SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 25, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Policies and Activities
in Latin America and
the Caribbean
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
SNIE 11/80/90-82
25 June 1982
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
Foreign Government Information
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
SNIE 11/80/90-82
SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES
IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN
Information available as of 15 June 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
Soviet Objectives ..................................................................................................... 5
Strategic Background .......................................................................................... 6
Role of Cuba ....................................................................................................... 6
Soviet Policies and Tactics ..................................................................................... 8
Consolidation of Revolutionary Regimes .......................................................... 8
Support for Insurgencies and Revolution .......................................................... 11
Bilateral State-to-State Relations ....................................................................... 13
iii
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
KEY JUDGMENTS
Soviet activity and interest in Latin America have increased
significantly in the past few years, and in the aftermath of the battle for
the Falklands the Soviets and their Cuban allies will be probing for new
opportunities. Since 1979, Moscow has moved more aggressively to
exploit opportunities presented by pressures for revolutionary change in
Central America and the Caribbean and by the willingness of Latin
American states to deal with the USSR and its allies. The Soviet Union
has helped to consolidate revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua and
Grenada, has provided considerable aid-mainly through proxies and
other third parties-to revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America, and
has intensified its efforts to develop favorable political and economic
ties with such countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Despite this
intensified interest, geographic remoteness has tended to relegate Latin
America-except for Cuba-to the periphery of Soviet security
concerns.
Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations with Latin America not
only as a dependent client serving Moscow's interests but also as an
independent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics. Fidel Castro's
vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries, for example, was
originally a Cuban initiative and had a marked impact on Soviet
attitudes and policy toward the region. Soviet leaders came to share
Castro's assessment that the prospects for the success of revolutionary
forces in Central America were brighter than they had earlier calcu-
lated. The Soviets have been working closely with the Cubans to
consolidate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which both view as
central to promoting leftist gains in the region.
The Soviets have by and large successfully implemented a policy of
encouraging unrest in various Central American states, gaining a
foothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the govern-
ments of the more important South American countries. From the
Soviet perspective, such a policy has potential for distracting American
attention from other regions; is relatively cheap in economic terms; has
not required major commitments to local allies; and has not raised
confrontation with the United States to an unmanageable level. The
Soviets are thus likely to persist with this strategy.
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Soviet support and guidance for Latin American revolutionary
movements now focus on:
- Encouragement of broad revolutionary coalitions, uniting pro-
Soviet Communist parties with their traditional leftwing rivals.
- Creation of loyal military components.
- Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric intermediaries.
- Training of revolutionaries.
In El Salvador the Soviets have facilitated the flow of arms and
military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents from Cuba and other
third parties. Although Moscow does not appear sanguine about the
insurgents' short-term military prospects, it probably still believes that
they can seize power through a prolonged armed struggle.
In Guatemala and Honduras, the USSR and its allies have been
pressuring the local Communists to join broad revolutionary fronts and
participate in armed struggle. The Soviets and Cubans have provided fi-
nancial assistance and training.
Moscow undoubtedly sees potential opportunities for the left in
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Chile.
In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Moscow's policy has aimed
largely at cultivating positive state-to-state relations. This approach has
emphasized trade expansion and-in some cases-readiness to sell
military hardware. Although these efforts have not usually been
translated into increased Soviet influence, they have given some Latin
American countries additional opportunities to assert their independ-
ence of the United States. By building on bilateral ties, the USSR also
seeks to achieve specific economic objectives and hopes to gain broader
political support for its policy initiatives in the hemisphere and
elsewhere in the world.
Since 1980, Soviet economic interest and activity in Latin America
have intensified. The USSR has become Argentina's largest grain buyer,
incurring large trade deficits. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year's
purchases are still expected to be 11-12 million tons, or about one-fourth
of the USSR's total grain imports.
In pursuit of major arms clients over the last decade, the USSR has
secured only Peru-where it is now the primary supplier of air and
ground equipment. Moscow's military relationship with Lima, however,
has given the Soviets little leverage over Peruvian policies.
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Despite Soviet success in Peru, most of the Latin American military
establishments have preferred Western-made arms and have been
suspicious of the Soviets. Moscow surely hopes, however, that its support
for Argentina in the Falklands dispute and interruptions in the supply
of arms from some Western sources will make at least the Argentine
military more receptive to Soviet offers.
Even in countries where the USSR's policy is-keyed to developing
bilateral state-to-state ties, as in Mexico, Moscow continues to conduct a
variety of covert activities and other "active measures" to improve its
position and play upon domestic vulnerabilities over the longer term.
These activities include:
Funding local Communist parties and front organizations.
Disseminating disinformation and forgeries aimed at the
United States.
Drumming up support for hemispheric revolutionaries.
Infiltrating military and security services as well as other
important sectors of Latin American bureaucracies.
Manipulating the media and mass organizations.
Developing and using agents of influence, mainly through the
Cubans.
The Soviets are also educating numerous Latin American and Carib-
bean students in the USSR, cultivating organized labor, and profiting
from the growth of pro-Marxist sentiments among religious activists.
Despite increased Soviet optimism about trends in Latin America,
Moscow recognizes that there are major constraints on its ability to
influence developments there. Foremost is US political, economic, and
military strength; but pervasive Latin American antipathy to Soviet
Communism and a Soviet desire not to alarm regional governments
through too blatant backing of leftist insurgencies also inhibit Moscow's
actions. Moscow has therefore moved in ways designed to avoid directly
provoking the United States. In contrast to the USSR's overt and direct
bilateral dealings with the larger states, its support for revolutionary
movements has been low-key and indirect, often employing interme-
diaries and surrogates.
Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding and supplanting US
influence in Latin America are unlikely to be affected, however, by its
recognition of these obstacles to its ambitions. Over the next few years,
Soviet efforts to gain influence are likely to increase. Washington's
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
response to this challenge will be complicated by the fact that its own
deep concern about Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared by
many regional governments. Sympathy with revolutionary causes will
persist in countries such as Mexico and Panama. Even countries less
sympathetic to leftist causes, such as Brazil and Venezuela, would be
opposed to US military intervention to check revolutionary gains in
Central America and the Caribbean.
The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in the region, which has
been accentuated by the Falklands crisis, offers the Soviets some new
opportunities to expand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives are
of less intrinsic significance than US policies and actions. US efforts to
build hemispheric solidarity with the current Salvadoran Government
and to gain Latin American support for countering Soviet-supported
leftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America have been damaged.
The Soviets are certain to attempt to exploit what they perceive as a US
setback.
The large and growing quantity of military hardware in the hands
of Soviet clients has major implications for the region. In addition to de-
fending both Cuba and Nicaragua against attack, such military power-
especially in Nicaragua-facilitates support to the Salvadoran insur-
gents and provides shelter for the guerrilla infrastructure. Within the
term of this Estimate, other objectives behind arms supply from the
USSR and various intermediaries probably include:
- Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus disposing them to-
ward acquiescence in the Soviet-Cuban foothold in Central
America.
- Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.
- Laying the groundwork for support of possible future insurgen-
cies in Honduras, Costa Rica, and elsewhere in the hemisphere.
The recent US warning of the consequences of delivering Soviet-
supplied MIG aircraft to Nicaragua may have prompted the deferral of
such deliveries. Nevertheless, preparations for their arrival are
continuing.
Over the longer term, there is also a possibility that the Soviets may
seek access to naval and air facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Such
access would have a significant impact on US security interests,
especially with regard to the Panama Canal and other lines of
communication.
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
DISCUSSION
Soviet Objectives
1. Soviet activity and interest in Latin America'
have increased significantly in the past few years.
Moscow has moved to exploit new opportunities pre-
sented by pressures for revolutionary change in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean and by the willingness
of Latin American states to deal with the USSR and its
allies. Since 1979 the Soviet Union has helped to
consolidate the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua, has
provided considerable aid-mainly through proxies
and other third parties-to revolutionaries elsewhere
in Latin America, and has intensified its efforts to
develop favorable political and economic ties with
such countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
2. Despite this intensified interest, Latin America's
geographical remoteness from the USSR has tended to
relegate it to the periphery of Soviet security concerns,
except when Soviet involvement with Cuba or Cuban
activities have threatened to provoke a serious crisis in
Soviet-US relations.' Over the years Latin America has
been less important in the USSR's rivalry with the
United States than other Third World areas such as
Asia and the Middle East, where Soviet stakes are
greater and Soviet power less constrained.
3. Soviet interest in Latin America is to a substantial
degree motivated by the USSR's global competition
with the United States and its ideological and prag-
matic commitment to support revolutionary causes
worldwide. Moscow's basic aim in the region is to
undermine US influence, which it seeks to achieve
' For purposes of this Estimate, Latin America is defined as all
mainland countries/territories/dependencies from Mexico south to
Argentina. Central America refers to Belize, Guatemala, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The Caribbean
includes those island states/territories/dependencies with a coast on
the Caribbean Sea.
The Estimate considers Soviet prospects in Latin America and the
Caribbean over approximately the next two years.
2 This Estimate examines the Moscow-Havana connection as it
bears upon the formulation and implementation of Soviet policy
toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Analysis of the overall
bilateral Soviet-Cuban relationship does not fall within the scope of
the paper.
both by strengthening Soviet diplomatic, economic,
and military ties with governments of the region and
by promoting radical change. This approach is in line
with Moscow's forward strategy in the Third World,
which has the long-term aim of changing the interna-
tional correlation of forces in favor of the USSR.
4. The Soviet leadership understands that growing
instability in Central America creates serious policy
dilemmas for Washington. In Moscow's view, if the
United States does not respond effectively in Central
America during the next few years, revolutionary
momentum will accelerate there and elsewhere in
Latin America. If Washington intervenes directly,
however, Moscow perceives that it will be able to
stimulate international criticism of US action. In either
case, Moscow anticipates that revolutionary ferment in
America's own backyard will divert US attention and
resources from more distant problems, sow divisions
between the United States and its allies, and undercut
Washington's credibility in the Third World.
5. Moscow's current support for revolutionary
causes should not obscure its other important priorities
and interests in the area, which it promotes simulta-
neously and sometimes in contradiction to its backing
for revolution. The level of Soviet economic, military,
and political activity with the larger countries indi-
cates that they are major targets in Soviet strategy
toward Latin America. A substantial share of the
USSR's agricultural imports comes from Argentina and
Brazil, and Moscow has a major arms supply relation-
ship with Peru. Such state-to-state relations give the
Soviet Union an opportunity to expand its presence
and influence in specific countries. The Soviets, of
course, also seek to encourage those states-such as
Mexico-to adopt policies independent of the United
States.
