MAURITIUS: MODERATE GOVERNMENT THREATENED AT POLLS (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000802030008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of secret
Intelligence
Mauritius:
Moderate Government
Threatened at Polls
An Intelligence Memorandum
State Dept. review completed
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I
f~a.25X1
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Mauritius:
Moderate Government
Threatened at Polls
An Intelligence Memorandum
Information available as eL4fgy 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This memorandum was prepared by
of the Office of African and
Latin American Analysis, with contributions
from 0 of the Office of Central
Reference. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to the Chief, West-East
Africa Division, ALA
This memorandum has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
ALA 82-10079
June 1982
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Secret
Mauritius:
Moderate Government
Threatened at Polls
Summary
influence through the provision of military aid and training.
Public statements by leaders of the Movement leave no doubt that the 25X1
installation of.an MMM government. would result in increased Soviet and
Libyan influence in Mauritius and the southwest Indian Ocean region at
the expense of the United States and the West. The Western powers almost
certainly would lose naval and other military access to Mauritius they now
enjoy. Though the Soviets might also be denied such access in accordance
with the MMM's putative nonaligned stance, they probably would gain
Ramgoolam government and its poor, economic performance.
The parliamentary election in Mauritius scheduled for 11 June is likely to
result in defeat for Prime Minister Ramgoolam's moderate, pro-Western,
Labor government at the hands of the Mauritian Militant Movement
(MMM), a Soviet- and Libyan-supported opposition party. The Move-
ment's appeal is based on its image as the youthful party of change and on
the unhappiness of many Mauritians with the unresponsive, corrupt
forces from the region
US military presence on Diego Garcia and would stridently reassert
Mauritian claims to the archipelago. An MMM regime would join with
like-minded neighbors in strongly advocating the Soviet-supported Indian
Ocean zone of peace concept and in calls for the withdrawal of all outside
An MMM regime would attempt to focus international attention on the
An MMM regime's attempts to loosen the country's economic ties with the
West, however, would be constrained by economic realities. Mauritius is
dependent on Western trade, investment, and economic assistance, espe-
cially from France. Domestically, the MMM would attempt gradually to
socialize the economy, moving cautiously to nationalize key enterprises. It
would also attempt to restrict civil liberties, and perhaps try to scrap the
Western parliamentary form of government. Mauritius, however, has a
long democratic tradition, including a free press, and such a move could re-
sult in violence that the MMM might find hard to contain. Should the
MMM need the support of its less radical coalition partner, the Mauritian
Socialist Party, to form a government, such a coalition would further slow
MMM efforts to socialize the economy or institute repressive measuresF_
Although unlikely, the wily Ramgoolam could still eke out a victory by per-
suading a former coalition partner to run with Labor in selected districts. A
Labor victory would result in the continued preeminence of Western
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Secret
ALA 82-10079
June 1982
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political influence in Mauritius, although it probably would also mean
increased need for Western aid to keep the economy afloat and avoid
unrest. A new Labor government's majority would be small, and it would
govern on a day-to-day basis because of the constant threat that its
partners would leave the coalition
Violence against the US Embassy or individual Americans at the time of
the election is possible no matter which side wins.
Opposition
allegations of US interference in the campaign would lead MMM extrem-
ists to blame the United States in the event their party lost
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Secret
Mauritius:
Moderate Government
Threatened at Polls
Introduction The leftist Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), supported by Libya
and the Soviet Union, is likely to defeat Prime Minister Ramgoolam's
moderate Labor Party in parliamentary elections on 11 June, ending
Ramgoolam's 14-year hold on power. Recent polls indicate a big advantage
for the MMM, and Labor leaders are very pessimistic about their party's
chances. The US Embassy also has reported a definite shift in public mood
in favor of the MMM. The MMM has capitalized on the government's
out-of-touch image, reputation for corruption, and the country's growing
economic difficulties. In the last elections in 1976, the MMM won a
plurality, but was denied control of, or participation in, government by
Ramgoolam's ability to arrange a coalition with other smaller parties. This
appeal of the MMM has grown as that of Labor has diminshed.
