BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR YOUR BRIEFINGS ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902340021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001 : CIA-RD 84B00049ROO0902340021-6
9 March 1982
NOTE FOR: DCI
FROM : NI O/ LA
SUBJECT : Background Information for Your Briefings on Central America
As you requested at our discussion this morning, I am attaching various
items of information that might be useful as you prepare your briefing. Since
you may be giving both classified and unclassified briefings and, since I have
both types of materials, I have separated my listing of these for each of the
substantive themes.
I presume you would like me to attend these scheduled briefings, and I
would be pleased to brief on any items you wish; but I might be mose useful on
the specific issues on Mexican actions in Central America and prospects for
Mexian internal stability. Please let me know.
Substantive Classified
Issue Enclosure
A/ Central America overview
(includes transnational
supporters of the extreme
left & of the moderates)
Unclassified
Enclosure
19 Feb 82 briefing used 24 Nov 81 overview
B/ Pattern of extreme left two charts
action in the region I
C/ Character of the extreme
left coalition in
El Salvador
0
D/ Rough comparison of
Nicaraguan experience
El Salvador "negotiated
settlement" suggestions
E/ Nicaraguan export of memo of 8 Mar 82 giving
subversion quotes from Carter
Administration &
Sandinista leaders
Aug 80 two-page over-
view of 10 steps to
extreme left victory,
then five steps to
consolidation of power.
Aug 80 sanitized CIA
chart released by State
& summary of each group
(this is what I used
in my public writing
to describe the union
between the"Marxist/
Leninist tiger" & the
'hon-communist rabbit"
draft of 9 Mar 82
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Tb
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Substantive Classified
Issue Enclosure
F/ Mexican dual strategy (DDI working on paper)
- tangible support for the
extreme left
- cool but continuing
relations with governments
G/ Potential. destabilization (DDI has draft paper on two pages from Jun 81
H/ Sandinista repression of
internal democratic
groups since 1979
Unclassified
Enclosure
13 Jul 81 article,
"Mexico's Central
America Strategy"
this) report for State
"Mexico--The Iran
Next Door?", San Diego
Union, Aug 79
one-page examples of
repression of 1979 to
present (not including
Miskito Indian data) 25X1
SECRETI
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1. Car1Cbean Basin Overview
24 countries and 11 soon to be independent entities with a total
population of 163 million in the Caribbean Sea and rimland from Suriname
to the US border; of these 93 million live in the region from Panama to the
US border.
? Two dimensions of strategic interest and threat
A/ Continuation of subversive momentum increasingly supported by Cuba since 1978
-- Could produce. more hostile Marxist/Leninist regimes in
Central America by 1983-84
Which ill turn, according to the would 25X1
"bring the revolution to Mexico's border, thereby raising the
risks of internal destabilization."
B/ In addition, a more hostile Caribbean is dangerous because:
45% of all trade and crude oil pass through the' Caribbean
-- 50% of US petroleum is now processed in Caribbean refineries
-- 50% of NATO supplies for wartime would pass through Caribbean
-- Sea litres of communication--have become more vulnerable
(1970 - 200 Soviet shipdays; 1980 - 2,600 Soviet shipdays)
A communist Central America with 20 million people could have
military forces of about 500,000--if the Nicaraguan or Cuban
proportti`bn held.
II. Cuban Threat and Actions--Three-Types
A/ Military power and buildup
125,000 to
--/150,000-person armed forces includes ready reserves of 100,uuu to 130,000
-- More than 200 MIGs; 650 tanks; 90 helicopters; other modern weapons
- Since 1981 massive Soviet supplied modernization--about 65,uUU metric tuns
including entirely new systems (Kona frigate, SA-6, sell'-prupeiled
artillery, HI-24 HIND helicopters and nine more r1IG-23s).
B/ 3;,000 Cuban troops supporting pro-Soviet regime! including Ethiopia,
Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen.,.plus 30,000 Cuban civilians.,worldwide.
C/ Cuban support for subversion--continuous and growing
-- Nicaragua now a full partner vs El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Costa Rica
NOTE: V ter the four-paag;ce briefing, attached are three charts--
CeWtral American economics and guerrilla strengths 1960-1981;
Map showing range of unemployment in the entire Caribbean region.
Chart showing country and region population.
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-- 6,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, about 1,000 military/security
-- Clear eattern in Central America--unificatinn,'training,
weapons, communications, propaganda, funds
-- Full Soviet Bloc support
-- Grenada--a propaganda partner--75KW radio-free Grenada will have
strongest in Eastern Caribbean other than Cuba's two new 500 KW
radios
-- Cuba politically active in Mexico*
- Close contacts in foreign ministry, other governments,
agencies and cultivating middle Tevel military officers
- Close links to new unified Marxist Leninist party estimated
to have 125,000 to 185,000 active members
- Close links to more than 1,200 Latin American terrorists in
groups from Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, which provide logistic
support from Mexican soil
-- Support to more than 600 M-19 guerrillas in Colombia (recall
March 1981 infiltration from Cuba via Panama of 125 guerrillas)
-- Other reported Cuban subversive efforts against-- Jamaica
Suriname, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Panama
III, Brief Country Reviews--Two Different Caribbean Contexts
A/ Serious subversion which makes the economic problems even worse--
most of Central America and Colombia
B/ Economic problems with noticeable subversive danger in some countries--
rest of Caribbean region
A/ Serious Subversion and Economic Problems (8 countries with 50M population)
El Salvador
- As the 28 March elections approach, the guerrillas are increasing
attacks on military outposts, taking over towns, interdicting major
roadways, and conducting economic sabotage. Attacks against major
cities including San Salvador are planned.
- The 24,000-man government security forces took 2,200 casualties last
year; they are spread thin.
Successful elections should provide a political toast, but time now
favors the guerrillas because of the continuing outside support and
economic destruction. 25X1
2
=RET4- !!T 25X1
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Guatemala
- Guerrilla activity has increased sharply.
- The insurgency there is entering a new, more active phase.
Guerrilla forces doubled to 4,500 during the past year.
Cuba and Nicaragua appear to be increasing their support.
If Salvador falls, there is little chance Guatemala can survive; otherwise,
there is some chance depending on events in the region and the internal
policies of the Guatemalan government.
Honduras
- The restoration of constitutional government in January 1982 is a positive step
- But the Cubans and Nicaraguans are working to unify extreme left groups
for an insurgency--probably in the next 12-18 months.
- Some terrorist actions began in 1981 and will likely increase.
- Terrorist/guerrilla unity meeting schedulef for mid-February '82 in Havana.