6. Moscow regards the Falklands situation as a
significant opportunity to intensify Latin American
alienation from the United States and expand its own
influence in the region. It is trying to stiffen Latin
American resentment of US support for Britain and to
stimulate distrust of the US commitment to regional
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84BOO049ROO0701830026-0
interests. It almost certainly sees the crisis as opening
the possibility of Argentina's turning to the USSR to
reequip its armed forces. Moreover, it probably also
views the crisis as weakening the US ability to mobilize
Latin American nations against Soviet, Cuban, and
other leftist advances in the area.
Strategic Background
7. The Soviets have had ties with some Latin
American Communist parties since the 1920s, but
until the 1960s they expended little effort to expand
their influence in the hemisphere. Soviet involvement
was limited largely to providing some financial assist-
ance to the local Communist parties, which in re-
turn-by and large-were expected mainly to support
Moscow's position at Communist international gather-
ings, while seeking to broaden their influence over
events in their own countries. Moscow's expectations
in the area remained modest until the advent of Fidel
Castro.
8. Castro's alignment of Cuba with the USSR by
1961 marked the turning point in Soviet involvement
in Latin America. Castro's move handed Moscow an
opportunity to establish an ideological, political, and
military foothold in the hemisphere, and a potential to
gain in the strategic competition with the United
States. The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis and the
containment of Castroism to Cuba in the early 1960s
nevertheless punctured Moscow's hopes of quickly
altering the strategic balance and forcing the pace of
change in the region.
9. In the 1960s in Latin America and the Caribbean
the USSR did not-with the exception of Cuba-
frontally challenge US dominance. The Soviets did
vigorously undertake "active measures" intended to
undercut US influence.' But Moscow provided no
The Soviets use the term "active measures" to refer to a broad
range of overt and covert operations intended to provoke policy
effects. These measures, which represent an unconventional adjunct
to traditional diplomacy, are designed to influence the decisions of
foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, under-
mine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, and discredit
opponents. They include such actions as manipulation of the media,
disinformation and forgery, use of foreign Communist parties and
fronts, sub rosa economic activities, and various political influence
operations. Operational Intelligence Memorandum CIA-319/01000-
82, Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures (April
1982), assesses Soviet "active measures" more broadly and in greater
detail.
military or any significant economic assistance to any
non-Communist Central American or Caribbean
country. It emphasized in its policy the more prag-
matic concerns of building diplomatic, commercial,
and even military relations with the existing govern-
ments, as in Peru. Moscow apparently hoped that
stronger bilateral ties would place it in a better
position to profit from growing nationalism and its
accompanying anti-Americanism. Correspondingly,
the Soviets also discouraged the small orthodox Com-
munist parties from engaging in violence and were
reluctant to support leftist groups advocating revolu-
tion. Although the Soviets did try from time to time to
cultivate some local leftist leaders-such as Jamaica's
Michael Manley, who was quite eager to curry favor
with them-their efforts were limited and they were
content to let the Cubans take the lead. In fact, they
encouraged Manley to maintain correct relations with
the United States in order to qualify for economic
assistance which they were unwilling to extend.
10. In the case of Chile's Salvador Allende, Mos-
cow's reluctance wholly to embrace his regime re-
flected a wide range of considerations beyond its
concern with the US reaction: his political opportun-
ism, conflict with members of his own Socialist party
as well as the Communist Party, inability to co-opt
groups of the extreme left, and lack of a loyal military
force to defend his regime. In their reflections on the
Chilean experience, Soviet leaders have noted the
possibility of a "peaceful road to socialism," while
warning revolutionaries of the need for a broad left-
wing coalition and their own military formation.
11. This measured approach by the Soviets yielded
both political and economic benefits. The number of
regional states with which Moscow established rela-
tions expanded (see map), and the USSR's 1970s
imports were 10 times those of the previous decade,
largely because of grain purchases from Argentina.
12. Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations
with Latin America both as a dependent client serving
Moscow's interests and as an independent actor influ-
encing Soviet policies and tactics. Cuba's dependence
on the USSR for economic and military assistance has
been a tender point for Castro, who vehemently denies
any linkage between Soviet largess and Cuban actions
in support of the USSR's foreign policy objectives.
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84BOO049ROO0701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Soviet Diplomatic Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean
Diplomatic relations
Established since January 1969
Established before 1969
Never established
aRelations maintained 1945-47; no missions
exchanged since.
bRelations established April 1945; Legation
opened in Moscow but closed July 1946; no
missions have been exchanged since.
"Relations established 1944; broken off 1947;
reestablished 1964; broken off again 1973
after ouster of Allende.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
4 Of
The Bdpamas
11 .
Kings Peltla' nl D Ingo
A
Prinee
7
SECRET
Antigua
end Barbuda
Dominica
St. Vincent anSt. Lucia
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
And, in fact, he has enjoyed greater freedom in his
policies in Latin America than he has elsewhere in the
Third World. Nevertheless, Castro pays close heed to
Soviet interests and to the limits of Moscow's tolerance
on tactical matters.
13. Soviet and Cuban approaches to the region have
not always been harmonious. Initially Moscow was
convinced that a "march toward socialism" in Latin
America would be slow and disapproved of Castro's
indiscriminate aid to hemispheric revolutionaries as
"adventurist." By 1968, however, Soviet political pres-
sure and economic incentives, combined with Cuban
foreign policy reverses, began to bring the two coun-
tries' goals and interests back into convergence and
culminated in their joint intervention in Angola and
Ethiopia in the mid-1970s. By 1979 the two had
expanded their collaboration to include support of
violent revolutionary parties and groups, particularly
in Central America.
