STRATEGIC SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002400025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 14, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Current
Policy No. 352
Strategic Situation in Central
America and the Caribbean
December 14, 1981
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is a statement by Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, before the Subcommit-
tee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 14, 1981.
Major Developments
There are four major developments that
have come together to create what can
only be described as a state of danger in
the Caribbean Basin.
One is the new Cuban strategy for
uniting the left in the countries of the
region, committing it to violence, arm-
ing it, training it in warfare, and at-
tempting to use it for the destruction
of existing governments. I say new be-
cause it is only 3 years ago that the
policy was adopted. Prior to 1978-for
some 10 years since the death of Che
Guevara on an Andean hillside-Cuba
had made a sustained effort to portray
itself as a member of the international
community not unlike others, carrying
on state-to-state relations through em-
bassies, emphasizing trade and cultural
contacts.
Observing this pattern, many in this
and other countries of the hemisphere
began to hope that revolutionary Cuba
was on the way to becoming a status-
quo nation. The 1970s, of course, were
marked by Cuban intervention in Africa
on a continent-wide scale. But, it was
argued, Africa was a special case.
The turn came in 1978, when Cuba
decided to back the insurrection in
Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent
to many that a new Cuban strategy was
in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like
a case all of its own. But then the same
thing was tried in El Salvador, in
Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is being
tried in Honduras.
We have attempted to identify and
illustrate the full scope of this new
Cuban strategy in a research paper [see
Special Report No. 90], which I would
like to submit to the committee for its
study. The paper is based on both public
and intelligence sources. It was not writ-
ten to make sensational revelations, and
it does not. But I wonder how many
Americans are aware of the sweep and
the sophistication of what is going on. In
many countries of the region, Cuba is
attempting no less than to construct a
machine to destroy the established
governments.
The pattern is always the same. For
years the radical left in the area has
been divided by disagreement over tac-
tics. The old-line Comintern parties
argued patience: You only had to wait
for Marx's famous objective conditions
to emerge, and the revolution would oc-
cur. Other factions were for setting up
Che Guevara-style focos: put some
armed guerrilleros into the countryside
and their presence will radicalize the
peasants. Others were for guerra pro-
longada: discredit the regime by hitting
the economy. Still others advocated
spectacular kidnapings and assassina-
tions.
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Under the new strategy Cuba is ap-
proaching each of these groups, often
calling them to Havana. Cuba offers to
supply (or arrange for the supply of)
arms and training. But there are condi-
tions: The left must unite, it must create
a single directorate for command and
control, it must commit to a single
strategy (which often is written out and
approved by Castro personally). And
that strategy is always the same: armed
struggle against the established govern-
ment.
It is important to be clear about the
effects of this process. It enhances
Cuba's role as the guide (and sometimes
as the arbiter) of each revolutionary
movement. It increases the pressure on
democratic movements on the left to
make common cause with the men with
the guns rather than face blame as the
obstacle to the unity of the left. Once
unity on the left has been created, demo-
cratic socialists in the hemisphere and in
Europe face the dilemma of whether or
not to support it. Many have supported
such movements-only to learn with
bitterness that their money and political
backing are welcome; their ideas are
not.
This is not only history. The process
goes on. In Honduras, Cuba has just
now completed the same unification
operaton: Parties have been joined
together in a national directorate com-
mitted to armed struggle. A new at-
tempt to overthrow an established
government by force is underway.
The democracies in the hemisphere
have had to break, suspend, or down-
grade relations with Cuba: Colombia,
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru,
and Ecuador.
The second development is the
economic and social crisis in the
region. It also began in 1978, just as
Castro was launching his new policy of
intervention.
For the past two generations, most
of the Central American countries and
many of the islands compiled an enviable
record of economic and social change.
But in 1978 a serious deterioration
began. Prices for export commodities-
coffee, sugar, cocoa-began to decline
sharply. Prices for imported oil and im-
ported capital kept going up. With
slowed economic growth in the industrial
world, tourism stagnated. Run-on credit
crunches resulted. Some countries are
bankrupt. Others are threatened with
bankruptcy. In two, Cuban-assisted in-
surrections are destroying power plants,
bridges, and crops and attempting to
disrupt the tourist trade.
The result is a grave, general
economic crisis bringing with it misery
and despair for many millions of people
in the region. Coinciding as it does with
the Cuban drive to unify the left and
commit it to violence, economic crisis
creates great potential political
vulnerability throughout the area.
The third factor is developing the
role of Nicaragua as a platform for in-
tervention throughout Central
America. We have watched with
deepening concern as Nicaragua has
moved away from pledges of political
pluralism toward a repressive, one-party
state. At the same time it is greatly ex-
panding its army and building up an in-
ventory of heavy arms. It continues to
be deeply involved in logistics and other
support for the insurgency in El
Salvador.
The United States and a number of
other countries have tried to provide an
alternative to these trends, notably by
providing economic aid but also by main-
taining political contacts. Since 1979 the
United States alone gave $120 million in
assistance. Recently we tried by diplo-
matic means to achieve a rapprochement
with Managua. And we don't close the
door on future attempts.
But frankly there is little to show
for our efforts. Indeed, I wonder
whether any of the democratic countries
that have supported Nicaragua can claim
to have slowed down, much less to have
stopped the negative trends.
