NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601660002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 20, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
Nicaraguan Support for Central American Revolutionaries
The Sandinistas remain fully committed to the Salvadoran
insurgency and are increasingly willing to acknowledge their
support.
Nicaragua continues to channel arms to El Salvador via land,
sea, and air routes, shifting traffic according to the circum-
stances of the moment. Because of overland interdiction efforts
by Honduran authorities, the Sandinistas are stepping up
deliveries by air and probably by sea as well.
While the ongoing supply effort appears to be sufficient to
sustain the level of guerrilla activity that has prevailed since
February, we believe it would have to be increased significantly
to support a major insurgent offensive. With the onset of the
dry season next month, Managua probably will step up its arms
deliveries.
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This memorandum, covering the period from 12 June 1981 to 19 October
1981, was requested by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs. It was prepared b iddle America-Caribbean Division, 25X1
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and coordinated with the
Clandestine Service. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief,
Middle America-Caribbean Division, OALA, 25X1
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addition, Nicaragua is sending small numbers of military advisers
to El Salvador and continues to train Salvadoran insurgents. The
Sandinistas also may be supporting train' c am s for Salvadoran
revolutionaries in northern Costa Rica.
Managua continues to provide arms and other support to
Guatemalan insurgents, and has increased its assistance to
Honduran leftists in preparation for armed struggle. Perhaps as
many as 400 Hondurans have been undergoing training in Sandinista
Army camps during the past year, and some are being infiltrated
into Honduras to set up cells in both rural and urban areas. In
addition, Nicaragua is collaborating with Cuba in helping
organize a new Costa Rican political party with a paramilitary
capability.
Sandinista Commitment
The Sandinistas are convinced that a leftist victory in El
Salvador is essential to the security of their own regime and
probably doubt that the US would resume economic assistance to
Nicaragua even if they halted their support activities. Thus,
Managua believes it has strong reasons--and little disincentive--
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for continuing its involvement in El Salvador.
The Sandinista regi ow is less inclined to conceal its
complicity. Last month,7 n
stated to foreign diplomats that Nicaragua would not a t its
assistance to the Salvadoran insurgents. In recent weeks, the
Sandinistas have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the
insurgency and have begun to glorify "Che" Guevara as a symbol of
"internationalism"--perhaps to prepare the public for increased
efforts on behalf of the Salvadoran left.
El Salvador
Managua continues to channel arms to El Salvador by land,
sea, and air. Weapons reportedly are stockpiled under Sandinista
Army control on Nicaragua's east coast; Salvadoran guerrillas who
operate the network within Nicaragua then move the arms to
forward positions for transshipment to El Salvador. Sandinista
National Directorate member Bayardo Arce is said to be personally
in charge of support activities. A farm--owned by the Nicaraguan
government--near Jalapa reportedly serves as a major base for the
overland traffic through Honduras. Other information indicates
that, in Nicaragua during July, there was an increase in the
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preparation of vehicles with concealment cavities for delivery of
weapons and explosives to El Salvador. Additional vehicles are
loaded with arms from stockpiles in Costa Rica and transit
Nicaragua with the collaboration of Sandinista security
officials.
At least three Salvadoran insurgent groups, supported by
Honduran leftists, operate separate arms-distribution networks in
Honduras. These networks maintain caches of weapons infiltrated
from Nicaragua and later transfer them to El Salvador
which transports weapons from caches in
temporarily suspended shipments in late
to resume operations soon.
Air deliveries, deemphasized for
stepped up. By September,
A major network,
the Danli area,
September but now plans
several months,
most weapons deliveries were being made by parachute, due in part
to the success of Honduran authorities in intercepting land ship-
ments. the commander of the
Sandinista Air Force is directly involved in the arms flights and
reports to Defense Minister Humberto Ortega on support
activities. There have been increased sightings of unidentified
aircraft in Salvadoran guerrilla zones--including one sighting of
a small plane dropping bundles--over the past two months
Seaborne shipments may also be increasing. In July, a
captured guerrilla told Salvadoran authorities that he had
participated in night deliveries of arms from Nicaragua to
Montecristo Island in El Salvador. Three additional reports
confirm the flow of weapons across the Gulf of Fonseca, and an
y sea a ong
Jprovides further evidence of
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According to a new route from 25X1
Nicaragua's east coast to the Honduran north coast was being
planned last July. Honduran Communist Party members are to
receive the arms shipments and transport them to the Salvadoran
border for delivery to Salvadoran insurgents. Cuba reportedly is
furnishing communications equipment to support the operation. 25X1
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Havana also operates a number of mobile communications-
intercept vans along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border to facilitate
the movement of arms and monitor military activities in
Honduras. In addition, a permanent unit on the north slope of
the Cosiguina volcano in Nicaragua is targeted against Salvadoran
and Honduran military, communications as well as ship movements in
the Gulf of Fonseca.
Despite Nicaraguan efforts, the Salvadoran guerrillas
continue to experience serious problems of food and munitions
resupply. The arms pipeline apparently is delivering enough to
sustain the level of guerrilla activity that has prevailed since
February, but significantly larger quantities would be necessary
to support a major insurgent offensive. Managua probably will
step up its shipments with the onset of the dry season next
month.