14. Castro's vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolu-
tionaries beginning in 1978 was essentially a Cuban
initiative, and it has had a marked impact on Soviet
attitudes and policy toward the region. Moscow was
impressed by Havana's success in exploiting the revo-
lutionary situation in Nicaragua. Not only did the
Cubans supplant US influence there, but, in a country
in which Moscow had previously had no official
representation, it soon enjoyed diplomatic, military,
economic, and even formal party links with the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Soviet
leaders apparently came to share Castro's revised
assessment that the prospects for the success of revolu-
tionary forces in Central America were brighter than
they had earlier calculated, and felt that the United
States was irresolute in countering leftist gains.
15. The Soviets have been working closely with the
Cubans to consolidate the Sandinista regime; both
share the view that Nicaragua is central to promoting
leftist gains elsewhere in Central America. The Cu-
bans have also served as intermediaries with insurgent
groups elsewhere in Central America and with the
radical Bishop regime in Grenada. Moscow prefers
that Havana take the lead in advancing regional
revolutionary causes-in deference to Castro's under-
standing of local political dynamics and longstanding
involvement with revolution in Latin America; be-
cause Cuba is a hemispheric, Spanish-speaking power;
and to shield the USSR against any backlash from the
United States and from the larger Latin American
countries where it has a bilateral stake.
16. Despite the efficacy of Havana's role so far,
Moscow is no doubt alert to the potential for damage
to its broader interests arising from its Cuban con-
nection. Potential for friction between Moscow and
Havana exists in their conflicting preferences for
different factions within some Latin American revolu-
tionary movements. Partly to monitor Cuba's activities
and check those they judge too provocative to the
United States, the Soviets will continue their efforts to
expand their own influence and leverage-particu-
larly in Nicaragua.
17. Moscow employs diverse means to exploit dif-
fering local conditions and to serve multiple Soviet
interests. It is helping to consolidate the revolutionary
regime in Nicaragua and is supporting the regime in
Grenada. In some Latin American countries-particu-
larly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras-it is
advocating and supporting violent revolution. In
others, it is employing a mix of diplomacy and "active
measures." This pattern is likely to persist for at least
the two-year period of the Estimate.
Consolidation of Revolutionary Regimes
18. Moscow places a high value on consolidating
and ensuring the survival of revolutionary regimes in
the hemisphere. The new radical regime in Nicaragua
and, to a lesser extent, that in Grenada are politically
and symbolically significant for the USSR, especially
after its experience with Allende's Chile. The Soviets
hope that the leftist, pro-Soviet, anti-American govern-
ments in Managua and Saint Georges will contribute to
the emergence of other similarly oriented regimes in
Central America and the Caribbean and serve as a
conduit for revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere.
19. Nicaragua. Moscow, whose involvement in
Central America was low before the Sandinista vic-
tory, is assiduously cultivating the new revolutionary
regime in Nicaragua. It has subordinated its ties to the
minuscule local Communist party and established
formal party links with the Sandinistas. A Soviet
diplomatic mission was established in January 1980,
and the total number of Soviets now in Nicaragua,
8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
including military advisers and technicians, is prob-
ably between 150 and 175.
20. The trend toward closer relations has acceler-
ated over the last year or so. Recent high-level Nicara-
guan visitors to Moscow have included Defense Minis-
ter Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Political Commission
Chairman Arce, and Foreign Minister D'Escoto. Junta
leader Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow and meeting
with President Brezhnev in May 1982 have put Soviet
ties with Nicaragua on the same level as those with
many important Soviet clients elsewhere in the Third
World.
21. Even at a time in which the Soviets are being
tightfisted with economic assistance, Moscow and its
allies are meeting some of Nicaragua's economic
needs. Moscow's economic assistance program is gov-
erned by a 1980 "framework" agreement-a form
usually reserved for major aid recipients such as
Afghanistan and Cuba-that calls for assistance to all
major economic sectors. To date, Moscow, its East
European allies, and Cuba claim to have committed
about $480 million in nonconvertible currency credits
to finance agricultural, roadbuilding, and communica-
tions equipment and other machinery. The claims
may involve some double counting and could there-
fore be inflated; nevertheless, some of the equipment
financed by these credits has already been delivered.
In addition, Libya has provided a $100 million cash
loan, and may have promised considerably more than
that (although the Libyans are notorious for not honor-
ing such commitments).
22. Moscow has also tried to blunt US economic
pressure on Managua. The countries of the Soviet
Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA) gave Nicaragua 80,000 metric tons of grain to
offset the cancellation of the 1981 US grain deliveries.
Nevertheless, the Soviets appear reluctant to commit
the substantial hard currency assistance most needed
by Managua and have privately advised the regime to
be cautious in disrupting economic ties with Nicara-
gua's most important Western economic partners.
23. In the area of military relations, Moscow contin-
ues to work largely through Cuba and other third
parties to help build up the Sandinista military estab-
lishment, but its own direct role is increasing as it
gauges the Latin American and US reaction. As evi-
denced by the visits of Defense Minister Ortega to
Moscow in the last year or so, military consultations
are becoming more frequent and direct. Moscow no
doubt hopes that its military assistance will forestall
efforts to topple the regime and strengthen pro-Soviet
elements in the Sandinista establishment.