Costa Rica
- Successful democratic election of 7 February.
- New Social Democratic president is anti-communist, will take office May 1982.
- However Cuba/Nicaragua are financing a radical left political front. and
a paramilitary force which is intended to neutralize and destabilize Costa Rica
B/ Countries with Mainly Economic Problems ( 16 countries with 113M population)
Their economies are being undercut by global economic conditions such as high
oil prices, declining commodity prices (sugar, coffee, bauxite), stagnating
foreign investment, soaring unemployment, and declining tourism.
Middle-class emigration is siphoning off technical skills as well as some
moderate poliitical leadership (particularly in Surname and Guyana).
radical
Economic conditions have made the youth increasingly susceptible to/leftist
influence (median age in region is 16).
Most governments lack adequate security force or intelligence structures and
are extremely vulnerable to the growing threat posed by radical, Cuban and
Libyan-backed movements.
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IV. S_ig_nif9cant new level of other international involvement in crisis areas
For El Salvador government and regional moderates
-- Christian democratic parties of Europe and Latin America
- national and international condemnations of the extreme left
- frequent endorsements of Duarte government - Dec 81 most recent
-- International non-communist trade unions and their federations
- ICFTU/ORIT/AFL-CIO
-- All the Latin American democracies including Venezuela and Colombia
-- September 1981, 15 nations condemned the Mexican-French initiative
December 1981, 22- 3 vote in St. Lucia (OAS endorses Salvador election;
Nicaragua, Mexico, Grenada opposed)
-- 19 January 1982, formation of Central American Democratic Community
involving El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica.
For the extreme left
Libya in Nicaragua including $100M in aid and advisors; seeking to
become active in several Caribbean states (Trinidad, Dominica, Bahamas,
St. Lucia)
Several Palestinian terrorist groups ~~-
- about 500 guerrillas have been trained in Palestinian camps
- PLO--since 1979. . . recent increase. . . public admission by
Arafat that Palestinians are helping the guerrillas in El Salvador
and that Palestinian pilots are in Nicaragua
- DFL.P is Soviet-controlled and has been involved
- Evidence of Soviet encouragement since 1979 for their involvement.
Many but not all Social Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America.
- Growing concern about the Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua
by formerly gOllible Social Democrats.
Mexico
Dual strategy of correct but cool relations with governments.
- While providny direct and indirect help to the extreme left
including funds, propaganda, base of operations.
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Central America: Guerrilla Strengths, Economic Growth Rates, 1960-81
4,000
3,000
GNP (%)
ai b, +12
1 /111
1,000 i i -8
1960-70 71-77 78 79 80 81 -12
-25.8
d. 3/80-Land reform in
El Salvador
f. 1/81 -Failure of
offensive in
El Salvador
ei +12
1,000 1 t- I I I ' -8
1960-70 71-77 78 79 80 81 712
5,000 +8
4,000 +4
a 3/79-Havana
meeting re Nicaragua
b 7/79-FSLN
victory in Nicaragua
c.12/79-Havana
meeting on
EI Salvador,
Guatemala
e. 5/80-Formation of
FDCR/Guatemala
4,000 +4
3,000 0
2,000 " -4
1,0001 I I I I I -8
1960-70 71-77 78 79 80 81 -12 Guerrillas
Secret GNP
401004 1-82
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'60-'70
'71-'77
'78
'79
'80
'81 est.
Nicaragua No. of Guerrillas
150
300
2,000
4,500
0
0
Real GNP (%)
+6.4
+6.0
-5.5
-25.8
+10
0
El Salvador No. of Guerrillas
0
300
850
2,000
3,500
4,500
Real GNP (%)
+5.5
+5.2
+4.4
+3.5
-10
-10
Guatemala No. of Guerrillas
300
250
600
1,000
2,000
4,500
Real GNP (%)
+5.2
+6.2
+5.0
+4.5
+3.5
-2
Honduras No. of Guerrillas
0
0
0
0
0
100
Real GNP (%)
+4.5
+3.8
+7.9
+6.7
+2.5
0
Costa Rica No. of Guerrillas
0
0
0
0
0
0
secret0 Real GNP (%)
+5.1
+6.4
+6.3
+3.3
+1.6
-5.0
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9~3t(~IdU by Sf)111'i
A-L lip
DEVELOPMENT OF LEFTIST GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR
1977-1979
1974-1976
1972
1970
/___-- IA 1:;[aST t.. ![' I5T /VInLE:1T LEFT -----------------------
f
guerrilla terrorist groups
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APPeaDZz III (b)
LErTSaT OPPOe1TIOIt OBOUps IY EL aALVADOa
1. A. PCES,-The Communist Party of El Salvador is the oldest organization
of the far left and has historically been oriented toward Moscow. It has recently
abandoned Its former attitude toward violent revolution and now espouses armed
action against the JAG.
B. UDN.--The National Democratic Union is the political front group for the
PCES and has a variety of component organizations such as labor unions and
urban poor.
2. A. FPL.-The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces is the largest
terrorist/guerrilla group and professes a revolutionary Marxist creed. Its leader.
Salvador Cayetano Carpio, was a member of the PCES before breaking with the'
orthodox party and helping form the FPL. The FPL claims to be developing a
revolutionary arm to defeat the JRG.
B. BPR.-The Popular Revolutionary Bloc, the front group of the FPL, is a
large coalition of peasant, worker, student, teacher. etc., groups. It is currently
beaded by Juan Chacon and has been responsible for numerous strikes, occupa-
tions of buildings, marches, etc.
3. A. ERP.- .The Popular Revolutionary
organized in the early 1970's by dissatisfied embersaofetheriPC Se It has been
A
particularly active in, bombings and kidnappings.
B. LP-28 -The 28 February Popular Leagues, the front group for the ERP.
Is a modest-sized coalition of students, teachers, and peasants
4. A. FARS.-The Armed Forces of National Resistance is a terrorist/guer? was
formed
B.
a rilla PAPUwhTbe United P pular Acttiion Front.b hy e trouttgroup for the group of the ERP.
of several student. tarmworker, and urban slumdweller or Ftiow,.
S. A. PRTC.-The Revolutionary Party of Central- American Workers is a
small terrorist/guerrilla group organized in the mid. 1970's.
B. MLF.-The Movement of Popular Liberation, the front group for the PRTC.
In headed b; 1Fabio Castillo.
8. KNR?-The National Revolutionary Movement is a small Social Democratic
oriented party headed by former.IRG Junta member Guillermo Ungo.
