit to both their commercial and military
aircraft development programs -- to the extent that aircraft from certain
Soviet design bureaus are to a significant degree copies of aircraft subsys-
tems of. Western design.
Although Soviets have a strong indigenous technology base that could
support the development of much of their tactical weaponry, this does not
prevent them from maintaining an ambitious program for acquiring and
benefiting Western technology in this area. In some cases, their acquisitions
probably satisfy a deficiency in Soviet technology. Smart weapons technology
and electro-optical technology are probably examples of this. Signal and
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information-processing technology, particularly for Soviet air defense systems)
is another. Probably more often, however, technology is exploited more to
speed up a developmental program, or, by "product testing" of sorts, to
improve upon original Western designs in an expeditious manner.
Western equipment and technology have played a very important, if not
crucial, role in the advancement of Soviet microelectronic production capabil-
ities. This advancement comes as a result of the illegal acquisition of tens
of hundreds of pieces of Western equipment.
/Tablecontains those production-related
illegal acquisitions that have significantly benefited the Soviets. These
acquisitions have been grouped into areas related to the four steps required
to produce a microchip: wafer preparation, circuit-mask making, device fabri-
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cation, and assembly and testing. Table I shows that the Soviets acquired a
massive amount of production equipment (with the mask-making technology being
extremely important). By combining this acquired Western equipment and tech-
nological know-how, the Soviets could satisfy 100 percent of their military
microelectronic needs or 50 percent of all their microelectronic needs.
TABLE III: MICROELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUIRED BY THE SOVIET BLC?
EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY COMMENTS
Process Technology for Micro- The Soviets have acquired hundreds of
electronic Wafer Preparation specific pieces of equipment related to
wafer preparation, including epitaxial
growth furnaces, crystal pullers, rinsers/
dryers, slicers, and lapping and polishing
units.
Process Technology for Many acquisitions in this area include
Producing Circuit Masks computer-aided design software, pattern
generators and compilers, digital plotters,
photorepeaters, contact printers, mask
comparators, electron-beam generators, and
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ion milling equipment.
Equipment for Device Many hundreds of acquisitions in this area
Fabrication have provided the Soviets with mask aligners,
diffusion furnaces, ion implanters, coaters,
etchers, and photochemical process lines.
Assembly and Test Equipment Hundreds of items of Western equipment,
including scribers, bonders, probe testers,
and final test equipment have been acquired
by the Soviets.
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As in the case of microelectronics, acquisition of computer technology
finds wide application within the Soviet Union. The acquisition of company
proprietary technical documentation, augmented by actual hardware of advanced
large Western general purpose computers has been instrumental in advancing the
development of the idigenous Soviet Ryad-series general purpose computer. In
addition to the advantage gained by the exploitation of computer technologies,
the acquired computer hardware also is being used for military related appli-
cations.
TABLE IV: COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUIRED BY THE SOVIET BLOC
EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY COMMENTS
Design concepts of the US IBM The Soviets Ryad series of computers is
360 and 370 series of patterned after the IBM 360 and 370
computers series. This Soviet series has had a wide
variety of applications in the civilian and
military industires. The adaptations of the
US computer have eliminated many of the high
risks in undertaking the development and
production of a new series of general purpose
computers and saved the Soviets considerable
time and man-power.
US Microporcessors and Can be used as the processors for a variety
advanced microdevices of special purpose computers. US designs
were copied by the Soviets for production in
the USSR.
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Software, probably for Could assist in the general software design
operating systems of Soviet general purpose computers.
Numerous Western general In general, these acquisitions could
purpose minicomputers, and compensate for the inability of the Bloc
microcomputer acquisitions computer industry to satisfy its consumer
requirements. These units could therefore
either be used for military applications or
could free indigenous equipment for these
applications.
IRIS-80 Computer-System This a powerful system. The computer
is useful for antisubmarine warfare
detection and classification problems.
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APPENDIX II
Projected Soviet Technological Needs
and Acquisition Targets Through the 1980s
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Given the dynamic nature of their collection program, it. is expected that
the Soviets will continue their attempts to acquire a broad range of Western
technologies. Certain areas, however, represent priority collection targets
for them; these areas are critical to the Soviets' enhancement of their
weapons capability, in which they have marked deficiencies.
Over the past decade, the Soviets' most Pco"--ea'improvements in stra-
tegic weaponry have been in the development of a MIRV ballistic missile capa-
bility and a significant improvement in the accuracy of their ICBMs. The
former capability was made possible largely through the introduction of
onboard digital computers and the latter through the improvement in the
quality of the missile guidance systems and the procedures used to calibrate
them. Technology acquisitions form the West contributed measurably to these
improved capabilities.
The Soviets probably will continue to make their highest priority the
acquisition of Western microelectronics and computer technology for in-flight
guidance computers. This acquisition effort will be motivated by a desire to
overcome reliability problems and also to provide the on-board processing
capability required for the development of terminal homing guidance, a
guidance option with the potential for extremely high accuracies.
The Soviets will also give top priority to acquiring information on the
latest generation of US inertial components upon which the MX and the Trident
guidance systems are based. Despite the past accuracy improvements of Soviets
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ICBMs, these two US systems incorporate technologies beyond present Soviet
capabilities. Moreover, their SLBM accuracies are significantly behind those
of US systems. In addition to information on hardware, the Soviets are
expected to seek calibration software algorithms which, as the guidance
instruments themselves reach their practical performance limit, would allow
for continued improvement in weapon system accuracy.