time, Ramgoolam has been unable to forge an effective alliance, and the 25X1
An MMM regime would attempt to alter fundamentally the country's
domestic and foreign policies-despite major constraints such as the
island's economic dependence on the West-and would work against US
strategic interests in the region. An MMM victory probably would lead to
the formation of a group of left-leaning Indian Ocean island states that
would strongly criticize the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean. F
Should Ramgoolam believe that he faces almost certain defeat, there is an
outside chance that he might decide at the eleventh hour to postpone the
election or declare a state of emergency-as he did in 1971-and cancel
the balloting altogether. Such a move would almost certainly result in
serious rioting that could in turn threaten Ramgoolam's ability to hold onto
power.
Alternatively, should the elections result either in the MMM or Labor
failing to win a clear victory, differences between coalition partners-such
as disputes over the distribution of ministries-could result in the failure of
either side to form a government. New elections would then have to be held
within a year. This would be likely to be a period of continuous political
maneuvering and instability, with a high likelihood of increased foreign
meddling in Mauritius's domestic politics.
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Percent of Predominantly
Population Urban or Rural
Creoles
26
Urban
Dockworkers,
Industrial Workers
Muslims
18
Urban
Traders,
Industrial Workers
Parties
Seats Won in
1976 Elections
Major Sources
of Communal
Support
Political
Orientation
Progress and Liberty
Assembly (RPL)
Creoles
Center
Mauritian Group a
Creole
Center
Mauritian Militant
Movement (MMM)
34
Muslims,
Creoles
Radical left
Mauritian Socialist
Party (PSM)
Hindus
Moderate left
Mauritian Social
Democratic Party (PMSD)
8
Creoles
Right
Mauritian Islamic Party (PIM]
Muslims
Unclear
Rodrigues People's
Organization (OPR) c
Creoles
Left
Mauritian Democratic Union
Probably
Creoles
Center
c Competing only for the two seats on the island of Rodrigues.
d The Muslim Action Committee is not contesting the 1982
elections. Several of its members are running as Labor Party
candidates.
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Current
Electoral
Bloc
Labor
Labor
MMM
Independent 25X1
Unclear
Independent
Independent
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The Contestants Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM). The MMM is led by 37-year-old
Paul Berenger. The US Embassy reports that the party draws most of its
support from Mauritius's Muslim and Creole communities, which are
concentrated in the urban areas. The Muslim minority, disgruntled youth,
and the urban poor and unemployed have been especially receptive to
Berenger's calls for nationalizing large sectors of the economy, higher
wages, and more equal income distribution. The MMM consistently takes
anti-Western and US stances and receives financial and ideological support
from the Soviets, Libyans, and leftist nonaligned states. The amounts and
channels through which the Soviets provide funding to the MMM are
unclear
The Libyans more openly provide generous financial aid to the party.
The varied means of dispersal make it impossible to determine the exact
amount of Libyan aid to the Movement. We doubt that MMM officials
know exactly how much Libyan money is flowing into the pockets of party
officials
The MMM, with its wide range of leftist political thought, resembles a
leftwing front more than an orthodox political party. Despite its Marxist
orientation, it does not have the rigid hierarchical structure characteristic
of orthodox Soviet-style Communist parties. Because of its diverse nature,
the MMM suffers from disputes between moderates and its violence-prone
radicals. Additionally, we believe that the potential for ethnic factionalism
within the party exists
some MMM members resent Berenger's unwillingness to accept advice or
criticism. We believe that Berenger's political skills will enable him to
overcome these problems and that a future MMM government would not
be severely hampered by intraparty disputes unless it had a narrow
majority. The party has had seven defections from its complement of 34
parliamentarians elected in 1976. With only a small majority Berenger
would, in our view, be forced to make concessions to a number of factions,
making it extremely difficult for him to govern the country effectively.