7. MPSC.-The Popular Social Christian Movement was formed in March 1980
by dissident Christian Democrats and is headed by Ruben Zamora Rivas. PD.
Democra
is a coalition of and MPSC,ras well as professional and labor groups iformed in early
parties, the 11NR
9. FDR.-The Revolutionary Democratic Front is a coalition of the CR1 land
the FD formed in mid-April 1980. It is headed by tit and
En Al.
CRJ1.-The Revolutionary Coordinator of theigMassesa isz the umbrella
group for leftist organizations which was formed in January 1980.
11. DRU.-The Unified Revolutionary Directorate is the recently formed con-
trol board for leftist organizations and comprises the leadership of the principal
terrnriat/gnerriila rrnupq. the PCES. the FPI., the ERP. and the FARN. The
DRU has declared that it will xuide the revolution, and thus appears to have
superceded the CRti1.
APPENDIX IV (a)
FPL RECOUNTS ACTrviTTxs OF PAST FEW )tOITT$a
(Special PRELA service by Mario Menendez Rodriguez)
The
For es pOlPL l-military otlensive of the Farabundo
during February, i h beg: n ilnunJan d h tl qC ;hi year and intensidedeandtwidened
has been effectively the
implemented through constant sabotage actionskand hold. devastating attacks
iona Armed Forcestof N tionallResista ce (FARN] in the u b area by the
through the initiation of activities by the Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberation] of the f ommunist Party. This o pnsivp was to announce the threat of revolutionary war to the repressive corps of th sesmall
nation which is without government and which. since Tuesday 13 May, has been
invaded by the regular Honduran and Guatemalan armies.
Amid the intense and prolonged crisis and the impossibility of finding a politi-
cal solution favorable to the interests of the 14 families and the imperialists, the
besieged and incompetent top military commands requested the genocidal inter.
vention of the troops of Gen. Policarpo Paz Garcia and Gen. Romeo Lucas Garcia
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OPPOSITION ON THE LEFT:
ITS ORIGINS AND RELATIONSHIPS
1925 PCES
UDN
1970
% FPL
BPR
1972
ERP
LP-28
1975
FARN
FAPU PRTC
MLP
Jan 1980
Mar 1980
MPSC
Apr 1980
May 1980
Nov 1980 (FMLN)
Legend:
-------.Break-away Group
4w
Front Organization
Umbrella Organization
Perspectives on Freedon, No. 1
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Proposals for a Negotiated Settlement in El Salvador--A Perspective
from the-Nicaraguan Experience, 1979 to the Present
Proposals for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador have been made
by Mexico (21 Feb 82), by the extreme left (Washington Post, 8 Mar 82 inter-
view), and by concerned US citizens, including Carter Administration NSC
staffer for Latin America, Dr. Robert Pastor (New Republic, Mar 82).
All of these share a number of common features, and all discussion so far has
ignored the important historical lesson provided by the recent experience in
Nicaragua. The following schematic outline attempts to put the El Salvador
negotiation proposals in realistic perspective.
Note that the negative results in Nicaragua are even more probable
in El Salvador both because the international momentum of the extreme left
is now stronger in the region than in 1979 and because unlike Nicaragua where
the Marxist-Leninists and genuinely democratic forces now totally excluded
from power were allies against the far right,in El Salvador they are currently
fighting each other.
"Negotiated Settlement" Similar Experience Result in Nicaragua
Component for El Salvador from Nicaragua
Friendly countries, multi-
national guarantees of a
settlement--to include
Mexico, perhaps France &
others.
Anti-Somoza coalition None acted with vigor
supported by Mexico, to protest systematic
Venezuela, Costa Rica, repression of democratic
Andean Pact, as well as forces or violation of
Cuba. OAS resolution and FSLN
promises.
Only the new Christian
Democratic government
of Venezuela has exerted
--------------------------------------------------------- au-pressure.------------
OAS might function as a OAS recognition of No OAS action to enforce
guarantor. June 23, 1979, based or even publicize this
explicitly on free resolution.
elections, press, etc.
No OAS or other call for
economic-sanctions,-etc.-
Extreme left would promise Sandinistas made explicit No enforcement or even
to respect "pluralism" and promises in writing, publicity.
territorial integrity of 12 July 1979.
neighbors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=------
US could be involved as US was involved in the No impact.
negotiating partner and use negotiations June-
economic incentives for July 1979, provided Virtually no US effort to
compliance with terms. significant economic aid use economic transactions
(about $180M direct, in order to help the
about $220M through IADB) genuinely democratic groups.
Congressionally mandated
US cutoff of $15M remainder
for economic assistance
22 Jan 81 due to bipartisan
finding that Nicaragua was
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impact on slowing of internal
repression. in Nicaragua.
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Introduce the discussion of Miskito repression with a brief paragraph,
indicating the sequence of events since autumn 1979.
"Beginning in the fall of 1979, Cuban and other Marxist/Leninist
'teachers' were sent to the Atlantic Coast region for the purpose of
indoctrinating the Protestant, English-speaking Indians who live there
in settled communities with strong family ties. The Indians resisted
passively--staging a large series of peaceful demonstrations in the
summer of 1980, and this was met with a combination of temporary
conciliation and the arrest of key leaders. Toward the end of 1981,
several thousand Indians had fled Sandinista repression and gone to
live in Honduras. In late December 1981, Sandinista repression of the
Indians in the northeastern part of the country, especially along the
Rio Coco, began to increase sharply (see map 2)."
Nicaraguan export of subversion -- reinforce our case both by quoting
President Carter and his officials and by quoting the Sandinistas
themselves.
In my view, we do not need to release ther 25X1
information to present a very accurate and credible case on this point.
With a little bit of staff work, we can provide a chronological listing
of public quotes to make this point.
Carter Administration statements:
- On 17 January 1981 in approving lethal military aid for El Salvador
the Carter Administration stated that its purpose was to "support
the Salvadoran government in its struggle against left-wing
terrorism supported covertly with arms, ammunition and training
and political and military advice by Cuba and other communist
nations."
- 15 January 1981, then US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White,
was quoted as making the same accusation in the New York Times.*
- March 1980, unclassified testimony of the Defense Department to
the House of Representatives also stated that Cuban support for
the extreme left in El Salvador and Guatemala includes "advice,
propaganda, safe haven, training, arms" and "men and material which
transit Honduras, aircraft landings at remote haciendas" with
weapons from Cuba.