Western solid rocket propulsion technology will be a high-priority Soviet
acquisition target in the 1980s. While the Soviets have vast experience with
the liquid-propellant systems which represent the bulk of their ballistic
missile force, they are shifting their emphasis to solid propulsion systems,
which have practical advantages over liquid systems in a variety of applica-
tions. At the same time, the Soviets have had only limited success with the
progress of their solid-propulsion program. They probably will pursue the
acquisition of information on solid-propellant production procedures, and
propellant grain design, motor case, and rocket nozzle technologies.
The Soviets' ABM R&D effort has continued since the 1960s. As a result,
they have gained considerable expertise in the development of large fixed-site
radars for early-warning, tracking, and engagement, and their interceptor
technology has also improved substantially over the years. Areas remain,
however, in which the Soviets will still seek and would benefit from Western
ABM technology. These include signal processing for detection, discrimina-
tion, target assignment, and sensor technology, particularly in the long-wave
infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum applicable towards improving
their launch detection capability.
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Priority Soviet targets in this area will include Western materials tech-
nology, particularly composite materials to allow weight-efficient designs.
The Soviets would also benefit from the acquisition of certain engine technol-
ogies, in particular those critical to the development of high-bypass turbo-
fans. While, in general, the Soviets' avionics appear adequate, they have yet
to demonstrate a capability to deploy reliable, accurate air-,? ne inertial
navigation systems for long-range navigation and weapons delivery. Thus,
while long used in the West, these systems are still prime candidates for
acquisition.
Very high priority probably will be given to the acquisition of computer-
aided aircraft design technology, an area in which the Soviets are clearly
impressed by US progress. In general, they also will continue to benefit from
the acquisition of efficient aircraft production technology from the West.
While the Soviets have a strong indigenous air defense radar and missile
technology, their general lag in microelectronics and microprocessing should
direct them to attempt wherever possible in the West the acquisition of
advanced signal-processing hardware and software.
The Soviets will continue to emphasize the acquisition of technologies
applicable to improving their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, an area in
which much Western technology is superior to theirs. Thus, a significant
effort to acquire acoustic sensor technology can be expected, in particular
that technology applicable to the development of large towed acoustic arrays
that would assist the localization of Western submarines in open waters. They
probably will also target the acquisition of signal-processing hardware and
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software required to fully exploit the detection capabilities of these
sensors.
Another critical problem area to which the Soviets will direct acquisi-
tion is that of submarine quieting. Here also the Soviets lag the West
significantly. As a result, not only are their submarines more vulnerable to
detection, but the self-generated noise reduces the effectiveness of their own
acoustic sensors!
An area in which the Soviet have historically lagged the West is in
precision submarine navigation -- in particular, in the development of subma-
rine inertial navigation systems. The need for improvements here will become
more pressing as the Soviets develop long-range cruise missiles for land
attack which require precise knowledge of launch location.
Finally, the Soviets will continue to target technologies related to
large aircraft carrier (for high-performance aircraft) design and construction
to reduce the likelihood of poor design choices that would arise in what is
for them an entirely new type of construction program.
Much of the Soviet acquisition effort in this area is likely to be
targeted against seeker and sensor technology for tactical missiles and preci-
sion-guided munitions. The Soviets will apply considerable effort in partic-
ular to acquiring advanced Western electro-optical technology. As in other
weapons areas, the signal processing and microelectroncs technologies
supporting tactical weapon systems will also be priority acquisition targets.
Technical documentation on entire weapon systems, if obtained, will be used to
develop countermeasures.
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The USSR is now at the stage of implementing its LSI (large-scale inte-
gration) technology to high-volume production. Despite the large acquisitions
of Western technology and production equipment over the past ten years which
have brought them to this level, additional acquisitions from the West are
needed for the more sophisticated weapons projects of the future. Ever-in-
creasing needs for higher precision Western equipment will extend at least
through the 1980s. In addition, the Soviets will require considerable expan-
sion of their microelectronic material base to support continued expansion of
integrated-circuit production. In this regard, the USSR is seeking Western
help to build two or three poly-silicon plants that will more than double
current Soviet capacity. Also, with increasing advances in the technology,
the USSR will be seeking additional Western assistance in key complementary
technologies such as packaging and printed circuit board production.
The USSR is expected to focus its future acquisitions efforts on the
emerging technologies related to very-high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC)
and very-large-scale integration (VLSI). It is important to note that, while
VHSIC is thought of as a military development program, and VLSI as a civilian
technology, there is little difference between the two as far as Soviet
production needs are concerned. The same materials, production, and test
equipment will be used to produce both. Furthermore, in both of these areas,
the USSR has over the years developed effective means and methods for ille-
gally acquiring Western advanced products.
Prime Soviet collection efforts in computer technology through the 1980s
are likely to include large-scale scientific computers such as the US-built
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CRAY-1 Computer. Computers of that class offer significant improvements over
Soviet models in weapons-systems design and simulation and in the processing
of numerical data for many military applications. Other hardware targets will
include: very dense random-access memory chips; high-capacity disk drives and
packs; the so-called "superminicomputer" class of machines; and the latest in
general purpose computer technology. All of the above targets offer opportu-
nities for significant performance improvements and represent technologies of
substantial Soviet lag.
In the area of computer software, the Soviets will continue to attempt to
collect IBM programs and programs of other vendors written for IBM machines
because of past Soviet decisions related to copying IBM computers. The large
and growing number of IBM-compatible computers in the USSR means that collec-
tion activity in this area can be expected to increase. Because IBM plans to
make some of their newest operating systems the bases of their future soft-
ware, the Soviets are likely to make this a prime target for future exploita-
tion. The compelling attraction of computer networks should spur great Soviet
interest in acquiring network-control software and other programs related to
networking.
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