UPDATE FOR THE 14 MAY BRIEFING BOOK FOR NSC MEETING ON 'US POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810018-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/31 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810018-1
Update for the 14 May Briefing Book for NSC Meeting on "US Policy in
Central America and the Caribbean"
Attached is a draft of Secretary Haig's talking points for the
28 May NSC meeting. We think it is consistent with our previous
recommendations to the DCI to generally bless the strategy paper, and
to support emphasis on positive economic and political measures in
order to win domestic and international backing for the overall
strategy.
Jack Davis
NI0/LA
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NSC review completed
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U.S. POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Major U.S. political and security interests in the
Caribbean Basin are threatened by the current Cuban offensive
and the appearance of two Cuban clients in Nicaragua and
Grenada.
The first response required of us is to give threatened
countries the means to defend themselves. We have already
done -so,in El Salvador. But $38 to $50 million in additional
security assistance in FY 1982 will. be required for other
countries.
NSC authorization is requested to seek that assistance
4 through budget amendment or reprogramming.
The second response required is to keep Cuba on the
defensive. Actions to accomplish that will be presented
to the NSC.next week.
The third response, for which NSC authorization is
requested today, is to develop a plan to stimulate free
enterprise, promote economic growth and build political
support for U.S. policy in the Basin in order to reduce
opportunities for Cuban export of violence and subversion.
The plan would aim at:
Helping countries build popular support needed
to defeat and forestall Cuban-sponsored insurgencies;
-- -Engaging Mexico (now working at cross purposes
with us in Central America), Venezuela,
Canada, the Europeans and Japanese and multilateral.
banks rn a broad pdsitive enterprise, while
we do=what is necessary to make sure the
insurgencies fail;
-- Helping to build broader Congressional and public
support and understanding for our policy in Central
America and heading off the threat of crippling
condi..t.ions on aid to El Salvador and a new Clark
-Amendment for Central America;
-- Lessening the incentive to illegal migration
to the U.S. by stimulating productive economic
activity in the Caribbean Basin.
The plan would emphasize use and expansion of private
sector resources in these countries and would consist of:
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Phased movement to one-way free trade (with appropriate
safeguards for sensitive industries);
promotion of foreign and domestic private investment
in the area through new regional insurance schemes
and cot(&S of investment treatment;
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-- Some increased official capital flows for
balance of payment and key project assistance
on a transitional basis.
We would not describe this as a "Marshall Plan" for
the Basin. That term would put the emphasis on official
assistance, while we want to put it on private enterprise
and trade. It also suggests that economic growth also
can.overcome insurgencies, while we know that revolutions
are made by revolutionaries, who must be defeated militarily
and politically. Economic growth needed for the long run,
often creates conditions in the short run that revolutinaries
can exploit. These programs are ther.efore not a substitute
for efforts to enhance security.
U.S. participation in a Caribbean Basin plan would
ae dependent on that of others. Canada should join in-
the trade preferences, along with Venezuela and Mexico
(on a symbolic basis). Other donors and the international
agencies should share the burden of official assistance
(our share might be $300-400 million beginning in FY 1983).
Recipient countries in the Basin should provide the protection
for free enterprise necessary for growth. We would exclude
Nicaragua and Grenada and any other Cuban clients from
receiving benefits from us. We would make sure that countries
friendly to us, like Jamaica, would be included.
There are obstacles to success. The Mexicans will
be chary about being involved with us: with them we should
emphasize (a) that we are building on the Mexican-Venezuelan
oil facility which serves most countries in the Basin,
and (b) that this is a collective enterprise, not a big
U.S. initiative. Sensitive domestic industries (especially
apparel) and their unions would have to be reassured.
And the recipients would have to overcome traditional jeal-
ousies as well as rescind domestic obstacles to private
enterprise.
With Presidential approval, we will staff this proposal
out with the domestic agencies (USTR, Commerce, AID, OMB,
and Treasury), and consult with Congress and foreign coun-
tries.
Meanwhile--we-recommend that the President seek to
engage Lopea-Portillo with this concept while he is Here.
One possible vehicle for launching the plan might be the
tripartite meeting with Trudeau and Lopez-Portillo (Trudeau
says that he would welcome a Caribbean Basin focus). Even
if the Mexicans do not engage, others will, and the plan
should go forward. A major conference (say in Jamaica)
might be called for a year from now to make commitments.
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