Sandinista statements:
- Washington Post, 8 March 1982, Rosenfeld column (page A13) - indicates
Foreign Minister of Nicaragua D'Escoto admitted "on the record" that
Nicaragua is giving help to the guerrillas. "All he denied was that
there is a substantial flow and that it is authorized."
*Quotation by Amb. White in the NYTimes of 15 January 1981: "It is my personal
conclusion that there has been a change in the amount and sophistication of
weapons coming to the guerrillas, and I think they are coming from Nicaragua."
He noted that large numbers of Soviet and Chinese-made weapons had been captured
in recent days by Salvadoran forces.
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Central America/Mexico: the oattern of action by the extreme left
Action
lCommunist and Insur-
gent groups/modest
Cuban/USSR support
2.Cuban pressure/in-
centives for unifi-
cation
3.Catalytic and dra-
matic violence
}.Unity and expanded
political-military
actions
5. Expanded interna-
tional propaganda
against target
government as lef-
tist terror grows
6..Endo rdement for ex-
treme left by
foreign democratic
socialist nroups
7. Formation of "broad
coalition" includ-
ing moderate left
and others
8? Establishment of
government in exile
3. Campaign to obtain
international support
and recognition for
government in exile
Nicaragua
1962-78
Jan 78 murder
of P. Chamorro
M4r 79 FSLN
Directorate
Spring 79
El Salvador
Jan 80 seizure of
embassies, hos-
tages
Mar 80 murder of
Bishop Rome 0
Jan 80 CRM formed
((later DRV)
All 80
-Jan 80 FES confer-
in Costa Rica*
Mar 80
Socialist Interna-
tional Conference
Santo Domingo
Spring 79 Aor 80
formation of FOR formed under
FAO under FSLN ARV/CRM leadership
leadership
May 79
JRN established
in Costa Rica
May-Jul 79
May 79 Mexico
breaks relations
with Somoza
Summer 80
reports of govern-
ment being organ-
ized in Mexico
Nov 80 planned So-
cialist Interna-
tional Conference
in Madrid
Guatemala
1960-79
Jan 80 seizure
of Spanish em-
bassy
May 80
Guatemalan
Patriotic Libera-
tion Front
May 80
FES conference
in Costa Rica*
May 80
FES supports es-
tablishment of
FDCR - "Demo-
cratic Front
Against Repres-
sion"
*FES - Frederich Ebert Steftung - the political action staff of the German Social
Democratic Party.
Mexico
1960-
Present
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~tctiorlr ? Nicaragua El Salvador Gua
temala Mexi
co
io.Final political- Jun-Jul 79 fall/winter 80*
military offensive
and extreme left
victory
11.Post revolutionary Jul 79-present early 81*
consolidation of (a) Directorate
power (a) establishment (b) JRN
of inner communist Council of State
group and (b) outer
coalition groups
12.International deception
campaign.-
-recognition by govern- Jul 79-present 81*
ments
-foreign aid from west Jul 79-present
-Socialist Interna- Jul 79-present
tional approval
-German SPD/FES support Jul 79-present
-muted,-subtle support
"from communist nations
-covert help for other
revolutionary groups
13.Establishment of overt
links with Cuba, USSR,
etc.
Jul 79-Mar 80
Aug 79-present
Mar 80 summer 81*
14.
Termination of the
Dec 80*
15.
phase of "bourgeios
transition" ending
last vestiges of
non-communist power
Overt alliance or
(following the left
victory in El Salvador)
early 81*
coordination with
Cuba/USSR
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 TI# Cwr~.*~ ~rl ~'nr-1'~~ "~'~~ ~'~> M . J t~._t981
? OWN 98 : GIA nrxn0aonnnannnnnnn1)oann1"
OPINION AND COMMENTARY
Mexico's Central America strategy
. By Constantine C. Menges
The most important and least understood issue in the cur-
rent United States-Mexican relationship is the communist
threat in Central America and the correct response to it.
Currently the A.axican strategy is to support the "leftist
coalition" in Nicaragua. El Salvador. and Guatemala with-
out seeking or urging any guarantee of tree elections, politi-
cal liberties. and the like. Mexico's hypothesis is that, given
the failure of the Canter administration to halt the Sandinista
victory in Nicaragua in 1979 and the growth of the revolution-
ary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala through 1980. its
only successful strategy must be to "moderate (he extremist
left by supporting the revolutionary groups."
Examples of this discreet but officially sanctioned sup-
port will illustrate how active and assertive Mexico has be-
come in Central America.
? Nicaragua. During the revolution against Somoza.
starting in late 1978. Mexico contributed money to buy weap-
ons for the FSLN (Sandinista Liberation Front) and
permitted its territory to be used for facilitating the flow of
guerillas, weapons, and propaganda for the FSLN. In May
1979 Mexico broke diplomatic relations with Sonroza. Lopez
Portillo personally called for the overthrow of "that horren-
dous dictatorship." terminated all sale of petroleum pro-
ducts, recognized the "provisional revolutionary govern-
ment of Nicaragua" then based in Costa Rica, and worked
with Cuba and others to coordinate expanded practical help
from many sources during the final military offensive in
June and Jul- 1979.
After the revolution Mexico adopted a policy of
"unconditioned support" for the Nicaraguan government of
National Reconstruction, making absolutely no distinction
between the Marxist-Leninist groups and the genuinely
democratic elements who combined to overthrow Sornoza
and never mentioning the promises for free elections, par-
ties, press, and trade unions made by the FSLN to the OAS.
Following the Carter/Reagan accusations of Nicaraguan
help for the revolutionary groups in El Salvador, the then
president of the Mexican government party. the PRI, visited
Nicaragua to pledge complete solidarity.
? Guatemala. President Lopez Portillo cancelled a
scheduled visit in 1979 and since then has followed a gener-
ally consistent policy of keeping an official distance from the
Lucas government. In 1980 the Mexican ambassador was re-
called but relations and oil sales continued. In March 1980
Mexico promised the Salvadoran communist party that dur-
ing the final offensive against the government %Icxi(,o would
send troops to the Guatemalan border to prevent the Guate-
malan army from helping the Salvadoran army
Those maneuvers were announced on Dec. ;, 19M, and
conducted just before and during the final offensive in El
Salvador (January 19811 with observers from the Guatema-
Ian army invited ostensibly to verify that there were no
camps for the communist guerrillas from Guatemala in
Mexican territory. In fact, there are strong allegations of
tacit Mexican approval for the establishment in Mexico of
networks which provide money, medicines. food, and per-
haps even weapons to the revolutionary forces in neighboring
Guatemala.
