SOVIET CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570006-2
Key Judgments
Soviet Contingency Plans
for Military Operations
Against Pakistan
ations against Pakistan soon. On the contrary, the information available
suggests that their plans-at least for large operations-are in the early
stages of development and probably will require substantial evaluation and
revision before the Soviets could even consider implementing them. Small
cross-border raids, however, probably could occur at any time= 25X1
Major military operations into Pakistan would be much more costly for the f
Soviets than their invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets sent an invasion
force into Afghanistan in a low-risk operation to prevent the downfall of a
client on their own border, ostensibly in response to a request for assistance
from a Marxist government. Pakistan, however, has long been within the
Western sphere of influence, has a security agreement with the United
States, and is an important Muslim state. Moreover, its armed forces of
about half a million men would resist a Soviet invasion. A Soviet move into
Pakistan would have grave consequences for the political bal inSnuth-
25X1
wes Asia and in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions.
7
7We have no indications that the Soviets intend to conduct military oper-
25X1
Recent information indicates that the Soviets and Afghans have been
developing plans for neutralizing insurgent bases in Pakistan and annexing
part of Pakistan's border area to Afghanistan. The Soviets have also begun
to develop separate contingency plans for a large invasion of Pakistan. This
planning probably reflects a need to cope more effectively with the Afghan
insurgency, high-level Soviet interest in redefining the USSR's military
position in Southwest Asia, and a need to rehearse procedures for mobilizing
and preparing the 40th Army in Afghanistan for a large war. ILLL5X1
L~~I
Although the Soviets have carefully avoided crossing Pakistan's border
intentionally, they might perceive small cross-border raids as a means of
pressuring Pakistan to curtail insurgent operations or as a way to disrupt
insurgent supply routes. Such raids probably are within Soviet capabilities
and would entail only limited risk of a major international outcry or military
confrontation with the United States, but they probably would disrupt the
insurgents only temporarily.)
The Soviets might consider larger cross-border operations and annexation of
part of Pakistan to Afghanistan as a means of gaining more lasting control
over areas in Pakistan which now support Afghan insurgents and of denying
access to insurgents by Pakistan or its allies. These advantages, however,
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Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570006-2
 would have to be tempered by concern that Pakistan would resist and seek
assistance from the United States. There would also be severe international
repercussionsF--]
stan's security could be assured, i at ac eking uni st ca`n attain superiority over
defending forces before the United States could intervene, and if they could
be resupplied. Soviet and Afghan authorities probably would be forced to
Forces required for this type of operation are available in Afghanistan, but
additional forces would be required to maintain Afghanistan's internal
security and protect the Soviet position there. The Soviets still would have to
seal the new border with Pakistan and prepare for a likely Pakistani
response. Attacking units would have to transit rugged terrain that offers
advantages to the defender. Nonetheless, this type of operation might
succeed if Pakistan's forces remained committed to the east, if Afghani-
escalate quickly to a larger conflict.
accept heavy losses and the probability that this type of operation could
A major invasion of YaKistan is unlikely at present and probably would not
be triggered solely by events in Afghanistan. Indeed, the planning on which
we have information is set against the backdrop of a general war, stalemated
in Europe, with the Soviets perceiving threats in the Far East, along their
southern border, and against India and Afghanistan. The Soviets might
consider such an invasion, however, to exploit a government takeover by
Pakistani leftists. Moscow would expect almost certain confrontation with
the United States, severe international repercussions, and extreme difficulty
in consolidating its military position in Pakistan. Soviet forces would require
mobilization and movement from the Turkestan Military District before
they could launch a major invasion. It probably will be at least several years
before Afghan forces could participate in such an invasion as more than a to-
ken force.
operations and substantial warning of a large invasion
We probably would be able to warn US policymakers if the Soviets were to
change their policy of respecting Pakistan's frontiers. We might not be able
to anticipate the details of small raids they might consider, but we probably
would be able to provide short notice of impending large cross-border
ILLEGIB
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- Approved For Release 2007/06/27: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601570006-2