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Cuba. Havana has responded with a small shipment of
arms, and promises of full military and economic
support. Although the Soviets will probably let Cuba
take the lead, they have already signaled their interest
in exploiting the new situation by announcing that
they will open a resident embassy in the near future.
32. Guyana. Soviet efforts to cultivate the leftist-
leaning government of Forbes Burnham and his Peo-
ple's National Congress (PNC) in Guyana have been
constrained by Moscow's longstanding relationship
with the pro-Soviet People's Progressive Party (PPP)
led by Cheddi Jagan. Although in the last year or two
Moscow has moved somewhat away from the PPP,
relations between Moscow and Burnham continue to
be characterized by mistrust. Although the Soviets
seem reluctant to extend economic aid to the finan-
cially hard-pressed government, they have sought to
take advantage of the regime's economic problems by
continuing to encourage a PPP-PNC coalition.
Support for Insurgencies and Revolution
33. Much of Moscow's support for insurgent and
revolutionary movements in the hemisphere is covert,
opportunistic, and flexible. Accordingly, the Soviets
are expanding their links with leftists-particularly in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras-where grow-
ing revolutionary activity promises opportunities to
install anti-US and potentially pro-Soviet regimes.
Elsewhere, they have encouraged the several small
orthodox Communist parties in the Caribbean to
prepare for violent revolution and have called on the
Chilean left to initiate armed struggle against the
Pinochet regime.
34. Soviet support and guidance for Latin Ameri-
can revolutionary movements now focus upon:
- Encouragement of broad revolutionary coali-
tions, uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties with
their traditional leftwing rivals.
- Creation of military components loyal to the
revolutionary coalitions.
- Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric inter-
mediaries.
- Training of revolutionary cadres.
35. In El Salvador, Moscow has continued to sup-
port Communist participation in the Unified Revolu-
tionary Directorate, the umbrella organization con-
ducting the insurgency, and has endorsed armed strug-
gle as the left's best alternative. Moscow has facilitated
the flow of arms and military equipment to the
Salvadoran insurgents from Cuba and other third
parties and has contributed logistic support to the
operation. While generally supporting the entire revo-
lutionary front, Moscow has strengthened the position
of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) within
it by funneling some of its assistance to the insurgents
through the PCES. This has endowed the Salvadoran
Communists with a degree of influence much greater
than their numerical strength would warrant. In bol-
stering the position of the PCES, Moscow hopes to
ensure that the party-and through it the USSR-will
be well positioned to exert influence on events in El
Salvador, especially if the leftist insurgency should
succeed.
36. Despite this involvement, Moscow has tried to
soft-pedal its role in El Salvador, partly to avoid
provoking strong US countermeasures there that could
spill over into Nicaragua and lead to further deteriora-
tion in relations with Washington. Moscow seemed to
have been impressed by the Reagan administration's
reaction to the situation in El Salvador and appears
concerned that the outcome of the election in March
1982 may have significantly lessened the immediate
prospects of the revolutionary left. However, the
Soviets have taken comfort in the West European
reluctance to endorse the elections. The Soviets also
hope that actions by the political right in El Salvador
will further complicate the US administration's efforts
to mobilize Congressional support for additional mili-
tary and economic support for that country, and, over
the long term, assist the left. Although the Soviets
appear less sanguine about the insurgents' short-term
military prospects, they probably still believe that the
insurgents can seize power through a prolonged armed
struggle.
37. In Guatemala and Honduras, Moscow and its
allies have also been pressuring the local Communists
to join broad revolutionary fronts and participate in
armed struggle. Cuba, probably supported by Moscow,
has promised arms to Communists and other radical
leftists if they unify. The Soviets have provided finan-
cial assistance and training and have encouraged
various third parties to do the same. In the last few
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
43. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Mos-
cow's policy has aimed largely at cultivating positive
state-to-state relations. This approach has emphasized
trade expansion and-in some cases-readiness to sell
military hardware. Although these Soviet efforts have
not usually been translated into increased Soviet influ-
ence, they have given some Latin American countries
additional opportunities to assert their independence
of the United States. By building on bilateral ties, the
USSR also seeks to achieve specific economic objec-
tives and hopes to gain broader political support for its
policy initiatives in the hemisphere and elsewhere in
the world.
44. Economic. The US-sponsored partial grain em-
bargo following the invasion of Afghanistan, combined
with Soviet agricultural problems, has intensified So-
viet economic interest and activity in Latin America.
It has led to a significant growth in grain purchases
from Argentina as well as Brazil. Since 1980 the USSR
has become Argentina's largest grain buyer, account-
ing for about 80 percent of that country's 1981 grain
exports. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year's sales
are still expected to be 11-12 million metric tons, or
about one-fourth of the USSR's total grain imports-
although the ultimate volume will depend upon the
results of the Soviet grain harvest. The USSR and
Argentina also have concluded a five-year agreement
which calls for annual Soviet purchase of 60,000 to
100,000 metric tons of Argentine beef; 1981 purchases
totaled 87,000 metric tons.
45. Such economic dealings with the USSR so far
have paid handsome dividends for Latin American
countries. Moscow has imported on a cash basis and
has run massive trade deficits. (See chart.) According
to the latest Soviet figures, Moscow's trade deficit with
Argentina reached $3.3 billion in 1981. Brazilian
exports to the USSR have also boomed-increasing
from 1980 by more than 100 percent to $744 million
in 1981-while imports totaled only some $23 million.