Since a revolutionary Guatemala might become a sanctu-
ary for guerrillas and terrorists operating in the southern oil-
rich regions of Mexico, the consequences of Mexico being
wrong about its strategy could be very severe for its people
By Gordon N. C)nverse. chief photographer
Mexico City's Monument of Revolution
and for the United States as well.
? El Salvador. During 1980. Mexico gate consistent sup-
port to the armed revolutionary groups. This was done by the
PRI, acting for the government, and involved permission Inc
the "Revolutionary Democratic Front" (F'Dltr to use Alexi-
can territory as its propaganda base and to facilitate help for
the guerrillas. There are reports that in the summer of 1980
the president of the Pill promised the communist coordinat-
ing leadership of the El Salvador guerrillas ((he DRU. Uni-
fied Revolutionary Directorate) extensive, clandestine sup-
port through the PRI apparatus (funds. propaganda.
safehouses). action against any Honduran support for the E I
Salvador government, and the holding of a conference on
world solidarity with the revolution in El Salvador.
Following the US election in November 1980 preparations
began for the final offensive in El Salvador. Mexico then took
the following actions: in late November 19811 a "demand" by
the Mexican trade union federation that the government stop
selling oil and break diplomatic relations with EI Salvador-,
the conference on world solidarity with El Salvador. in I)e-
cember 1980 the ambiguous military maneuvers on the Gua-
temalan border and an enormous increase in Mexican gu%-
ernment and media support for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
along with additional funds for propaganda and permission
fora "government in exile" to be based in Mexico.
The United States must communicate to Mexico that it
understands the Mexican strategy but believes it is mistaken
because of the fundamental differences in outlook and power
between the hard-core communist groups which control the
"leftist coalition" in Nicaragua, Ft Salvador, Guatemal? and
the moderate reformist left which Mexico hopes to
encourage.
A better way to promote reform, stability, and constitu-
tional government would be an approach which consists of
support for the center as well as democratic left forces and
which condemns equally the violence of the extreme left arid
extreme right.
Mexico, as a sovereign state. will of course pursue its own
policy. However, it would be advisable to discuss the facts
and alternatives in Central America at greater length in fol-
low-up meetings at a senior level in the wake of the Reagan-
Lopez Portillo summit. Ambassador John Gavin has inn
pressed Washington with his intelligence, serious dedication,
and knowledge of Mexico. Combine these qualities with his
close relationship to President Reagan. and the prospects for
effective diplomacy are excellent
Constantine A/enges is a foreign policy analyst cur-
rently with the Washington office of the Hudson
Institute.
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP 4$0004198 021-6
THE SAN DIEGO UNION, SUNDAY, AUGUST 5, 1979
CURRENrs ;,
Mexico
THE IRAN NEXT DQQ ?
By CONSTANTIM MWGES
For The San Diego Union ' ` .
Last February, the president of Mexico bluntly told President Carter that
both countries "have not decided what we are willing to make of our
relationship." Those words reflected frustration felt by the Mexican leaders
because they had hoped to use the Mexico City summit for comprehensive
negotiations on major issues. Unfortunately, preoccupied by the fall of the
Shah in Iran, the United States was prepared for little more than cordial
ceremony.
There has been virtually no progress in the months since that visit. Instead
the White House and State Department undermined the current ambassador
by telling the press of his impending recall. A promised special ambassador
who would coordinate and lead the many federal agencies involved in our
negotiations with Mexico has not yet been appointed by the President. Nor
has much sustained attention been given to Mexican issues by our top
leadership.
Relations with Mexico involve millions of individuals, billions in transac-
tions, vital sources of scarce energy and basic elements of our national
security. As in the can of Iran trader the Shah, there is a widespread
complacency about political and economic trends in Mexico which could
create very serious problems. Now is the time for a closer look at the realities
underlying past, present and future relations between our two nations.
Most Americans are unaware that normal relations with Mexico were only
restored in 1940 after a century of sharp conflict about territory and economic
issues. A legacy of mistrust and suspicion was the result of three wars - the
most recent in 1917 - the loss of substantial Mexican territory --nd
differences In national development and cultural traditions. Within both
The Mexican revolution of 1910 is in many respects a
metaphor and precedent for the dangers forcing both
Mexico and the United Stabs in the early 1980s.
nations, but for different reasons, there is a dualism of feeling about the other
which contains strong elements of attraction and hostility.
The Mexican revolution of 1910" is in many respects a metaphor and
precedent for the dangers facing both Mexico and the United States in the
early 1980s. That revolution came after many years of political dictatorship,
massive foreign investment and overall economic growth which had left the
majority of the Mexican people in deep poverty. It brought three decades of
internal conflict, the expropriation of foreign investments and a foreign
policy of anti-capitalist and especially anti-American rhetoric and action.
Today there are elements of similarity which suggest that some groups in
Mexico might be working for a second revolution.
During the last four decades, especially since the 1950s, there has been
enormous economic growth in Mexico, along with a return of foreign
investment and credit from public and private sources. Economic growth per
person was 7.3 percent during the 1960s and 5.5 percent during the 1970s,
among the highest in the world. There have also been substantial gains in
social benefits, including from 19611 to 1975 a three-fold increase in secondary
and higher education enrollments, a doubling of the population covered by
social insurance and substantial increases in literacy (to 76 percent) and life
expectancy.
Unfortunately, these positive changes have been accompanied by an
enormous increase in population and the inability of the current government
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r ergo . e v.c+r a i"or more 'bona ecade ar, ro.,uq policy Issues as a federal
officral, un,versuy faculty member and staff member of the Hudson Inshrute and RAND
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000902340021-6
MICO:Thy IRAN MXT DCOR?
to improve ticome- distribution: Mexico's population" increasef from 36
million in 1960 to 70 million this year and, even under optimistic assumptions,
would reach 95 million by 1990. The distribution of income in Mexico is among
the most unequal in Latin America. The upper fifth of the population receives
56 percent of the total while the bottom 40 percent (Z8 million people) must
struggle to survive on a yearly income of $200.
Nearly I million young people become old enough to work each year, but
the economy has not been able to provide nearly enough new jobs. The result
is that 40 to 50 percent of the active labor force is unemployed or
underemployed. This in turn creates the desperate pressure for immigration
to the United States. During the 1970s, an estimated 4 million Mexicans
became illegal residents in this country. At current rates, this population is
expected to increase by 1 million a year during the next decade, which would
mean a total illegal Mexican population of roughly 12 million by 1985.