Berenger, who is white, is the party's secretary general and the de facto
leader of the MMM. The MMM has announced that Berenger will
initially serve as finance minister in an MMM government, but we believe
that he will exercise effective power. He is a radical whose political ideas
were shaped during the May 1968 riots in Paris and who draws much of his
political philosophy from leading thinkers on the French left. The central
core of his political thought appears to be the idea of workers' self-
management-along the lines of the Yugoslav model.
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The group's titular leader and candidate for prime minister is Aneerood
Jugnauth, a Hindu, who has taken a backseat to the dynamic Berenger.
Based on Jugnauth's comments to US officials, we believe that as Prime
Minister in an MMM regime, he may be tempted to become more
assertive, especially on issues directly involving the Hindu community.
25X1
As the elections have approached, Berenger has attempted to attract more
voters and reassure uneasy businessmen that despite previous MMM 25X1
rhetoric the Movement will not engage in wholesale nationalizations or
legislated wage increases.
We believe the MMM hopes to capitalize on its fresh image and on the
government's poor economic performance. According to a variety of 25X1
reports, the youthfulness of MMM candidates-11 years younger on
average than their Labor counterparts-will appeal to the large number of
young voters. The MMM is also gaining from its allegations of US
Government involvement on Labor's side in the campaign
25X1
The MMM's smaller and less radical ally, the Mauritian Socialist Party
(PSM), was formed by dissident Labor Party members. The Hindu-based
PSM disagrees with the MMM on a number of issues. The PSM has
embarrassed the MMM by criticizing Libyan activities in Mauritius. An
MMM-dominated government dependent on PSM support would be
subject to moderating influences from its coalition partner.
The Labor Party and Its Allies 25X1
The Labor Party, headed by 81-year-old Prime Minister Ramgoolam,
relies on the primarily rural Hindu community as its basis of support. The
party favors a mixed economy and generally supports Western positions on
foreign policy issues
Ramgoolam has formed a coalition (the National Alliance Party) which
includes the Labor Party; the small Mauritian Group, formerly a faction of
the Creole-based Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD); and the
Creole-based Progress and Liberty Assembly (RPL).
The US Embassy reports that Labor's chances of winning the election were
badly damaged by delays in forming the coalition and the failure of the
PSMD, Labor's traditional coalition partner, to ally itself again with
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Ramgoolam. PMSD leader Gaetan Duval refused to join the Labor
coalition this year because he considered the leaders of the less important
smaller coalition partners to be challenging his leadership of the Creole
community.
The Labor Party itself is weakened by factionalism, corruption, and the
age of its leadership. Embassy and press reporting indicates that Mauri-
tians want change and that Ramgoolam's failure to purge Labor's
candidate list of unpopular old-guard members probably deprived the part
of its best opportunity to challenge the MMM.
Ramgoolam has sought to discredit his opposition by emphasizing the
radical nature of the MMM. He has characterized the elections as a
struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, and frequently points to
the MMM's Soviet and Libyan connections. The government's warning
last January to the Libyan "People's Bureau"-the diplomatic mission-to
stop interfering in Mauritian internal affairs proved to be an effective
campaign move. Most Hindus applauded the action while the MMM
alienated some of its Muslim constituent b not s eaking out vigorously
against the crackdown.
Labor is concentrating its campaigning in the rural areas, where the
Hindus predominate, leaving its coalition partners to contest the MMM in
the urban areas.