Such highly favorable trade arrangements are of great
benefit to Argentina, and of more modest benefit to
Brazil, in helping to offset their balance-of-payments
deficits with other regions. Before the outbreak of the
Falklands conflict, the Soviets-in response to their
own hard currency stringencies-sought short-term
credits from Argentina to cover grain purchases, but
they did not appear to use the conflict to press this
Soviet Trade With Latin America
and the Caribbean (Excluding Cuba)
Soviet
Imports
Soviet
Hard
Currency
Deficit
Soviet
Exports
500
0 1960-75a 76 77 78 79 80 81
aAnnual average.
586717 6-82
demand. Argentina, badly in need of hard currency
from grain sales to finance its military activities, has
been unwilling and unable to offer any short-term
credits and, in fact, has requested advance hard
currency payments from the USSR for impending
grain deliveries. In the absence of an agreement on the
issue, the USSR has obtained West European financing
for its purchases.
46. Despite these deficits, the Soviets have derived
certain benefits of their own from this trade. In
addition to meeting urgent economic needs, the USSR
was able to undercut the 1980 US grain embargo and
blunt its potential for future use. The Soviets are
pressing to develop the bigger Latin American coun-
tries-particularly Argentina and Brazil-into impor-
tant markets for Soviet finished goods, especially
equipment for hydropower projects. There are now
almost 1,000 Soviet and East European civilian techni-
cians in the region. (See table 2.)
47. The nuclear field is another important area in
the growing relationship between the USSR and Ar-
gentina. In an attempt to diversify its sources of
supply, Buenos Aires has turned to Moscow for zirca-
loy production equipment. Earlier this year, the two
13
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
48. The Soviets are also making an economic push
in Brazil. Moscow's decision last year to sell oil there
when it was reducing deliveries to its allies and other
Third World countries reflected a desire to court the
Brazilian Government as well as a pressing need for
hard currency. Soviet oil exports to Brazil through
1982 will be 20,000 to 24,000 barrels per day, or about
3 percent of Brazil's oil requirements. Long-term trade
agreements initiated by the two countries last year
envision a trade turnover of $5 billion over the next
five years. According to the terms of the agreements,
Brazil will supply agricultural products under long-
term contracts while the Soviets will continue sales of
crude and also provide turbines for Brazilian hydro-
electric projects.
49. Moscow has also expanded technical exchanges
with Brazil. Attracted by Moscow's willingness to
provide advanced technology on attractive financial
50. The Soviets are also increasing their economic
and commercial activity in Mexico, albeit not rapidly.
For the last seven years, Mexico has had observer
status with CEMA. Despite a gradual expansion during
this period, Mexican trade with the USSR still accounts
for less than 1 percent of Mexico's foreign commerce.
Discussions with the USSR on a quadrilateral oil swap
underscore Mexico's openness to dealings with the
Soviet Union, but Mexico's insistence on commercially
viable arrangements may continue to restrict trade
expansion. Moscow wants Mexico to ship oil to Cuba.
In turn, the USSR would supply Mexican customers
14
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
in Europe. In addition to gaining substantial transpor-
tation savings, Moscow may think that the United
States would be less likely to interrupt Mexican than
Soviet shipments of oil if Washington resorted to an oil
blockade of Cuba. The Soviets may also seek to obtain
advanced US technology in Mexico, but Mexican
efforts to avoid violating US export controls could limit
Soviet opportunities.
55. Political. On the political front, the Soviets
have consistently sought to discredit US policy. They
are prepared at every turn to capitalize on the Latin
perception of decades of US political and economic
pressure. Moscow has applauded demonstrations of
independence from the United States, such as the
refusal of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru to join in the
US-sponsored trade sanctions against the USSR follow-
ing the Afghanistan invasion. The Soviets have sought
to exploit Mexico's opposition to US initiatives in El
Salvador and to play on the differences between
Mexico and the United States over how best to restore
stability in Central America. Moscow is especially
pleased to see differences between the United States
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
and Latin American countries regarding policy toward
the USSR, and probably views such disagreements as
signs of a further weakening of US influence and
increase in its own.
- Disseminating disinformation and forgeries
aimed at the United States.
- Drumming up support for hemispheric revolu-
tionaries.
56. The Soviets have tried to use the Falkland
Islands dispute between Argentina and Great Britain
to further ingratiate themselves with the government
in Buenos Aires and elsewhere in the region. After
initial hesitation, Moscow publicly supported Argenti-
rgentina s claim to sovereignty over the a an s,
although it has depicted Argentine policy in positive
terms as a continuation of the process of
decolonization.
58. Even in countries where the USSR's policy is
keyed to developing bilateral state-to-state ties, Mos-
cow continues to conduct a variety of covert activities
and other "active measures" to improve its position
and play upon domestic vulnerabilities over the longer
term. These activities include:
- Funding local Communist parties and front
organizations.
- Infiltrating military and security services as well
as other important sectors of governmental
bureaucracies.
- Manipulating the media and mass organizations.
- Cultivating pro-Soviet sentiments among aca-
demics and students.
- Developing and using agents of influence, mainly
through the Cubans.
59. To Moscow, the local orthodox Communist
parties are essentially instruments of Soviet policy (for
sizes of parties, see table 3). The USSR provides funds
to most Latin American Communist parties and is
encouraging them to become more active, particularly
ou. e ovie s nave also s epee up eir propa-
ganda activities in the area over the last several years.
These efforts aim both to discredit US policy in the
hemisphere and to strengthen leftist elements. Mos-
cow, for example, has directed its representatives in
Latin America to spread false accusations about the
16
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Argentina .............................................................