The economic benefits from the newly discovered Mexican oil and gas
reserves, along with expanded trade, could offer a new opportunity to cope
with the ever-growing economic and social pressures. Yet the experience of
Iran demonstrates that this new wealth might also raise expectations,
increase inflation and internal conflicts, disrupt established social patterns
and highlight institutional weaknesses such as corruption without providing
much tangible help for the very poor.
It is probable that the wealthy, established groups will try to squeeze every
financial advantage out of the new oil money while the powerful, radical left
will bend every effort to bring about a repetition of the Iran experience. The
professed goal of the radical left will probably be to replace the "corrupted"
semi-authoritarian system of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
with an "authentic renewal" of the revolution of 1910, with special emphasis
on the egalitarian and anti-American aspects.
On the surface, especially from a
distance, the current Mexican politi-
cal system appears stable. However,
some observers and some Mexican
leaders understand that there are
significant forces of radical left
opposition. These forces include in-
fluential elements in organized labor
(especially among oil and transport
workers), peasant groups (most ac-
tive in the northwest states), most of
the activist university faculty and
students and many other intellectu.
als. After the success of Fidel Castro
in 1959, Mexico saw large scale
peasant and labor disturbances, the
formation of a radical left coalition
In 1961 and large student uprisings in
1966 and .1968.
A number of Soviet KGB officials
were expelled by Mexico in 1959 for
their role in organizing those anti-
government demonstrations and
again in 1968 because they had pro-
vided funds and training for a large
network. of urban guerrillas who
were to launch "red brigade" type
attacks. In fact, more than five
t9rrorist groups of be communist
a :d radical left are cerrentiy active.
The example of Iran, the warI poor most, near civil Insurrection* in
against Somoza in Nicaragua and a number of rural areas, and
the real prospects for success might strained relations with the United
tempt the various Mexican radical States.
groups to establish a broad coalition The converging stresses of the
which joins all dissatisfied elements next few years will put ever greater
together in a coordinated effort to pressures on the stability of the
overthrow the current system. Mexican political system. Private
As ... United States-Mexican negotiations intensify, the
radical left will 'probably tryr harder to intimidate the
Mexican government Into a hyper-nationalist position by
accusing it of bowing to"imperialist pressure" if it makes
reasonable demands end compromises.
A preview of the fragility of 11exi- foreign bank loans soared from $3.2
co was provided by President Lute billion in 1970 to $22 billion by 1977.
Echeverria (1970-1976). Unable to The growing debt repayment burden
overcome the resistance of wee y could act as one catalyst for anti-
Mexicans to his attempt to raise tax American feeling. At the same time,
revenues from them, Echeverria the Mexican leadership will undoubt-
tried to obtain support from the edly continue to- find negotiations
powerful left by a foreign policy of with the United States difficult. It
Third World and anti- imperialist may decide to use nationalism and
symbolism which pleased their anti- anti-imperialist postures as a means
American sentiments. The end re- of keeping the radicals quiet and
suit of his hyper-nationalism was a getting concessions from the United
succession of lost international eco. States.
nomuc opportunities, mounting 4'nfla- Bu the end result of this approach
tion, a devaluation which hurt the in the two-year-long -,controversy
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MEYICO:TI- IRAN NEXT DOOR? -3-
The Sedrch For U.S., Mexico Rapport;
is Crucial To Both.
over the natural gas price was that
Mexico literally burned up nearly
$1.5 billion in revenues it could have
had in 1978. The natural gas impasse
illustrates the dangers posed by the
bargaining style adopted in both
countries.
As the pace and scope of the
United States-Mexican negotiation
intensify, the radical. left will proba
bly try harder to intimidate th
Mexican government into a hype
nationalist position by accusing it
bowing to "imperialist pressure"
it makes reasonable demands
compromises.
Thus, a dilemma faces both go
ernments. If Mexico adopts unr
sonable positions which prevt
agreement, it will undermine stab
ty by further increasing the al
and economic difficulties of he
nation. And, if the United St es
gives in to unreasonable Mexi an
demands on one or two issues w ch
involve large costs, the likely effect
would be a mobilization of Amer~an
economic interest group pressures
that would make compromise more
difficult in other areas. Tr,:ditional-
ly, American economic interests are
concerned with only their own, spe-
cific financial results and they will
use all their resources to prevent
any concessions on political grounds.
Thus, it will be a large task for
either government to overcome the
limitations imposed by recent histo-
ry and domestic political forces.
Yet the effort to reach fair agree-
ments with Mexico must be given.
top priority by our government now.
Time is running short because the
American elections will distract our
leadership in 1980. In addition, this is
the moment to search for ways to
bring about a genuine breakthrough
toward far greater realistic mutual
understanding. This should include
arrangements for encouraging indi-
viduais in many fields to meet each
other and share information about
both nations' values, institutions and
accomplishments. The ultimate
stake in this delicate interplay of
domestic and foreign politics may
well be in the `survival of the current
Mexican political system or its re-
placement by a revolutionary re-
gime hostile to the United States.
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 October 1911
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g~1r7qid i x_
Exampl(S ff Sandinista Rcpressio:i.-i9/r) to Present
14 November 1979 - Interior Minister Borye, in press Cori ferencc, ard!niis abuses,
including torture, under Sandinista rule.
25 January 1980 - Security forces close down newspaper "II Pueblo"; 3ayardo Arce
.warns that other im.dia could receive "same medicine".
April 1980 - FSLN unilaterally changes composition of Council of State, giving
itself a majority, moderates Rohelo & Mrs. Pedro Chamorro resirn in pro
23 August 1980 - Violating an agreement with the OAS and private Sector, Sandinist
unilaterally announce "elections to improve the revolutionary
government" will not be held until 1985.
21 August 1930 - Sandinista-controlled Council of State issu;:;three decrees
that greatly constrain the media and proscribe activity relating to
the promised 1985 elections.
7 November 1980 - Regime forbids opposition Democratic Movement Party political
rally.
17 November 1930 - Sandinista' pull off sophisticated entrapment plan, kill
prominent busines}man and arrest others for anti-regime plotting.
10 February 1981 - Government occupies and closes down the offices of Human
Rights Committee in Managua; subsequently allows it to reopen (after
international outcry).
13 February 1981 Sandinista mob attacks persons assembled at airport to greet
rqe rning human rights activist.
10 March 19,111 - Sandinista mobs invade national headquarters or Democratic
Movement Party; police refuse to intervene.
7 July 1981 - Managua Archbishop prohibited from delivering traditional Sunday
sermas on TV. after he had said Nicaragus is niovinq toward totalitariani
10 July 1931 - Independent newspaper, LaPrensa, closed down for Ifs hours .
19 July 1981 - FSLN issues a series of punitive decrees aimed at intimidating
the opposition and extending state control over the economy.