(Despite
these efforts, the continuing economic decline and Labor's unwillingness to 25X1
rid itself of unpopular and corrupt candidates will cause many voters to
turn to the MMM, according to the US Embassy. In addition, the failure
of the PMSD to join the Labor coalition will ensure the opposition's
complete dominance in the urban districts, where Creoles and Muslims are
the major ethnic groups
A Labor loss, in our view, would lead to Ramgoolam's resignation as party
leader and a power struggle in the party. We believe that Agriculture
Minister Boolell, who has pushed hard for reform of the party, would
emerge on top. He would have the support of the new generation of
younger and more dynamic party members who probably would be able to
push aside the party's "old guard" discredited by the election loss. As
Boolell represents the party's moderate right wing, we do not believe the
party's orientation would change greatly
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Election Issues The Economy
The current economic slump, marked by double-digit inflation, chronic
unemployment, and economic stagnation, has led many Mauritians to
support Berenger's socialist policies. Polls indicate that most voters hold
Labor responsible for their troubles, even though external forces-bad
weather and weak demand for su ar, the island's major export-are in part
the culprits. 25X1
The collapse of sugar prices after 1975 and two consecutive bad harvests
sent the economy into a tailspin from which it has yet to recover. The gov-
ernment's inability to curb its spending resulted in steadily widening
deficits in both the budgetary and international trade accounts. Economic
growth slowed dramatically, from 16.6 percent to 2 percent, adding
thousands of workers to already swollen unemployment rolls. Meanwhile,
inflation rose to Al 7 percent in 1980_
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The government in recent years has resorted to substantial overseas
borrowing-both private and public-including several loans from the
International Monetary Fund. The country's international debts rose from
$45 million in 1974 to $400 million in 1981, although the debt service ratio
is still a low 8 percent.
More recently Ramgoolam introduced a series of austerity measures-
partly in response to IMF demands-to reduce government spending and
curb imports. Heading the list was a currency devaluation of almost
17 percent last September. He also reduced a number of consumer
subsidies, limited wage increases, and eliminated end-of-the-year salary
bonuses for workers. The results of these measures are not yet clear. Any
improvement in the economic situation must await the sale of this year's
sugar harvest-forecast to be a bumper crop. Weather damage to the last
two sugar, crops hamnered the stabilization impact of previous austerity
measures.
Labor is attempting to limit the political fallout from the restrictive
measures and regain the political initiative by the announcement in mid-
May of a locally unprecedented unemployment assistance program and a
large public works program that would employ 8,000 people. The funds for
the latter program are derived from the USAID "Food for Work"
agreement.
that these stopgap measures will restore Labor's image as a credible and
forceful manager of the economy
Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
The MMM strongly advocates an Indian Ocean zone of peace, a concept
also supported by the Soviets. Consequently, the Western-especially
US-military presence in the region has been the subject of MMM
criticism. The MMM has also called for a ban on naval visits to Port Louis
by non-Indian Ocean powers. This contrasts with the Ramgoolam govern-
ment's policy of encouraging visits by foreign navies and Ramgoolam's
quiet support for the Western military presence in the region.
MMM attacks on the Western military presence center on the US military
use of Diego Garcia, which was part of preindependence Mauritius. With
strong Soviet encouragement, the MMM calls for Mauritian sovereignty
over the island and the dismantling of the US military facilities. Berenger
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charges that Ramgoolam illegally gave away the island to the British in re-
turn for economic assistance and early independence.' Ramgoolam periodi-
cally issues pro forma calls for Mauritian sovereignty over Diego Garcia to
blunt the MMM campaign, but privately he has told US officials he takes
comfort in the US military presence on the island.
25X1
Ramgoolam has managed to quiet the opposition on the Diego Garcia issue
by obtaining US agreement for the use of some Mauritian labor on Diego
Garcia. Even the MMM was unwilling to criticize directly anything that
eased the island's unemployment problems. Although Ramgoolam lost
some political ground when a US firm rather than a Mauritian concern
was awarded a contract for construction materials used on Diego Garcia,
the government's success in resolving the contentious matter of the
displaced inhabitants of Diego Garcia has deprived the MMM of a major
election issue. Ramgoolam and the United Kingdom recently agreed to
compensate the 1,200 Diego Garcians, who were resettled on Mauritius in
1971 to make room for military construction, with almost $8 million and
some land in Mauritius in exchange for renouncing further financial claims
against London and Port Louis. 25X1
Foreign Policy The USSR
Implications An MMM victory would be a political victory for the Soviets, shifting
Mauritius from a pro-Western to a nonaligned or even pro-Soviet position
in international forums 25X1
Based on MMM rhetoric, however, Moscow has reason to believe
that an MMM regime would deny the Western powers the limited, though
useful, military access they now enjoy on Mauritius. An MAIM regime 25X1
would be a valuable ally in Moscow's campaign for an Indian Ocean zone
of peace and against the US military presence on Diego Garcia.