Bolivia ..................................................................
Brazil ....................................................................
Chile .....................................................................
Colombia .............................................................
Costa Rica ............................................................
Dominican Republic ...........................................
El Salvador ..........................................................
Guadeloupe .........................................................
Guatemala ...........................................................
Guyana ................................................................
Honduras .............................................................
Jamaica ................................................................
Martinique ...........................................................
Mexico .................................................................
Nicaragua ............................................................
Panama ................................................................
Paraguay ..............................................................
Peru ......................................................................
Uruguay ...............................................................
Venezuela ............................................................
Estimated Communist Party
Population, Estimated
Mid-1981 Membership Status
28,130,000 45,000 Proscribed
5,490,000 500 Proscribed
124,800,000 6,000 Proscribed
11,162,000 20,000 Proscribed
25,217,000 12,000 Legal
2,332,000 3,200 (PVP) Legal
5,855,000 6,000 Legal
8,275,000 1,000 Legal
4,610,000 800 Proscribed
304,000 3,000 Legal
7,310,000 750 (PGT) Proscribed
857,000 Unknown (PPP) Legal
5,923,000 350 (PUCH) Proscribed
3,940,000 1,500 Proscribed
2,268,000 Unknown (WPJ) Legal
302,000 1,000 Legal
69,100,000 112,000 a Legal
2,559,000 250 (PSN) Legal
1,928,000 550 (PPP) Legal
3,268,000 3,500 Proscribed
18,119,000 3,000 Legal
2,944,000 7,000 Proscribed
17,913,000 4,500 Legal
a This figure is the total membership claimed for a Communist-dominated coalition called the Unified
Party of Mexico (PSUM), which is somewhat more independent in orientation than the other parties listed in
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
63. The Soviets have profited from the growth of
pro-Marxist sentiments among religious activists. They
have been especially impressed with the direct support
such activists have provided the Sandinista regime and
other revolutionary causes elsewhere in Central Amer-
activists for leftist revolution in the region.
notwithstanding, Moscow and Havana probably will
seek to benefit from the sympathies of many church
ica. Growing resistance among church leaders to this
de facto partnership between religion and revolution
Constraints
64. Despite its increased optimism about trends in
Latin America, Moscow recognizes that there are
major constraints on its ability to influence develop-
ments there. Foremost is the attitude and role of the
United States. Moscow believes that US political,
economic, and military strength still gives Washington
potential for considerable leverage in the hemisphere.
18
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
65. Moscow has therefore moved in ways designed
to avoid directly provoking the United States. In
contrast to the USSR's overt and direct bilateral
dealings with the larger states, its support for revolu-
tionary movements has been low-key, often employing
intermediaries and surrogates. This pattern of indirect
support also reflects Soviet uncertainty about the long-
term prospects of revolutionary movements and un-
willingness to commit the USSR irretrievably to re-
spond to possible US actions against them. Further-
more, Moscow has been careful to play down its direct
commitment to the Sandinista regime and has appar-
ently not sought a "friendship" treaty with Nicaragua
as it has with some Third World clients outside the
Western Hemisphere.
66. More important, the Soviets have displayed
concern about the application of US political and
military leverage in response to the crisis in Central
America. The Reagan administration's frank warnings
have emphasized that Washington is indeed sensitive
to Moscow's efforts to exploit political instability in its
own backyard and that such activities there might well
trigger a strong US reaction. The level of arms deliv-
eries to Cuba in 1981-the second-highest annual total
on record-and the Soviet efforts to build up Nicara-
gua's military forces are to a degree indicative of this
anxiety. At the same time these measures provide
Cuban and Nicaraguan armed forces with increased
offensive capabilities and with further means to in-
timidate neighbors and provide safehaven for leftist
insurgents.
67. Antipathy to the Soviets is another constraint on
Moscow. Even those governments that have developed
important bilateral ties with the USSR, such as Argen-
tina and Brazil, remain strongly anti-Communist and
governments and reinforce their suspicions of Soviet-
inspired interference in their internal politics. Such
backing would also stimulate anti-Communist ele-
ments among important social groups, especially the
various churches.
68. Moreover, economic considerations also impose
some constraints on Soviet activism in the region.
Foremost are the poor quality, technological back-
wardness, and narrow range of Soviet industrial goods,
which are compounded by the area's historical prefer-
ence for Western goods. Taken together, these factors
severely limit Soviet export prospects. In cases where
Moscow might hope to make political inroads through
imports from Latin American or Caribbean countries,
its severe shortage of hard currency is a major con-
straint. Finally, the USSR's record of tightfistedness
with regard to economic assistance deprives it of
further opportunities to assist pro-Soviet regimes or
otherwise gain influence in the region.
69. Another constraint on Moscow is the unstable
nature of new leftist regimes and its recognition that
its influence is dependent on local political trends that
it may be unable to control. The electoral ouster of
Manley in Jamaica was a key case in point, and the
Bishop regime in Grenada faces economic problems
that could generate political discontent. The Soviets
probably are still uncertain whether the new revolu-
tionary regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada can sur-
vive. The Soviets see Nicaragua's Sandinistas under
considerable pressure from the United States and
formerly sympathetic European socialists. They also
see Nicaragua increasingly beset by a wide variety of
political opponents, armed counterrevolutionaries, and
mounting economic problems.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
70. Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding and
supplanting US influence in Latin America are unlike-
ly to be affected by its recognition of the obstacles to
its ambitions under present power realities and the
political climate in the hemisphere. In fact, over the
next few years, Soviet efforts to gain influence in the
region are likely to increase and will probably present
more serious problems for the United States. Washing-
ton's response to this growing Soviet challenge will be
complicated by the fact that its own deep concern
about Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
by many regional governments. Sympathy with revo-
lutionary causes will persist in countries such as Mexi-
co and Panama. Even countries less sympathetic to
leftist causes such as Brazil and Venezuela would be
opposed to US military intervention to check revolu-
tionary gains in Central America and the Caribbean.