9 Sehi:ember 1981 - Government dod oration of "social and economic emergency"
bans labor strikes and further restricts freedom of press and of express
21 October 1981 - Four business leaders and several extreme leftists arrested by
security forces for criticizing the regime.
25 October 1981 - Sandinista mobs attack the home of major opposition leader.
26 October 1981 - Four democratic political leaders have thy'r ;
and are in detention (Washington Post, 10/27) ~ p-35'.'-ports taken
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POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA -- BRIEF SUGGESTIONS
It is widely recognized that the truth about events in Central America has
not been effectively communicated and that much more needs to be done on an urgent
basis. An effective communications effort must inform both US domestic audiences
and a variety of international participants on the Central American events. In
each case, there is a need for factual information which can reach key leadership
groups as well as the general public through the communications media.
This brief outline will summarize a number of themes and suggest a linkage
between key audiences and private institutions which might have an interest in
participating on a voluntary basis.
I. Essential Communications Themes
A. Nicaragua
1. TThe~Marxist/Leninist Directorate virtually controls the society
a. new secret police
b. large and well-equipped military forces
c. dominant Sandinista Party
d. mass organizations (e.g., Sandinista Defense Committee)
e. large foreign communist and radical Arab presence and help
2. Moderate and democratic forces still exist and include:
a. two trade union federations (35,000 members)
b. five-democratic political parties
c. business associations and cooperatives (75,000 members)
d. Catholic and Protestant Churches
e. Atlantic Coast Indian communities of 150,000 -- Protestant and
English-speaking
f. one newspaper and two radio stations
3. The Sandinista Government is violating its promises to the OAS
a. 23 June 1979 OAS resolution called for free elections, press,
trade unions, media
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b. 12 July 1979 Sandinista letter to OAS affirmed its intention to
establish democracy and implement the above resolution
9. El Salvador
1. The Extreme Left
a. history, purpose, tactics
b. estimated number of people killed and kidnapped by the extreme
left, 1976-81
c. the strategy of economic destruction and the human consequences
d. propaganda and false claims of the extreme left, e.g., May 1980
claim that Israeli and US troops invaded El Salvador
2. The Extreme Right
a. history, purpose, tactics
b. estimated number of victime, 1976-81
c. efforts.tb overthrow the current Salvadoran government (three
coup attempts 1980-81)
d. some degree of collaboration from minorities in some government
security forces (mafia, big city police department analogy)
3. Moderate Groups Ranging from Democratic Left to Conservative
a. moderates include most of the military, anti-communist labor
unions , most of the Catholic Church, most of the business
community -- tangible accomplishments of the moderate civil/military
coalition including
a-l. surviving against both extremes
a-2. major demonstrations of public support
a-3. land reform of 1980 benefitting more than one million
peasants among 1.8 million formerly landless
a-4. other reforms
C. Transnational Forces
1. For the Moderates in Central America
a. Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, other Latin democracies
h. Christian democratic parties of Latin America and Europe
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Leadership Groups to be Informed
Possible Congress Media Religious Intellectuals Liberal Conservative Veterans
Communicators Groups & Colleges Civic Groups Civic Groups & Busines
e. social democratic parties of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and important
factions in other European and Latin American parties have condemned
the extreme left in Central America
2. For the Extreme Left
a. Cuba, other communist states
b. Libya/Palestinian terrorist groups
c. Mexico-signs of second thoughts outside the government
d. Social Democrats--some divisions
II. Linking Possible Communicators with US Leadership Groups
Better understanding about Central America can be encouraged both by the
direct communications efforts of the US Government and by better informing various
private organizations, which in turn have credibility with i erent ea e-r ip
groups. The following schematic outline suggests some possible linkages by
designating with an X those organizations which might inform different leadership
groups.
US Govt.
State
Defense
CIA
AFL-CIO/AIFLD
c. free trade unions of the US, Latin America, and Europe
X X X X X
X
X
Council of the X
Americas (bus)
Freedom House X X X X X X
Instit. for
Rel igion
D-mocrac j X X X X X
Committee on the
Present Danger X X
Natl. Strat. Info
Center X X
Land Council (NY) X X
Ci-,Jr, for the
Free World
x x X X
Groups
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III. Improving theInformation Available to Influential internationational
Participants in Central America
The participation of the US free trade union movement (AFL-CIO and AIFLD)
provides an opportunity to reach into the Social Democratic parties of Europe
and Latin America through their links with their own independent trade unions
and the various anti-communist international confederations. This and other such
communications linkages are suggested by the following schematic outline.
Leadership Groups to be Informed
Possible Intl Trade Chris.Dem. Soc. Dem Trade Democratic Latin Mexico
Communicators Unions-e.g. Trade Unions Unions, Parties, Socialist Govts.
US t3DVt.
State
ICFTU, OR-IT & Soc. Int. Government
ICA/Labor X X X X X X
Defense ----X (NATO) X (Rio) X (military
AFL-CIO/AIFLD X X X X (labor)
Freedom House X
Soc. Dem.
Parties of
CR, Nic
Chris. Dem.
Parties &
Federations X
Committee for
the Free
World X X
X (parties)
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 OPINION AND COMMENTARY
Mexico's Central America strategy
. By Constantine C. Menges
The most important and least understood issue in the cur-
rent United States-Mexican relationship is the communist
threat in Central America and the correct response to it.
Currently the S.axican strategy is to support the "leftist
coalition" in Nicaragua. El Salvador. and Guatemala with-
out seeking or urging any guarantee of free elections, politi-
cal liberties, and the like. Mexico's hypothesis is that, given
the failure of the Carter administration to halt the Sandinista
victory in Nicaragua in 1979 and the growth of the revolution-
ary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala through 1980. its
only successful strategy must be to "moderate the extremist
left by supporting the revolutionary groups."
Examples of this discreet but officially sanctioned sup-
port will illustrate how active and assertive Mexico has be-
come in Central America.