25X1
An MMM government would quickly establish warm relations with
Moscow, but its support for Soviet positions probably would not come
cheaply.
We do not believe the Soviets would be willing to 25X1
' Mauritius ceded the Chagos Archipelago (a group of islands including Diego Garcia) to
the United Kingdom in 1965 in return for $7.2 million in development aid. The terms of the
transfer of Diego Garcia remain in'dispute. Ramgoolam, the principal Mauritian official in
the negotiations, claims he was forced to cede the island to hasten Mauritian independence.
25X1
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provide large-scale hard currency aid in view of Moscow's own economic
problems. Based on past practice, we believe the Soviets are more likely to
provide military equipment and training, the most important source of
Soviet influence in much of the Third World
Ramgoolam has long kept Moscow at arm's length. Soviet poaching in the
fishing grounds off Mauritius led him to decide against renewing a
fisheries agreement with the USSR. Soviet fishing, merchant, research,
and naval vessels do call at Port Louis, however, and the Soviets are
considering the use of Mauritian drydocking facilities for their fishing
Libya
In addition to funding the MMM, the Libyans have actively and openly
proselytized among the island's Muslim minority, many members of which
are unhappy with the community's underrepresentation in government and
the professions.
These efforts
have struck a responsive chord among young Muslims, many of whom have
flocked to the MMM, according to US Embassy sources
The government circulated a communique last September warning foreign
missions against interference in Mauritian internal affairs, a move widely
interpreted by diplomats and, according to US Embassy sources, by much
of the populace, as anti-Libyan. Early this year the government specifically
warned the Libyan diplomatic mission to stop interfering in Mauritian
internal affairs.
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We believe that under an MMM government the Libyans probably would
work harder and with greater success to undermine US and Western
influence in Mauritius and the region. Last year the Libyan mission 25X1
distributed anti-US leaflets on the Diego Garcia issue during the visit of a
US naval ship.
Cuba 25X1
There is little known Cuban activity in Mauritius at present. Our
judgment, based on past Cuban performance is that an MMM regime
would receive help in reorganizing the security services from the Cubans,
We believe that Havana would follow its practice of sending
medical teams or teachers to Mauritius and providing schooling in Cuba _,, ,
France and Other West European Countries
Mauritius has close ties with Western Europe, especially France and the
United Kingdom. Paris probably has the broadest overall interest in
preserving Mauritius as a friend of the West. The US Embassy in Port
Louis believes that an MMM regime would be likely to call, unsuccess-
fully, for Paris to decolonize Reunion-a nearby island that is a depart-
ment of France and the site of important French military facilities-and
cede Tromelin, another nearby island, to Mauritius. We believe that an
MMM government, in line with the Indian Ocean zone of peace concept,
probably would also call for the removal of French military forces from the
area and would include French ships in its ban on calls by foreign navies.
Mauritius's declining economic situation leads us to believe that these
demands on France would be muted, however, by the MMM's hopes for
continued support from Paris. France is the largest single donor of
economic assistance to Mauritius, providing approximately $15 million per
year, and is Mauritius's third-largest trade partner. The presence of an
important Franco-Mauritian minority and the prevalence of French cul-
ture also would be likely to encourage continued strong ties with France.
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British influence is also strong on Mauritius. The Queen of England is the
formal head of state, Mauritius is a member of the British Commonwealth,
and the United Kingdom is Mauritius's largest trading partner. In 1976
the United Kingdom and Mauritius extended postindependence agree-
ments that placed British technical advisers in several Mauritian minis-
tries, and the British have provided training for the security forces. In
addition, British capital developed Mauritian irrigation and port facilities.
The proposed agreement on compensation for the displaced Diego Garcians
will remove the thorniest issue between the United Kingdom and the Labor
government.
