CUBA/NICARAGUA SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902340005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2 06/ ` IA-RDP84B0004
Since 1979, the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua have been
coordinating an international network to supply military weapons
and equipment to insurgents in El Salvador. This arms pipeline,
supplemented by training and political and technical support and
advice for Salvadoran leftists, constitutes the major thrust of
an overall effort by Cuba and its allies to promote revolution
4.V,- fEi S< 1. ,J.Dv 9 March 1982
throughout Central America.
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For two-and-a-half years, the supply network has transported
by land, sea, and air weapons and equipment provided by Cuba,
Nicaragua, the Soviet bloc, the PLO, and Libya, as well as
quantities purchased on the international arms market. This
materiel is channeled primarily through Nicaragua, although other
Central American countries periodically serve as transit
points. Cuba and Nicaragua also have provided the Salvadoran
guerrillas with safehaven, training, documentation, propaganda
support, and advice on strategy and tactics. Both have played
major roles in helping unify the disparate insurgent groups, thus
increasing their effectiveness dramatically.
supplies from various communist donors via Cuba and Nicaragua.
"final" offensive of January 1981, the Salvadoran insurgents
hoped to receive some 600-800 tons of arms, ammunition, and other
R000902340005-4 ILLEGIB A
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in preparation for their
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We believe some 200 tons were actually delivered
to guerrilla units from October 1980 to February 1981, with the
remainder still tied up in the pipeline thanks in part to the
guerrillas inability to absorb large arms deliveries quickly.
(U)
US diplomatic pressure, enhanced interdiction measures, and
other factors contributed to a decline in the arms flow in
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Nicaragua has since early 1980 supplied military personnel
in addition to arms and supplies.
While the Cubans have attempted to minimize the direct
participation of Cuban personnel in the fighting in El Salvador,
there is no question that Havana is involved in large scale
training of Salvadoran insurgents.
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Arms shipments are also continuing.
The Cubans reprotedly believe that US military support to El
Salvador precludes a guerrilla victory for now, but the Castro
regime plans to continue aiding the insurgents in expectation
that international public opinion will eventually force the US to
withdraw and open the way for insurgent success. Toward that
end, the Cubans will supplement their arms shipments and training
effort with an intensified worldwide propaganda offensive. At
the same time, Havana is increasing its attention to the
insurgency in Guatemala and expects heightened guerrilla activity
there to contribute indirectly to insurgent fortunes in El
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