REAGAN EXPECTED TO SEEK INCREASE IN SALVADORAN AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902300019-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 31, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000902300019-3
REAGAN EXPECTED- -
TO SEEK INCREASE
IN SALVADORAN AID
EXTRA $100 MILLION CITED
Military and Economic Total Is
Put at $235 Million in 1982
and $300 Million in'83
By LESLIE H. GELB
Sped-1 to The Now Yost Tlmee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 - The White
House will ask Congress to increase
military and economic aid to El Salva-
dor by about $100 million this fiscal year
and will seek further increases in the
next fiscal year, according to Adminis-
tration officials.
Military aid for the current fiscal year
stands at $25 million and all forms of
economic aid total about $110 million.
The economic and military aid request
for the next fiscal year, which begins
Oct. 1, will be In the President's nudget
presentation next month and is expected
to be about $300 million.
The officials also said that an addi-
tional $25 million would be needed to re.
place aircraft and helicopters lost in a
'guerrilla attack this week that de?
stroyed about half of El Salvador's air
power. Officials said this money would
come from funds now earmarked for
other countries.
Existing Policy Affirmed
The attack prompted a State Depart-
ment announcement that the Adminis-
tration would ask for more aid but the
amount was not mentioned.
Administration officials said the
moves were an affirmation of existing
policy, which is to support the Govern-
ment of President Joni Napoleon
Duarte, to urge political and economic
changes on his Government, to resist
guerrilla demands for direct negotia
tions and to build toward general elec-
tions in March to strengthen the politi-
cal center.
Above all, they reiterated; Adminis-
tration policy was to stem the expansion
of Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan influ-
ence in Central America.
.V.
Behind this reaffirmation lie consl4
erable differences In the Administratiop
over whether the situation in El Salvo-.
dor is stable and perhaps even improv-
ing or whether it is deteriorating, per.
haps sharply. Almost all officials Inter..
viewed acknowledged that they did not .
know which side was winning.
There is also questioning among some.
officials about Administration policy.
Military officers in particular are ques?
tioning whether the current approach
can deal with a deteriorating situation.
While not challenging Administration
goals directly, theme officials ask if
President Reagan and his advisers have
asked themselves how far they are pre-
pared to go and how far they might have
to go to prevent a guerrilla victory.
Key officials in the State Department
and the Pentagon say this kind of think-
ing is based on misplaced fears of "an-
other Vietnam." President Reagan,
they insisted, will never send United
States troops to fight in El Salvador.
Even without American troops, they
maintained, the situation will be man-
ageable as long as aid is increased, the
Salvadoran Government's program of
liberalization continues and public opin-
ion Is not turned against the effort by
what some officials called inaccurate
and overblown news accounts of the
war.
Yet a third train of thought, centered
mainly among liberals and moderates
in Congress, is that there should be ne.
gotiations between the rebels and the
Duarte Government, apparently with a
view to establishing a coalition govern-
ment. This is also the starting point of
the rebel position, and it has no support
inside the Administration. To Adminis-
tration officials, a coalition government
would only fall into the hands of the
guerrillas eventually.
All of these policy tangles lay just be-
neath the surface this week when Presi-
dent Reagan, as required by law, moved
to free military aid to El Salvador by
certifying that the Duarte Government
was trying to end abuses of civil rights
and economic progress on political and
This finding is expected to be chal- i
lenged in Congressional hearings next
week. Inside the Administration, ac-
cording to many officials, no one ob-
jected to the certification. As one State
Department official put it, "We don't
disagree that Duarte is doing what the
law asks; the disagreement is over how
much difference his efforts have made
in the war, and that, only time will tell."
The President's certification also
came in the face of further troubles in El I
Salvador. There were r In The,
New York Times and The W 1
Post this week of the massacre of m
dreds of men, women and children, and
Government troops apparently were re?
said for the killing, One accounting
said 733 died in the massacre last
month; another said 928. Officials said
they could not corroborate the accounts.
There was also the successful guer-
rilla attack on the Government's biggest
air base, near San Salvador. The offi-
cials feared that this could have a dra-
matic effect on opinion in El Salvador
and the United States.
Part of a Larger Package
Administration officials said the big
Increase in aid planned for El Salvador
would be part of a larger military and
economic aid package for Central
America, and that this new package
would be 50 to 80 percent larger than in
this fiscal year.
This year, regional -totals are about
$230 million in economic aid and $105
million in military aid to El Salvador,
Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and
Panama.