Mauritius also has important economic ties with the European Economic
Community (EC). A quota agreement, presently under renegotiation,
provided for the sale of 500,000 tons of sugar-the bulk of the country's
crop-to the EC at prices that were, except in 1980, well above world
market levels.
United States
The US military and strategic interest inf Mauritius is significant, though
limited. Port Louis is one of the few ports in the southwest Indian Ocean
that are accessible to US ships and suitable for rest and relaxation of
crews.
Mauritius is the only remaining democratic, pro-Western island state in
the area. It supports US positions in international meetings, and has often
played a moderating role in contentious debates affecting US interests. We
believe an MMM regime would reverse this and pave the way for more
concerted attacks on US and Western policies by the island states acting as
a group.
Mauritius depends on the United States to purchase a large portion of the
sugar crop that remains after fulfilling the EC quota and domestic needs.
Mauritius may have as much as 130,000 tons to put on the world market if
this year's crop is up to expectations. Mauritian officials are now upset by
the recent imposition of a sugar quota by the United States. The United
States has sharply increased food aid in recent years; agreements for 1982
provide for $3.5 million in concessional sales of food and a food-for-work
program based on a $2 million grant. A proposed extension of $2 million in
US economic support funds for Mauritius is pending.
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India
Relations between Mauritius and India traditionally have been close as a
result of cultural, religious, and political affinities. Approximately two-
thirds of all Mauritians are of Indian descent.
The US Embassy in New Delhi reports that India badly wants to
lay the groundwork for good relations with a future MMM government
despite New Delhi's apprehension about the party's radical nature and the
possible decline in the Hindu community's influence under an MMM
government. 25X1
China
China hosted a high-level Mauritian Government delegation late last year.
We believe Beijing's motivation was its desire to improve Labor's election
prospects with Mauritius's small but influential Chinese minority. This
strongly suggests that Beijing supports the Ramgoolam regime as an
obstacle to increased Soviet influence in the southwest Indian Ocean. C
25X1 25X1
Other Indian Ocean States and South Africa
Despite officially adhering to sanctions by the Organization of African
Unity against Pretoria, Mauritius is heavily dependent economically on 25X1
South Africa, its second most important trading partner. South Africa
buys a large portion of Mauritius's tea crop and supplies about 20 percent
of Mauritius's imports, including much of its food.
ewe believe Pretoria has discreetly helped offset some of
Labor's campaign costs. Should the MMM come to power, Berenger will
be on guard against a South African-backed coup attempt. We believe
that the unsuccessful coup attempt late last November against the leftist
regime in Seychelles-and the mercenary-led installation of a conservative
government in Comoros several years ago-has heightened Berenger's 25X1
Fear of South Africa also would serve as an incentive for an MMM 25X1
government to cooperate with the leftist regimes in Madagascar and
Seychelles, which feel similarly threatened.
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Berenger has said that he and Sey-
chelles President Rene are especially close and we believe the two are likely
to join Madagascar in promoting the Indian Ocean zone of peace in
international forumsJ
Election Results: Labor's unresponsive image, its difficulty in organizing a coalition, the
Implications for the island's continuing economic decline, and the widely perceived need for
United States change point to a likely MMM victory. Polls indicate that there is a good
chance the Movement will win an outright majority in the Legislative
Assembly, thereby freeing the party from any dependence on its ally, the
smaller Socialist Party.
MMM Controls Parliament
Soviet prospects in Mauritius under an MMM government would definite-
ly improve. We believe that Berenger probably would establish an army,
which Mauritius now lacks, and that he would be likely to seek Soviet
equipment and training.
In addition, we believe an MMM government would sign fishing
an cultural accords with Moscow.
Past statements by MMM leaders suggest also that an MMM government
would almost certainly end foreign military access to Mauritius. Berenger
is a strong nationalist who would not want to prejudice his claims to
nonalignment and who probably would include the USSR in his ban on for-
eign military access. In the near term it is unlikely he would grant them
any exceptions unless he believed his regime to be seriously threatened by
outside powers or by domestic unrest.