? Nicaragua. During the revolution against Somoza.
starting in late 1978. Mexico contributed money to buy weap-
ons for the FSLN (Sandinista Liberation Front) and
permitted its territory to be used for facilitating the flow of
guerillas, weapons, and propaganda for the FSLN. In May
1979 Mexico broke diplomatic relations with Somoza. Lopez
Portillo personally called for the overthrow of "that horren-
dous dictatorship," terminated all sale of petroleum pro-
ducts, recognized the "provisional revolutionary govern-
ment of Nicaragua" then based in Costa Rica, and worked
with Cuba and others to coordinate expanded practical help
from many sources during the final military offensive in
June and July 1979. -
After the revolution Mexico adopted a policy of
"unconditioned support" for the Nicaraguan government of
National Reconstruction, making absolutely no distinction
between the Marxist-Leninist groups and the genuinely
democratic elements who combined to overthrow Somoza
and never mentioning the promises for free elections, par-
ties, press, and trade unions made by the FSLN to the OAS.
Following the Carter/Reagan accusations of Nicaraguan
help for the revolutionary groups in El Salvador. the then
president of the Mexican government party, the Pill; visited
Nicaragua to pledge complete solidarity.
? Guatemala. President Lopez Portillo cancelled a
scheduled visit in 1979 and since then has followed a gener-
ally consistent policy of keeping an official distance from the
Lucas government. In 1980 the Mexican ambassador was re-
called but relations and oil sales continued. In March 1980
Mexico promised the Salvadoran communist party that dur-
ing the final offensive against the government Mexico would
send troops to the Guatemalan border to prevent the Guate-
malan army from helping the Salvadoran army.
Those maneuvers were announced on Dec. 5. 1980, and
conducted just before and during the final offensive in El
Salvador (January 19811 with observers from the Guatema-
Ian army invited ostensibly to verify that there were no
camps for the communist guerrillas from Guatemala in
Mexican territory. In fact, there are strong allegations of
tacit Mexican approval for the establishment in Mexico of
networks which provide money, medicines, food, and per-
haps even weapons to the revolutionary forces in neighboring
Guatemala.
Since a revolutionary Guatemala might become a sanctu-
ary for guerrillas and terrorists operating in the southern oil-
rich regions of :Mexico, the consequences of Mexico being
wrong about its strategy could be very severe for its people
By Gordon N. Converse chvef photographer
Mexico City's Monumenf of Revolution
and for the United States as well.
? El Salvador. During 1980. Mexico gave consistent sup-
port to the armed revolutionary groups This was done by the
PRI, acting for the government, and involved permission for
the "Revolutionary Democratic Front" (FUR to use Mexi-
can territory as its propaganda base and to facilitate help for
the guerrillas. There are reports that in the summer of 1980
the president of the PRI promised the communist coordinat-
ing leadership of the El Salvador guerrillas (the DRU. Uni-
fied Revolutionary Directorate) extensive, clandestine sup-
port through the ERI apparatus (funds, propaganda.
safehouses). action against any Honduran support for the EI
Salvador government, and the holding of a conference on
world solidarity with the revolution in El Salvador.
Following the US election in November 1980 preparations
began for the final offensive in El Salvador. Mexico then took
the following actions: in late November 1980 a "demand" by
the Mexican trade union federation that the government slop
selling oil and break diplomatic relations with El Salvador.
the conference on world solidarity with El Salvador; in De-
cember 1980 the ambiguous military maneuvers on the Gua-
temalan border and an enormous increase in Mexican go%
ernment and media support for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
along with additional funds for propaganda and permission
for a "government in exile" to be based in Mexico.
The United States must communicate to Mexico that it
understands the Mexican strategy but believes it is mistaken
because of the fundamental differences in outlook and power
between the hard-core communist groups which control the
"leftist coalition" in Nicaragua, E! Salvador, Guatemal? and
the moderate reformist left which Mexico holx's to
encourage.
A better way to promote reform, stability, and constitu-
tional government would be an approach which consists of
support for the center as well as democratic left forces and
which condemns equally the violence of the extreme left and
extreme right.
Mexico. as a sovereign state. will of course pursue its own
policy. However, it would be advisable to discuss the facts
and alternatives in Central America at greater length in fol-
low-up meetings at a senior level in the wake of the Reagan-
Lopez Portillo summit. Ambassador John Gavin has im-
pressed Washington with his intelligence, serious dedication.
and knowledge of Mexico. Combine these qualities with his
close relationship to President Reagan, and the prospects for
effective diplomacy are excellent.
Constantine Menges is a foreign polies' anah:sl cur-
rently with the Washington office of the Hudson
Institute.
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Proposals for a Negotiated Settlement in El Salvador--A Perspective
from the-Nicaraquan Experience, 1979 to the Present
Proposals for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador have been made
by Mexico (21 Feb 82), by the extreme left (Washington Post, 8 Mar 82 inter-
view), and by concerned US citizens, including Carter Administration NSC
staffer for Latin America, Dr. Robert Pastor (New Republic, Mar 82).
AT.1 of these share a number of common features, and all discussion so far has
ignored the important historical lesson provided by the recent experience in
Nicaragua. The following schematic outline attempts to put the El Salvador
negotiation proposals in realistic perspective.
Note that the negative results in Nicaragua are even more probable
in El Salvador both because the international momentum of the extreme left
is now stronger in the region than in 1979 and because unlike Nicaragua where
the Marxist-Leninists and genuinely democratic forces now totally excluded
from power were allies against the far right,in El Salvador they are currently
fighting each other.
"Negotiated Settlement" Similar Experience Result in Nicaragua
Component for El Salvador from Nicaragua
Friendly countries, multi-
national guarantees of a
settlement--to include
Mexico, perhaps France &
others.
Anti-Somoza coalition None acted with vigor
supported by Mexico, to protest systematic
Venezuela, Costa Rica, repression of democratic
Andean Pact, as well as forces or violation of
Cuba. OAS resolution and FSLN
promises.
Only the new Christian
Democratic government
of Venezuela has exerted
--------------------------------------------------------- any-12M55ure.------------
OAS might function as a OAS recognition of No OAS action to enforce
guarantor. June 23, 1979, based or even publicize this
explicitly on free resolution.
elections, press, etc.
No OAS or other call for
economic sanctions, etc.
--------------------------------------------------------- ---
Extreme left would promise Sandinistas made explicit No enforcement or even
to respect "pluralism" and promises in writing, publicity.
territorial integrity of 12 July 1979.
neighbors.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
US could be involved as US was involved in the No impact.
negotiating partner and use negotiations June-
economic incentives for July 1979, provided Virtually no US effort to
compliance with terms. significant economic aid use economic transactions
(about $180M direct, in order to help the
about $220M through IADB) genuinely democratic groups.
Congressionally mandated
US cutoff of $15M remainder
for economic assistance
22 Jan 81 due to bipartisan
finding that Nicaragua was
Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049P4)62 mfbeersi on , but no
impact on slowing of internal
repression In Nicaragua.