There are more than 1,500 Cuban
military and security advisers in Nica-
ragua, twice as many as there were at
the start of the year. More tanks are
reported on their way. Preparations for
the receipt of MiGs are well advanced.
A final factor is the special impor-
tance of the struggle in El Salvador
for the future of the area. El Salvador
is the second largest Central American
state in population and in the past has
achieved a relatively high level of eco-
nomic development.
But El Salvador is important not
only for itself. There are underway
these two critical experiments in reform:
one in land tenure, the other in the crea-
tion of democratic institutions and
strengthening the political center. If
these reforms are defeated by arms,
prospects for peaceful change elsewhere
will be seriously set back.
There is something else. If, after
Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a
violent minority, what state in Central
America will be able to resist? How long
would it be before the major strategic
U.S. interests-the canal, sea lanes, oil
supplies-were at risk?
U.S. Strategy
To meet and overcome these challenges
the United States must also have a com-
prehensive strategy. Let me summarize
briefly the line of action we are now
developing.
First, we must make sure that our
friends have the means to defend
themselves. El Salvador and Honduras
are the two most threatened countries.
The buildup in Nicaragua menaces both;
targeting of El Salvador's economy by
Nicaraguan-supported insurgents creates
a situation of emergency in that country.
Both need more resources-above all,
economic but military as well. We will
be consulting with the Congress on how
we can best provide help.
Second, we must join with others
to help provide the Caribbean Basin
countries the opportunity to achieve
long-term prosperity. President Reagan
is preparing for submission to the Con-
gress early next year a far-reaching
package of proposals. Because the
markets in the countries of the basin are
so small, investment other than in
staples is often unattractive. But if in-
vestors could be sure of unimpeded ac-
cess to outside markets, particularly to
the vast U.S. market, at least for a
defined period of time, then investment
in the area becomes more interesting.
The skilled and relatively low-cost labor
of the area becomes an attraction. We
are developing proposals for one-way
free trade arrangements and for invest-
ment incentives; there will also be provi-
sion for preventing abuses. At the same
time we will present proposals for
emergency financial assistance to tide
countries over until they can take ad-
vantage of the new opportunities to
begin earning'their own way.
Third, we must not falter in our
pursuit of democratic values-for they
assure the legitimacy of governments
we hope to help. In a free, open elec-
tion with broad participation, Honduras
chose a new government last month.
Costa Rica-whose deeply rooted demo-
cratic institutions are helping it to
weather a brutal economic crisis without
violence-goes to the polls in February.
El Salvador will follow with elections for
a constituent assembly-the first step in
creating representative, constitutionally
bound government in that nation. In
Central America only the Nicaraguan
Government refuses to go before the
people.
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Let me in this regard make a
remark on the subject of proposals for
negotiation between the government and
the insurgents. Members of the Frente
Democratico Revolucionario (FDR) say
they want to talk about "restructuring
the army" and "establishing a new
order." In their view such changes are
conditions precedent to elections.
But the establishment of a new
order and the status of the army are
among the subjects for the constituent
assembly to be elected in March. Why
should they only be debated and decided
with the insurgents and not with the
campesinos, the labor unions, and the
political parties? Why shouldn't the FDR
have-only have-the representation in
the assembly it can get by campaigning?
In July the United States said it
would facilitate contacts and discussions
on election issues. In September we sent
a group to El Salvador and talked to all
interested in talking to us, including the
Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
(MNR), a member of the FDR. The
representative of another member of the
FDR has asked to see us in Washington
this week, and we are receiving him on
the same basis. If there are opposition
elements who believe in a democratic
solution, we will help them participate in
the electoral process. But it would be
wrong to assist those-in negotiations or
otherwise-who are committed to the
destruction of democracy.
Fourth, we must continue the pur-
suit of justice for the countries of the
area. Lawlessness from both the left
and right has been a major weakness in
El Salvador. But the government is
making progress in bringing it under
control. Violent deaths other than in
combat as reported each week by our
Embassy in San Salvador are down by
more than a half since last year. I do not
want to give you the impression that our
weekly figures are complete. But the
trend is significant. Progress is un-
mistakable. I wonder whether the in-
surgents have made any contribution to
that progress at all. For they claim that
their violence is justified by a higher
goal.
Fifth, our emphasis should be on
collective action. Last week the
Organization of American States voted
22 to 3 with 4 abstentions in support of
free elections as a means to a political
solution in El Salvador. In the same
forum Secretary Haig has suggested
that all countries in Central America
should address the arms race that now
threatens in Central America as a result
of Nicaraguan imports of heavy weapons
and the Cuban military adviser presence
in Nicaragua. Should more serious
threats emerge, it is in collective securi-
ty that we should seek solutions.
Finally, we must communicate to
Cuba that the costs of escalating its
intervention in the region will be very
high. We have readied measures to pre-
vent another Mariel sealift should Cuba
again seek to utilize the longings of its
own citizens to harm this country. We
are tightening the economic embargo.
We are preparing creation of a radio
devoted to Cuba news and beamed to
the island, so that Cubans can be better
able to hold their government account-
able for its actions. Our underlying
message is clear: We will not accept, we
do not believe the countries of the
region will accept, that the future of the
Caribbean Basin be manipulated from
Havana. It must be determined by the
countries themselves. ^
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? December 1981
Editor: Colleen Sussman ? This material is
in the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
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