An MMM government, according to its leaders' announced plans, would
pursue a radical nonaligned policy that would generally coincide with
Soviet goals and interests. The MMM would support Soviet efforts to
promote the Indian Ocean zone of peace concept and would intensify
demands for the United Kingdom to return Diego Garcia and for an end to
the US military presence.
(Both Madagascar and
Seychelles receive substantial Western aid, however, and we believe they
may be reluctant to offend present and potential Western benefactors. For
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Secret
example, a Malagasy official told US Embassy officers that President
Ratsiraka was trying to avoid offending France because of its sizable aid to
Madagascar 25X1
We believe that Libya would try to persuade the new 25X1
government to sever, or at least curtail, relations with the United States.
Nonetheless, the MMM would probably try to limit Libyan activities in
Mauritius, recognizing that the issue of Libyan influence could disrupt the
island's delicate ethnic and religious relations.
Statements by MMM members indicate that Berenger would establish
good relations with Yugoslavia-as one of the founders of the nonaligned 25X1
movement-and other "progressive" Third World nations such as Zim-
babwe, Algeria, and India
Although the French Government appears to favor Labor, the US Embassy
in Paris reports that the MMM has a number of supporters among French
socialist leaders, and we believe Berenger would look to them to help in
eliciting political and economic support. Like leaders in Seychelles and
Madagascar, which receive French financial assistance, Berenger might be
reluctant to upset Paris should it come through with a sizable aid package.
Domestically, it is our view that an MMM regime probably would move to
restrict civil liberties, including freedom of the press, if significant
opposition to MMM programs developed. We believe Berenger also may be
planning to alter the Mauritian form of government because he has said
that Western-style parliamentary systems are not "democratic." Mauritius
has a long tradition of political participation and a vigorous press, however,
and any attempt to stifle civil liberties could touch off violent demonstra-
tions. 25X1
An MMM government would have trouble reviving Mauritius's sluggish
economy. Berenger is unlikely to introduce radical economic changes
immediately because sweeping nationalization of sugar and other indus-
tries would risk discouraging vital Western investment and financial
assistance. His most likely course of action will be a program of selective
takeovers.
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MMM in Coalition
Should the MMM fail to win a parliamentary majority and have to depend
on Socialist Party support to form a government, Berenger's ability to
implement his programs would be limited. The two parties thus far have
submerged their differences but trouble probably would resurface in a
coalition. The PSM is basically a communal party that in large part
represents liberal Hindu interests. PSM officials have indicated that they
would see an increase in Libyan influence in Mauritius or a disproportion-
ate role for Muslims in a new government as a threatening development.
influence in Mauritius, especially a large number of Soviet advisers, or the
institution of repressive measures would also lead the PSM to withdraw
from a future government, possibly causing the government to collapse.
Should a future MMM-PSM government fall, we believe the MMM would
be tempted to declare martial law to remain in power. In our view such a
move would be strongly resisted by the majority Hindu community, which
would see a threat to the democratic process as a challenge to Hindu
influence, and by rightwing elements of the Creole population.
Defections from Berenger's own party could also cause the fall of a future
MMM government; of the 34 MMM deputies elected in 1976, seven have
left the party. The MMM suffers from disputes between party radicals and
moderates and from unhappiness with Berenger's unwillingness to accept
advice and criticism
Labor Forms a Government
If the MMM wins a plurality of the votes rather than a majority, as it did
in 1976, Ramgoolam, as current Prime Minister, would have the constitu-
tional prerogative to try to form a coalition. It is possible that he could do
this with a razor thin majority. Such a new and insecure Labor government
would seek generous Western economic aid to keep the economy afloat and
to avoid the serious disorders that would probably accompany increased
economic hardship. Realizing these dangers, Ramgoolam, in our view, is
likely to attempt to elicit more from the West in return for maintaining his
benign neutrality and for facilitating US naval access. He recently
approached the United States with a request for $30 million in economic
assistance.
A Labor victory probably would result in violence by MMM radicals.