71. The Soviets will continue to use both state-to-
state and revolutionary approaches, depending on the
situation. Moscow probably will continue to judge that
in the long term it has a great deal to gain by
continuing to develop positions of influence in the
more politically significant countries such as Argen-
tina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. It will couple this
interest with its exploitation of ferment in countries
embroiled in insurgencies or ruled by unstable
regimes.
72. Uncertainty about US intentions is the domi-
nant consideration in Soviet thinking about risks and
gains in exploiting regional opportunities. Without
abandoning its support for revolution, Moscow is likely
at present to minimize risk by recommending tactical
prudence to its regional clients Cuba and Nicaragua.
Moscow's recent endorsement of calls for talks be-
tween Nicaragua and the United States, for example,
probably reflects its interest in easing US pressure and
buying time for the beleaguered Sandinista regime, as
well as in cutting its own costs.
73. So far, the Soviets have been reluctant to pro-
vide Nicaragua with massive economic aid. Nonethe-
less, if the Sandinista regime falters for economic
reasons, Moscow and its allies probably would be
somewhat more forthcoming with economic support.
Because Nicaragua's population is much smaller than
Cuba's, and because Managua seems at this time to
enjoy broader international economic backing than
did Havana in the 1960s, in the near term at least the
Soviets would almost certainly not have to assume the
kind of economic burden that they have been carrying
in Cuba for two decades.
74. Intensified pressure on Managua by Nicaraguan
dissident armed elements may be seen by Moscow as
posing a potential long-term threat to the Sandinista
regime, yet as also offering an opportunity to draw
Nicaragua still closer to the Soviet Bloc. Moscow will
probably counsel Managua to avoid countermeasures
provocative to the United States-such as armed
forays deep into Honduras-but may assume a more
active role in planning Nicaragua's counterinsurgency
measures, and might expand its military assistance.
76. The large and growing levels of military hard-
ware in the hands of Soviet clients have major implica-
tions for the region. In addition to defending both
Cuba and Nicaragua against attack, such military
power-especially in Nicaragua-facilitates support to
the Salvadoran insurgents and provides shelter for the
guerrilla infrastructure. Within the term of this Esti-
mate, other objectives behind arms supply from the
USSR and various intermediaries probably include:
- Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus dispos-
ing them toward acquiescence in the Soviet-
Cuban foothold in Central America.
- Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.
- Laying the groundwork for support of possible
future insurgencies in Honduras, Costa Rica, and
elsewhere in the hemisphere.
77. Over the longer term, there is also a possibility
that the Soviets may seek access to naval and air
facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Such access
would have a significant impact on US security inter-
ests, especially with regard to the Panama Canal and
other lines of communication. The principal constraint
on the Soviets in expanding their military presence in
Central America and the Caribbean is their uncer-
tainty as to the US response. Nevertheless, they are
very likely to continue to probe US resolve during this
decade.
78. The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in the
region, which has been accentuated by the Falklands
20
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
crisis, offers the Soviets some new opportunities to
expand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives are
of less intrinsic significance than US policies and
actions. The Soviets probably have no firm expectation
of any dramatic new political payoffs in the near term,
although they probably do hope that their support will
moderate local suspicions of Moscow and enable them
to project an image of the USSR as a distant but
powerful supporter of Latin American and anti-
colonial interests. They may also calculate that the
outcome of the crisis could usher in a period of
political instability and open prospects for those in
Buenos Aires who might be more inclined toward
closer relations with the USSR. The Soviets are already
seeking to profit from any general deterioration in US
influence in the hemisphere arising out of the Falk-
lands crisis, but they realize that Washington's losses
cannot be immediately chalked up as Moscow's gains.
79. US efforts to build hemispheric solidarity with
the current Salvadoran Government and to gain Latin
American support for countering Soviet-supported
leftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America have
been damaged. The Soviets are certain to attempt to
exploit what they perceive as a US setback. They will
continue to conduct many of their activities in the
region either covertly or through intermediaries. Al-
though generally successful to date, this tactic is
vulnerable to public exposure of Soviet support for
subversion and revolutionary violence. Furthermore,
some Soviet intermediaries (such as Cuba, Algeria, or
the PLO) might possibly be led to moderate their
policies through a combination of external pressure
and internal problems.
80. The Soviets have by and large successfully
implemented a policy of encouraging unrest in various
Central American states, gaining a foothold in Nicara-
gua, and improving their relations with the govern-
ments of the more important South American coun-
tries. They probably expect their general progress to
continue, especially if the United States appears to be
inconsistent, or discredits itself through its reactions to
events in the region. From the Soviet perspective, such
a policy has potential for distracting American atten-
tion from other regions; is relatively cheap in eco-
nomic terms; has not required major commitments to
local allies; and has not raised confrontation with the
United States to an unmanageable level. The Soviets
are thus likely to persist with this strategy.
21
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000701830026-0