Although Cuba and the USSR have facilitated the supply of
weapons smuggled to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, Libya
apparently is taking a larger role. According to 125X1
the Libyan government intended in August to step 25X1
up its inancia and military assistance to the Salvadorans
through the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Tripoli. Moreover,
Panamanian National Guard G-2 Noriega reportedly told Salvadoran
junta President Duarte in mid-September that Libya had been
supplying arms to the guerrillas via Nicaragua for two months.
In addition to channeling arms to El Salvador, the
Sandinistas now are sending advisers. In late August, 25
Sandinista Army officers reportedly infiltrated by land routes to
serve as instructors to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Since four
had received special training in parachute delivery systems, they
probably will be involved in receiving arms shipments as well.
Another group of Army personnel--including five former members of
Defense Minister Ortega's personal security staff--reportedly
were sent last July. A Salvadoran soldier held captive by insur-
gents in El Salvador later reported that a Nicaraguan officer was
killed during a government sweep operation early this month.
personnel
Nicaraguan military
in being asked to volunteer for duty in El
lindicates
that additional Nicaraguans or other "internationalists" continue
to arrive in El Salvador.
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Guatemala
Nicaragua is continuing its assistance to Guatemalan insur-
gents as well. A captured Guatemalan guerrilla told 25X1
authorities last June that the Nicaraguan government was collabo-
rating with his organization in arms supply. In addition, we
have an unconfirmed report that Sandinista commander Eden
Pastora--whose departure from Nicaragua last July was well
publicized--intends to join the insurgents in Guatemala. 25X1
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According) Managua also 25X1
provides transit for Guatemalan leftists goin to Cuba and East
Europe for paramilitary training. In June, 25X1
substantiated these reports by stating that they had 25X1
traveled-via Nicaragua when returning from a training stint in
Cuba. 25X1
We hae no further information on arms traffickin through
Belize, bu leaders of
one of the principal Guatemalan guerrilla organizations antici-
pate that the independence of Belize will facilitate their insur-
gency. The guerrillas believe that the Belizean government will
be either sympathetic to them or unable to halt the infiltration
of arms and personnel through its territory.
Honduras
While Honduras continues to serve primarily as a conduit for
arms to El Salvador, the Sandinistas have stepped up their assis-
tance to Honduran leftists in preparation for armed struggle
According to
three Cuban- and Nicaraguan-trained guerre as
were apprehended last July when returning to Honduras. The
captured leftists stated that numerous insurgents have been
infiltrated since December 1980 to set up rural and urban cells,
which are to be supplied from Nicaragua,, and that guerrilla oper-
ations are to commence early next year.
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One of the captured leftists claimed to be personally aware
of 40 Hondurans training in Sandinista Army facilities and
estimated the total number at 400. Interrogation of another
guerrilla revealed that members of a group responsible for
several terrorist acts earlier this year also trained in
Nicaragua. Moreover, 25X1
the largest Honduran insurgent organization in July chose about
20 individuals to travel to Nicaragua for terrorist training.
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The Sandinistas also continue to provide transit for Honduran
leftists en route to training courses in Cuba and other Socialist
countries.
According tol Ithe Sandinista
leadership in August offered $50,000 to the Communist Party of
Honduras for the purchase of arms and equipment, and agreed to
locate a forged-documents laboratory in Nicaragua. In addition,
a Nicaraguan intelligence officer in Tegucigalpa maintains
contact with--and provides operational assistance to--the
Honduran extreme left.
Costa Rica
The Sandinistas also are increasingly active in Costa
Rica. Three separate sources have reported the existence of
training camps for leftist guerrillas--probably to be infiltrated
into El Salvador--in northern Costa Rica. Arms and other
supplies reportedly arrive by air and sea from Nicaragua to
support the camps. According to a
additional arms--presumably from Cuba--enter Costa Rica by sea
from Panama. Some of the weapons stored in caches probably will
be shipped to El Salvador, and some will remain in the hands of
Apparently Cuba and Nicaragua are preparing for a gradual
increase in leftist capabilities in Costa Rica. Another
reports that former security chief
Echeverria is organizing a political party with a paramilitary
capability. Havana is providing funds and has pledged training
and arms. Top Sandinista officials have promised their full
support, including the provision of Western-made weapons now in
Nicaraguan inventories.
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Major Central American Arms Routes
0
U.S
A Guerrilla arms cache
..v.... Seaborne arms route
"- --_ Possible seaborne route
Overland arms route
~.~ Airborne arms route
~- . Possible airborne route
9 100
Kilometers
Costa Rica
Grecia
A SAN, JOSE
/ Boundary representation is
not necessarily author tat ae.
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MWRAAV[ 1M FOR: DCI
Mr. Casey:
We have shown this memo to Admiral Nance,' Roger Fontaine,
Lt. Gen. Gorman, Bing West, and Tom Enders. Because of
the danger of leaks, all copies have been retrieved after
reading.
Admiral Nance has asked that the memo be made available
to the NSPG. Dewey Clarridge, however, remains concerned
about source protection and the sensitivity of the
information. You might consider briefing from the memo
if the subject comes up rather than-making copies
available.
23 October 1981
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