MMM allegations of US interference in the campaign increase the
likelihood of violence directed against US citizens or the US Embassy
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25X1
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should Ramgoolam carry the day. The MMM may even have contingency
plans to seize power if Ramgoolam were to survive, though we have no evi-
dence indicating this to be the case. The Libyans have been rumored to be
storing arms in the Seychelles for the MMM 'ng to the US
Embassy in Seychelles. 25X1
Even without MMM-inspired troubles, however, a Labor coalition would
be inherently unstable. Its narrow majority would give the smaller parties
disproportionate influence and factionalism would be aggravated by in-
creased maneuvering among aspirants for Ramgoolam's position.
Ramgoolam, however, might use a victory-however narrow-as a face-
saving opportunity to step down in the interest of rejuvenating the party.
His most likely successor, Agriculture Minister Boolell, is widely viewed in
the Labor Party as its most acceptable leader, and probably would continue
Ramgoolam's policies.
17 Secret
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A former physician, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam has been
parliamentary leader of the Mauritian Labor Party since 1948 and
Prime Minister since independence in 1968. He is regarded
affectionately by many Mauritians as the architect of independence.
Ramgoolam views himself as a socialist in the British Labor Party
mold and is one of Africa's most moderate leaders. His ability to
compromise has enabled him to survive numerous political chal-
lenges but he also has been criticized for failing to make hard
decisions regarding the island's economic and social problems. C
The son of indentured Indian immigrants, Ramgoolam, a Hindu,
was born in 1900. In 1921 he traveled to the United Kingdom to
study medicine. There he took an interest in politics and developed a
strop belief in British socialism
Paul Berenger, a young, left wing political activist who studied in
France and the United Kingdom has led the oppositionist Mauritian
Militant Movement (MMM) since he founded it in 1969. As
Secretary General of the MMM Berenger has sought power through
Berenger left Mauritius in 1963 to study journalism at the
University of Paris. There he was attracted to socialist ideas and
participated in the May 1968 student unrest. During the summer of
1968 he returned to Mauritius and founded the Club of Militant
Students of Mauritius, which later became the Mauritian Militant
Movement. In 1971 the government detained Berenger because of
his "confrontation politics. "Berenger, the son ofa wealthy Franco-
Mauritian plantation owner, was born in 1945
Aneerood Jugnauth, President of the Mauritian Militant Movement
(MMM) since 1974 and leader of the opposition in the Legislative
Assembly since 1977, is his party's shadow Prime Minister. He has
few strong ideological beliefs and is viewed as a stalking horse for
MMM Secretary General Paul Berenger. Jugnauth, who visited the
United States in August 1981, has stated that if he wins the
elections the MMM will maintain good relations with Washington. 25X1
A Hindu, Jugnauth was born in 1930. He is a lawyer and studied in
the United Kingdom
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Secret
An educator by training, Harish Boodhoo is a founding member of
the left-of-center Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM). He and two
other Labor Party dissidents established the PSM in 1979, a few
months after they were expelled from the Labor Party because of
their campaign to rid Labor of its corrupt leadership and return the
party to stricter socialist principles. In March 1981 the PSM
formed a coalition with the Mauritian Militant Movement to
enhance the election prospects of both parties. Despite his socialist
beliefs, Boodhoo is generally pro-Western. Boodhoo, a Hindu, was
Gaetan Duval, one of Mauritius's most experienced and erratic
politicians and former Foreign Minister (1969-73), has led the
Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD) since 1966. He
originally opposed independence for the island in 1968 because he
believed it would lead to Hindu domination of the government at the
expense of his fellow Creoles. He eventually tempered his views,
however, and in 1969 joined a coalition government as a cabinet
member. This alliance ended in 1973 when Duval's lobbying for the
establishment of a French naval base in Mauritius failed. Following
the 1976 parliamentary elections the PMSD rejoined a coalition 25X1
government, but Duval again withdrew his party from the govern-
ment in June 1981 after a power struggle with a PMSD faction that
opposed his leadership Duval was born
1930 and studied law in London and Paris.
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