Increasing. aid to foster political
changes and economic now
seems to be at the center of Ad lrn J tra-
tion policy toward the area, but for some
time the policy was not clear at all. Last February, Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr. spoke as if Cen-
tral America had become the new arena
of East-West conflict. He maintained
j that the Administration would draw the
line in El Salvador and that, if necessary, the United States would "go to the
source" of aggression in the region,
meaning to Cuba or even to the Soviet
Union.
This was quickly followed by the pub-
lication of a White Paper that purported
to prove that Salvadoran guerrillas
were receiving substantial equipment
and direction from Moscow and Cuba
through the Sandlnist-led Government
of Nicaragua.
Tough Language Played Down
Subsequent admissions by the Admin-
istration cast serious doubt on whether
the evidence in the paper was valid, but
the Administration did not back away
THE NEW YQRK TIMES
31 JANUARY 1982
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from its judgment about substantial
Cuban involvement.
Shortly thereafter, White House offi-
clals let it be known to Congress and
news organizations that they thought
Mr. Haig had made too much of the mat-
ter.
White House officials wanted to play
down the tough language. They did not
want attention diverted from the pri-
ority effort to pass the President's eco-
nomic program, and they thought Mr.
Haig was scaring the public by making
it look as if the President were contem-
plating direct American military ac-
tion.
In the meantime, however, American
military advisers were sent to El Salva-
dor and aid was increased.
In mid-July, Thomas O. Enders,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, gave what was then
said to be the definitive Administration
position. In a speech that even critics
said did justice to the complexities of
the situation, Mr. Enders committed the
Reagan team to "a political solution,"
not a military one.
Haig Sees a 'Stalemate'
He said that the conflict was "Salva-
doran in its origins, so its ultimate reso-
lution must be Salvadoran." His pre-
scription was for aid, political and eco-
nomic changes and elections in which
all parties could participate.
By late fall, the American military
had come to the view that the situation
in El Salvador was deteriorating, and
Mr. Haig publicly useii the word "stale-
mate."
He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
an analysis of various military moves
that could be used in El Salvador and
against Nicaragua and Cuba. The chiefs
were highly skeptical about every alter-
native. Nonetheless, after an account of
this was published, Mr. Haig acknowl-
edged that he was looking for stronger
action. The White House again disowned
his remarks.
By December, however, Edwin Meese
3d, the White House counselor, was
warning publicly that the President had
not ruled out a blockade or other mili-
tary action to halt the flow of arms to
Salvadoran guerrillas. Later, Mr. Rea-
gan himself made similar statements.
Administration officials interpreted
them, however, as largely tough talk to
make Cuba think twice about its aid.
All Administration officials inter-
viewed said they believed that even
without Cuban and Nicaraguan instiga-
tion there would be a serious civil con-
flict in El Salvador. And they all, re-
gardless of their views on American
policy, said Cuban arms were playing a
significant role in the war and that Cuba
had significant influence over the guer-
rillas. Above all, they all said that with-
out Cuban aid, the containment of the
guerrillas would be far easier.
Issue of Publication
Asked if they would publish their
proof of Cuba's involvement with the
rebels, they said probably not. The evi-
dence comes from sensitive intelligence
sources that would be jeopardized by
publication, they said.
Asked if they thought publication of
the evidence would be likely to convince
skeptics that Cuba was helping the
rebels, almost all said it would not. But
01 said the evidence'was sufficient to
convince every intelligence agency of
the executive branch.
Nor is there any disagreement in the
Administration that the economic situa-
tion in El Salvador is very bad and get-
ting worse. Officials said the gross do-
mestic product, exclusive of trade, had
declined almost 25 percent in the last
three years. They also agreed that it
would take a long time and much out-
side financial support to turn this tide.
The differences of opinion among offi-
ciaLs were almost entirely over the polit-
ical and military situation. Key State
Department officials below the Secre-
tary and a few high civilian officials in
the Pentagon were the only ones who
said there was political or military
stability or even signs of improvement.
The Central Intelligence Agency and
military officers were to varying de.
grees more pessimistic.
The doubters said they thought the
situation was deteriorating and did not
know what the Administration could do
about it. Military action to halt supplies
to the guerrillas, they pointed out, had
been judged by the Joint Chiefs to be ei-
ther too risky or unworkable.
More aid, they contended, would not
help much unless the Administration
applied great pressure on the Duarte
Government and the military for politi.?
cal and economic changes. But, in their
view, the Administration had shown Its
unwillingness to use all the leverage it
could.
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